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 Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to challenge the entrenched academic consensus that there are no 
opportunities for welfare state expansion in liberal welfare regimes in the face of neo-liberal 
economic ideology and new public management reforms to decision-making.  It does so 
though an examination of social policy expansion in early years education and care (EYEC) 
in England and Canada/Ontario; two liberal welfare states.  This thesis contends that EYEC 
policy, often neglected in comparative welfare literature, is an important social dimension of 
the welfare state which can potentially alter the relationship between the state, parents and 
children.  Utilising a multi-level discursive institutionalist framework the thesis examines the 
processes underlying EYEC policy innovations in the two cases.  Its first major contribution 
is an innovative framework of six competing and contrasting discursive EYEC frames and the 
evidence and expertise pivotal to them.  Though this lens, the thesis identifies common 
institutional reforms that have altered practices of policy making; presenting openings in the 
bureaucratic structure to new forms of expertise and particular EYEC frames.  It also extends 
the analysis above the national context to examine the influence of the OECD as a form of 
ideational pressure and the extent of ideational circulation between the two cases.  In so doing 
this thesis captures complex rather than linear trajectories of development and moments of 
convergence and divergence between the two cases.  This thesis finds that in both cases a 
multiplicity of competing frames and ‘evidence-based’ forms of policy innovation have led to 
strategic incoherence and an unstable basis for the concrete implementation EYEC policy. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A substantial body of current welfare state research is devoted to elucidating the theoretical 
underpinnings and mapping the empirical complexity of welfare state variations in advanced 
democracies (Pierson, 2001; Zeitlin and Trubek, 2003).  It is also the subject of continuing 
political interest, especially as the debate about the welfare state remains dominated by the 
notion of a welfare state crisis (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  Constellations of economic and 
social pressures, processes of globalisation combined with the influence of neo-liberal ideas 
are said to be putting existing welfare states under threat (King, 1999).  In addition, a whole 
host of endogenous forces associated with post-industrialism, demographic changes and 
welfare state maturation lead authors to suggest that ‘old’ welfare states seem unresponsive to 
new social demands (Bonoli, 2005; Hacker, 2004).   
 
Over recent years, historical institutionalist welfare state research has predominantly been 
concerned with whether these institutions and policies could endure ‘permanent austerity’ or 
the pressures of retrenchment would inevitably lead to their being substantially undercut 
(Pierson, 2001; Pierson, 2006).  There is a general consensus that the institutional structure of 
liberal welfares states are particularly vulnerable to these post-industrial pressures and as 
these policy trajectories are considered to crystallise around a path-dependent logic of 
ordering, future policy will be likely to be driven by cost-containment and retrenchment 
efforts (Iversen and Wren, 1998).  With very few exceptions, these approaches suggest that 
liberal welfare states are the last place that we would expect to see novelty, innovations or 
expansions in social policy and especially those that do not appear to conform to its pre-
existing welfare trajectory.  Yet recent developments suggest that the fate of liberal welfare 
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states is not sealed.  Certain new policy developments and budgetary commitments have 
arisen in this seemingly hostile environment.   
 
Against this background, my research started from one basic question; how are we to make 
sense of the emergence of new policy discourses and the apparent expansion of social policy, 
including the commitment of significant new resources to it?  I have called this the puzzle of 
‘expansion despite permanent austerity’.  In spite of significant purported constraints, we find 
evidence of new discourses, policy and resources devoted to early years education and care 
(EYEC) policies in several states.  The present project has been designed to address just this 
puzzle.  Using a comparative design, two ‘unlikely’ cases for expansion despite permanent 
austerity - England1 and Ontario/Canada – are analysed in some detail (see chapters 2-5).  
England and Canada serve as interesting comparative cases and will add to existing welfare 
state literature as they have not, as yet, been systematically studied in this particular policy 
area.   
 
In designing and conducting my research, I have found that I have had to address a number of 
further issues in addition to the primary concern with social policy expansion despite 
permanent austerity.  Two require some discussion here.  First, it is surely true that part of the 
explanation of the emergence of EYEC on the policy agenda is broadly related to social-
structural changes – including general processes of change in gender roles and more 
particularly to the growth of involvement of mothers in formal employment.  However, there 
are differences in the extent and timing of changes in these aspects of the social structures of 
                                               
1
 Note that note that EYEC provision has been the subject of devolved control elsewhere in the UK, an issue that 
I do not have the space to address 
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my two cases.  Thus, while the earlier growth of female labour force participation in 
Ontario/Canada may have helped to trigger the emergence of a more significant and earlier 
feminist advocacy for childcare rooted in an equality perspective, from the early 1970s, these 
differences give me relatively little grip on more recent patterns of similarity and difference 
across the cases.  Moreover, prior to expansion in EYEC, both case countries had high female 
(and maternal) labour force participation, which reduces the salience of an alternative 
economic rationale for developing these policies.   
 
Second, in the context of previously low levels of public policy concern with and limited 
public investment in EYEC, the growth of women’s participation in formal employment has 
increased the stresses placed on parents – and particularly on mothers – and also, arguably the 
‘problem load’ on various aspects of state policy.  However, it is not accurate to characterise 
these problems as a ‘crisis’, ‘critical moment’ or an ‘exogenous shock’, in the sense of these 
concepts that is usually deployed within Historical Institutionalist theory when accounting for 
(the rare occurrence of) ‘path-breaking’ policy change.  This combination of factors poses a 
supplementary ‘puzzle’ for the present analysis: how are we to make sense of (what may be 
understood as) significant change and policy innovation in the absence of a ‘crisis’?   
 
Taking change as the key issue, this thesis contributes to addressing these important questions 
by focusing primarily on change at the level of policy discourse and ideas.  As should already 
be clear, this is not because I argue that discourse can account fully for the changes I map and 
analyse here, but it does provide an important part of such an explanation.  In addition, the 
mapping of discourses and discursive change provides a ‘way in’ to making sense of the 
puzzles I have identified.  Chapter one contributes to my analysis – and to the literature on 
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EYEC as well as wider discussions of welfare state change – by elaborating six ways in which 
EYEC policy has been discursively ‘framed’.  These are the maternal care, social engineering, 
educative, equal opportunities, neuroscience, and child-centred frames.  This thesis takes the 
novel approach of analysing the extensive bodies of expertise and evidence which have 
supported and/or constructed distinctive EYEC frames.   
 
The following four chapters deal with the experiences of England and Ontario/Canada, 
featuring a chapter each addressing the historical background (and periods of relative 
institutional and policy stability) and a chapter addressing more recent changes, in which 
significant phases of policy innovation have occurred.  In these chapters I wish to explain how 
particular expert EYEC frames have produced multiple discursive opportunities to paths of 
(policy) action and complex trajectories of policy development.  I am particularly concerned 
with the ways in which particular (or multiple) frames have gained (or lost) ascendance 
through a dynamic interplay with the (evolving) practices of policy making and the ways in 
which these processes open and close down opportunities for external EYEC experts and 
actors and facilitate (or constrain) policy innovation.  In so doing, this thesis will capture 
complex (as opposed to linear) trajectories of development through the case studies.  It will 
also show the similar but distinctive, framing, patterns of policy developments and moments 
of convergence and divergence between the two cases.  
 
In accounting for ongoing policy change and moments of apparent convergence within the 
two case studies, I have also extended the methodological scope of most existing historical 
institutionalist frameworks which often presume that national welfare states (or particular) 
regimes are presumed closed to transnational influences.  In so doing this thesis aims to 
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reinstate a greater level of contingency into welfare state analysis and fully account for the 
range of discursive influence in EYEC policy at the national level.  Chapter six will assess the 
possibilities for ideational circulation (in EYEC ideas) between the two cases.  This focus on 
the circulation of ideas – and the existence of similar frames in both of my cases (although the 
frames do combine in different ways in each of them) – merits closer attention.  Its first major 
section addresses the theoretical and conceptual literature on how the circulation of ideas 
impacts on public policy.  My research into the England – and especially – into 
Ontario/Canada has revealed that a particular organisation – the OECD – has had some 
impact and interestingly as a progressive force.  Studying the OECD in this aspect, 
contributes to the wider literature on political economy and the welfare state tends to depict 
the OECD as a proponent of neoliberalism, including welfare residualisation.  For all these 
reasons, the second part of chapter six explores the role of the OECD in relation to EYEC 
policies, both as something of an international analogue of my comparative argument for 
England and Ontairo/Canada and as an influence on these two cases.   
 
This thesis has drawn its analysis through extensive documentary analysis and interviews with 
elite actors, including external experts and advocates for EYEC (working at the national and 
international levels) and also government actors (at various levels) who have worked on the 
implementation of EYEC policy in England and Canada.  For a list of interviews, please refer 
to the bibliography. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: FRAMES, RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE: THE MANY 
DISCOURSES OF ‘EARLY YEARS’ AND ‘CHILDCARE’ 
 
Within academic and policy-making circles, debates over childcare and, more recently, 
policies of early education and care have often revolved around disagreements over the 
underlying meaning and definition of these policies: put simply, what childcare is for and for 
whom.  Underpinning these various policy frames of ‘early years education and care’ (EYEC) 
are particular discourses of ‘care’ and ‘education’ and each has an attending body of expertise 
and evidence.  Indeed, whilst EYEC policies can often incite highly emotive debates in 
political and academic communities, it is also an area which has called into use a broad canon 
of expertise including the work of developmental psychologists, education experts, feminists, 
epidemiologists and (latterly) neurologists and economists.  It is not often explicitly or clearly 
noted, but this expertise and evidence has been influential in defining broader political and 
public debates on EYEC2.   Moreover, developments in EYEC research, evidence and ideas 
have, over time, helped to support, given legitimacy to and, in some cases, created new 
distinct discursive EYEC frames.  These different ways of conceptualising early years and 
childcare; containing both normative ideas and more prescriptive elements within EYEC 
frames, have led to complex policy trajectories in both England and Canada, as will be 
described in latter chapters.  This chapter aims to shed light on the discursive processes and 
agential action which have created different policy frames of EYEC.   By explaining the kinds 
                                               
2
 For a discussion of how ECEC can be framed in order to gain public support for childcare see Mahon in 
Wincott, 2006, p.290 (and also Friendly and Lero, 2002: p.5.). Wincott outlines Mahon’s five frames: poverty 
alleviation; female labour force participation; promoting gender equality; investment in human capital; 
contributing to class/racial equality.  In this chapter I wish to explain how evidence and expertise have created 
different discursive frames and how these have produced complex multiple discursive opportunities to paths of 
(policy) action.   
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of expertise, research projects and broader ideas which have formed distinct discursive ‘hubs’ 
I hope to show how different EYEC policy frames have, over time, concretised around these 
sets of ‘anchoring ideas’ and by virtue of the work of actors and institutions (both external 
and more closely linked to the governments of England and Canada) who endeavour to 
develop, champion and disseminate them. 
 
This subject of this chapter is to map six main EYEC frames (Maternal Care frame; Social 
Engineering Frame; Educative Frame; Equal Opportunities Frame; Neuroscience Frame; 
Child-Centred Frame), their roots in different bodies of expertise and evidence and the actors 
and institutions which have been pivotal in communicating them.  These frames have been 
identified during the course of my empirical research into early years policies.   Having 
interviewed external academics and advocates who have been significant in articulating the 
need for early years policies during the 1980s and 1990s and also the state actors involved in 
developing policy, it has become clear that there is a discursive instability within England and 
Canada’s EYEC policies.  This is made manifest in the shifting meanings and perceptions of 
state actors, the often contradictory elements of policy coexisting together and the (sometimes 
sharply) changing policy trajectories in both countries.  Thus, understanding the discursive 
construction of early years policies and the evidence and expertise informing them becomes 
important, as EYEC frames are actively employed and deployed, externally and internally 
within policy making arenas.  Externally, various EYEC frames have been championed and 
disseminated at both national and international levels; through advocates, academics and 
international organisations.  Such actors use frames as ‘strategically crafted sets of arguments’ 
(Fischer, 2003), which aim to persuade and convince policy makers of the need to reform and 
to promote specific policy alternatives.  Internally, policy makers have often relied on this 
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external expertise to give credibility to their policy choices and they have been utilised as 
weapons within inter-departmental (and federal/provincial) disputes3.  In many ways, the very 
existence of multiple EYEC frames and their constituent discursive elements have created a 
wide spectrum of resonance with different civil and political actors but also a tendency 
towards division between those wedded to a particular EYEC frame.  Ultimately, and as will 
be shown in subsequent chapters, the particular EYEC frame (or frames) being subscribed to 
by policy actors materialise as qualitatively different types of early years policies on the 
ground; allowing for radically different types of services and starkly differing levels of 
quality.  Hence, Fischer argues, “ideas thus move to the centre of policy evaluation.  As 
fundamental media of all political conflicts; they make possible the shared meanings and 
assumptions that motivate people to action and wield individual striving into collective 
causes… a constant struggle over the very ideas that guide the ways citizens and policy 
analysts think and behave…[defining] the boundaries of political categories and the criteria of 
classification – the politics of criteria” (2003: 24.).  This chapter seeks to show that how 
evidence and expertise creates discursive ‘hubs’ around which actors can mobilise their 
activities and opens up spaces (both discursive and material) to action.    
 
This chapter will be organised as follows.  Firstly it will discuss the main EYEC frames, 
mentioned above.  The frames I will outline are not intended to be exhaustive studies of all 
evidence and expertise that could be identified with particular frames, nor do they necessarily 
apply to both Canada and the UK.  These frames are stylised heuristics or ‘ideal types’ which 
                                               
3
 Interviews with Margaret Hodge, former Minister of State for Children (Department for Education and Skills) 
(2006) from the UK; and Lynne Westlake, Special Policy Advisor from Human Resources and Social 
Development Canada.   This chapter is primarily focused on the history of early years and childcare expertise 
and the external academics and advocates involved in creating EYEC frames.   
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highlight the common discursive elements which bind pieces of evidence and research on 
early years and childcare.  As Hall argues, “any attempt to specify the conditions under which 
ideas acquire political influence inevitably teeters on the brink of reductionism, while the 
failure to make such attempt leaves a large lacuna at the centre of out understanding of public 
policy” (1993, cited in Rich, 2004: 8).  The aim is to simply give an illustrative account of 
common discursive threads and the waves of EYEC research and expertise which have arisen, 
over time, to inform particular rationalisations for state investment in EYEC or to inform a 
particular policy model.  This will be especially useful when discussing the utilisation of 
multiple discursive frames and subsequent ‘discursive slippage’ that occurs both in policy 
documents and through the conceptions of state actors.   
 
1.1 Maternal Care Frame 
 
A ‘maternal care frame’ views ideas about early years education with suspicion.  It instead 
prioritises ideas about care and especially, mothers care.  It draws on a pro-maternalist 
discourse, which views the ideal care arrangement for young children (especially those under 
three) as full time mother care, ideally performed at home (Kremer, 2006: 264.).   Hence, 
within this frame, the function of state regarding childcare is limited to catering for those 
children seriously ‘at risk’ whose mothers have ‘failed’ in their maternal duties.  Moreover, 
wherever possible, forms of childcare should try to emulate a domestic setting4.  State 
childcare, in this case, is for the welfare of the child and it is the choice of last resort: lone 
parents who have no option but to go out to work, are ill, incapable of giving children the care 
                                               
4
 Often the child care from family members, friends, nannies or childminders.  Implicitly this is a private matter, 
as this frame views state interference into child rearing matters an invasion of privacy and indeed condoning 
policies which may induce women to leave their maternal roles.  
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they need or for whom day care might prevent the breakdown of the mother or break-up of the 
family (Randall, 2000: 61.).  In terms of the policies that this pro-maternalist discourse 
promotes, childcare places at state nurseries should be restricted to those with no other option 
and the eligibility is to be tightly restricted so as to prevent those without the most desperate 
of situations from accessing them.  In the years before World War I and post World War II 5, 
the pro-maternalist discourse was an ideal that became hegemonic in many welfare states, 
although it disappeared quickly in some Scandinavian countries after the 1950s (Kremer, 
2006: 264.).  Originally, during the first decades of the twentieth century, eugenic and neo-
hygienist arguments were dominant sets of expertise that informed and reinforced the 
ascendancy of a pro-maternalist discourse.  This expertise was directed to ensuring that 
mothers kept their children clean and well nourished (Penn, 1999: 3.).  In contrast, nurseries 
were considered sites of infection and there were particular health concerns around group 
care.  Such issues were reflected in the UK by the Committee of the Medical Women’s 
Federation, which concluded from two surveys of nursery children, carried out in 1944-5 that 
‘the outstanding fact is the constant and considerable increase of respiratory tract infection’ 
(Randall, 2000: 39.).  Traditional ideas of the nuclear family reinforced these ideas in the UK 
and Canada.  Even the National Council of Women of Canada (NCWC), who were 
supposedly pro-equal opportunities argued ‘As women, we want to live in a Canada in which 
                                               
5
 For a discussion of the World War years and the establishment of the War Nurseries, albeit temporary as they 
were precipitated by acute labour shortages and fiercely resisted by the Ministry of Health, see Randall, 2000.   
These nurseries were quickly wound up after the war, the Exchequer grant available for nurseries was halved and 
responsibility for them was devolved to local authorities and buildings that had been requisitioned, returned 
(p.39.).  Similarly in Canada, World War II resulted in labour shortage which Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
responded to with the Dominion-Provincial Wartime Day Nurseries Agreements which committed the federal 
government to share with the provinces the costs of creating child care centres for mothers working in war 
related industries.  This funding was withdrawn by Ottawa in 1945 and many of the centres created in Ontario 
closed down (see Kershaw, 2005: 76.).   
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we can raise our children in our own homes and in the schools of our choice, not in public 
institutions under the guidance of the state’ (Finkel, 2006: 201.).   
 
However, the most influential set of expertise to influence and reinforce a maternalist 
discourse of childcare was a ‘new psychology’ (sometimes referred to as Depth Psychology) 
developed during the forties, which Nikolas Rose defines as ‘a group of English doctors and 
psychologists, many engaged in therapeutic work, who, whilst recognising the revolutionary 
discoveries of Freud, sought to dispense with the central concepts of his system and combine 
the remainder with theories drawn from other domains’ (Hendrick, 1994: 164.).  In this 
science ‘character’ was the product of ‘instincts’ that required to be channelled in order to 
produce a ‘normal’ child (ibid.).  Thus the emotional condition of children - not just their 
health - became important to experts advising the UK government.  In particular, experts 
honed in on the emotional environment of the family; specifically, the consequences of the 
separation of the parent (especially mothers) and the child for future development and to 
avoid delinquency.  The idea, closely associated with John Bowlby, Director of Child 
Guidance at the Tavistock Clinic, and known as maternal deprivation, was popularised in his 
seminal study, Maternal Care and Mental Health (1951) (Hendrick, 1994: 219.).  Bowlby 
constructed an ethological theory which asserted the biological basis of early emotional 
attachments.  He argued that both mother and baby were genetically programmed to seek 
contact with one another.  From this a deep emotional bond was thought to develop which (if 
broken by even brief separation) led to serious distress for both child and mother (Ball, 1994: 
12.).   This has provided an apparently scientific basis for popular views, such as ‘the 
mother’s place is in the home’ or ‘childcare and early learning that separates children from the 
mother may be harmful’ (ibid.).    
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Simplified versions of this thesis have conditioned policy makers during the post-war years, 
who have also been able to avoid developing nursery provision by capitalising on the 
Bowlby-induced state of guilt amongst mothers.  In the UK where this expertise was 
interpreted most conservatively, mothers were discouraged from working and placement of 
babies in nurseries was heavily discouraged, save for those children severely ‘at risk’6.  
Evidence of this frame in operation can be found in the UK Plowden report: ‘it is generally 
undesirable, except to prevent a greater evil, to separate mother and child for a whole day in a 
nursery… it is no business of the education service to encourage these [working mothers]’. 
(CASE, 1967, cited in Browne, 1996: 372.).   Under this frame, childminders are acceptable 
forms of childcare for those seeking work (though it is clearly less than ideal), as these 
emulate as closely as possible ‘a domestic setting’ and a ‘mother replacement’.  As the 
maternal care frame is hostile to state ‘institutional’ intervention it may favour private or 
voluntary sessional EYEC such as playgroups, so supplement the primary care role of the 
mother.    
 
Although the maternal deprivation thesis has been widely challenged in the academic 
community and especially by those working in the education field, a ‘maternal care frame’, 
based on the notion that childcare is damaging to children (especially in the very early years) 
and hence maternal care should be instead promoted, persists in policy discussions.  In terms 
of research, ideas of ‘parental warmth’ in parent-child relationships which benefit subsequent 
                                               
6
 In Canada, there was a similar concern that group care was ‘over stimulating’ for children and that a mother’s 
care was best, during the 1950s.  The recommended alternative to parental care for young children was foster 
care with a “day-time mother”, according to the Graduate Nurses Association (Prochner, 2000: 55.).  Daycare 
was also often viewed as being a precipitator of juvenile delinquency (see Finkel, 2006: 209.).   
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cognitive and behavioural outcomes continue to feed negative perceptions of childcare.  As 
Brennen and Moss suggest, the rationale has shifted towards ‘mothers as unfolders of their 
children’s cognitive capacities’, rather than simply preventing delinquency and mental 
disturbance in children (Randall, 1995: 343.).  Bretherton (1985) argues that ‘children who 
have a secure sense of attachment particularly as infants, subsequently approach cognitive 
tasks in ways conducive to cognitive development… more curiosity, persistence and 
enthusiasm and less frustration than less securely attached infants’ (cited in Feinstein, 
Duckworth and Sabates, 2004: 24.).  Even into the late 1990s, Masten and Coatsworth (1998), 
have suggested that children, whose interactions with their mothers are warm and involved, 
are more likely to be competent and less likely to exhibit problems than children without such 
positive parental interactions (ibid.).   
 
In Canada, social conservative advocates such as R.E.A.L women (Real, Equal and Active for 
Life), have been prominent in policy debates since the 1980s 7 and actively pursue a ‘maternal 
care frame’ for EYEC.  As a group supporting traditional gender roles, R.E.A.L women 
(2001) argue that ‘women should have a genuine choice, financially and socially, to remain at 
home as full-time mothers, if they choose, especially when their children are young (Kershaw, 
2005: 60.).  As the R.E.A.L women’s position paper on childcare states ‘Real Women of 
Canada does not support the concept of universally available, government subsidized day 
care.  Universal day care is an imposed government plan of institutional care for children.  
Studies show that for young children, the family setting is usually preferable’ (2008).  Similar 
debates in the media have emphasised a maternal care frame (and indeed in some instances 
                                               
7
 And particularly active at a conference I attended whilst undertaking fieldwork in Canada, Securing the Future 
for Our Children, 26th October 2006.  It was a common occurrence, according to other attendees for R.E.A.L 
women to attend and demonstrate at childcare conferences.   
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sought to perpetuate it), through selective reporting of research evidence which states that 
childcare is harmful to children.  For example, the recent reporting of the first findings from a 
longitudinal study by Leach, Sylva and Stein, A prospective study of the effects of different 
kinds of care on children's development in the first five years (1998-ongoing) in The Times 
stressed that ‘mother’s care is best for the first three years… children cared for by anyone 
other than their mothers tended to show higher levels of aggression or were inclined to 
become more withdrawn, compliant and unhappy’ (Bale, 2005).  The issue of quality and 
conversely the numerous problems with low-quality private EYEC that the report summary 
clearly states is a factor in outcomes8 is not clearly addressed in the same way as a similar 
Guardian article which states “it highlighted a demand for developmentally appropriate high-
quality childcare” (Press Association, 2005).  It highlights the implicit favouring of maternal 
care.   
 
A maternal care frame will thus seek to include measures to promote and facilitate mothers 
care of young children.  Extensions to maternity leave and other cash benefits to support 
women (or in some cases fathers) to look after children are prioritised in policy discussions.  
It encourages the development of voluntary and part-time supplements to maternal care such 
as playgroups and mother and toddler groups.  For those requiring childcare, 
childminders/nannies are favoured, so as to emulate domestic settings as near as possible.   In 
the worst case scenario, where children are ‘at risk’ as defined above, ‘welfare’ nurseries will 
suffice as a substitute for maternal care, linking together social services and health for the 
                                               
8
 See the detailed research report on the FCCC website: 
http://www.familieschildrenchildcare.org/fccc_frames_home.html 
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protection of the child9.  Being sceptical of the effects of full-time group care and prioritising 
policies which preserve maternal/parental care this policy frame does not specify levels of 
quality (in terms of educational benefits or the holistic socialisation of children.).  In the same 
way it eschews different policy debates over how to deliver the service (ie through 
supply/demand financing10, or particularly in Canada, ‘for profit’ versus ‘non-profit’).   It is 
assumed that primary maternal care is the best for developing both emotional and intellectual 
capabilities. 
 
1.2 Social Engineering Frame 
 
A social engineering frame seeks to utilise EYEC programmes to ameliorate social and 
educational disadvantage and intergenerational transmissions of poverty for children at risk.  
Here, it is important to note that risk is defined differently to conceptions of risk as outlined in 
a maternal care frame.  The maternal frame implicitly favours maternal care as the basis of 
secure attachment and cognitive outcomes and hence risk is primarily for those children 
thought to be at a high risk of emotional disturbance (though suboptimal familial care).  
Conceptions of risk in a social engineering frame are defined in much broader terms of 
disadvantage; in categories of socioeconomic, health and psychosocial deficiency.  These 
multiple conceptions of risk can be broadly categorised into two, environmental and physical.  
                                               
9
 As Bruner (1980) argues ‘welfare nurseries’ were originally aimed at raising the working-class child from the 
conditions of the slum, dedicated to intellectual, practical and social skills: to save the would-be delinquent from 
the ravages of his broken home (p.17.).  In middle class versions there were no likewise questions.   
10
 In fact maternal frame advocates would argue that childcare benefits paid through the tax and benefit system 
undermine the family unit by encouraging women to seek work, or in some cases inducing poor women to leave 
their primary caring role.  Moreover that it unfairly penalises the ‘stay at home mom’ (insight from interview 
with Peter Nicholson, 2006.).    
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In terms of environmental risk, low parental income/socioeconomic occupation, low parental 
education level, or suboptimal psychosocial home environments (existing contact with social 
services, mental health problems, young mothers) are considered to be disadvantageous for 
normal child development (Hertzman and Wiens, 1996: 1088.).   In the second, physical 
conception, high risk status is due to low birth weight, prematurity or malnutrition of the 
infant (ibid.)11.  It is those children and families from the former, environmental (usually 
socioeconomic) categories (or multiple categories) of profiled risk that are particularly 
targeted for state intervention and EYEC services.  For the most part, middle class families 
are considered to create optimal environments for children’s development and as such there is 
no case for state intervention for populations outside the ‘target’ groups.  As the social 
engineering frame takes a broad view of risk groups and potential elements of risk for the 
individual child (or at least broader than the maternal care frame), these forms of disadvantage 
require similarly broad intervention programmes.  Thus the EYEC services which this frame 
seeks to promote include a range of parental programmes to support effective parenting, 
health and nutrition and pre-school programmes for young children.   
 
The rationale for developing intervention services under a social engineering frame differ 
significantly from other frames by articulating justifications for state intervention and 
investment in terms of the ‘public interest’ and macro social gains as opposed to simply 
benefits for the individual child (Friendly, 2000).  By intervening early with EYEC services, 
proponents of this frame posit that targeted children may show improved socio-cognitive 
functioning over time; they may have better school results and hence a better ability to 
                                               
11
 It is not necessarily the case that those suffering from low birth weight or prematurity will necessarily come 
from a mother in low socio-economic class.   
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compete in the labour market; they may be less likely to have a teenage pregnancy; they may 
be less prone to delinquency and imprisonment; they may have reduced likelihood of 
requiring social services and other forms of remedial interventions (Parton and Pugh, 1999: 
230; Pugh, 2005: 1.).  In this way, by altering the potential life-course trajectory of the 
targeted children for the better, society will concurrently gain from more educated and 
responsible citizens, reduced crime, reductions in poverty and all the associated future state 
costs that dealing with ‘social problems’ entail (such as prison spaces, remedial education 
programmes, social benefits and other welfare services).  Thus this frame explicitly views 
EYEC services as a means to a greater end; it argues that poverty, social disadvantage and 
social problems can be ‘engineered’ away through specific targeted interventions.   
 
This frame is strongly associated with research that originates in the USA.  In particular, two 
well known intervention projects, Head Start and The Perry High/Scope Project have formed 
the ideational and research base of the social engineering frame since their creation in the 
1960s.  Penn and others argue that these EYEC services operate within a particular paradigm 
that assumes that ‘within a private childcare market, publically funded pre-school 
interventions are only appropriate for highly targeted, low income families’ (Penn, 2005: 2.).  
However, the received wisdom of American individualism and attendant residual forms of 
welfare preclude a more complex understanding of the nuances of earlier welfare 
interventions and historical trajectories.  It is often easy to be conditioned by America’s 
current neoliberal paradigm and arch-typical ‘liberal’ welfare regime and hence view past 
reform efforts from within this paradigm.  Yet, the roots of these reforms and, consequently, 
the development of a ‘social engineering’ frame are formed from a specific historical thread 
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of American concern for mothers and their children12.  Indeed the early development of 
(female led) Children’s Bureau in 1912 began to investigate and find strong associations 
between socioeconomic factors and infant and maternal deaths, launching the beginning of a 
research agenda linking social inequalities and health outcomes (Shonkoff, 2000: 34).   
 
The origins of Project Head Start, which was set up in 1965, can be found, in part, within this 
earlier investigative tradition linking socioeconomic factors with future outcomes.  However, 
by the 1960s, Federal and Presidential concern about inequalities in infant and maternal health 
had broadened into a wider concern regarding levels of poverty in affluent America and the 
environmental and institutional factors that precipitated this poverty.  Kuntz describes this 
attention to poverty and the belief that it could be eliminated as a product of American 
optimism, fuelled by a sense amongst the public that it was immoral to accept poverty in the 
midst of a rich country such as America (1998: 5.).  Indeed economists of the time made bold 
declarations; “We can abolish poverty in America in ten years” and “The elimination of 
poverty is well within the means of Federal, state and local governments” (ibid.).    
 
During the same period of time, ideas about the nature of development were being reassessed 
and this in turn fuelled academic optimism about the ability to change social structures.  
Psychologists were becoming increasingly critical of the Progressive Era beliefs that a child’s 
development was predetermined by genetics and research findings were highlighting the 
importance of early experiences in later development and abilities.  Hence intelligence was no 
longer perceived as fixed but as something that could be improved and built upon (Evangelou 
and Sylva, 2003: 30.).   As such, many researchers started to pay more and more attention to 
                                               
12
 For an extensive discussion see Skocpol, 1993.   
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environmental factors and their effects on child outcomes.  They sought to explain why 
children from economically disadvantaged families failed in school more often than children 
from economically privileged families (Prochner, 2000: 98.).  Such a question could lead 
research down a path of looking at broad macro environmental conditions (broad social 
structures) and the conditioning effect on individual outcomes.  Such investigative endeavours 
would presumably seek to challenge and alter these broad structures.  However, one strand of 
research and of particular relevance to the development of a social engineering frame would 
instead start to link environmental factors at the micro level (individual child/family) on the 
macro societal outcome of poverty and social inequality.  Important in this respect was J 
McVivker Hunt, popularising ideas which linked child development to environmental factors 
and subsequent poverty (ibid: 99.).   He hypothesised that a lack of ‘cultural preparation’ 
perpetuated cycles of poverty.  His research proposed that there are certain periods in a child’s 
life when specific experiences are necessary for optimal development and that exposure to 
middle class codes of behaviour, learning styles and expectations were beneficial to child 
development.  In contrast he assumed that poor parents did not have sufficient ability or 
wherewithal to prepare their children for school.  This would ultimately lead to school failure, 
future unemployment, poverty and a similar ‘culturally deprived’ environment for the 
subsequent generation (ibid; Halpern, 2000: 364.).  The solution to these disadvantageous 
micro-level environmental conditions for children was a similar micro solution: to create a 
variety of intervention programmes for children and parents, designed to overcome the 
influence of culturally and economically impoverished homes (Procher, 2000: 227.).  These 
kinds of ideas became influential in the newly created Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) which had been tasked with the eradication of poverty in the United States (Kuntz, 
1998: 2.).    
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The OEO had been given the flexibility to create a variety of approaches, including funds to 
create community action programmes.  However fighting poverty in areas which were 
profiled to be high risk of ‘cultural deprivation’ (disadvantaged, inner city, African American 
children, as well as impoverished rural communities) was politically contentious (Halpern, 
2000: 364.).   The OEO decided that a programme which focused on pre-school children 
could take advantage of prevailing biases towards protecting children and hence would be 
attractive to even the most conservative constituencies and circumvent the more contentious 
issues, especially the issue of targeting specific racial groups.   
 
The OEO tasked experts in the field, including Robert Cooke, Jerome Bruner and Urie 
Bronfenbrenner to devise a programme to prepare poor children for school; to take care of 
their nutrition and health problems; to give them books and toys; to give them a head start on 
their education (Kuntz, 1998: 6.).   The result was a comprehensive programme including 
health services, nutrition, community development activities, and parenting (to teach games 
and activities that enhance cognitive development of children), surrounding a core of 
preschool education for three and four year olds (Evangelou and Sylva, 2003: 30.  The 
advisors had recommended a small pilot programme for these interventions which could test 
the effectiveness of the programmes.  However politics dictated a much more dramatic 
gesture and Head Start was launched as an eight-week summer programme for nearly half a 
million children.  The difficulties with stimulating communities into action and the speed 
required for training teachers working in the pre-school education programmes did present 
problems of quality and these problems were exacerbated when Head Start was extended to a 
ten month programme after the first two summer programmes (Halpern, 2000: 364.).  Yet 
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Head Start was extremely popular.  The OEO’s hunch that a programme for children would 
be supported by a wide constituency base was entirely correct.  Even during particularly 
austere times for social spending, a poll reported in Newsweek (2 February 1987) showed that 
75% of American’s would be willing to increase their tax payments by $50 a year in order to 
support Head Start Programmes (Browne, 1996: 369.).  Latent ideas of child vulnerability that 
had their roots in earlier reforms may go some way to explaining how Head Start survived 
when other areas of welfare became highly punitive towards mothers and consequently their 
children.  Nevertheless, the EYEC services that Project Head Start created were specifically 
intended to break cycles of poverty and as such research investigating the effectiveness of 
these interventions was a crucial facet of this particular frame of EYEC intervention.  Unlike 
other EYEC frames, justifications for policy intervention are based on broader social benefits 
and these must be demonstrated.   
 
The initial waves of evaluation and research on the effects of Project Head Start were mixed.  
This was partly due to the complexity of measuring a programme which had experimented 
with community-based models of intervention, leading to a highly diverse set of programmes 
and it was partly due to the uncomplicated methods with which the first waves of 
investigation chose to model them.  A simple input/output model was used in the early studies 
measuring Head Start’s impact.  IQ or attainment test scores of pre-school ‘graduates’ were 
compared to test scores of control children who had no pre-school experience (Slyva, 1994: 
84.).  They found that children’s early IQ gains from the project quickly deteriorated, leaving 
Head Start graduates no different from the control group.  Evangelou and Sylva argue that 
these pieces of research that sought to demonstrate effectiveness simply on the basis of 
quantifiable intelligence measures seriously underestimated the effects of the programme 
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(2003: 42.).  Latterly, more rigorous research conducted by Brookes-Gunn and Schnur (1988) 
compared the outcomes of 969 disadvantaged children who had experienced three different 
pre-school environments: Head Start, other pre-school programmes and no pre-school (Sylva, 
1994: 86.).  The study controlled for Head Start children’s lower initial outcomes on social 
and cognitive functioning (readiness for school) and measured the net gain against children in 
the other groups.  They found that Head Start children made larger gains on social and 
cognitive functioning than similar peers (and especially large gains were made by black 
children, above and beyond their white peers).  However, the programme could not 
completely close the gap between those who had more advantageous beginnings (ibid.).   
 
The research and evaluation of Head Start have thus, overall, been considered disappointing.  
However, the US federal government retains a strong normative attachment to the programme 
and support its rhetoric of poverty alleviation.  In many ways the rhetoric of a functioning 
poverty alleviation scheme for children (despite limited evidence to its actual efficacy) works 
as a powerful discourse against broader neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies which 
seek to limit social assistance given to those families (but mainly parents) who have become 
locked into inter-generational cycles of poverty and ‘welfare dependency’.   
  
The Perry Pre-School project run by the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation is the 
most often cited study by those wishing to advance a social engineering frame for EYEC.  
The High/Scope Foundation was set up as an independent, non-profit research, development, 
training and public policy organisation and the ‘High/Scope’ pre-school curriculum it 
developed was employed within some Head Start Programmes (Evalengou and Sylva, 2003: 
31.).  The operation of the High/Scope Perry Pre-school Program was similar to that of other 
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Head Start programmes due to its focus on high risk children and including parental 
involvement; however it focused on children aged between three and six only (without 
parental and early years health services).  It can be considered a higher quality programme 
than many other Head Start programmes by virtue of a sophisticated curriculum based on 
Piagetian13 learning theory and well trained staff (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 46.).  Unlike 
Head Start, High/Scope research and evaluation has produced more powerful empirical 
evidence in support of a social engineering frame.   
 
The High/Scope programme ran from 1962 through 1967, which consisted of two and a half 
hour, five days a week, centre based programme for 30 weeks each year, supplemented by 90 
minute weekly teacher visits (ibid; Schweinhart and Weikart, 1994: 101.).  From the outset, 
the programme operated as a demonstration project with an evaluation strand.  The 
High/Scope Perry Preschool Study examined the lives of 123 African Americans born into 
poverty and at high risk of failing in school (Schweinhart, 2003: 2.)14.  At ages 3 and 4, the 
researchers divided these individuals into a group who received the High/Scope programme 
(treatment group) and those who received no pre-school programme (control group).  Data 
was collected on both groups annually from ages 3 through 11 and at ages 14, 15, 19, 27 and 
more recently 39-41 (ibid.).  As such, this is a small scale but carefully controlled longitudinal 
                                               
13
 This learning theory views children as active learners, with structure emanating from its sequence of ‘plan-do-
review’ approach for children’s daily activities.  It seeks to encourage the unique differences in children and 
claims to develop their self confidence by building on what they can do.  Children are encouraged to become 
decision-makers and problem solvers: who can plan, initiate and reflect on their work (Evangelou and Sylva, 
2003: 31.).     
14
 Here referral for High/Scope was based upon low socio-economic status, low scores for parents’ years of 
schooling, parents occupational levels and rooms per person in their households.  They also selected children 
based upon their IQ (on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test) who were in the range of 75-85 (Schweinhart, 
2003: 2-3.).   
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study which has sought to identify the economic and social benefits and the sustained 
academic gains from a high quality curriculum and intervention programme.  In this way, the 
High/Scope research has sought to demonstrate the dual benefits of EYEC intervention: micro 
level individual gains and macro level social benefits.  The research has compiled 
comprehensive data on demographic characteristics, test performance throughout childhood 
and adolescence, school success, crime, socioeconomic success and personal development 
(ibid: 4.).    
 
The evaluators initially focused on micro level gains at the level of individual IQ scores, 
charted over time.  They found statistically significant effects on IQ during and up to a year 
after the program, but not after that (Schweinhart, 2005: 16.).  In part, tracking originally 
educationally disadvantaged children with intelligence IQ tests for age specific cohorts, 
underestimated their net gains (ibid.).  Many critics of the time thus wrote off the programme 
as the effects of High/Scope were simply ‘washed out’ by the time these children entered the 
public school system.  However the outcomes of further longitudinal study of individual life-
trajectories, published in 1993, were much more significant and created a renewed excitement 
around the benefits of a pre-school education or kindergarten (Schweinhart, Barnes and 
Weikart, 1993).  As Sylva argues, the researchers found that in their initial study, simple IQ 
measures could not capture the overall benefits of EYEC programmes which would appear in 
‘life skills’, social and economic outcomes (which revealed themselves much further along in 
the lifetime trajectory) rather than in tests of formal intelligence (1994: 84.).  In their latter 
study, the evaluators found startling differences in high school graduation, employment 
levels, social adjustment, community participation and crime between individuals who 
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attended the programme as pre-schoolers and the control group who remained at home (Sylva 
and Evans, 1999: 280.).  
 
In order to show the macro social benefits that these EYEC interventions created, 
Schweinhart, Barnes and Weikart (1993) carried out a cost benefit analysis of the High/Scope 
programme and found that for every $1,000 that was invested in the pre-school programme, at 
least $7,160 (after adjustment for inflation) had been saved by society (ibid.).  This was based 
upon an average cost of the programme being $14,716 per participant and yielding $105,324 
of public benefits per participant (Schweinhart, 2003: 5.).  Partly, these benefits were 
calculated on the basis of a decrease in welfare expenditure that has arisen as a result of better 
long term outcomes for the targeted children, savings of $3,475 were made in reduced welfare 
costs, $7,488 saved in a reduced need for remedial education services and $10,537 brought in 
by increased taxes paid by programme participants higher earnings (ibid.).  However the 
lion’s share of the benefit or saving to society is the amount that would be notionally saved by 
victims of crime, if the crimes against them had not been committed (Penn, 2005: 1.).  
Schweinhart et al, calculate that $68,584 would be saved by the potential victims of crimes 
never committed, based upon typical in-court and out-of-court settlements for such crimes and 
$15,240 based upon savings in reduced justice system costs (2003: 5.).  This as Penn argues is 
a highly conjectural figure and without an estimate of the costs to the victims of crimes 
(which may only apply to the US criminal justice system) the long-term economic benefits of 
the programme appear to be more marginal (2005: 1.).  Moreover, there is now a great deal of 
criticism (from some quarters) based on the ways in which Afro-American groups and other 
people of colour have been treated in research programmes on child development.  They may 
face particular problems of discrimination in schooling and elsewhere; the high rates of 
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incarceration of black youths in the USA is a particular feature of the criminal justice system 
(ibid: 2.).     
 
The issues with High/Scope may generate problems of generalisability and transferability to 
other national contexts.  However, High/Scope research continues to be used as quantitative 
evidence for a social engineering frame and is cited by those who wish to implement similar 
programmes outside of the USA.  Indeed its findings point towards a conclusion that 
compensatory, targeted programmes make sustained benefits for both society and the 
individual.  Yet, as Hertzman and Wiens succinctly point out, the data on High/Scope can be 
interpreted in two ways (1998: 1087.).  On one side, emphasis can be given to the remarkable 
improvements experienced by the pre-school group in relation to the controls, as is generally 
reported in the press and by government officials.  The alternative viewpoint would 
emphasize the fact that most of the achievements of pre-school group, although impressive 
when compared with the controls, would not nearly match those of middle class children who 
had greater opportunities (ibid.).  Indeed, despite reduced rates of crime and social service 
use, some 7% of the programme participants were arrested or detained at least five times and 
59% had received social services between 17 and 27 years old (ibid.).   
 
It is clear that underlying operative social structures serve to constrain and limit the effects of 
short term compensatory EYEC interventions as prescribed by a social engineering frame.  In 
essence, although individual children may get a significant boost from EYEC services (which 
cast within another frame would become enough to rationalise intervention), they do not 
manage to ‘cure’ broader societal ills such as poverty and sustained social disadvantage.  As 
Kagan and Zigler make clear: 
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‘we cannot simply inoculate children in one year against the ravages of a life of 
deprivation.  Even the champions of early childhood education… have made sobering 
statements warning us not to expect too much while doing too little.  The hard fact is 
there are no educational miracles for the effects of poverty’ (1987, cited in Browne, 1996: 
369.).    
 
However, the social engineering frame side-steps this argument as it promotes EYEC 
intervention on the basis that it will be an effective means to create broader macro gains 
which benefit society at large, whether in terms of civil unrest or economic gains to the public 
purse.  This is perhaps the result of a lack of convincing evidence that these programmes can 
challenge existing social structures creating inequality.  Critics of this particular frame for 
EYEC argue from a position of social justice that the way that compensatory programmes are 
set up - targeting low income or ‘multi-problem families’ - can give rise to stigma and low 
expectations (Penn, 2005: 2.).   This potential ‘unintended effect’ of targeting may be to 
undermine the benefits that these programmes may hope to realise; they may be viewed by 
those ‘chosen’ with hostility and suspicion.  A policy promoting universal coverage, in 
contrast, benefits from being more socially inclusive and non-stigmatising.  Indeed it is a 
difficult rhetorical justification to make intervention and targeting based upon environmental 
risk without implying that such families are in some ways deficient.   
 
Other critics fear that it may actually enable policy-makers to tinker with the social structure 
and appear to be dealing with inequalities (or poverty) whilst in reality managing to avoid 
working on making any radical changes (Browne, 1996: 369.).  That if EYEC is predicated 
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upon being a ‘stand alone’ vaccinatary programme which cures social inequalities, it simply 
does not go far enough unless supported by much broader measures to combat social 
inequality.  Indeed, underlying the social engineering frame is a number of broader questions 
about how to combat social disadvantage.  The research which informs this policy frame and, 
in turn, rationalises intervention for particular individuals and families is profiled through a 
combination of material and social indicators of ‘risk’; thus directing discursively policy 
endeavours towards marginal ‘targeted’ welfare interventions at the individual, micro level.   
Both the Head Start and High/Scope projects took up hypothesised risky sections of society 
(based on the prevailing ideas of Anglo-American developmental psychology and empirical 
sociology) who were considered to be at disadvantage but who could also be considered to be 
in some way deficient in their ability to provide their children with an appropriate base for 
educational and social development.  However, the link between this hypothesized ‘problem’ 
and ‘treatment’ can be considered under theorised, indeed, High/Scope operated as an 
experimental project.  Yet the research is set within the parameters of the intervention project 
and thus does not consider broader structural bases of disadvantage; gains, both public and 
individual, can only be shown within these policy parameters.  Thus questions about the 
nature of society and how real equality of opportunity and social mobility can be created are 
side-stepped and with them consideration of broader programmes of social reform.   
 
Overall, the social engineering frame directs attention towards micro solutions to broader 
social goals.  Although there are many difficulties with framing EYEC intervention in such 
ways and there may be doubts towards its actual efficacy, the power of its discourse of 
‘targeting’ intervention to those ‘who need it most’ and complementary cost-benefit rationale, 
lends itself towards ideational circulation through those advocates who wish to make the case 
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for EYEC intervention, especially as a child poverty strategy.  Unlike other frames it does not 
have anything to say about how EYEC services can be effective for working women, indeed, 
what is notably absent in High/Scope’s cost benefit analysis is a consideration of the potential 
gains to the economy through parental employment15.  The Head Start and High/Scope 
projects were initiated at a time when it was assumed that part-time educational provision was 
sufficient to meet children’s needs (and should be introduced from age 3 upwards) and that no 
extra care need be provided, because mothers commonly stayed at home (Penn, 2005: 1.).  
This gap is highly criticised by feminists who view a dual role for care and education.  It is 
also criticised by those working on a neuroscience frame (see below) that is not pitched at an 
early enough time.   
 
1.3 Educative Frame 
 
An educative frame prioritises the educational aspects of EYEC and, in particular, the benefits 
which come from universal access to centre-based group care, such as a nursery or 
kindergarten.  An educative frame is based on a strong discourse of education; that early 
educational experiences have a long-term and significant impact on subsequent educational 
achievement and future cognitive gains (Pascal et al., 1998: 51.).  As such, as a social right, 
                                               
15
 This is the case despite Schweinart and Weikart mentioning that a full day (9 hours) programme would, if 
meeting quality standards, be probably just as effective if not more so than a part time (2 ½ hrs per day) 
programme (1993: 101.).  Cleveland and Krashinsky, based in Canada have calculated the benefits to the pubic 
purse of a universal system of high quality childcare.  They have calculated the monetary benefits of child 
development and labour force benefits set against the net costs of a full childcare programme (based upon full 
daycare for 2-5 year olds minus a parental contribution of 20%, scaled to income and minus current government 
expenditures on childcare).  They estimate that whilst this full childcare programme could cost some $5.2 billion 
dollars (in 1998), it would return $10.5 billion dollars, roughly equating to a 2-1 dollar return investment (1998: 
74.).     
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each child should be entitled to an early education experience which is developmentally 
appropriate and intellectually stimulating, thus creating a solid foundation upon which the 
future educational career will proceed and hopefully create benefits on throughout life.   In 
many ways, the archetypical ‘educative frame’ would seek to emulate the French ecoles 
maternelles, which are publicly run and funded pre-schools, serving nearly 100% of children 
aged two and older (Waldfogel, 2002: 534.).  These are intended to serve as a form of 
compensatory education, with the aim of reducing the gap in school readiness between the 
better-off and the less well off, yet they encourage all children to benefit from such services 
(ibid.).  Indeed, in much the same way that education for older children has been accepted and 
universalised in Western societies, so too should early childhood be an important time for 
managed learning.  In this way, within an educative frame it is good for all children (across all 
social and economic classes) to attend some form of centre-based, educationally minded pre-
school; ultimately it should be viewed as the first (yet distinct) stage of education.  This is 
opposed to a social engineering frame which seeks to target pre-school education and early 
years policies based on risk, and tends to justify benefits in terms of the cost benefits of 
reducing delinquency.  Most proponents of early education would prefer not to justify these 
services merely on the grounds of reduced crime rates; indeed the focus is generally on 
building children’s cognitive capacities for future educational performance (Browne, 1996: 
369; Daniels, 1995: 163.).   
  
The roots of expertise and research that constitute the educative frame can be found in the 
work of developmental psychologists, who dominated the field of early years research before 
educationalists and other policy orientated professionals took to researching EYEC from 1980 
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onwards (BREA, 2003: 6.)16.  As such, the expertise and evidence relating to an educative 
frame can be considered to be from the same broad academic discipline as the social 
engineering frame17.  However, rather than investigating early interventions for poor or ‘at 
risk’ children, researchers working from this frame were keen to investigate the impact and 
benefits of early education on intellectual and emotional development for all social groups.  
Indeed the research investigates and profiles different forms of early education temporally as 
opposed to profiling effects between different social classes.  As Jerome Bruner, head of the 
Oxford Preschool Research Group, argued “the importance of early childhood for intellectual, 
social and emotional growth of human beings is probably one of the most revolutionary 
discoveries of modern times” (1980: 9.).   
 
Bruner’s research group, which was set up in 1975, with funding from the Education 
Research Board of the Social Science Research Committee18 (and later from the Department 
of Education and Science), was commissioned during a buoyant period of early years research 
when it was thought that the UK was about to launch a major expansion of pre-school care.  
Margaret Thatcher, the then Secretary of State for Education and Science had recently issued 
a White Paper, Education: A Framework For Expansion (1972) which proposed an increase 
                                               
16
 For a longer history of the British nursery education movement and the earliest pioneers of nursery education 
see Wadsworth (2002: 55.).       
17
 Jerome Bruner held the distinction of being one of the architects of the American Head Start programme, 
having urged the Johnston Administration, alongside Urie Bronfenbrenner, in 1965, to trial experiments with 
compensatory early years provision (Mills and Mills, 2002: 4.).  Frustrated that the US government had pushed 
forward with the policy rather than allowing him to conduct an experimental phase, Bruner came to the UK to 
conduct practice-based research (and for all children rather than those at risk for which “there was ample 
research available” (Bruner, 1980: xvi.).  This worked much more in an educative frame.  He has also been 
particularly critical of subsequent neuroscientific research on early years as a ‘step too far’ (Bruner, 1996.).   
18
 Which is now known as the Economic and Social Research Council, ESRC.   
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in State financed care for the under-fives, in general but for particularly those ‘at risk’ 
(Bruner, 1980: xii).  However the external researchers brought in to carry out the research19 
focused their brief more broadly and sought to measure effects of EYEC for all children, 
rather than those profiled as at risk.  They also assessed different types of EYEC; focusing 
upon monitored intervention (nursery and their effects); skills, curricula and invisible 
pedagogies in the peer-group, home and school (ibid: xviii).  The Oxfordshire project 
concluded that childminders, playgroups and [private] day nurseries were inadequate at 
stimulating children’s intellectual development whereas nursery schools did not have these 
drawbacks (David, 1981: 123.).  Childminding was considered by the study to be ‘an empty 
time separated from home’ (Bruner, 1980: 180.).   Thus in great contrast to a ‘maternal care 
frame’ which extols the virtue of a ‘domestic setting’, the educative frame turns this on its 
head; a managed external setting is beneficial to children’s cognitive development alongside 
the additional emotional benefits of peer group interaction.  Nursery schools of sufficient 
quality, the study found, were much more adept at producing the richest ‘elaborated free play’ 
and in such circumstances a child would “express his powers to the full” (ibid: 186-187.).  An 
important development to the educative frame was that quality education in the early years is 
particularly important as ‘human childhood, more than any of other species, is marked by 
extraordinary plasticity’ (ibid: 178.).  In this way, early education produces “early attitudes 
and skills upon which later ones must be built.  A fear of failure, developed early, will inhibit 
the confident use of the mind later.  Resistance to adults, early established is not easily shed… 
the earlier a skill can be mastered without tears and sacrifice of other values, the more will it 
contribute to a child’s life and form the basis for other skills (ibid: 178-179.).    
                                               
19
 Who included some important figures in early years: Barbara Tizard, Teresa Smith, Harry Judge and Kathy 
Sylva (who is still extremely important in current policy debates).   
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Sylva et al (1980), working as part of the Oxford Research Group, analysed several hundred 
hours of systematic observations of under-fives in playgroups and nursery schools and found 
that the structuring aspects of children’s experience impacted on cognitive gains20.  They 
found that children at school entry who had nursery education, rather than attending 
playgroups, were more likely to initiate contacts with teachers that were ‘learning orientated’ 
rather than asking for help and used more persistent and independent strategies with school 
activities (BERA, 2003: 22.).   
 
Subsequent to these early studies, policy orientated educationalists and social workers have 
participated in providing research and expertise to support an educative frame and to 
rationalise state investment in EYEC.  There was an increasing concern that whilst early 
research had shown nursery schools and early education programmes to create cognitive gains 
for pre-school children, these effects ‘washed out’ soon after school begins (Sylva, 1994: 88.).  
Thus research attention has increasingly focused upon the more technical aspects of EYEC 
‘teaching pedagogy’21 and ‘quality’ in early years education and superseding research which 
focuses on the effects of early years care on children in different settings (which often sought 
to dispel widely held views that early education damages children).   
                                               
20
 Cognitive gains here were measured ‘softly’: including perseverance on task, complexity of behaviours and 
language use with adults and peers.  
21
 The issues of appropriate pedagogy will be taken up within the discussion of the ‘child-centred frame’ outlined 
below.  Whilst many educational theorists based in the UK have made use of the concept ‘pedagogy’ (borrowing 
the word from Continental Europe), they have tended to construct this term as ‘method of teaching’ or as such to 
forward a specific educative learning strategy that fits a specific curriculum and achieves measurable outcomes.  
This is not the sense of the term as utilised in a child-centred frame, nor the sense that it is used in other 
European countries, such as Denmark or Reggio Emilia in Italy. 
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An important study in this regard, was the Effective Early Learning Project (EEL) which was 
set up in the UK in 1993 and is ongoing.  It is a national research and development initiative 
which aims to improve the quality of early learning in a wide range of education and care 
settings (Pascal et al, 1998: 52.).  There are two parts to the EEL project.  Firstly it 
constructed a conceptual framework to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of early 
childhood settings (ibid.).  Alongside this ‘best practice’ model for early learning, the EEL 
framework measures contexts of learning such as staffing and the physical and processes of 
learning such as educative interactions which occur between adults and pupils within a setting 
Pascal et al (1998: 53.).   This conceptual framework has been disseminated to local 
authorities and practitioners on the ground, intending to give non-graduate EYEC staff “a 
magic recipe… a thorough understanding of child development and learning theory but in a 
way that is really accessible, focused on kids and hooked into a qualification system as well” 
(Pascal, 2006.).  Secondly, a small scale longitudinal study has been drawn from a sub sample 
of the EEL project (118 children in ten settings in the West Midlands).  This research 
contributes to the educative frame as it seeks to test quality through different teaching 
pedagogies, investigating the effects of early learning and child involvement levels in 
different settings on outcomes, as displayed in children’s level of academic attainment on a 
Baseline Assessment Scheme at four and Standard Assessment Tasks (SATS) at seven years 
(Pascal et al., 1998: 54.).  Preliminary reporting in 1998 showed that in 50% of cases a linear 
relationship was found between positive child involvement and the two measures at 4 years 
and 7 years (BREA, 2003: 40.).   
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In order to give policy makers more ‘hard’ evidence on the long term educative effects of 
EYEC22, the DfEE funded a large scale longitudinal study, Effective Provision of Pre-School 
Education (EPPE) on the outcomes of children’s early pre-school experiences in 1996 
(Blackmore, 2000: 12)23.  The Start Right enquiry (Ball, 1994) had previously reported a 
concern that whilst there were many small-scale studies suggesting a positive impact for pre-
schools, there was a need for larger, longitudinal studies of the impact of pre-school education 
and care (Sammons et al., 2004: 692.).  The EPPE study was thus the first large-scale British 
study on the effectiveness of different kinds of pre-school provision and the impact of 
attendance at individual centres on young children’s developmental outcomes (Sylva et al., 
2004: 2.).  The team studied a range of different types of pre-schools (local authority day 
nurseries, integrated centres, playgroups, private day nurseries, nursery schools and nursery 
classes) against a control group of children with no EYEC and sought to establish whether 
some pre-school centres are more effective than others in promoting children’s cognitive and 
social/behavioural development (ibid: 5.).  The study recruited 3,000 children, age 3 years and 
above, from a range of social backgrounds (ibid: 2.).   Data on a range of child development 
outcomes (both qualitative and quantitative indicators of cognitive and emotional/behavioural 
outcomes) were collected at ages 3, 4/5, 6 and 7 years.  An important element of the study 
                                               
22
 In this sense, hard findings refer to empirical testing (both quantitative and qualitative) which can be 
conducted in a longitudinal study, as opposed to the earlier ‘soft’ evidence collected by generally small scale 
studies, measuring attitudes and dispositions of children.  
23
 The research was originally funded by the Conservatives.  It’s brief was to test children’s outcomes on the 
basis of whether they attended nursery schools, nursery classes or playgroups; in essence, to test whether the 
institution in which EYEC was given made differences to children’s education outcomes and therefore cost-
effective to further invest in childcare (Penn, 2006).  With the change in government and shifting policy agenda, 
the programme of research expanded to look at effective practice and pedagogy through twelve intensive case 
studies of settings where children had positive outcomes (Sylva et al., 2004: i.).  It also sought to test the 
effectiveness of the government’s new integrated centres (combining education and care) and nursery schools 
(ibid: 4.).   
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was to take into account the contribution to children’s cognitive development of background 
factors such as birth weight, gender, parental qualifications/occupations and home learning 
environments so as to ascertain pre-school effects ‘net’ of child and family factors (ibid: i.).  
The EPPE researchers wanted to clearly establish the educative benefits for children, 
regardless of social background.  This was achieved by constructing a ‘value-added’ 
multilevel analysis, which yielded generalised regressions showing the ‘effect sizes’ of 
different pre-school types and duration of attendance on pre-reading, early number concepts 
and language (Sammons et al., 2004: 702.).   
  
Overall, EPPE evidence found that pre-school experience, compared to none, enhances all 
round intellectual and cognitive development.  Moreover they found that duration of 
attendance and intellectual development is strongly linked; earlier starts (under age 3) 
correlating with the highest cognitive development and peer sociability (Sylva et al., 2004: 
iii.).  Full time attendance made no better gains for children than part-time provision.  Some 
negative effects were on social behavioural outcomes were associated with early starts to pre-
school (under 2 and 1 years), though the researchers found that the effect was primarily 
related to local authority day nurseries and private day nurseries24 (ibid: 31.).  Hence quality 
in EYEC settings was particularly important for developing cognitive abilities, with integrated 
provision and nursery school settings promoting higher intellectual outcomes (ibid: iv.).   To 
this effect the project has also sought to ascertain the characteristics of effective practice (and 
teaching pedagogy which underpins it) through twelve intensive case studies of settings where 
children had positive outcomes (Sylva et al., 2004: i.).  The EPPE research is ongoing and a 
                                               
24
 And that if those children who were first assessed at three years old went onto a high quality setting between 
3-5 years, the anti-social behaviour decreased (Sylva et al., 2004: v.).   
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latter project (EPPE 3-11, 2003 – 2008) will study the continuing effects of pre-school 
provision (ibid: 84.).  In this way, EPPE evidence is supportive of a universal centre-based 
pre-school provision for children that is high quality (through high staff qualifications, 
effective teaching pedagogy), that can create clear and quantifiable ‘value-added’ intellectual 
benefits and preparations for school entry (‘school readiness’) and ameliorate disparate social 
background effects.  Here EYEC is clearly for educative benefits rather than childcare, as 
provision can be part or full time and it is sceptical of EYEC for children who are very young.      
 
In Canada, recent research has utilised the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and 
Youth (NLSCY), which began sampling in 1994.  Hertzman and Kohen (1998) have 
examined patterns of non parental care used by a sample of pre-schoolers (4 and 5 yr olds) 
from the first cycle of the NLSCY25.  They found that these children had significantly higher 
scores on a standardised measure of receptive vocabulary26 than children who were at home 
with a childminder or mother (Lipps and Yiptong-Avila, 1999: 52.).  In their follow up study, 
Kohen et al., (2002) found that more formal childcare had the greatest effect on vocabulary 
scores for children in lower income groups but that pre-school programmes had positive 
effects for a broad range of Canadian children over and above family socio-demographic 
characteristics (Kohen, Lipps and Hertzman, 2006: 3.).   Another similar study, by Lipps and 
Yiptong-Avila (1999), using cycles 1 and 2 of the NLSCY compared children aged 2 to 3 
                                               
25
 National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth.  This was the only data set that was available at the time 
(which in its first phase was geared to measuring child poverty, demographics, health and family patterns and 
relationships.).  In 1999 a pilot modification to the NLSCY – the Understanding the Early Years (UEY) 
community component was initiated in North York and subsequently extended out to all new birth cohorts.  It 
added objective direct assessments of child development, information on community characteristics and 
resources and questions on non-parental care in the early years (Connor and Brink, 1999b: 7.).   
26
 The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (PPVT-R).   
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years, who went to some form of non-parental care27 and those who were looked after by their 
parents (p.54.).  They found that regardless of education of the child’s mother or the income, 
external care had positive effects on the performance of children in kindergarten.  40% of the 
children who were in non-parental care were judged by their teachers as being near the top of 
their kindergarten class in communication skills, versus 25% who were in parental care.  38% 
of children in non-parental care were rated as near top of the class in learning skills versus 
24% who were in parental care (ibid.).    
 
To summarise, an educative frame prioritises the educative aspects of EYEC and, in terms of 
policy, advocates for quality and universal services for children (hence requiring significant 
government funding) in order to ensure that children achieve their fullest educational 
capacities.  To this effect EYEC services should be primarily for the educational benefit of the 
child and not necessarily a service for working parents.  This research that informs this frame 
is ambivalent about whether EYEC should be part time, school hours or full time (EPPE 
research supports part-time provision, as full time care does not make increases in educational 
benefits.).  Indeed, where an educative frame supports centre-based, structured EYEC, part-
time or half-day provision is more often advocated so as to not ‘overload’ children.   
 
The research which has underpinned an educative frame has moved with general long term 
trends in mainstream educative policy research towards more quantitative and empirically 
verifiable measures of education.  Moreover, the educative frame reflects a particularly 
Anglo-Saxon (pre-primary) way of thinking about education, which stresses the importance of 
                                               
27
 Including early childhood programmes, daycare centre or received care from a paid worker such as a nanny.  
The study did not make a distinction between levels of quality of EYEC.   
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acquiring specific subject-based knowledge and specific skills and the necessity of getting 
children ‘in and on early’.  Indeed, early childhood practitioners and those engaged in 
research now operate within a professional context in which measurement, ‘baseline 
assessment’ and ‘value added’ strategies are dominant features (Pascal et al., 1998: 58.).  
Such strategies require highly qualified staff to implement effective ‘early learning’ 
curriculums and hence may improve the status and pay of those working in a professional 
EYEC field.   However this narrowing of educative discourse to that which can be expressed 
in terms of standardised, measurable skills and outcomes, may actually impede development 
of effective pedagogical approaches.  There is a danger that the relationship between educator 
and child becomes an instrumental one, based predominantly on children attaining certain 
targets (Bennett, 2004: 16.).  Moreover, the stress on academic goals and outcomes can be 
criticised as an invasion of childhood (Bennett, cited in, Kamerman, 2000: 31.).  Indeed a 
tension exists in educative framed research that seeks to demonstrate ‘convincing’ outcomes 
and justifications to policy makers, whilst protecting more effective early learning pedagogies 
that allow for experimental and spontaneous learning and emotional development.  
 
1.4 Equal Opportunities Frame 
 
An equal opportunities frame is strongly linked (especially in discursive terms) with the care 
aspects of EYEC policy.  However, unlike a maternal care frame which frames ‘care’ in 
traditional terms (that mothers want to and should provide the majority of care) an equal 
opportunities frame seeks to socialise the care of societies young children; caring should not 
be the sole preserve of mothers and caring work needs to reconciled with men and more 
broadly with society.  Underlying these two different discursive frames are particular 
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normative statements about gender.  A maternal frame (outlined above) implicitly favours a 
‘difference’ perspective between the genders and a tendency to favour private solutions 
(through a suspicion of group early years care).  An equal opportunities frame does the very 
opposite.  It looks for public solutions for care work and seeks to challenge traditional social 
norms regarding caring as a specifically female role, ideally to equalise assumptions about 
care work between the genders.   EYEC services, moreover, are considered to be a positive 
and enriching service for women and children, rather than being seen as a ‘necessary evil’ 
only to be contemplated when the mother cannot cope (Moss, 1988: 6.).   
 
From the perspective of an equal opportunities frame, universal EYEC services are important 
policies which can promote equal opportunities and can thus aid gender equality.  This frame 
is closely associated with the work of feminists, childcare advocates28 and trade union 
activists, who have long advocated for high quality, universal childcare services, ideally 
funded by the state.  In particular, feminist social policy research has continuously argued that 
the arrangement of care of young children29 stratifies the position and opportunities of women 
and men in a society (Kroger, 1999: 31.).  In this way, the action (or inaction) resulting from 
welfare state policies addressing the organisation of care is decisive for gender relations 
(ibid.).   
 
                                               
28
 Alternatively called ‘daycare’ advocates.  There has been much internal debate within the Canadian advocacy 
community over the usage of the word ‘daycare’ versus ‘childcare’.  The term ‘daycare’ was seen as not 
sensitive to the needs of families working irregular hours, so ‘childcare’ has been adopted increasingly (Rothman 
and Kass, 1999: 266.).  For example the Ontario Coalition for Better Daycare (OCBDC) changed its name to 
Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care (OCBCC).   
29
 And also the care of disabled and older people (Kroger, 1999: 31.).  
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The rationale for developing EYEC services as understood from an equal opportunities frame 
is principally about creating meaningful, genuine choices for individuals with children and in 
so doing alter structures of gender inequality.  Universal EYEC services, it is argued, can help 
to create more of a level playing field for women and men (and for individuals with or 
without children) to compete in the labour market, embark on education and training or to 
more broadly to contribute to society; in essence creating a system of childcare services which 
provide actors with genuine choices over their participation in society.  Many advocates 
working with an equal opportunities frame would stress that in order to create such genuine 
choices, EYEC services must ensure high quality (though not necessarily in the strictly 
educative or developmental sense, as would be in an educative frame) and good experiences 
for the child.  Whilst poor quality, patchy services may allow for female labour market 
attachment it will not create opportunities for mothers to make positive choices; for many 
using such services will be a choice of last resort.  Moreover it may actually dissuade mothers 
from taking up an offer of good employment if there is not good childcare available.  In this 
way, the needs of mothers and children over quality services are considered to be one and the 
same. 
 
Within an equal opportunities frame it is thus argued that EYEC policy should ensure high 
quality, publicly funded (or subsidised) universal services for the care of young children, 
covering both extended and unusual hours and being available in a variety of locations to aid 
access.  In so doing these services will create: better structures of opportunity for actors 
making choices about labour market attachment; alter domestic power relations between men 
and women; aid individuals to form autonomous households; and potentially alter (or at least 
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challenge) broader gendered social norms regarding care work and employment 
discrimination arising from such norms30.   
 
The anchoring ideas and expertise which informs an equal opportunities frame for EYEC 
have their roots in the feminist movement, as briefly mentioned above.  However, it must be 
stated that not all feminists would agree with the perspective of an equal opportunities frame 
for EYEC, indeed, issues of childcare and motherhood have divided feminists as much as 
united them.  Within feminism there are deep seated disagreements over whether women and 
mothers should be valued for their gender difference against those who wish to actively 
deconstruct gender identities and transcend them.  Feminists who fall into the latter group 
have been generally associated with the push for EYEC services under an equal opportunities 
frame.   Since the 1960s these ‘equality’ feminists (part of the ‘second-wave’ of feminism) 
optimistically envisioned a world in which child rearing had become completely socialised, 
making traditional motherhood a thing of the past (Michel, 2002: 333.).  They argue that the 
traditional domestic bargain does not work to the advantage of all women.  Indeed, they 
consider most women’s lives to be shaped by an enforced dependency by virtue of caring 
conventions; that they were neither prepared, nor expected or given the opportunity to be 
autonomous adults (Coote, Harman and Hewitt, 1990: 34.).  The assumption and anticipation 
of motherhood (with its subsequent caring role) has stifled the expectations of women to 
become the main breadwinner or participate in extended education and training.  Moreover, in 
                                               
30
 Indeed it must be noted at this juncture that many feminists would argue that simply the provision of adequate 
childcare services would create true “equality of opportunity” nor resolve gendered inequality of domestic caring 
roles and divisions of labour.  Indeed patriarchal structures run much deeper than a surface-level lack of 
childcare services.  To achieve gender equality simply at a household level a much more complex rebalancing of 
unpaid work between market, state, men and women would be required (see Lewis and Giullari, 2005:78.).    
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so doing, women have often earned less than men and hence it ‘makes sense’ for women take 
time out of the labour market, lowering their earning potential (alongside other benefits such 
as pensions) and further reinforcing their dependency on men (ibid.).  In this way, ideas of 
maternal care and broader gender identities needed to be actively challenged31.  They argue 
that this is a possibility since such identities are social constructions arising from patriarchal 
social structures rather than essential biologically determined divisions and as such they could 
be problematised, overcome and eventually transcended.  This agenda of gender identity 
deconstruction is to be pursued at the individual and societal/state level.  At the individual 
level early second-wave feminists used consciousness-raising groups to develop critiques of 
how girls were raised and outlined the inequalities of girl’s (and subsequently a mother’s) 
socialisation (Martin, 2005: 458.).  Through these endeavours, these feminists wanted to open 
up possibilities for women and to remove limitations on their lives; encouraging expanded 
roles for both women and mothers.    
 
At the societal level and of great importance to the second wave feminist agenda was whether 
the state institutions upheld, or helped to transcend, traditional gender identities.  As Orloff 
states, ‘Gender differentiation exists on the systemic level (eg through creating different 
programs for labour market and family failures) and on the individual level (eg through 
processes of making claims on the state where men have typically made claims as individuals 
and workers, women often as dependents and family members)’ (1996: 72.).  Within the 
Beveridge system, the duty of unpaid care was recognised by benefits allocated to wives and 
children as dependents of men and through men (Pascal, 1997: 106.).  Benefits on this basis 
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 Although maternal ideas were actively reclaimed by latter feminists who took a ‘difference’ or cultural 
perspective.  See for example Koven and Michel, 1993.   
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entrenched dependency and inequality in citizenship itself: women depended for their rights 
on a man and a marriage (ibid.).  As the traditional ‘male breadwinner’ family started to 
become less entrenched as the standard family form, the need for state social policies to 
reconcile work and care became pressing.  Crucially, access to paid work and to the services 
that facilitate employment for caregivers are critical gender dimensions of welfare regime 
variability and reflect core gendered interests of women.  Paid work is a principal avenue by 
which women have sought both to enhance their independence from husbands and fathers in 
families (thereby undermining the bread-winner housewife family form) and to claim full 
status as independent citizens (ibid.).   However, the terms on which women seek to enter the 
labour force are not equal.  Access to the full range of jobs in a society and genuine equality 
of opportunity requires access to ‘internal labour markets’ (Moss, 1988: 29.).  These ‘internal 
labour markets’ provide the possibility of promotion; of good pay, conditions; and a relatively 
high level of security.  Internal labour markets provide the basis of power within the labour 
market.  Jobs which fall outside these markets are often part of a secondary labour market, 
where pay, conditions prospects for training and advancement and security are poor (ibid.).  
However jobs within internal labour markets often come with implicit or explicit 
commitments to working hours or continuing employment after a business has invested in 
training an individual.   It is argued by feminists and childcare advocates that employer 
discrimination is rife within the labour market where the state policy treats care as a private 
matter.  In such circumstances, only those who have a significant income from their job can 
afford to utilise private care (whether it be a nursery or nanny).  While women are 
disadvantaged because of the unequal distribution of childcare and the lack of employment to 
adapt to family responsibilities of employees; the labour market cannot said to be free (Moss, 
1988: 256.).    
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Estimates have been made of the material cost to women of caring for children.  Heather Joshi 
has analysed the way in which the anticipation of motherhood (by women themselves and 
others) affects their earning power, so that they earn less than men even if they don’t have 
children (Coote, Harmen and Hewitt, 1990: 35.).  She counts the total loss for a mother of two 
children, compared with women without children, at 46 per cent of lifetime earnings and 
‘more than twentyfold her annual salary when she dropped out’ (1992, in Pascal, 1997: 98.).  
If a women’s earning are compared with men’s there is a similar loss of lifetime earnings 
resulting from being female.  Joshi states “if this general disadvantage, to which all women 
are exposed, it is itself an indirect outcome of the social expectations about the female caring 
role, the costs of caring are compounded – in this case, roughly doubled” (ibid.).   
 
Many Feminists have looked to Scandinavia as a place where significant investments have 
been made in EYEC policies in order to socialise care and promote better gender equality.  
Here, during the 1970s, processes of profound societal change contributed to the rethinking of 
the state-parent relationship (Leira, 2006: 30.).  In Denmark and Sweden32 the trade union 
movement and feminist academics who questioned traditional gender roles began to lobby 
forcefully for public day care (Bergman, 2004: 222.).  The rhetoric employed by equality 
feminists concerned every adult individual’s right to be economically independent or self-
                                               
32
 Finland and Norway had different trajectories of development in respect of childcare and early years policies.  
In these countries, women were integrated into the paid work without childcare services.  Historically, traditional 
gender arrangements have received more support in Norway than elsewhere in the Nordic region.  It was not 
until the 1980s until that childcare provision expanded, however the country still lags behind in terms of full-
time nursery places (Bergman, 2004: 221.).  Finland was also the first of the Nordic welfare states to introduce a 
cash grants in the place of childcare services (where parents could choose between childcare or a cash grant) 
(Leira 2006: 41.).   
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supporting and every child’s pedagogical and social right to be cared for in a high-quality, 
well-equipped day care institution (ibid: 223.).  During this time, individual needs for care 
were redefined to form a basis for social rights.  Framed within the vocabulary of social 
rights, to which was added a profound political commitment to gender equality, parenthood 
policies promoted defamilisation as well as refemilisation of childcare; moving mothers out of 
the home and a returning home of fathers (Leira, 2006: 31.).   In particular, EYEC, once 
defined as a primary responsibility of parents, was redesigned as an interest common to, or a 
joint venture between, parents and the welfare state.  Moreover, state funding of early 
childhood and care would facilitate the employment of mothers as well as fathers encouraging 
a despecialisation of parental practices (ibid.).  Initially, these competing discourses on the 
position of women and who should care for children triggered a heated debate, not least 
among women (Borchorst, 2006: 106.).  During this time also it was widely debated whether 
childcare facilities were beneficial to children or not and experts providing evidence to settle 
the matter generated ambiguous conclusions (ibid.).  However, by the 1970s, working 
mothers had become the hegemonic norm and ideas of the necessity of maternal care had lost 
ground; such material changes to the social structure perhaps facilitated the ascendency of the 
feminist discourse on gender equality33.  Moreover, the Nordic states, accepting that the 
economy would need both mother’s and father’s labour as part of a full employment strategy, 
developed municipal child-care services which have become an integral part of the social 
welfare system (Bergman, 2004: 225.).  Universal coverage was the aim: services were to be 
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 Feminists in Scandinavia were skilful in framing EYEC services both in terms of gender equality and secondly 
as a social right of the child.  EYEC was advocated as educationally and socially advantageous for young 
children; state-sponsoring of childcare was also presented as being in the best interests of the child and as a 
means of overcoming social inequalities among children (Leira, 2006: 35.).  Indeed, whilst Scandinavia is often 
considered as a model of feminist success and indeed fits well discursively with an equal opportunities frame, 
the particular history and policy trajectory of Nordic social policy is more complex.    
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made available at affordable costs for all children whose parents wanted parents it and not just 
for the children of employed people and students (Leira, 2006: 37.).  This point is important 
for those Anglo-Saxon advocates who wish to emulate a Scandinavian system - social 
contributions should be viewed as widely as possible and through accepting this broad notion 
of contribution, childcare and early years policies should not be exclusively tied to parental 
employment.  Indeed, by creating EYEC systems, the aim is simply not to activate (or 
commodify) labour on whatever terms necessary34.  From an equal opportunities frame, it is 
inevitable that women, in the large part, will wish or need to work but state funded childcare 
services alter the terms on which they carry out such employment.   
 
The supply of EYEC services in Scandinavia grew from 1970s and 1980s.  By the early 
2000s, save for Norway, the universal right to childcare and early years services was 
complete.  The success of the various feminist movements in the Nordic states in promoting 
EYEC policies as a broader programme of equal opportunities, creating an institutionalised 
set of universal social rights to EYEC, has provided feminists and childcare advocates in 
Anglo-Saxon countries with a blueprint for social rights and policy programme which could 
be adapted to the national context.   
 
In Canada, there has been a particularly strong tradition of feminist activism in respect of 
childcare and EYEC services, much of which has utilised (and indeed contributed to) an equal 
opportunities frame.  However, as elsewhere, the relationship between the women’s 
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 Such a policy would, in all probability, be ineffective as data from Huber and Stephen’s comparative analysis 
of 16 countries from the early 1960s attests to.  They found that rather than childcare services being prior to big 
expansions in female labour force participation, it is a growing female labour force participation which, through 
both direct and indirect processes, has led to social service expansion (2000: 325.). 
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movement and the childcare movement is complex and contradictory, in part because of the 
intractable divisions over the meaning and the politics of motherhood (Prentice, 2001: 20.).   
Labour movements and childcare advocates have worked together to challenge entrenched 
gender norms and argue for a ‘socialised form of childcare that would transform relations 
between men and women and thereby counter patriarchal power structures in society’ (White, 
1999: 100.).  In this way, much of the Canadian childcare debate has centred on auspice35 and 
structural definitions of quality.  High quality under this frame is discursively linked with 
working conditions of the childcare staff (invariably due to the high representation of labour 
groups), which dovetails neatly with a broader feminist agenda to ensure better employment 
rights and equality in areas where women had traditionally been disproportionately 
represented.  Moreover and certainly linked to this framing of high quality was auspice; to 
ensure state support for not-for-profit childcare centres only.  For the CDCAA and its 
supporters, high quality through good wages and provision could only be assured through 
either state-run (usually municipal) or not-for profit childcare centres, preferably where 
parents should also have a role in the delivery of childcare programmes (Rothman and Kass, 
1999: 264.).  High quality could certainly not be assured by the commercial sector36 who, as 
businesses, were required to make a profit from care from what the advocates viewed in 
                                               
35
 Many of the groups during the 1970s were advocating for ‘free universal and quality state daycare’.  However, 
by the end of the decade, advocacy groups adjusted their demands to gain more mainstream support.  For 
example Action Daycare (latterly Ontario Coalition for Better Childcare, OCBCC) moved to lobbying for 
‘universally accessible, publically funded, not-for-profit and non-compulsory daycare system’ (ibid.).  In general 
there was a shift in arguing for purely state-run EYEC services to either state run or state funded not-for-profit 
EYEC (as long as these both ensured quality).   This adjustment to the advocacy’s lobbying demands made a 
subtle, yet important discursive shift emphasising the importance of auspice of EYEC within the advocacy 
movement 
36
 The commercial sector is represented by the Canadian Child Daycare Federation (CCDCF) which included in 
its ranks both professional childhood early educators and commercial childcare providers (Jenson, Mahon, 
Philips, 2003: 142.).   
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contrast as a social service, akin to education or healthcare (Jenson, Mahon and Philips, 2003: 
142.).   Advocacy groups have argued for ‘childcare centres which would operate for full, 
short or long days or extended or unusual hours, located in residential communities, at or near 
workplaces, in schools or in the other locations, available on a full-time or part-time basis’ 
(Friendly et al., 1991: 5.).   
 
Feminist childcare advocates in the UK have echoed the concerns of the Canadian advocacy 
movement that stress in the absence of a public funded and regulated childcare women’s 
choices and opportunities remain limited.  In particular, the Daycare Trust was set up in 1986 
with an agenda to create a national, publicly funded childcare system in the UK.  The founder, 
Helen Penn, states the motivating reason to begin a campaign on childcare was that 
 
“women were having such a very bad deal, particularly working women and one of the 
ideas behind the Daycare Trust was to try and change the conceptualisation of services 
so that it was useful for working women” (Penn, 2007).   
 
The Daycare Trust served as a counter-voice to those advocates working from an educative 
frame, arguing that state services should merely provide for care on a part time basis as this 
would not cater for women’s needs for childcare (ibid.).  Indeed as David states “enabling 
mothers to work part-time and more flexibly would therefore serve to reinforce patriarchal 
relations and the sexual division of labour in childcare” (1981: 123.).  David is equally 
concerned that state inaction allows childminding and other private solutions to develop in the 
policy vacuum an absence of public provision creates and that such policies serve to maintain 
a cheap and flexible labour force.  Indeed as she states: 
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“Private minding has great advantages for governments and employers…. the service 
expands and contracts with little cost except to minders and mothers.  It is in short, 
ideally suited to the needs of disadvantaged and weak sectors of the labour force, 
indeed, childminders themselves form part of that sector” (ibid: 124.).   
 
In this way, well funded public provision is necessary to guard against a stratification 
occurring between affluent working women and poor (and often migrant) childcare workers 
(Lister, 2002: 134.).   
 
As can be seen, the equality opportunities frame thus directs attention discursively to the 
gendered nature of state action or inaction over EYEC services.  As Lewis argues by way of 
summary, ‘policies that stop at making it simply possible for women to go out to work do 
nothing either to promote a more equal gendered division of the care work that remains to be 
done, or to promote the valuing and recognition of that work at the household and societal 
levels’ (2002: 347.).  EYEC services can both cover the hours necessary to allow women to 
make working choices and to be of a level of quality that provides children with positive 
experiences also.  Such a preoccupation with creating both gender equality and high quality 
childcare services for children are criticised from those working from alternate frames, who 
suggest that such policies informed by such arguments would “put the interests of women 
before children” (Moss, 1998: 252.).  However, this standpoint is misinformed and suggests 
that mothers would intentionally place their interests above those of their children.  Moreover, 
the equal opportunity definition of ‘quality’ which is inextricably linked to the proper 
working conditions and labour rights of childcare workers, links both the interests of children 
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and women into one.  For many who advocate from within this frame, a privately run EYEC 
system will invariably either squeeze profit from either low levels of quality or from low paid 
staff.  Unlike other frames which have ‘the weight of science or evidence’ behind them, the 
equal opportunities frame relies on normative statements about social policy, social 
knowledge derived from feminism and cross-national comparisons of EYEC systems.  Some 
question the power of a feminist discourse from which an equal opportunities frame draws to 
challenge the status quo; indeed the equal opportunities frame seeks to alter dominant norms 
about gender roles (White, 1999: 108).  Although it is an extremely depressing thought to 
consider feminist arguments as a hindrance to gaining government and societal support for 
childcare, the complex politics of motherhood within the UK and Canada creates potential 
conflict where two opposing counter-discourses (of female difference or equality) rally 
against one another.  Other frames which focus discursively on ‘children’s rights’ as its 
rationale for policy action or make less explicitly contentious policy objectives (such as 
education) may draw less negative external press and be less likely to insight potential 
counter-groups to object to the frames normative and policy position.  However where such 
policies advocate for small gains in specific areas, mobilisation and reinforcing social 
feedback loops will also be more difficult to come by.  The equal opportunities frame’s 
rationale for EYEC is ambitious and wide in scope and hence (as the Scandinavian case 
shows) once institutionalised increases the potential female political mobilisation to maintain 
and develop such rights.  Moreover it does seem a little pre-emptive and self-defeating to 
reject a frame on the basis that it is too ambitious.   
 52 
1.5 Neuroscience Frame 
 
The neuroscience frame for explaining and rationalising state EYEC interventions is the 
newest of the EYEC frames, based upon emerging field of evidence and expertise, indeed, 
much of the research which this frame draws its ideas from, can (even today) considered to be 
in its infancy.  Moreover, in many academic and advocating quarters it is considered a 
controversial field of evidence and expertise, especially with regard to attempts to fuse the 
fields of (existing) ‘early years education’ research and neuroscientific evidence.  As with the 
social engineering frame, such expertise and evidence has mainly emerged from America.   
However, rather than being based upon the work of educationalists and developmental 
psychologists (as the educative frame and social engineering frame respectively) the 
neuroscience frame is based upon evidence in the field of neuroscience, 
psychoneuroimmunology, psychoneuroendocrinology and some epidemiology37.  In America, 
according to an OECD report, the years 1990 to 2000 were declared the “Decade of the 
Brain” (2002: 70.).  Certainly during this time there was an explosion of knowledge from 
neuroscience about the brain; the relationship between development in the early years and 
learning behaviour, and health risks in the latter stages of the life cycle (McCain and Mustard, 
1999: 26.).  Such ideas have come to prominence in discussions on EYEC policy and have 
created a powerful policy rationalisation for EYEC which seeks to enhance overall child 
development.   
                                               
37
 Neuroscience being the study of the structure and function of the nervous system and in particular in this case 
the study of the brain.  Psychoneuroimmunology being a branch of science concerned with the relationships 
between the mind and emotions, the nervous and immune system and hence susceptibility to disease.  
Psychoneuroendocrinology being a branch of science concerned with the relationship between the nervous 
system and the endocrine system.   
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To both its detractors and its advocates, the neuroscience frame of EYEC is a powerful fusion 
of ‘hard science’ regarding the brain and discourses of health and education.  In particular 
neuroscience seeks to define in biological terms the importance of the ‘early years’ and the 
necessity of EYEC and child development/stimulation policies during this time period.  
Where other research programmes in the fields of developmental psychology have made 
tentative causal links between the environment and subsequent cognitive development and 
there has been a nearly 50 year link between cognitive psychology and education research, 
neuroscientific ideas spell this link out in the most definite of terms (even if in reality many of 
the actual causal links made between neuroscience evidence and education policy are 
tenuous).  For the most part, EYEC advocates forwarding a neuroscience frame claim to have 
the most powerful evidence for the importance of the early years and the necessity of 
investing in early years education alongside all the other satellite child/foetal development 
programmes (such as maternal health, nutrition and broader maternal stress alleviation 
programmes).  As Clyde Hertzman of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) 
states: 
 
“the rediscovery in the policy world, of the role of early childhood as a lifelong 
determinant of health, well being and competence […] has occurred because issues of 
early childhood development began to be expressed in a credible vocabulary for 
modern society – the vocabulary of science” (2000, 16, cited in Saint-Martin, 2007: 
291.).  
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It is argued in short, that investments in early stimulation services are vital if a society is to 
realise each individual’s full potential.  Moreover, it has aroused broad social, political and 
media interest.  As Bruer, notes “brain science fascinates teachers and educators, just as it 
fascinates all of us” (1997: 4.).  In part also, it is a visual frame, where the latest technologies 
have allowed neuroscientists to take pictures of the human brain and study its activity at 
different stages of development (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 26.).   Such visual evidence 
adds potential media usability and political interest.  In short, many in and outside of the early 
years field have been dazzled.   
 
The main thrust of the neuroscience frame for EYEC is to stress the importance of the early 
years for subsequent educational abilities, emotional strength and future health.  In many 
ways, neuroscientific evidence enhances or augments existing rationalisations for EYEC 
(indeed for many this ‘new science’ is an irrelevance to existing policy rationalisations for 
EYEC).  However this frame casts attention towards the importance of the earliest period of 
life (even before birth) for subsequent developmental outcomes and hence directs attention to 
social policy interventions at a much earlier time period than all of the other frames.  It is still 
subject of conjecture between particular neuroscientists, but where “early childhood” has 
generally been defined as the period form birth to age 8, some neuroscientists have narrowed 
the window of importance for EYEC interventions from birth to age 3 (ECS, 1996: 12.).  
Others relax and extend this period, from birth to 5 (Friendly, 2000).  As has been shown 
above, the educative frame advocates for most EYEC interventions to begin around age 2/3; 
as have the experimental educational interventions of the social engineering frame.  The 
neuroscientific frame’s evidence (as will be outlined below) radically shifts policy attention 
towards the earliest years.  As such many advocates seeking political attention argue for a 
 55 
significant overhaul of both education systems and the proportion of state expenditure 
devoted to different stages of education38.   As McCain and Mustard state 
 
“the evidence is clear that good early child development programs that involve parents 
or other primary caregivers of young children and can vastly improve outcomes for 
children’s behaviour, learning and health in later life.  The earlier in a child’s life these 
programs begin the better.  These programs can benefit children and families from all 
socioeconomic groups in society” (1999: 7.).   
 
As can be seen from the above policy rationalisation the evidence and expertise which forms 
the foundations of the neuroscience frame supports and recommends (except for few 
exceptions) universal provision of this early ‘education and care’.  Indeed, in ways similar to 
the educative frame, EYEC policies are important for the development of all children, albeit 
at an earlier window for intervention.  Much of the research, is based upon primate studies on 
the brain (and specific developmental periods which are crucial to normal future 
development) which are then extrapolated and compared to hypothesised human brain 
potential.  This research is therefore not necessarily premised upon a sociological analysis of 
early education benefits for certain socioeconomic groups considered to be at risk (as with the 
social engineering frame).  Risk, under the neuroscientific frame is rather about the analysis 
of ‘critical’ (or at least sensitive) time periods in any one child’s life.  For some advocates this 
leads to the conclusion that during this critical period, interventions are necessary and indeed 
if children during this period miss out on vital stimulating experiences, learning opportunities 
                                               
38
 For instance in figures quoted from OECD, the UK spent only 2% of the education budget on children in their 
early years, whereas Sweden spent closer to 17% of their education budget (Margaret Hodge, 2nd June 1997, in 
Hansard, Vol.295,column,70.).   
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can be lost forever (Bruer, 1996: 4.).  In this way, all mothers and children can benefit and 
may well require enrichment programmes, specific nutritional advice and health.  Moreover, 
where risk is profiled by a neuroscience frame for social policy intervention, it is primarily a 
physically defined conception of risk (as opposed to the socially defined risk of a social 
engineering frame).  Here, high risk status is due to low birth weight, prematurity or 
malnutrition in the infant (Hertzman and Weins, 1996: 1089.).  It can also be based upon high 
levels of stress during maternity and/or depression on foetal development (Dawson, Hessel 
and Frey, 1994).  These profiles of risk are once again not socioeconomically specific; 
individuals presenting as a risk may come from any socio-economic group.  Hence those 
advocating utilising a neuroscience frame suggest that social policy interventions in EYEC 
must be universal, so as to capture those who may need it most.  Secondly, as every child will 
have specific periods where enrichment programmes may aid development – all children 
should benefit from and indeed require such programmes to reach their full developmental 
potential.   
 
The neuroscientific research and evidence that forms a neuroscience frame, as mentioned 
briefly above, started to be taken up by some early years advocates during the early 1990s.  
For decades prior to the 1990s, it was known that the brain development of many animals, 
particularly within the visual cortex was highly dependent upon environmental stimulation 
(Mills and Mills, 2000: 3b.).  This branch of research was developed during the early 1990s to 
look at the comparisons between animal studies and the possible links to human development 
in the early years.  The merging of the neuroscience story with the development story, it is 
argued, has increased the understanding of how fundamental the first years of a child’s life are 
in laying the base for the future (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 25.).  In particular, this research 
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focused upon the linkage between the way the brain develops and the neurological and 
biological pathways that affect learning, behaviour and health throughout life.  The work of 
Goldman-Rakic on synaptogenesis is important here.  This research has sought to link 
experimental data on the brain development and the synaptogenesis (the process of synaptic 
proliferation creating brain density) of rhesus monkeys to humans (Blackmore, 2000: 2.).  
This work found that in rhesus monkeys, synaptic density (the number of synapses per unit of 
brain tissue) reaches maximal levels two to four months after birth and appears to do so 
simultaneously in all areas of the cerebral cortex (Bruer, 1996: 5.).  Then significant pruning 
begins (where frequently used connections are strengthened and infrequently used 
connections are eliminated) (Blackmore, 2000: 2.).  For rhesus monkeys, synaptic densities 
gradually decline to adult levels around three years of age, the time of sexual maturity for that 
species (ibid.).  This experimental data on monkeys and the idea of an important early stage 
for brain development is extrapolated to the human case.  Before this research was carried out, 
it was widely believed that the architecture of the brain was pretty well set at birth by the 
individual’s genetic characteristics inherited from the parents (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 
26.).  But Goldman-Rakic’s work changes this perception, for the monkeys at least, 
development of the brain is an ongoing process initiated pre-natally and peaking at the point 
of sexual maturity.  In, the case of humans, considerable brain development takes place also 
before birth.  At the beginning of the embryonic period (two weeks after conception) the 
neural tube, which will form the brain and spinal cord, is formed.  Most of a human’s lifetime 
supply of brain cells is produced between the fourth and seventh months of gestation.  A full 
term baby comes into the world with billions of neurons which have to form quadrillions of 
connections to function effectively (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 27.).  In response to stimuli 
from the environment through the sense organs (for example, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin, 
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muscle joints) the neurons in the relevant part of the brain form connections (synapses) that 
allow the brain to recognise the signals of the neural pathway connected to the sensory organs 
(ibid.).  From infancy and continuing into later childhood, there is a dramatic increase in the 
number of connections (synapses) between the brain cells (neurons) (Blackmore, 2000: 2.).  
Just as with the monkeys, synaptic proliferation occurs before synaptic elimination takes over.  
The period of time between synaptic proliferation and elimination is a matter of great 
conjecture amongst neuro-scientists.  Claims are made in educational literature working with 
a neuroscience frame (and following the evidence of Goldman-Rakic) that the ‘critical period’ 
for humans may be as early as from birth to age three years and that the areas of the cerebral 
cortex (the part of the brain responsible for sensing, moving and thinking) develops at the 
same time39 (ECS, 1996: 12.).  Other neuroscientists dispute the period of time in which 
synaptoegenesis and synaptic elimination occurs40, suggesting that some areas of the brain 
have different rates of maturation and that some of this may continue until individuals reach 
18 years of age.  Most would agree, however that significant activity occurs in the years 
before pre-school. 
 
That neuroscientists purport to be able to pin-point when a baby’s brain sets neural pathways 
for life (within the above early years range) is a bold claim, yet it is argued that such 
information will be useful to educators, parents and policymakers.  Indeed, for it is in this 
time (to be most effective) that children should be exposed to all sorts of learning experiences 
                                               
39
 It is argued so, because the brain’s structures are linked by a complex network of interconnections and thus 
each structure is a separate module that functions in parallel with the others (Goldman-Rakie, in ECS, 1996: 12.).   
40
 For instance in the human visual cortex there is a rapid increase in the number of synaptic connections at 
around two or three months of age which reaches a peak at eight to ten months and stabilisation at age 10 
(Blackmore, 2000: 3.).     
 59 
to aid development (ECS, 1996).  In sum, a child’s development, according to this evidence 
requires positive interaction, modelling and support from the outside by parents and other care 
givers (OECD, 2006: 191.).  This discourse of neuroscience rationalises EYEC intervention at 
this vital time; for Goldman-Rakic if this window of opportunity for learning experiences is 
lost, it is lost forever.  As she argues: 
 
“from the time a child enters first grade, through high school, college and beyond, 
there is little change in the number of synapses.  There is considerable debate within 
the field about whether learning creates new synapses – I haven’t seen convincing 
evidence for that” (ECS, 1996: 12.).   
 
Moreover, it is argued, that this evidence must have some implications for how a society 
approaches education.  Whether this process is indeed a ‘critical period’ as Goldman-Rakic’s 
work suggests, or should be defined as a ‘sensitive period’ is debated amongst neuroscientists 
and early years advocates as this has significant implications for those individuals who have 
missed (or been deprived of) enriching experiences in the early years.   Indeed, often within 
the literature, ‘critical periods’ and ‘sensitive periods’ are used interchangeably, yet these 
different wordings have different implications for policy and the ethical treatment of 
individuals.   
 
From the neuroscience side, the arguments for critical periods are supported by the work of 
David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel, (1965).  Here they studied how visual deprivation affects 
the development of visual systems in cats (Bruer, 1997: 7.).  To test developmental 
‘plasticity’ the researchers covered one eye of new-born kittens.  After about three months, 
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the eye was uncovered and the researchers studied the connections between the eye and the 
brain.  They found that this early visual deprivation led to a severe deterioration of neuronal 
connections in the visual areas of the brain and to virtual blindness (Blackmore, 2000: 3.).  
This outcome did not occur when adult kittens were subjected to the same ordeal.  Hence this 
research suggested evidence of a specific ‘critical period’ for development which, if tampered 
with at this time, resulted in permanent damage.  However, this work has been subject to 
much criticism, especially in terms of its applicability for humans41.  This area of 
neuroscience is difficult to prove in the case of humans as for obvious reasons such 
experiments cannot be carried out in the same way and physical studies of brain development 
must come from autopsy.  The counter thesis to critical periods is that ‘sensitive periods’ exist 
for human beings in the early years.  This implies that whilst the time frame for a particular 
biological marker is important it is not absolutely necessary in the achievement of a particular 
skill; mastery can occur but with more difficulty (OECD, 2002: 75.).  It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to fully identify and elaborate each counter piece of evidence which refutes the 
case of ‘critical periods’ in human development.  However, one good example of synaptic 
elaboration at latter dates is that provided by Maguire et al., (2000) on London taxi drivers42.  
Evidence that taxi drivers have a larger hippocampus (the area of the brain responsible for 
spatial memory) than non-taxi drivers, suggests that changes and growth in the brain can 
occur later and according to use (Blackmore, 2000: 5.).  Because of these controversies, in a 
debate which is still ongoing in neuroscience, many scientists in the field stress that as our 
                                               
41
 And even cats.  For instance Chow and Stewart (1972) tested this hypothesis more closely with kittens.  Their 
work revealed the potential for kittens to recover their function in the visual cortex.  For the full discussion see 
Bruer, 1997: 7-8. 
42
 For a full elaboration of evidence relating to sensitive periods see Blackmore (2000).  Also the evidence on 
neuroscience is fully explained in the OECD report, Understanding the Brain: Towards a New Learning Science 
(2002).   
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current understandings are at best an approximate measure, ‘sensitive periods’ should be used 
to describe the process of early child development and synapogenesis.  As mentioned above, 
stressing ‘sensitive periods’ over ‘critical periods’ has ethical implications for individuals and 
is particularly relevant to how policy is conceived.  Indeed, framing the importance of early 
child education policy through a notion of ‘sensitive’ periods for subsequent development is 
much less controversial than stating that such time periods are ‘critical’, as the latter implies 
that children who miss out on vital developmental milestones and enriching experiences do 
not have any hope of catching up later on and hence remedial education and other 
opportunities for a second chance will be useless.  As Hertzman and Weins state ‘who wants 
to embrace a model which says that if they aren’t ok by age three, scrap them!’ (1996: 1087.).  
Whilst a policy advocate (often non-specialists in neuroscience) may want to make a bold 
claim that intervention and investment is ‘critical’, the material manifestation of this discourse 
in policy has significant implications for how remedial policy is conceived in political 
quarters.  It is however, an issue which is somewhat overlooked by policy advocates who 
utilise the neuroscience frame for political action, but does highlight the importance of subtle 
differences in particular discourses for framing policy interventions.   
 
If policy advocates who work within a neuroscience frame may disagree over specific time 
scales for intervention and how much these will determine future outcomes, all agree that 
during the ‘sensitive’ pre-school period, all children can benefit from rich, stimulating 
learning experiences.  Neuroscience research shows that complex skill development is 
essentially ‘experience dependent’ and requires structured experience through social 
interaction (OECD, 2006: 191.).  This is especially the case with language and vocabulary 
development.  Even before birth, the infant's brain is constantly seeking to make sense of 
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what it experiences, including the use of language.  For instance, babies everywhere can 
distinguish the sounds of one language from another.  But after about six months, babies 
begin to develop "magnets" that attract them to the sounds of their own language.  They lose 
their early ability to discern fine differences in sounds in foreign languages.  A baby who 
listens to Swedish, with its sixteen vowel sounds will have different language magnets than a 
baby who hears English, with eight or nine, or Japanese with only five vowel sounds (ECS, 
1996: 13.).  Those ‘perceptual maps’ developed in infancy may account for distinctive 
national accents and the difficulty in learning and distinguishing related sounds in other 
languages as we grow older (ibid., 1996: 4.).  The perceptual map accounts for the difficulty 
experienced by adults acquiring a new language.  Many Japanese students of English find 
differentiation between R and L sounds particularly difficult, even after many years of 
speaking English (ibid.).  Conversely, deprivation of language during the crucial early years 
will adversely affect a child’s development.  It is clear that exposure to the words of the 
language is essential to the acquisition of vocabulary; feral children who lack all interaction 
with human adults do not acquire language (Huttenlocher et al., 1991: 237.).  This example is 
extreme but this idea of perceptual maps and the importance of exposure to a rich language 
for development creates an impetus to create high quality EYEC services which will 
maximise a child’s potential43.  Indeed, by two years old, the average child acquires nine 
hundred words and a rudimentary syntax (ibid: 236.).  Some children develop more 
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 In a conversation I had with a professor who had spent some time in Sweden and had sent her child to a 
municipal nursery there, her child learnt to count in twelve different languages.  EYEC and effective pedagogy 
thus have the potential to open up a child’s capacity for language.   
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however44, and this language development which occurs between fourteen and twenty-six 
months, strongly predicts subsequent educational attainment.  Thus developmental 
neurobiology in conjunction with knowledge of language development purports to explain 
why Head Start programmes fail to result in sustained improvements in children’s IQs.  Head 
Start begins too late in children’s critical learning period to rewire their brains (Bruer, 1997: 
5.).  Hence the development of ‘Early Head Start’ programmes in the United States.  It also 
reinforces the necessity of early learning and effective pedagogy within early years education 
and care services.    
 
Another contribution that neuroscience brings to the understanding of the importance of the 
early years for subsequent development and justificatory evidence for the importance of 
investing early is that EYEC can have a protective effect on health.  Hertzman and Wiens 
(1996) suggest that education in the first two decades of life can protect against dementia at 
the end of life.  In this way, education can have a protective effect on the health of 
individuals.  They cite a review a study by Katzman (1993) in which the association of low 
education with an increased prevalence of clinically diagnosed dementia was found to be a 
consistent finding in studies carried out in six different settings around the world (cited in 
Hertzman and Weins, 1996: 1085.).  The hypothesis is that those with more education have 
greater brain reserve in the form of an increased density of neural interconnections (increased 
synaptic density) in the areas of the brain associated with learning and memory (ibid.).   The 
increased reserve would have the effect of postponing the time at which declines in brain 
reserve associated with ageing would reach a threshold for dementia.   
                                               
44
 An American study by Heart and Risely (1995) found that by the time they were four, children of professional 
parents had, on average heard 45 million adult words.  Children with parents on welfare had only heard 13 
million (Mills and Mills, 2000.).   
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Moreover, it has been suggested by those in the field of psychoneuroendocrinology that the 
neurological system can ‘talk to’ the immune and endocrine systems which in turn can affect 
resistance to disease and the function of vital organs (Hertzman and Weins, 1996: 1084.).  
This process is active during the pre-natal stage and thus directs attention to policies which 
care for the mother.  Indeed, maternal stress and depression it is suggested can create 
unfavourable intrauterine environments, including biochemical changes directly related to 
mother’s depression as well as factors such as nutrition, sleep patterns and stress levels 
(Dawson, Hessl and Frey, 1994: 776.).  Studies on the offspring of rhesus monkey mothers 
exposed to repeated unpredictable stress during pregnancy have been found to exhibit lower 
birth weights, impaired neuromotor development, attention deficits, delayed cognitive 
development and less exploratory behaviour (Schneider, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, cited in 
Dawson, Hessl and Fray, 1994: 776.).  In humans it is therefore highly possible that early 
experiences in the womb and during the early postnatal period may have enduring effects on 
the biochemistry and microarchitecture of the developing brain (ibid.).  In particular, low birth 
weight and length of gestation may link to conditions such as coronary heart disease, high 
blood pressure, non-insulin dependent diabetes, reduced immune function and obesity in later 
stages of the life cycle (Mustard, 2000: 4.).  Barker’s work45 on this subject revealed that there 
can be intrauterine programming of the CRH-HPA axis46 which affects memory, cognition, 
behaviour and metabolic pathways, the immune system and cardiovascular system throughout 
                                               
45
 See 1992, 1997, 1998, explained in full in Mustard, 2000: 2-5 
46
 This system basically regulates hormones in the HPA – hypothalamus (pituitary/adrenal gland) system and 
regulates the release of corticotrophin (CRH).  The ‘sterols’ released into the blood following stimulation of the 
CRH-HPA pathway affect all body systems including the brain.  Elevated blood sterol levels of a long duration 
are not good.  It may have effects on behaviour, loss of cognitive function and memory loss with aging (see 
Mustard, 1999: 3.) 
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life (ibid.).  In less scientific terms, Barker reasons that poor maternal nutrition and/or stress, 
not only restricts the normal growth of a foetus, but also programmes the baby to develop 
common chronic diseases in later life.  Moroever, it is suggested, that this nutrition-induced 
stress could ‘hard-wire’ the brain of the foetus so that it operates in permanent ‘fight or flight’ 
mode, thereby triggering high blood pressure (Schmidt, 1999.).  Armed with such evidence 
and expertise, policy advocates working from a neuroscience perspective thus suggest that in 
order to fully realise any effective EYEC system, policy interventions must begin at the very 
earliest stage of life and significant attention should be paid to the needs of mothers.  Indeed 
this evidence leads some policy advocates to pry open social questions and advocate for a 
broad agenda of social reform.  It is certainly a difficult policy agenda to fully realise; many 
overlaying problems, conditions and broader operative structures can lead to the condition of 
maternal stress and whilst intuitively it would suggest that mothers should certainly not be 
exposed to poverty and unsuitable home environments, in practice most advocates have 
focused on effective nutrition programmes for mothers.     
 
As has been shown, the neuroscientific frame is extensive in policy scope and has some 
overlaps with other frames in policy terms.  In many ways the neuroscientific frame can be 
distinguished from others by heavily stressing the necessity of enhancing child (health and 
cognitive) development through scientifically informed intervention.  As such, the policy 
implications of a neuroscience frame for EYEC are also extremely broad where they have 
been concretised in policy documents.  As can be seen from a policy document from Clyde 
Hertzman, director of the prestigious Canadian inter-disciplinary team set up to investigate 
neuroscience evidence.  Here the policy agenda included a wide scope of action. As he states: 
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“Because the developing brain is an “environmental organ” improving child 
development depends upon improving the environments where children grow up, live 
and learn.  It is not simply a question of fulfilling specific service mandates to 
narrowly-defined client populations… [it is to] bring an environmental perspective to 
agencies that have traditionally understood their role to be exclusively the provision of 
one-to-one client services… primary prevention of speech and language pathology 
means working to create a richer ‘language environment’ in the community.  Family 
literacy programs are an example of such an approach” (2004: 10.).   
 
Alongside a wide scope of action it is true to say that those advocating EYEC services from a 
neuroscience frame have tended to be somewhat vague on actual education policy and 
pedagogy over polemic.  The Education Commission of the States, concludes that this is not 
necessarily a bad thing: 
 
“early child education is one area in which educators could take advantage of what 
neuroscience needs.  Many early childhood educators have known intuitively that 
children’s capacities develop in tandem and the findings of neuroscience seem to 
support education researcher’s pleas for integrated, contextual instruction in 
mathematics, reading, spelling, science and so on” (1996: 9.).   
 
However, critics of the neuroscientific frame such as Bruer (1997) suggest that in fact, studies 
in neuroscience cannot yet form the foundation for principles about how to improve formal 
education and early years pedagogy.  He suggests that educational researchers probably have 
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a better handle on effective child development and learning strategies at present and that these 
advocates are: 
 
“Trying to build a bridge too far…  Currently we do not know enough about brain 
development and neural function to link that understanding directly in any meaningful 
way to instruction and educational practice” (1997: 4.).   
 
Similarly a recent OCED report, calls such endeavours to encourage early years teachers to 
adopt newly developed ‘brain-based teaching strategies’, the institutionalisation of a 
‘neuromythology’ (2002: 69.).  Many advocates working from an educative frame would 
suggest that on the basis of their research and evidence, attempting to create a formal 
curriculum or pedagogical approach for children under eighteen months of age (indeed, even 
under age three), would in fact be harmful to children, if indeed it is at all possible.  This is 
especially the case where neuroscientific insights into early years educative practice are still 
being developed.  Christine Pascal, Director of the Centre for Research in Early Childhood at 
Worcester suggested that there is a danger that policy makers may interpret the neuroscience 
discourse and frame for intervention as “rationalising a very formal prescriptive curriculum 
for very young children” (Pascal, 2006.).  Hence, whilst neuroscientific insights into 
education may prove fruitful in the future, it would be unwise to experiment upon a 
generation of children.   
 
Some advocates argue that the neuroscientific discourse of ‘early enriching environments’ as 
a necessity for young children may unduly worry parents.  Parents experience significant guilt 
proceeding from their supposed capacity to influence their children’s early experiences and 
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one has only to think of the pregnant mother playing cds of Mozart in an effort to stimulate 
her unborn child, to realise how much pressure this may place on them to ‘realise a child’s 
full educational and developmental potential’.  As the OECD comments, ‘parents are an 
important ‘market’ for neuromythologies’ (2002: 69.).  Moreover, some elements of the 
neuroscience discourse which stress ‘sensitive’ or ‘critical’ periods for children’s 
development, may also put undue pressure on children to achieve developmental milestones at 
appropriate times.  As this ‘science of development’ is being fully elaborated, questions can 
be asked about how those children (for whatever reason – for instance those who are perhaps 
disabled) who do not achieve certain developmental goals will be treated by policy makers.  
The more stress that is put on the importance of stages to development, the less emphasis is 
placed on the ability of remedial social policy.   Most advocates forwarding a neuroscience 
frame have tended to not either elaborate upon this issue (whilst it is often taken up by those 
forwarding an educative frame and a child-centred frame) or rather focused upon broad 
rationalisations for investments in the early years.  Certainly, as a polemic against a lack of 
state intervention and investment in this area, is where the neuroscience frame works most 
effectively.   
 
1.6 Child-centred Frame  
 
The ‘child-centred frame’ self-consciously sets itself apart from all other frames for EYEC.  
In many ways it can be considered to be an anti-scientific and anti-evidence frame.  It is 
formed, in part, from a general dissatisfaction with mainstream research practices and a 
rejection of other EYEC frames which base their discursive (policy) rationales upon claims to 
‘objective’, ‘scientific’ truths justified through empirical and often quantitative supporting 
 69 
evidence.  Indeed, it is argued that within Anglo-Saxon countries, such frames and evidence 
purport to have an authority over other forms of knowledge and expertise and thus excludes 
other forms of knowledge and other potential discourses of the early years.   
 
Many of the EYEC frames which have been covered thus far (with the exception of the equal 
opportunities frame) have been founded upon research that works within an (implicit and 
explicit) positivist epistemology and research methodology.  Much of this evidence and 
expertise is drawn from research fields from where this is to be expected: developmental 
psychology, neuroscience, epidemiology and other ‘sciences’ all self-consciously reflect this 
particular epistemological paradigm47.  Moreover, within these alternate frames, the benefits 
of EYEC programmes are often justified with reference to quantitative and empirical 
measures of ‘child development’ and other ‘measured’ outcomes which have subsequently 
informed implicitly ‘objective and universally applicable’ discourses of quality for EYEC 
programmes.  It is thus implicitly claimed that the various ‘EYEC policy models’ which each 
frame describes, can be applicable across different national contexts and within different 
cultural settings.  Indeed, as has been discussed in the proceeding sections, much of the 
evidence upon which various frames draw their policy rationales has arisen from America.  
Despite some obvious methodological problems with the potential transferability of EYEC 
policy (especially the specific national demonstration projects) from one national context to 
the next, this evidence has been developed and reproduced through seemingly coherent policy 
frames in such a way as to facilitate ideational circulation.  This is particularly evident within 
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 Schweinhart (architect of High/Scope research which contributed to the formation of the social engineering 
frame) makes this explicit.  He states “The scientific approach adopted in the High/Scope Perry Pre-school study 
is the logical application of the principle that similar experiences have similar effects on human development – 
what might be called the principle of external validity or generalizability” (2005: 14.).   
 70 
the neuroscience frame; brain research seeks to identify the common and universal structures 
of development in humans.  It is thus presented as applicable in all contexts and for every 
individual; indeed the raison d’être of the neuroscience frame is convince governments of the 
necessity to invest in the very early years. 
 
For those who work in other research paradigms, especially those EYEC experts who work 
from within a postmodern epistemological position, the central concepts which have informed 
dominant research practice and define policy within alternate EYEC frames such as ‘quality’, 
‘best practice’ and ‘child development’ are neither neutral nor universal constructs which can 
be applied in all circumstances and cultural contexts.  Indeed, the particular discourses of 
quality and child development (found especially within the social engineering, educative and 
neuroscience frames) which have acquired a hegemonic status in the Anglo-Saxon EYEC 
field are considered to be strongly modernist, positivistic in approach and committed to the 
importance of generating objective forms of knowledge (Dahlberg et al., 1999: 101.).  By 
exposing such knowledge as operating within a certain paradigm, a child-centred frame 
asserts that these discourses in fact embody a ‘grand narrative’ of early childhood and 
development.  For these researchers, the early childhood field is increasingly dominated by 
this one particularly strong narrative: an Anglo-American narrative spoken in the English 
language, located in a liberal political and economic context, instrumental in rationality, 
universalist in ethics and technical in its approach (Moss, 2001: 13.).  Moreover within this 
narrative it is suggested that technocratic ‘child development knowledge has been so 
foundational to the field of early childhood education that erasing it would seem to leave us in 
a mindless limbo’ (Darlberg et al, 1999: 100.).  Researchers, activists and academics from a 
child-centred frame argue that this narrative can be actively challenged and moreover that the 
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discourses of ‘child development’, ‘quality’ and ‘childhood’ actually differ according to 
particular cultural and temporal spaces (especially outside the Anglo-Saxon world).  They are 
concepts constituted through a particular discourse, of a particular ‘regime of truth’, which 
can (and indeed should be) essentially contested and open to deconstruction.   
 
In this way, a central thrust of the child-centred frame is to closely interrogate the central 
unifying concept of ‘early childhood’ which binds all EYEC frames and to which (discursive 
and policy) action is directed.  Indeed, as Carlina Rinaldi, from the influential Reggio Emilia 
project in Italy, states ‘childhood does not exist, we create it as a society, as public subject.  It 
is a social, political and historical construction’ (cited, in Moss, 2001: 3.).  Questioning what 
are usually treated as neutral concepts and problematising the notion of childhood is thus an 
important endeavour for these academics and activists.  Working from an explicitly 
postmodern position48, these actors have sought to create a counter-discourse of ‘early 
childhood’ and ‘the child’ which challenges (what they view as) the positivist orientation of 
the mainstream.  Much of the impetus for this action, aside from questioning the external 
validity and generalisability of knowledge generated from a positivist epistemological 
position, is that some of the other EYEC policy frames can have real and detrimental effects 
on children; that children are subjects and objects of intervention and, as such, not are 
considered as citizens in their own right.  Many of these researchers are concerned that a 
‘schoolification’ of the early childhood years is taking place through an overt focus on 
readiness for school and learning standards in Anglo-Saxon countries (OECD, 2006: 63.).  
Potentially, other frames for EYEC, if transposed to the political/state arena and concretised 
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 And often drawing upon insights from the post-structuralism of Foucault, see Darlberg et al, (1999).  
Especially pp.28-35.     
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through policy, will make this situation worse for the lives of children.  Moreover, inaction by 
the state in this regard will also leave the early experiences of children to the whims of the 
market, which fills the vacuum that an absence of social policy creates.  Indeed many 
researchers working from this child-centred frame worry that modern childhood is 
increasingly becoming institutionalised (Moss, 2001: 4.).   
 
Through carrying out a project of deconstructing ‘normalising’ concepts contained within the 
early childhood mainstream field these researchers have also embarked upon a project of 
reconstruction which aims to create an alternative frame for EYEC intervention and loosely 
conceived ideas of potential early childhood institutions which are explicitly child-centred.  
Indeed, from the viewpoint of the child-centred frame, ‘childhood’ is and should be viewed as 
a phase of life with intrinsic value (Neuman, 2000: 8.).  In this way, as Friendly (2000) states: 
 
“It presumes that children have a value here and now, not simply for what they might 
become, whether they might become better students or better citizens or less inclined 
to criminal behaviour.  One way to think about this is, as has been said, ‘children are 
people, not merely adults in training’ ”   
  
Broadly speaking, this reconstructive project seeks to describe an alternative vision for early 
childhood institutions as potential ‘children’s spaces’.  In this way, a child-centred frame 
explicitly rejects conventional notions of EYEC institutions as ‘services’, instead these 
‘spaces’ are conceived as ‘physical and discursive spaces which provide opportunities for 
many projects involving children and adults, the consequences of which may be unknown’ 
(Moss, 2001: 5.).  As such, these EYEC institutions explicitly ‘[turn] away from the 
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modernist idea of organic unity and encourages multiple languages, confrontation, ambiguity 
and ambivalence’ (ibid.).  This is a radical conception of EYEC institutions and turns the idea 
of rationalising EYEC on the basis that it will achieve a particular broader goal (whether this 
is: increasing a child’s potential cognitive development, saving future social expenditures, 
allowing female labour market participation etc) on its head.  Instead, EYEC institutions 
should be primarily for the benefit of child ‘in the here and now’ without reference to some 
broader aim or specific external set of goals.  Indeed, the vision of EYEC institutions as 
‘spaces’ draws attention to the idea that children and adults should determine their own goals 
in EYEC centres and engage in a variety of activities and projects without necessarily 
working towards a pre-determined set of criteria, nor to achieve a particular outcome.  This 
explicitly views the child as a ‘co-constructor of knowledge, understanding and identity, who 
at an early age is viewed as rich in potential, and strong, powerful and competent’ (Neuman, 
2000: 7.).  In so doing, the child-centred frame rejects the idea that a child is an empty vessel 
which needs to be filled with knowledge or should be the subject of other policy aims.  
Instead this frame aims to build a vision for EYEC centres which are more participatory and 
inclusive with children at the centre of collaborative projects.  As such, EYEC centres should 
be: 
 
“sites for many projects.  These projects can be of many kinds: social economic 
cultural, political aesthetic, ethical.  What the projects are will be determined by adults 
and children, and once again are contestable – there is nothing inevitable about what 
happens in children’s spaces” (Moss, 2001: 5.).  
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Peter Moss, Professor of Early Childhood Provision, at the influential Thomas Coram 
Research Unit (based at the Institute of Education, University of London), arguably the 
principal proponent of the ‘child-centred frame’ (especially throughout the Anglo-Saxon 
world) sums up the central rationale for a child-centred frame for EYEC institutions to the 
point.  As he states:  
 
“For me early years education institutions are at their best, like schools at their best, 
places of possibilities” (Moss, 2007). 
 
In this way, through constructing an idea of EYEC institutions as a site of possibilities and 
having a relatively wide scope for potential activity, the child-centred frame seeks to broaden 
the notion of what EYEC services can conceivably achieve, the aims of these institutions and 
what place they can occupy in society.   
 
Overall, in a sense, a child-centred frame asserts that EYEC institutions should be viewed as 
forums or focal points located in civil society: for children and constructed by the needs of 
children (Friendly and Lero, 2002: 8.).   Moreover, these institutions should be ‘community 
institutions in their own right’.  For Darlberg et al., such institutions can become ‘the primary 
means for fostering the visibility, inclusion and active participation of the young child in civil 
society (1999: 7.).   
 
Speaking more prescriptively, such institutions should be seen as a resource for local children, 
families and communities.  Their task is to provide a range of provisions, activities based 
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upon a holistic approach to children and in response to the needs of local children and 
families.  As an OCED report asserts: 
 
“The curriculum for [EYEC] should be: broad and holistic; more process-related and 
co-constructive; defined by the vital interests and needs of the children, families and 
community; and more in tune with socio-cultural contexts.  This supports the 
development of flexible frameworks that give freedom for adaptation, experimentation 
and cultural inputs” (2001: 116.).    
 
Moreover following the idea of participation, this model would seek to include all children; 
there should not be separate services for children with disabilities, for families at risk or for 
children with employed parents (Moss, 1997: 15.).  Of course, following the principles of 
diversity and local knowledge which is so integral to the post-modern understanding (and so 
opposed to the universalising force of scientific ideas as within social engineering, educative 
and neuroscientific frames), proposed EYEC centres would seek to retain as much local 
diversity as possible whilst maintaining a common ethos which would ensure a consistent, 
equitable and integrated approach (ibid.).    
 
The overall aims and ambitions of the child-centred frame for EYEC can thus be considered 
ambitious and, as has been shown, reflects a distinctive conception of children as experts 
within their own lives.  This is very much opposed to children being the subject of experts and 
expertise.  As can be seen from the proceeding discussion, the overall ethos or vision for 
EYEC centres that a child-centred frame constructs is quite loosely conceived, in many 
places, the child-centred frame asserts that EYEC centres should treat children both 
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holistically (implying attention to many facets of a child’s development) and yet also respond 
to the specific needs of each child as an individual (implying an autonomy from specific or 
external learning objectives or set criteria for activities).  As such the child centred frame 
offers a general sketch of how EYEC centres or institutions might actually operate.  In part, 
this is to maintain sensitivity to different national and cultural situations.  Indeed, for a 
country like Canada, with significant First Nations populations, such considerations are 
especially important where previously such communities have been subject to western ‘best 
practice’ considered to be in the best interests of subjected children (Darlberg et al., 1999: 
169.).  In part also, it is a central aim of the child-centred frame to reject a technical or 
standardised approach which can be classified and replicated irrespective of context (ibid: 
122.).   
 
However, it is true to say that this frame draws much of its inspiration from the work of 
municipal pre-schools, in the Reggio Emilia region of Italy49.  The Reggio Emilia pre-school 
centres have been famed not only for their democratic vision of society, but also for the level 
and complexity of learning generated by children in these centres (OECD, 2006: 139.).  In 
keeping with the idea of children as experts of their own learning, projects are freely chosen 
with teachers and children experience aspects of the surrounding world (including their 
experience of life in the city) and explore their interconnectedness (ibid.).  Their thinking and 
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 This frame also similarly draws inspiration from the Danish pedagogical approach which is in many ways very 
similar to Reggio Emilia.  Danish pedagogues are educated to work across a wide range of occupations and 
settings and are the main workers in early childhood settings, school age childcare, youth work, residential care 
for children and young people and services for adults with severe disabilities.  As such they are very far removed 
from the English idea of ‘teacher’ and pedagogues maintain a distinct and strong professional identity (see Moss, 
2004).  Moreover the Danish eschew didactic education models, preferring a notion of competence rather than 
acquisition of knowledge (OECD, 2006: 139.).   
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learning are expressed through many modes of expression (their words, projects, paintings, 
photos and constructions) reflecting a central place given to freedom of inquiry, culture and 
imagination (ibid.).   In many ways, the child-centred frame seeks to emulate (or at least draw 
inspiration from) the principles and pedagogical approach to working with young children as 
happens within Reggio pre-schools.  As Darlberg et al, state ‘the Reggio approach shares 
much with post-modern understandings and concepts such as ‘construction’, ‘co-construction’ 
and ‘reconstruction’.’ (1999: 121.).  Moreover, it shares ‘a pedagogical practice located in a 
profound understanding of young children in relation to the world and a philosophical 
perspective which in many respects seems to us postmodern’ (1999: 122.).   
 
The Reggio Emilia approach or practice to working with children in their early years has been 
developed since the end of the Second World War within the commune (local authority) of 
Reggio and has built up an extensive network of early childhood institutions for children from 
0 to 6 and at the same time working to develop a pedagogical theory and practice, which has 
been the subject of much international interest (Darlberg et al., 1999: 13.).  The nurseries 
began as self-organised day care collectives, whose funding was taken over and extended by 
the local authority (Penn, 1999).  As such they are local collaborations between parents, 
practitioners and children of Reggio but, in particular, the work of Loris Malaguzzi, a 
psychologist working in the area and the first head of the early childhood service was an 
important developer of the pedagogical practice (or method) which has become synonymous 
with Reggio.   
 
Here it is useful to specify what pedagogical practice entails, especially outside of an Anglo-
Saxon context.  Pedagogy is a long established tradition in Continental Europe, but to the 
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English ear, especially outside certain specialist circles it is largely unused or where it is, 
misused (Moss and Petrie, 2002: 138.).  Often in British educational theory, the term is used 
in the sense of ‘the science, methods of teaching/learning and especially the methods for 
teaching subjects’50.   In Continental European usage, pedagogy denotes a much broader 
intellectual domain which encompasses the study of education and a variety of forms of 
human enquiry and endeavour related to it (ibid.).  In this way, the field of pedagogy is much 
wider than that of the English word, teacher, indeed it refers to the whole domain of social 
responsibility for children, their well-being, learning and competence.  Pedagogues work 
across a wide range of occupations.  The general approach is relational and holistic: ‘the 
pedagogue sets out to address the whole child, the child with a body mind, emotions, 
creativity, history and social identity’ (Moss, 2004: 1.).  For Malaguzzi specifically, the 
Reggio pedagogical practice aimed to: 
 
“make a place of research, learning, revisiting, reconsideration and reflection… in our 
approach we proceed by making plans, considering options, making cognitive 
reflections and symbolic representations and refining communications skills… what is 
most appreciated all along is the shared sense of accomplishment as individuals and as 
a group (1993, cited in Penn, 1999) 
 
Malaguzzi developed the idea that through an active reciprocal exchange, pedagogues can 
strengthen learners how to learn.  The central acts of adults, therefore is to activate, especially 
indirectly, the meaning-making competencies of children as a basis of all learning.  As a 
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 Often this is the way that pedagogy is referred to within the educative frame.  For example Siraj-Blatchford 
and Sylva (2002) in their recent DfES-sponsored study of effective pedagogy in the early years, explain the term 
as ‘both teaching and the provision of instructive learning environments and routines’ (cited in BERA, 2003: 7.).   
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pedagogical councillor in Reggio describes ‘the job of the pre-school is to let the children 
know that they are the ones who give shape to things and are not just destined to submit the 
things’ (Filippini, 1997: 40.).  As such Reggio Emilia schools do not follow an external 
curriculum.  The content of the work is said to be ‘emergent’, that is, chosen by the children 
and is negotiated with their pedagogue, who’s main task is to support the children in realising 
and reflecting on their project (OECD, 2006: 149.).   Moreover, Malaguzzi, aimed to create a 
diverse learning experience which would include what he termed ‘many languages’; 
‘expressive, symbolic, cognitive, logical, imaginative, ethical, metaphorical and rational’.   
All which would be given equal weight or consideration (Filippini, 1997: 42.).  The 
environment of the pre-school would also be given attention, Malaguzzi colourfully 
describing it as a ‘kind of aquarium which reflects the ideas, ethics, attitudes and culture of 
the people who live in it’ (ibid.).  
 
As can be seen from the proceeding discussion, the child-centred frame directs discursive and 
policy attention towards to the child.  Perhaps more than any other frame, it has a well-
developed sense of the child as citizen with rights and as an active and valuable participant in 
civil society.  Those who advocate the child-centred EYEC frame would not wish to assert 
(owing to their epistemological concerns) that their particular frame offers ‘the best’ vision 
for a EYEC institutions, nor that Reggio institutions in Italy should provide a specific 
blueprint for policy outside of that particular context.  Advocates for a child-centred EYEC 
policy, such as Peter Moss, would rather appeal to the notion of creating a broad programme 
of action for EYEC intervention which would recognise children as having rights, autonomy 
and a need to follow their own specific developmental path.  In many ways, the child-centred 
frame seeks to radically alter social policy orientations to children.  In so doing it offers a 
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powerful critique of alternative frames which seek to enact EYEC policies upon children, 
especially where there are specific measurable and external goals in mind.  It also offers a 
critique of the dominant expert discourses which produce research about EYEC.  As Peter 
Moss mentioned in interview: 
 
“it is not that any of these [policy frames] are not rationales but there is a tendency to 
layer everything on one thing…. you get a homogenised approach which actually 
produces extraordinarily dull research, you get the same old ‘if you spend one dollar 
you get so many back’.  I think on the one hand it completely underplays the potential 
of the institutions in early childhood and on the other hand sets them with impossible 
expectations” (2007.).   
 
Within a child-centred frame, that children’s holistic well being can be enhanced through 
EYEC institutions should be the single motivating aim of any policy.  For these advocates 
there is no need to justify policy with appeals to quantitative ‘educative gains’ or ‘investment 
returns’.  Such policies have a tendency to treat individuals instrumentally.  Instead these 
advocates seek to justify policy purely through rights; to borrow from the Reggio city motto: 
‘Investment in children is a fundamental cultural and social investment’ (Ontario, 2006: 91.).    
 
The programme of reform which the child-centred frame rationalises would require 
significant investment on the part of the state.   As much as 40% of the municipal budget in 
Reggio Emilia is allocated to education (ibid.).  Creating universal community hubs which 
could be accessed equitably by all would require significant new (capital) investment, 
alongside a broad training programme which would allow EYEC practitioners to develop 
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appropriate pedagogical approaches.  Moreover, many child-centred advocates seek to follow 
the Nordic example of a late start to formal education and as such raise the entry age of 
children into school.  Whilst there are many good reasons for such investments and a 
restructuring of the Anglo-Saxon education system, it is certainly the most radical frame when 
compared to the traditional lack of state invention in EYEC within Canada and the UK.  
Indeed, the child-centred frame seeks to fundamentally challenge existing divisions between 
the state and family responsibilities and create a new specific area of social policy constructed 
through a discourse of children’s social rights.  Where a particular state has traditionally 
considered issues of childcare as a private, family matter, as has been the case within the UK 
and Canada, a child-centred policy frame challenges the fundamental values of welfare state 
action.  In so doing it potentially seeks to challenge underlying cultural values about the 
position of children in civil society.  In this sense, therefore the child-centred frame asks 
governments to move the furthest; to establish a distinct new area of social policy.  This is in 
contrast to alternative frames which target interventions to specific clienteles (as in the social 
engineering frame) and others which seek to build upon existing social policy areas such as 
education (the educative frame and to some extent the neuroscience frame).  As such, 
academics, activists and policy entrepreneurs who seek to forward this frame in the political 
arena have, without doubt, the biggest task ahead of them.  It is possibly for such reasons that 
these child-centred advocates encompass a small, yet highly committed set of agents working 
at the margins of the international early years field.    
 
As such, as has been shown, these six frames make very distinctive claims about EYEC; what 
mode the state should play in terms of reconciling care, education/development and 
wellbeing.  Whilst some are expansive and potentially reconcilable, such as the child-centred 
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and equal opportunities frames, others narrow the focus of EYEC to particular elements 
which may preclude an integrated system or confine EYEC institutions to those at risk.   
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2. CHAPTER TWO: EYEC IN ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
“Children are 20 per cent of our population but 100 per cent of our future” (Gordon 
Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, HC, 2002) 
 
Since 1997, over the course of three terms of government, New Labour have invested over 
£25 billion in EYEC policies; opening some 3,000 ‘Children’s Centres’ across the country; 
provided free universal part time early years education for three and four years olds 
(alongside pilots for 2 year olds) which by 2010 will entitle each child to 15 hours per week 
for 38 weeks of the year; created an extended schools programme within half of all primary 
schools, providing Ofsted registered childcare from 8am to 6pm, 48 weeks of the year; 
created a statutory duty for all local authorities to provide sufficient childcare places for 
children under three; and provided child tax credits which aim to cover up to 80 per cent of 
childcare costs (HC, 2009; DCFS, 2009; HC 2007; HM Treasury, 2007: 113; HC, 2007a; HC, 
2007b.).  In short, New Labour have embarked upon an unprecedented social policy 
expansion into the EYEC field and committed significant state funding towards this 
endeavour.  Over time, EYEC has come to be generally considered a flagship policy of New 
Labour’s tenure.  As Gordon Brown has made clear ‘we are committed to a national childcare 
strategy for the first time in this country, and we are committed to funding it properly’ (HC, 
2001a.).  Similarly, the first Minister for Children, Young People and Families, Margaret 
Hodge, has asserted that the government would ‘put children at the heart of everything we do’ 
(Hodge, 2003 cited in Williams and Roseneil, 2004).   
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Such a high level of recent commitment to EYEC policy is thrown into relief by the historic 
paucity of funding for early years and childcare policy in England.  Until relatively recently, 
EYEC has notably lacked significant policy attention.  While many other European countries 
have developed extensive, sometimes near universal EYEC systems, England has been a 
policy laggard (OECD, 2001: 180.).  For the most part, save for those children who have been 
deemed ‘at risk of neglect’, the state has intervened little in this area.  The education and care 
of children have been considered very much the private responsibility of their parents (Millar 
and Ridge, 2002: 85.).  Previous policy initiatives to develop elements of an EYEC system 
have stalled without enacting legislation (Ball, 1994: 13.).  To view England’s early years 
policy trajectory through the guiding prism of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typologies, 
such policy absence and welfare residualism is typical of the liberal welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 75.).  It also reflects the enduring background influence of the maternal care 
frame and its institutionalisation in the English welfare state (Randall, 2000: 13.).  This frame 
views maternal care as the ideal for young children, helping to entrench the assumption that 
mothers should be the primary carers of the young.  Historically, English social protection 
policies have been based this sort of male breadwinner family model (Lewis, 2006: 5.).  
Whilst England has never followed this policy frame to its logical conclusion by providing a 
full maternal care allowance; the state has provided some protections based upon the 
recognition of (maternal) care roles. 
 
As such, the development of EYEC policy during the mid-1990s marks a significant break 
with the past; when broadly taken together, these EYEC policies radically reconfigure the 
relationship between the state, mothers and their children.  Moreover, these policies represent 
a significant expansion of social policy; extending England’s welfare state into new domains 
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of social provision, some of which are based upon the principle of universality.  This is an 
entirely unexpected move for a supposed liberal welfare state, which mainstream research 
considers to be moving towards general retrenchment (Pierson, 2001: 433.).  In any case, the 
development of a new area of social policy is a significant event, requiring committed 
political intention to effect such change.  The natural question to ask at such a point is: what 
factors precipitate and motivate political agents to enact these innovative reforms, especially 
where there has been little institutional legacy?   
 
This chapter, and the next, account for the political impetus to develop EYEC policies in 
England and explain the underlying reasons behind these political developments.  Such a task 
is necessarily complex.  A full explanation would involve elucidating the interplay between 
the underlying material and social structural change, institutional developments and the 
ascendency of new EYEC ideational frames which have precipitated the necessary ideational 
pressures and institutional conditions conductive to policy change and agential innovation.  
My analysis takes a historical approach and seeks to trace how an established ideational and 
institutional matrix informed by maternal care ideas and exhibiting classic liberal features 
could come to be destabilised and superseded by feminist pressure and a set of ‘scientifically 
informed’ EYEC ideas, which assert the importance of the early years for future outcomes.   
 
The analysis is centred upon the identification and explanation of underlying social structural 
shifts, evolving practices of policy making within institutions, alongside developments in 
EYEC ideas, evidence and knowledge.  In combination these factors precipitated a contingent 
period of ‘open space’ in the policy process.  I argue that the mid-1990s, marked the (re)turn 
to evidence-based policy making within the social policy realm.  Tracing how such evidence 
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has been utilised within the political process is central to understanding the recent 
commitment and state investment within the early years.  The following chapter shows that 
the turn to ‘evidence’ and expertise has been precipitated through a reaction to the New Public 
Management (NPM) era and that a post-NPM agenda for change within both within various 
government departments and New Labour in opposition.  I argue that this has created the right 
institutional and political conditions for the ascendency of evidence-based policy making and 
an openness in the policy process to external sources of (scientific) evidence.  Alongside these 
underlying institutional changes, the appearance of a set of scientifically informed EYEC 
ideas (arising principally from research in the US), articulated skilfully by a network of early 
years advocates and academics, created a persuasive discursive imperative linked with a set of 
specific rationalisations for significant investment in the early years and, in particular, the 
importance of early years development and education.  The next chapter will show how this 
new ‘scientific’ early years evidence has destabilised and superseded the existing latent 
maternal care frame, where other policy rationalisations – especially those based upon 
feminist ideas (as developed in an equal opportunities frame for EYEC) – had previously 
failed to gain ascendency and to motivate change in isolation.  These institutional conditions 
and ideational frames have led to a tipping point of pressure where state disinterest and 
inactivity in the field of EYEC policy could no longer be justified.   
 
The next chapter argues that scientific EYEC ideas and evidence have had a profound effect 
upon the social policy trajectory in England; opening the political process to academics and 
advocates who had previously been closed (or at least held a marginal position) from the 
policy process.  Whilst government policy has often been aided and guided by external 
expertise – indeed expertise it is as old as government itself – it is novel for social policy to be 
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driven by external evidence to such a great extent and for policy to be justified with reference 
to such evidence (Fisher, 2003: 2.).  However, an important caveat needs to be entered.  The 
chapter will show that whilst New Labour has devoted a particular attention to developing and 
rationalising social policy investments on the basis of EYEC evidence, this has not entailed a 
coherent process or a straight correspondence between one single set or frame of early years 
‘evidence’ and subsequent (coherent) policy development.  Indeed, the chapter demonstrates 
that, in the moment of ‘open space’, disparate and partially conflicting set of EYEC frames 
and evidence entered the policy area.  Each EYEC frame in some ways rationalises 
investments in the early years, but all articulate (sometimes subtly) different discursive 
constructions of EYEC and back qualitatively different policy models.  Hence, whilst the 
network of early years academics and experts made their arguments for investing in the early 
years more powerful by combining different frames to justify state investments, the 
unintended effect was to create conflicting messages about the purpose of EYEC and, thus, 
the best policy model to follow.  The next chapter will explain the specific ways in which 
various EYEC frames have been utilised by different areas of government and within different 
EYEC programmes.  This has generated a ‘scattergun’ approach to policy making and a 
relatively unstable discursive articulation of the character and purposes of EYEC.  Rather than 
embodying a stable child-centred investment or ‘LEGO’ paradigm (Jensen and Saint-Martin, 
2006), England’s EYEC policy trajectory is complex, unstable and has not always embodied 
specifically ‘child-centred’ investments.  Driven by multiple ideational frames, New Labour’s 
initial policy approach has not been entirely coherent.  Much to the disappointment of early 
years academics and advocates, it does not appear to have transcended the historic 
institutionalisation of a fragmented (albeit very limited) EYEC system, polarised between 
‘early education’ and ‘childcare’.   
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The next chapter will chart the ways in which New Labour have latterly sought to bring 
coherence to their EYEC policy through interdepartmental reviews, the dissenting voices of 
the Select Committee on Education and Employment and the OECD; all of which have sought 
to steer the government towards a more child-centred frame for EYEC and to integrate 
services.  Whilst there has been some progress towards integrating services, the chapter will 
explore how, over time, Labour’s commitment to a modernisation project based on evidence-
based policy making has set institutional conditions which have selected for the ascendency 
and embedding of the ‘scientific’ educative, neuroscientific and social engineering frames.  
Hence it is these ideas which come dominate the government’s EYEC policy agenda (and to 
which the lion’s share of resources have been devoted).  This may have limited the scope to 
develop a fully integrated and child-centred vision for EYEC; one which actually puts 
children at the heart of policy development (rather than treating them instrumentally) and 
equally negated the ability of policy to fully address gender concerns.   
 
2.1 EYEC policy pre-1990s: the dominance of the maternal care frame and the ‘hands off’ 
state 
 
Until recently, EYEC policy has been ‘the sootiest of British “Cinderella” services, holding a 
marginal place in both the theory and practice of the UK’s welfare state’ (Wincott 2006: 286).  
Moreover, as Randall argues, the failure to develop strong national interventionist policies 
around the family, the labour market or social equality that could have provided a propitious 
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context for the latter emergence of public childcare provision51, all show England conforming 
to a liberal welfare state type (2000: 176.).  Indeed, built into the conditions of England’s 
welfare provisions and social rights have been the assumption of stable nuclear families based 
upon a gendered division of domestic caring labour (Prideaux, 2005: 139.).  As O’Conner et 
al., describe it ‘a male breadwinner-female housewife logic which implies strong gender 
differentiation’ (1999: 195.).   In this way, the lack of adequate childcare is cited as evidence 
of this unfolding gender logic and the consequence being that ‘defamilialization’ (the extent 
to which households welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed) occurs purely through 
market forms both for supply (fees) and demand (commercial or employer provision) (Mahon, 
2002: 6.).   
 
But why would there be a historical reluctance on the part of the state to socialise care and 
instead prioritise the nuclear family model in social provisions?  The English policy trajectory 
has been largely defined by the enduring influence of the maternal care frame.  Its influence in 
political circles and subsequent concretisation in policy has set discursive and latterly 
institutional limits on the development of extensive state provision of childcare.  As has been 
elaborated previously, the maternal care frame assumes by default that mothers provide the 
best care of the young (indeed it is necessary for children’s wellbeing to become securely 
attached to a primary carer) and hence it is only those mothers who are seriously deficient in 
providing care (or have desperate circumstances negating their ability to care) who require 
state intervention.  Indeed, as the UK Central Policy Review Staff reporting on services for 
young children with working mothers in 1978 comments, ‘hitherto the assumption has been 
that the parents and in particular the mother can normally cope unaided with a child’s first 5 
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 As indeed happened in Sweden. 
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years of life with a certain amount of fairly elementary help on health and development’ 
(CPRS, 1978: 11.).  This assumption that the majority of mothers are able to and therefore 
should take responsibility for children’s care in the early years, has led to a deliberate policy 
of state absence in the field of childcare and other intervention policies to aid mothers to enter 
the labour market.  Under the influence of the maternal frame, childcare policy discussions 
have implicitly centred on protections for those children who were ‘needy’ or indeed at ‘risk 
of neglect’.  In this way, rather than state intervention in childcare entailing a (positive) social 
right for parents, policy was constructed as a (negative) provision for ‘problem’ families.  
Childcare and early years policies have thus been considered a ‘marginal’ policy concern for 
the ‘margins’ of society.  Such ideas have been concretised in the institutionalisation of 
childcare as a residual ‘welfare issue’ located in the Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) (Bacchi, 1999: 137.).  Placing childcare policy within the DHSS has conditioned 
policy development for childcare through a health and social services perspective.  As such, 
the Children’s division focused policy development upon delinquency, children at risk, 
children’s health and adoption (CPRS, 1978: 59.).  At local authority level, childcare places in 
‘day nurseries’ were necessarily been restricted by Social Services departments to those in 
dire need and strictly controlled.  As the Central Policy Review Staff report asserts:  
 
“places in day nurseries [are only given] after a recommendation has been made by a 
social worker and the case has been considered by a committee consisting of the social 
worker, health visitor and nursery matron concerned, even where the needs of the 
child or its family for the place at the day nursery are extremely pressing…. the top 
priority for nursery places is given to children who are ‘at risk’ or who are thought to 
have been damaged by their parents; children with unsatisfactory housing conditions 
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are given some priority as are the children of single parent families where their parent 
if anxious and able to return to work” (CPRS, 1978: 50.).  
 
Over time, neither the Labour nor Conservative governments sought to expand such services, 
nor widen eligibility.  Indeed, even by the end of the 1980s, the Children Act of 1989 
contained a public duty to provide ‘day care’ services, but only for children defined by 
welfare authorities as ‘in need’ (Moss and Penn, 1996: 36.).  In practice, Social Services 
departments during the Thatcher era were increasingly inclined to narrow the use of publicly 
funded services purely for those at risk of physical or sexual abuse, further undermining 
public provision of childcare for lone or working parents (Bacchi, 1999: 137.).  Moreover, the 
numbers of local authority day care nurseries fell during the 1980s, from 32,000 (in 1980) to 
30,000 in 1990 (Ringin, 1997: 77.).  Such narrow eligibility and falling provision is reflected 
by the fact that by 1990, only 8% of pre-school children (four and under) were in a local 
authority day nursery (ibid: 73.).   
 
Whilst the prominence of the maternal care frame has conditioned the development of a 
limited ‘childcare’ service (and gender differentiated notions of care), it has consequently led 
to the provision of some social entitlements on the principle of maternal care.  The 
introduction of child benefit (replacing family allowances) phased in during 1977-9 gave 
entitlements to the first child and upgraded benefit levels (Sainsbury, 1996: 79.).  This was a 
comparatively generous child benefit package and meant that until 1988 lone mothers 
received relatively higher means-tested benefits than couples (Lewis, 1997: 14.).  Even in the 
context of ascending neo-conservative ideas which lamented the existence of non-working 
lone mothers as evidence a growing underclass who were, by such circumstances, ‘welfare 
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dependent’, the Conservatives remained ambivalent about whether to encourage mothers to 
work outside the home.  As late as 1990, the National Audit Office iterated the Government’s 
official policy of neutrality regarding lone mother’s employment (ibid: 66.).   
 
The influence and persistence of the maternal care frame has also partly hindered the 
ascendency of early years ‘educative ideas’ in policy discussions (despite the best efforts of 
early years education advocates and academics) and this has prevented the development of a 
universal nursery education system in the England.  Indeed, whilst nursery education in some 
ways has a stronger, albeit limited policy legacy than that of day nurseries, the enduring idea 
that mothers should be the primary carers of young children (and involved in their early 
experiences and education), has marginalised the development of a comprehensive publicly 
funded EYEC system through an educative agenda.  As has been previously elaborated, a 
maternal care frame is sceptical of the benefits of centre-based group care; an underling 
theory of ‘attachment’ prioritises a one-to-one care relationship ideally in a domestic setting 
for the majority of the time.  In many ways, these ideas have served to condition policy 
recommendations for nursery education.  Indeed the discussion of pre-school provision in the 
Plowden Report, Children and Their Primary Schools (1967) reveals underlying assumptions 
about the primacy of maternal care and the restriction of places to those ‘in need’52.  Plowden 
recommended full-time attendance at nursery for only 15 per cent of three and four year olds; 
these being the number of children who were considered needy enough to attend full-time 
because their home circumstances are poor (Kiernan, Land & Lewis: 1998: 249.).  As the 
report states ‘the children of very large families, those from overcrowded homes, homes with 
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 Being in need here implied that the home circumstance was less than ideal, rather than construing ‘need’ or 
‘risk’ on a socio-economic basis (as formed the principles of the social engineering frame).   
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only one parent or with sick mothers’ (cited in, ibid.).  Indeed it was considered ‘generally 
undesirable, except to prevent a greater evil, to separate mother and child for a whole day in 
nursery… it is no business of the education service to encourage these [working mothers]’ 
(CASE, 1967, cited in Browne, 1996: 372.).  There was a general concern that expanding 
nursery education towards a comprehensive system (along the lines of a school day or longer) 
would prevent mothers from being involved with their children’s early experiences.  Unlike 
mother and toddler groups and playgroups, nursery classes separated the mother and child for 
long periods of time and in many ways this was seen as potentially damaging to both children 
and mothers 53(Plowden, 1987: 123.).  Indeed as the majority of mothers stayed at home to 
care for children at this time (indeed many married women were housewives), maternal care 
ideas resonated with the existing family structures and as such it was easy to simply assume 
that mothers would only want services which enhanced their role as primary carers and an 
opposition to services which supplanted their role. 
  
A later education White Paper, Education: A Framework for Expansion (1972) argued for the 
first significant increase in educational nursery provision since wartime nurseries and yet 
similarly framed a proposed expansion of (part time) nursery education around those 
particularly at risk (Ringin, 1997: 74; Bruner, 1980: xvi).  Moreover, whilst the White Paper 
acknowledged to some extent the ‘importance of the years before five in a child’s education’, 
the promise made by Margaret Thatcher (then Education Secretary) to expand services with a 
view to developing towards universal provision rapidly faded and both Conservative and 
Labour governments subsequently failed to implement this plan (Ringin, 1997: 74; Ball, 
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 Indeed it was the problem of loneliness and boredom, even depression which conditioned policy makers away 
from managed nursery provisions and instead to encourage part-time services which allowed mother and child to 
stay together (Plowden, 1987: 123; CPRS, 1978: 23.).   
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1994: 7.).  In part, general political opinion appeared to remain conditioned by maternal care 
ideas and against any ‘care’ policies which would prevent children from being with their 
mothers.  As Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Security State for Social Security 
stated ‘I don’t think mothers have the same right to work as fathers… these are the biological 
facts; young children do depend upon their mothers’ (1979, cited in Ringin, 1997: 74.).  There 
were also embedded institutional constraints.  There was a lack of a specific grant for early 
learning and local authorities had no duty to provide one.  In this way, nursery education had 
to compete for resources with all other areas of local government responsibility, such as 
libraries, adult education or services for old people (Ball, 1994: 11.).  In austere times, nursery 
education was an easy cut for local authorities to make54.   
 
Alongside the enduring maternal care frame, another factor which conditioned against 
substantial investments in early years education and nursery schools was the perceived lack of 
specific evidence that managed early years settings such as of that in a nursery (as opposed to 
that of their mothers or other domestic setting), were necessary to develop children’s 
educational capacity.  Whilst educational researchers (as has been outlined in ‘the educative 
frame’) sought to develop the case that all children would benefit from early years education, 
their research was hampered by the lack of convincing or hard evidence on the both the 
necessity of ‘early education’ for future performance and that nursery education provided 
benefits that were better than that of other early experiences (being with mother; childminder; 
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 According to the CPRS report there had been some expansion between 1972 and 1975.  However, in 1975 
public expenditure cuts caused severe cut backs in the programme.  Local authorities were free to decide whether 
or not to provide nursery education which further hampered the policy (CPRS, 1978: 62.).   
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playgroup)55.  Indeed their focus has been predominantly upon dispelling the notion that 
managed settings away from mothers, damaged children (and as such used as a last resort).  
Whilst educational researchers made progress with building the case for nursery education, 
the Department for Education remained sceptical that early education was advantageous, 
especially in the long term (Ball, 1994: 11.)  Even by the end of the 1980s there were doubts 
about the efficacy of early education.  As the minutes of evidence of the Education, Science 
and Arts Committee reveal when considering whether there were advantages to having a ‘pre-
school education’ system the Committee stated that the research evidence was ‘properly 
cautious about the causal link’ (1989: 140.).  Hence limited resources would ‘confine further 
expansion of provision in the immediate future to the areas of greatest social deprivation’ 
(ibid: 149.).  As such, nursery education places only slowly increased over years, by 1991 
only 26% of three and four year olds having a place (roughly 15% of overall pre-school 
children), 80% of which was part time56 (Browne, 1996: 366; Ringin, 1997: 73.).   
 
It perhaps would be expected with such state reticence to provide publicly-funded EYEC 
services and other labour market activation policies, that female labour market participation 
would be relatively low in England.  However, despite the lack of state support, many women 
and mothers increasingly entered the labour market.  Indeed, the overall female labour force 
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 Indeed as Smith argues the dismal results emanating from Head Start during the 1960s and 1970s conditioned 
policy makers away from developing Educational Priority Areas and the faith in the power of education to 
combat poverty (1987: 34.).   
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 Many four year olds were increasingly being admitted to reception classes in primary schools.  Whilst there 
had been a policy in many local authorities to admit ‘rising fives’ (children admitted at the start of the term in 
which they would turn five) a trend towards once-yearly admission led to younger four year olds being admitted 
(Ball, 1994: 33.).  The problem with admitting the younger children to school is that primary school teachers (at 
this time) were not specifically trained in early years education and hence the primary school curriculum would 
not always be appropriate for this age group.   
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participation rate (of prime age women – twenty-five to fifty-four years old) gradually rose 
from 62.1% in 1980, to 67.7% in 1985, to 73% in 1990 and 74% by 1995 (ILO; 2008.).  Such 
a figure is comparatively high if compared to Southern European countries, but lower than the 
Nordic countries.   
 
The increasing proportion of mothers working provides the most striking figures.  In the 
heyday of the ‘male breadwinner family form’ during the 1950s only 15% of women with 
children under five worked and as such appeared to conform to state preferences for maternal 
care.  During the latter half of the century there was a significant increase in working mothers 
with young children (Kiernan, Land and Lewis, 1998: 245.).  Between 1979 and 1995, the 
proportion of working mothers with pre-school children (under five) almost doubled from 
26% to 48% (ibid.).  Although much of this increase was due to mothers working part time, it 
was clear that the traditional family structures and maternal care norm on which English 
social protection policies had been based were being eroded by the entry of women and 
mothers into the labour force (despite significant structural constraints).  An increasingly 
sharp disjuncture was appearing between existing social policy ideas (and provision) and 
underlying social-structural change.  Hacker identifies such a process as ‘policy drift’; 
‘changes in the operation or effect of policies that occur without significant changes in those 
policies structure’ (2004: 246.).  Indeed, as women sought to enter the labour market in ever 
greater numbers, the ability of England’s ‘maternal care’ frame of social provision to account 
and provide for this evolving social reality weakened.  In this case, such ‘policy drift’ was 
adversely affecting the ability of existing frameworks of social provision to deal with major 
life contingencies (in this case childbirth) leading to the appearance of ‘new social risks’ to 
which the English welfare state could not adequately respond (ibid; Lewis, 2005: 54.).  
 97 
Moreover, an underlying pressure for childcare services developed, as more women sought to 
reconcile work and family life.  A childcare crisis was emerging.   
 
In such contexts of rapid material changes within the social structure the maternal care frame 
might be expected to come under challenge and be destabilised (or at least become unstable).  
State actors, reflexively monitoring such changes, might seek to adapt to these ‘new social 
risks’ by updating social provisions and prompting innovations in EYEC services – especially 
those that dealt with ‘childcare’.  In relation to the Canadian case Jensen argues that it was 
‘new social risks [that] have promoted policy innovation’ (2004: 180.).  However, this was 
not (straightforwardly) the case in the England.  Even by the end of the 1980s when the lack 
of childcare spaces was extremely pressing, the Conservatives refused to acknowledge that 
the state should provide ‘childcare’ services save for those greatly at risk.  As John Pattern, 
Chair of the Ministerial group on working Women’s Issues stated ‘I don’t think that the state 
should step in to help working mothers unless her life has collapsed’ (1989, cited in Browne, 
1996: 371.).  In this way, as Harker argues, the emergence of risk-benefit mismatches should 
be viewed as a process that is highly mediated by politics (2004: 246.).  Hence there is no 
inevitability that welfare states will fall into line with prevailing social trends, nor that actors 
perceive or respond to underlying material changes to the social structure in ways that will be 
expected (or indeed rational).  EYEC policy in this case was being allowed to drift ever 
further as an official policy of neutrality over mothers labour market participation, obscured a 
policy framework that disincentivised mothers labour market participation (providing bad 
terms on which to enter and often unsuitable places for children) and implicitly favoured 
maternal care.  As John Major stated: ‘We have always made it clear that is not for the 
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government to encourage or discourage women with children to go out to work’ (1990, cited 
in Ringin, 1997: 74.).   
 
Such underpinning structures and state inactivity in updating social policy provision created a 
policy vacuum between the limited state funded EYEC services and the choices women were 
actively seeking to make; one which increasingly being filled by private and informal EYEC 
provision.  Private and informal provision (private day nurseries, childminders/nannies, 
playgroups and friends and relatives) had always been a feature of the England’s EYEC 
provision and indeed explains partly how mother’s labour market participation was able to 
increase; albeit that in the absence of central organisation and subsidisation of costs such 
opportunities were unequally distributed (by location and income), often unreliable and 
moreover had no guarantees of a level of quality.  A dual policy trend developed, with slow 
growth57 in publicly funded EYEC services against a rapidly expanding private market for 
childcare.  This gathered pace during the 1980s as mothers’ labour market participation 
spiked.  Private nursery places almost quadrupled between 1980 and 199158 (Ball, 1994: 32.).  
Registered childminders had similarly grown in numbers to meet demand, with over double 
the numbers from 1980 to 199159 (ibid.).  In this way, the qualitative texture of EYEC 
provision was evolving into an increasingly private model.   
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 Which refers to overall growth which as has been discussed is made up from part time nursery education 
places, as daycare places in nurseries were falling. 
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 In 1980 there were 22,017 places in private nurseries and by 1991 there were 79,029.  A percentage change of 
259% (Ball, 1994: 32.).   
59
 In 1980 there were 98,495 childcare places increasing to 233,258 by 1991.  A percentage change of 137% 
(Ball, 1994: 32). 
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By the early 1990s, England’s EYEC policy trajectory, through the confluence of maternal 
care ideas, the fragmented institutional frameworks in which EYEC policy was developed and 
an absence of gender equity concerns in political circles (which may have been able to 
counter the status quo), appeared to be locked (or lapsing) into exhibiting an increasingly 
‘liberal’ welfare state formation60.  In this liberal sense (child) care work and children’s 
education and development was left to be negotiated in the private realm of the family and the 
job of expanding services was being left to the markets and informal sectors.  Indeed, at this 
time there appeared to be no real necessity from the perspective of the state to intervene much 
in pre-school children’s lives, save to look after their health and to protect those at risk of 
neglect.  Of course, the non-development of EYEC provision under the Conservatives also 
reflected their ambition for a general reduction of the role of the state in social, economic and 
political life, as embodied in their attempts to retrenchment many existing areas of social 
provision as well as their reforms of public administration informed by the ideas associated 
with the ‘New Public Management’.  However, particular developments in the understandings 
of early years and the consequences for future educative, social and developmental outcomes 
would come to destabilise the prevailing status quo and latent maternal care ideas, pushing 
EYEC onto the policy radar, even during the height of neo-liberal restructuring; the most 
austere of times.   
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 In other areas of social policy which were more firmly entrenched and extensive (and as such exhibiting social 
democratic tendencies) could be defended from prevailing neo-liberal forces seeking to retrench the welfare 
state, in the case of EYEC there was hardly enough existing policy to ‘retrench’.    
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2.2 A crack in the policy paradigm? Developments in EYEC ideas and Major’s nursery 
vouchers experiment 
 
While England’s EYEC policy framework appeared to be locked into a self-reinforcing 
trajectory of retrenchment, ideational developments were afoot which were about to begin the 
process of destabilising existing maternal care ideas within government circles.  As has been 
discussed above, by the end of the 1980s, the early years academics who had been attempting 
to press the state to invest in early years education and nursery schools though their 
‘educative’ agenda were having difficulties making claims that early years education 
superseded maternal and informal care.  Moreover, that early education had effects on 
subsequent outcomes.  However, the publication of Schweinhart and Weikart’s longitudinal 
study of High/Scope in 1993 (albeit that it has its ideational roots in a social engineering 
frame), appeared to give early years education academics the ‘hook’ on which to catch 
government attention and to begin to promote their own educative research and, as such, 
begin to destabilise latent maternal care ideas.    
 
A few academics and practitioners working specifically within early education research had 
always had some access to government policy discussions, via Select Committees and 
commissioned research for the DES during the 1970s61 (although this relationship declined 
during the 1980s and began to re-emerge in the early 1990s as will be discussed later).  A 
member of the various committees and government enquires during the early 1990s, Dr Chris 
Pascal (2006) has noted that as a community they had been quite strategic in the way that they 
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 As has been discussed within the earlier chapter, educative researchers had been involved since the mid-
1960s-1970s in developing evidence in support of developing early education services for the DES (and 
subsequently DfEE) and latterly the Education, Science and Arts Committee.   
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had presented the case for early education, playing hardball and switching between frames 
and discourses (talking economics, or welfare strategies, if they needed to).  High/Scope 
provided some apparently ‘hard’ evidence that early education had benefits for the wider 
society and economy.  Elements of the High/Scope research which highlighted reductions in 
juvenile delinquency particularly impressed the Home Office (Randall, 2000: 97.).  Moreover, 
Schweinhart and Weikhart’s cost benefit analysis rationalised investment as economically 
efficient, investing one dollar to secure seven in return (1993: 5.).  This powerful 
rationalisation for investment built upon on the recently produced government enquiry, 
Starting with Quality (The Rumbold Report), which had sought, despite the limited original 
brief, to develop the case that ‘schools and parents, are not the sole educators of 3 and 4 year 
olds’ and articulate a conception of quality into existing early years settings and to condition 
policy making towards managed settings (1990: 1.).  In this way, if High/Scope evidence 
articulated the ‘macro social benefits’ of pre-school education for the margins of society, the 
Rumbold Report made the case that this should occur in managed pre-schools.  Through the 
combined articulation of these reports, the cracks were beginning to show in the maternal care 
frame and early education academics were well placed to make the case for extending early 
education services for all.  However, whilst academics had lobbied hard to secure a 
commitment to expand nursery education places, making the case that only high quality 
(state) settings could secure the educative and social gains that High/Scope rationalised, the 
government were ideologically committed to expanding services purely through the markets 
(Pascal, 2006).  Indeed, despite the evidence, the cost of providing such publicly funded 
services appeared to be too high for the government; as Pascal noted the discussions 
concluded that there the country couldn’t possibly afford it and there were objections from 
DfEE itself (ibid; Randall, 2000: 98.).   
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Whilst Major had initially talked of creating a universal provision for three and four year olds 
(in December 1993), the proposals were significantly watered down over time and by July 
1995, the government announced that they would provide a £1100 ‘voucher’ for part-time 
pre-school education for four year olds only62 (ibid.).  This was framed as a policy which 
would allow parental ‘choice’ over their four year olds pre-school education63.  Despite, the 
scheme setting some minor educative conditions that providers would have to fulfil in order to 
receive vouchers 64(hence childminders were generally excluded from the programme) the 
policy was not designed to expand the supply of places or develop the quality of early 
education.  Indeed in practice, it was actually a retraction of public spending on nursery 
education; funds were removed from LEA budgets and transferred to parents in order to 
stimulate demand (Crouch, 2000: 127.).   For some, the proposals were simply a sleight of 
hand by the Major government, as the increasing trend for schools to take four year olds 
would already account for three quarters of four year olds in 1994 (Ball, 1994: 33.).  Indeed, 
the vouchers exacerbated this trend as LEA’s responded to the loss of funds by attempting to 
capture the rest of the four year old population and their voucher money (Crouch, 2000: 127.).  
                                               
62
 The programme was initially a pilot and was actually introduced in April 1997 and would quickly be abolished 
by New Labour (Crouch, 2000: 127.).   
63
 As the Education Secretary Gillian Shepherd asserted: ‘the voucher scheme puts parental choice at its centre.  
It allows parents to choose pre-school education in the maintained sector, the private sector and the voluntary 
sector’ (HC, 1996).   
64
 The providers that could enter the scheme were maintained schools, independent schools, and private and 
voluntary sector institutions registered under the Children Act 1989.  All providers were told that they must work 
towards the set of desirable learning outcomes developed by the SCAA (School Curriculum and Assessment 
Authority) and they must submit to inspection by the chief inspector of schools (HC, 1996.).  This was heavily 
criticised latterly by Labour as ‘an attempt to achieve expansion on the cheap, [hence] quality standards have 
been watered down to the lowest common denominator [and that] new providers have only to complete a self-
assessment from to qualify to take in four year olds’ (Labour, 1996: 5.).   
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Whilst the Conservatives had started to accept the idea that early education might be 
important for subsequent outcomes, scepticism still remained over where this should occur.  
As such, the voucher policy was in many ways a small experiment; a concession to the early 
education lobby.  Indeed, before the government would consider further proposals to develop 
a specific ‘early years education’ policy they still required more evidence and preferably that 
which emanated from the UK case rather than borrowing US data.  Hence in 1996 the DfEE 
funded its own longitudinal study, EPPE (Effective Provision of Pre-School Education), the 
original brief of which was to ascertain whether it really did make a difference to children’s 
outcomes if they attended a certain type of early years provision (nursery schools, nursery 
classes or playgroups) or just stayed at home and hence whether it would be cost-effective and 
educationally beneficial to invest in EYEC (Penn, 2006.).  That this would lay the foundations 
of a strong institutional evidential base for developing ‘educative’ EYEC policy during the 
New Labour era was perhaps an unintended effect of such scepticism over the importance of 
the early years and an arms-length attitude to the evidence.  Clearly however, the ‘maternal 
care’ framework appeared to be increasingly under ideational challenge from the ‘educative’ 
agenda.   
 
2.3 Feminist challenges to the maternal care frame: developing childcare for equality of 
opportunities? 
 
Whilst maternal care ideas had become heavily embedded within the institutions of the 
welfare state, thereby closing off gender concerns and which would latterly only start to 
become destabilised by particular educative ideas, the Labour party in opposition were 
becoming increasingly receptive to the ‘equality of opportunity’ frame.  Feminist Labour MPs 
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were beginning to stress the case for adequate quality childcare.  As Margaret Hodge asserted 
in interview, the very early roots of (New) Labour’s interest in EYEC arose out of a feminist 
agenda and that a group of women activists within the voluntary sector, the labour party and 
in particular a key caucus of feminists, Harriet Harman, Pat Hewitt, Tessa Jowell65 who were 
around at the right place, at the right time, were pivotal to getting childcare onto the policy 
agenda (Hodge, 2007).  Indeed, out of office during the early 1980s Labour had little to say 
about the family and was ambivalent to the issue of childcare (Coote, Harman and Hewitt, 
1990: 13).   As Harriet Harman noted: 
 
“in the early 1980s when I spoke to the House of Commons calling for more nurseries 
and after-school clubs, I was jeered – by my own side as well as by the Tories… the 
overwhelmingly male parliament just could not see the point of even discussing it” 
(2004, cited in Childs, 2004: vii.).    
 
By the end of the 1980s it was apparent that the Left shifted its position away from echoing 
the Right’s defence of the traditional family model, to a more positive endorsement of 
women’s equality and choice (Coote, Harmen and Hewitt, 1990: 4.).  Indeed Labour appeared 
to be taking the idea of equal opportunities and childcare much more seriously and links were 
developing between feminist MPs and party members and advocates for childcare, such as the 
Daycare Trust (Penn, 2007).  The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a left-wing 
think tank founded in 1988 (to compete with existing New Right tanks) that had close links 
                                               
65
 Some of which like Harman were already MPs and others like Hewitt and Jowell would latterly become MPs, 
but were closely connected to the Labour party. 
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with the Labour party66 was particularly active in feeding in equality of opportunity ideas to 
the Labour policy machine as part of the first stages of the modernisation of the Labour Party.  
The policy document, The Family Way: A New Approach to Policy Making, outlined the case 
for state investment in childcare.  It recognised that major social changes could not be ignored 
by the state and (although it did not phrase it in the same way) that ‘new social risks’ needed 
to be reconciled with the structures of social provisions.  Indeed as a result of changes in 
employment patterns ‘fewer women and virtually no men, are willing or able to be full-time 
parents for five years or longer, then children will need alternative child care provision’ 
(Coote, Harman and Hewitt, 1990: 39.).   Hence public investment in childcare was necessary 
to firstly account for these changing social conditions and promote equality of opportunities 
as ‘the expectation that women will do most of the caring severely restricts their employment 
prospects, the losses for the women are substantial’ and in this way ‘proper child care 
provision – including policies which make it easier for women, and also men, to combine 
family responsibilities with employment’ would be beneficial for both ‘the economy, as well 
as the interests of individual women’ (ibid.).    
 
The result of this feminist pressure can be seen within the Labour Party’s policy review at the 
end of the 1980s, Meet the challenge: Make the Change, which made a clear commitment to 
state investment in childcare framed through ‘equality of opportunities’.  As it states: 
 
“lack of childcare is the single most important obstacle to equal opportunities between 
women and men.  It restricts women’s opportunities to study, seek and retain paid 
                                               
66
 Indeed Patricia Hewitt was deputy director from 1989 to 1994, was previously Press and Broadcasting 
secretary and policy co-ordinator for the Leader of the Opposition, Neil Kinnock (Coote, Harman, Hewitt, 1990: 
3.).  
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employment, participate in public life, recreation and leisure… we shall therefore 
place a statutory duty on all local authorities to provide comprehensive, integrated 
childcare services for the under 5’s and 5-14 year olds out of school care” (1989: 62.).  
  
Thus significant feminist mobilisation within the Labour party was able to centrally attack the 
existing maternal care framework of social provision and had appeared to have secured 
‘childcare’ and the promotion of gender concerns as a key policy priority for the Labour 
party67.  Indeed, it would have been interesting to see whether, had Labour secured the 1992 
general election, policy initiatives would have developed on the basis of this frame for EYEC.  
However, this was not to be the case and a latter IPPR paper for the Commission on Social 
Justice68, Social Justice, Children and Families, published in 1993, revealed a developing set 
of new concerns around EYEC policy and a seeming discursive shift away from the ‘equality 
of opportunities’ frame.  As it states:  
 
“There is no doubt that there is an unmet need for collective childcare provision; that 
such provision is of benefit in itself to some infants and toddlers; and that, in the form 
                                               
67
 Indeed whilst for constraints of space this thesis focuses on ‘childcare’ policies as an aid to gender equality, 
Meet the Challenge makes clear that ‘it is essential to encourage men to play a much greater role in caring for 
their families… Labour will implement a series of measures to assist both women and men to combine family 
and work more fully… under Labour the Department of Employment will work closely with the Women’s 
Ministry to ensure that women’s interests are reflected across the full range of employment policy’ (1989: 22.).  
Moreover, Gordon Brown latterly asserted ‘the time for patriarchal and class-bound Conservatism, the New 
Right or even past Labour’ was now over: not least because ‘for the first time the majority of women are in the 
labour force, demanding an economic policy built around the needs of women’ (1994, cited in Coates and 
Oettinger, 2007: 119.).     
68
 The Commission on Social Justice was established at the instigation of John Smith, Leader of the Labour Party 
at the end of 1992.  The Commission’s remit was to develop a new social and economic vision for the UK.  The 
IPPR’s policy papers were designed to promote policy debate around these issues (Hewitt and Leach, 1993: i.).    
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of pre-school education, it benefits almost all pre-school children.  But the full day 
care, 8am-6pm, that fits the male model of work is seldom ideal from the children’s 
point of view, may be far from ideal for the youngest groups and does not seem to be 
what most parents would choose” (Hewitt and Leach, 1993: 22.).   
 
Indeed, it seemed that whilst maternal care ideas had been successfully superseded within 
Labour’s discursive lexicon and hence a positive state role was required to reconcile ‘care’, it 
appeared that a discursive tension was developing between childcare as a service to aid 
working women against childcare services which met the needs of children, especially those 
in their early years.  As Social Justice makes clear, ‘collective provision for the care of young 
children should be primarily designed to meet the children’s needs and only secondarily the 
needs of employed parents or those who employ them’ (ibid: 26.).   
 
This discursive tension appears at first puzzling and may even appear to be harking back to 
older ideas which questioned the effect of full daycare on children.  However, rather than this 
policy document exhibiting a straight-forward retraction of gender equity concerns in the 
context of Labour’s ongoing modernisation programme- indeed these feminist ideas and 
feminist pressures for childcare remained69 - other ideational processes were again at work, 
adding to the ideational complexity of EYEC policy.  Indeed the circulation of new EYEC 
ideas in academic and the think tank community appeared to be modifying or, as such, adding 
discursive layers over the framing of childcare policy and the way in which children’s ‘early 
years’ were being conceptualised and their relative importance for future outcomes.   
                                               
69
 Indeed feminist mobilisation remained, principally from Harriet Harman, who absolutely insisted that a 
‘childcare agenda’ remained a key policy plank of the 1997 manifesto.   
 108 
2.4 The importance of the ‘early years’: the ‘early years glitterati’ and a revolution in EYEC 
ideas   
 
During the 1980s, a loose network of early education academics, practitioners, childcare 
advocates and academics from the Thomas Coram Research Unit and Oxford Pre-School 
research group was developing around EYEC policy (Pascal, 2006).  Although the network 
members hailed from different academic disciplines, identified with particular EYEC frames 
(as has been outlined previously) and as such were looking to forward different agendas (in 
some ways radically), the network was brought together through a mutual apprehension of the 
state of England’s EYEC system (or lack there of) and the growth of private markets in EYEC 
(Penn, 2007).  Indeed as Pascal noted: 
 
“right back in the 80s we had started to have visions and ambitions, to talk to people 
and network and have a sense of - this isn’t right – this policy and the marketisation 
that was beginning to happen in the early years.  We were deeply troubled by ‘put it 
out to the marketplace – just make it childcare - make it cheap and cheerful’ and this 
downward pressure of a formal curriculum… we were deeply troubled about what was 
going on and very aware of what was going on in the rest of Europe that was 
disconnecting us - kids that were growing up in England were being disenfranchised 
and disadvantaged” (2006). 
 
In this way, despite theoretical and normative differences over conceptions of ‘early 
childhood’ and ideal EYEC policy models, the ‘early years glitterati’ (as eminent educational 
theorist, Ted Wragg referred to them) sought to combine forces to push an agenda for a proper 
 109 
EYEC system in common with other European countries70.  Unlike particular ‘educative’ 
researchers who had some limited access to the DES (latterly DfEE) through nursery 
education policy, many of the network members working from ‘equal opportunities or ‘child 
centred frames’ had either very limited or no involvement with existing policy debates as the 
early years were the preserve of parents.  When, in the late 1980s, Labour asserted an interest 
in ‘childcare’ and was developing links towards feminist advocates forwarding an equal 
opportunities frame, it made sense to combine efforts with those from the educative and child-
centred backgrounds to generate as much research and expertise to attempt to shape the policy 
priorities of the Labour party in the context of their modernisation project, indeed a few were 
seeking to develop a policy model of ‘integrated’ EYEC systems which could potentially 
combine agendas.  As has been outlined in the previous chapter, many of the ideas around 
particular frames had lengthy ideational roots and many from the ‘educative’ field were 
seeking to generate ‘hard’ empirical evidence on the benefits of early years education having 
already picked up upon US research on High/Scope.  In the early 1990s however, new 
neuroscientific ideas on early brain development also started to infiltrate the network (albeit 
that some members stood highly opposed to the frame both normatively and prescriptively).  
Indeed neuroscientific ideas had just come onto stream as some members of the network were 
compiling a report for the Royal Society of Arts, Right Start: the importance of early 
learning, led by Sir Christopher Ball, which sought to make the case for early education71.  
For the educative researchers, such ideas lent powerful ‘scientific’ rationalisations for the 
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 Even though the particular European countries which such researchers would seek to emulate would differ 
(with ‘educative’ researchers seeking to emulate France; Feminists, Sweden; and Child-centred academics, 
Denmark and Reggio Emilia in Italy).   
71
 This principally aimed to secure in current policy the limited agenda of nursery education for 3 and 4 year olds 
as they were operating within the hostile context of existing Conservative rule.   
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necessity to invest in universal early education: indeed rather than the early years just being 
important, they could now increasingly be considered ‘crucial’ for subsequent development 
and cognitive outcomes72 and not just for those in certain socio-economic groups (as 
High/Scope evidence rationalised).  Indeed as has been outlined previously, the discourse of 
neuroscience considers the first five years of life fundamental and that all children benefit 
from rich stimulating learning experiences.  It also, however, drew in to some extent the 
experience and expertise of those advocates and academics working from a child-centred 
frame, who were seeking to push within England an emulation of the social pedagogical 
tradition of particular Nordic states and Reggio Emilia in Italy.  Here these countries had long 
periods of pre-school, beginning from the earliest years and children’s early lives and 
experiences have been traditionally valued and funded by the state.  Indeed, as neuroscience 
purported to explain why the early years were so important, in so doing, the case for early 
intervention and high quality early experiences for children, developmentally appropriate 
early education, and significant investment to secure these broad aims were strengthened 
(albeit that this strengthening was from within a particular positivist paradigm). 
 
As such, this drawing together of disparate frames and agendas can be seen within Right 
Start:  
 
“Until recently the ‘early childhood profession’ has failed to speak with one voice.  
Different groups have emphasised different arguments for improved provision, 
contrasting (for example) the needs of mothers with the benefits for children: or they 
                                               
72
 Even though educative researchers would dispute the notion that such periods were ‘critical’ as a strict 
following of the neuroscientific evidence reads. 
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have difference aims [however] modern educational research is on the threshold of a 
revolution.  The findings of brain science for example, or the theory of multiple 
intelligence or the idea of different styles of learning are all pointing the way toward a 
new powerful theory of learning which will be able to satisfy the three tests of 
explanation, prediction and application” (Ball, 1994: 17; 23).   
 
Despite the network’s careful efforts, as can be seen above, not to create a conflict between 
childcare for working women and the needs of children (indeed in many ways the harmonised 
agenda complements the equality of opportunities frame’s stress upon ‘high quality’ childcare 
provision), the tilting of the discursive attention towards children and the increasing 
importance of their early experiences did create discursive tensions in some quarters (as can 
be seen above within Labour’s ideas-tank, the IPPR).  Moreover, despite efforts to generate a 
shared vision of EYEC, in practice the early years network remained divided over particular 
policy models, particular discursive emphasises and the way that policy should be justified – 
hence the development of a consistent, internally coherent policy vision for EYEC did not 
materialise which could offer government agents a single policy ‘magic recipe’.   
  
In spite of this tension and despite the added ideational complexity that multiple sets of 
expertise, evidence and agendas creates within EYEC policy discussions, the combined effect 
of all these different rationalisations was to put significant ideational pressure upon both the 
incumbent and opposition governments to invest and fund EYEC in its various forms.  Indeed 
whilst this ‘early years’ discourse was not stable or internally coherent, it had a wide spectrum 
of resonance with different sets of civil and political actors.  However, as has been discussed 
earlier, the Conservatives appeared to be highly selective with the evidence that rationalised 
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early education – indeed there was a certain ambivalence and scepticism towards EYEC 
research, save for that which specifically appealed to existing agendas (such as reducing 
juvenile crime).  In this way, ideas could not be seen to be actually shaping policy 
development; indeed the resulting policy was a limited experiment which indeed went in 
some ways contrary to what the experts were seeking and what the evidence rationalised.  
 
As such, whilst the early years network had developed a powerful and persuasive ‘early years’ 
discourse and strong rationalisations for investment, thereby challenging and effectively 
subverting latent maternal care ideas and in so doing opening new (albeit potentially 
conflicting) paths for action, complementary institutional developments were occurring 
alongside Labour’s ongoing modernisation project.  These would further aid the ascendency 
of ‘early years’ ideas and lay the basis for a particular receptivity to EYEC evidence in 
Labour’s manifesto and subsequent policy agenda.  In so doing, these ideal ideational 
conditions and Labour’s strategic response to these institutional developments would 
precipitate a period of openness in the policy space to evidence-based ideas; a contingent and 
unique period into which the ‘early years glitterati’ would move quickly to secure their 
discursive influence.   
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3. CHAPTER THREE: EYEC AND NEW LABOUR IN GOVERNMENT 
 
3.1 Shifting institutional contexts of policy making: New Labour’s modernisation programme, 
a response to New Public Management and the Treasury’s turn to pro-active spending  
 
In order to fully understand how a seemingly entrenched and therefore ‘locked’ institutional 
context of EYEC (and indeed welfare) residualism, where only a few educative researchers 
had limited access and influence, would subsequently come to be open to a confluence of 
‘early years’ ideas articulated by external advocates and academics, it is first necessary to 
unpick and elucidate the underlying shifts in the institutional processes of policy making 
precipitated by the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Secondly Labour’s response to these changes (and noted problems) and thirdly the ways in 
which particular discursive and concrete elements have been appropriated or opposed in 
formulating their modernisation programme and have hence channelled subsequent policy 
agendas and defined institutional workings.  In many ways, Labour’s ongoing modernisation 
programme, which symbolically culminated in the re-branding ‘New Labour’73, appeared to 
create the right conditions for a particular openness to external expertise and signalled the 
embryonic stages of a (re)emergence of an evidence-informed policy making process (Davies, 
Nutley and Smith, 2000: 20.).  The New Labour project (in both an ambitious and a somewhat 
naïve way) attempted to forge an overall modernisation programme for both the institutions 
and practices of government which would seek to correct what they viewed as problematic 
tendencies in the context of existing New Public Management and previous ‘ideological’ 
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 And indeed was ongoing, as Wincott argues ‘nearly a decade on New Labour remains a work in progress’ 
despite signalling from Tony Blair that by rebranding Labour as ‘new’, the modernisation project was completed 
(2006: 288; Hay, 1999: 3.).    
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times; the prioritisation of efficiency over policy effectiveness and innovation; cost-
containment over ‘pro-active’ spending; a closed, arms length attitude to evidence and 
research in policy making process rather than drawing in external expertise and ideas; a 
fragmented institutional system rather than joined up ‘holistic’ governance; and lastly to 
prioritise ideological ideas over ‘objective’ pragmatic solutions.   
 
This emerging ‘modernising’ agenda would mark the appearance of a change in the temporal 
sequence of external evidence vis-à-vis policy making; from a sequence whereby expert 
research was often latterly commissioned in order to justify or support existing policy choices 
to one where (new) evidence and ideas would appear to drive and inform policy agendas with 
help from the broader academic community and other experts.  In this way, as a key part of 
this modernising strategy, ‘New Labour’ would actively search for new policy ideas to define 
their ‘modern’ policy agenda, drawing upon external expertise to inform, rationalise and 
define their manifesto and not simply from conventional sources (at least conventional since 
the 1980s) such as think tanks.  Such evolving conditions would provide an ideal strategic 
context for the various academics and advocates who were primed with such scientific ideas 
and positivist evidence, but also open the policy space up to broader ideas from those EYEC 
advocates usually marginalised from the policy process.  Understanding how this process 
occurred from ‘there’ to ‘here’ is discussed below. 
 
As mentioned above, Labour’s modernisation programme, despite its discursive construction 
as ‘new’, signalled a return to, or a re-emergence to a privileging of academic expertise and 
policy evidence in the policy generating process.  As Newman argues, the turn to policy 
evidence is not new and neither is particularly modern; there have been specific periods and 
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phases of modernisation previously, in which evidence has either been privileged or kept at 
arms length from the policy process (2001: 47-48.).  Indeed, in many ways the ascendency of 
external ‘evidence’ in policy making has come in waves.  The 1960s are considered to be the 
last high point of a role for (academic) social policy research within government circles.  
Indeed with the development of the social sciences in the post war period, the production of 
organised knowledge about social problems became more institutionalised and a range of 
organisations conducting such research had rapidly grown (Davies, Nutley and Smith, 2000: 
18.).  Indeed particular social engineering ideas were circulating in academic communities 
(and borrowing from US studies) which purported to be able to engineer social and economic 
changes through social policy interventions.  During this time it was routine for cabinet 
ministers to consult both formally and informally with academics on social policy issues74 
(Baldock, 2000: 127.).  However, with the general disillusionment created in the wake of the 
apparent failure of programmes such as Head Start called into question the whole enterprise 
of creating social knowledge for direct use by governments (Davies, Nutley and Smith, 2000: 
18.).  Moreover by the 1970s social academics had begun to write strong critiques of Labour’s 
record and they appeared to lose their entrée through the portals of power (Baldock, 2002: 
127.).  During the 1980s the distancing of even dismissal of (academic) social research in 
social policy was particularly apparent with the rise of the New Right and New Public 
Management ideas.   
 
The term New Public Management (NPM) appeared in the early 1990s in the academic 
literature to refer to the changes in public administration carried out in some Anglo-Saxon 
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 Even quite junior members of the LSE department found themselves on government committees, surrounded 
by ready listeners (Baldock, 2000: 127.).   
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countries during the 1980s (Torres, 2004: 99.).  It is a slippery label in many ways as different 
conceptualisations of NPM all stress different things 75(Dunleavy et al., 2006: 97.).  However, 
the NPM can be broadly characterised as a series of trait policy interventions which sought to 
move bureaucratic processes away from the old system of ‘public administration’, which was 
considered bloated, rigid, hierarchical and over-centralised, had an absence of a performance 
culture and was inefficient (Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007: 5.).  Instead the NPM model 
advocated a series of reforms that were designed to remake the public sector in the image of 
the private sector.  Hence the NPM encompassed a new set of practices and values, a new 
language which emphasised efficiency, value for money, competition, markets and 
consumerism (Clarke, Gertwitz and McLaughlin, 2000: 6.).   In many ways NPM tried to 
introduce a ‘bottom line’ mentality into the way government operated.  Efficiency became the 
main goal, as private sector techniques were fastened on to the machine of government 
(Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007: 5.).  In particular, the civil service was to undergo restructuring 
on the basis of performance management in which government employees had to become 
more accountable and performance-minded.  Performance measurement regimes were 
installed and attempts were made to quantify government activity so that it could be 
effectively assessed (ibid.).  This served to elevate the importance of ‘strategic management’ 
within government departments, which focused their attention onto the matters of cost 
management, to prioritise economic efficiency arguments in the use of public resources, the 
devolution of management control, contracting out of traditionally publicly provided services 
                                               
75
 Indeed due to constraints of space I will not enter into a discussion of how the New Public Management arose 
through and interacted with broader neo-liberal ideas and indeed shaped the growth of private markets and 
broader welfare policy as with regards to EYEC policy its marginal status meant that it was not on the radar of 
the neo-liberal retrenchment project.  Here I am principally concerned with the way that New Public 
Management agenda marginalised academic expertise and installed a business orientated practice to assessing 
policy.  
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and a sharper focus on (most often quantifiable) results of outcomes as opposed to qualitative 
processes (Ramia, 2002: 6.).  The government’s overall general distrust of the civil service 
(which had precipitated these NPM reforms) led to the rise of particular trusted think tanks 
which bypassed them and policy inputs were fed into the centre (Davies, Nutely and Smith, 
2000: 19.).  In this way, as departmental silos were stifled and entered into a defensive, 
competitive mode, so actual policy making gravitated towards the political centre.  Indeed 
some commentators observed that these were particularly ‘ideological’ times (ibid.).   
 
The sum total of these NPM reforms served to have a particular effect on government policy 
development and the government’s relationship to evidence and expertise, especially that 
which was generated in the broad academic community.  Indeed the focus of the government 
was to observe whether departments or their agencies were meeting specific targets and 
objectives, principally in relation to service delivery or economic targets.  As such, by 
responding to these new ‘management’ imperatives, much less attention was given to 
effective and systematic evaluation of policy itself or indeed the search for ‘good’ policy 
within particular departments (Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007: 15; Painter, 2003: 212.).  It led to 
what Jervis and Richards highlight as a ‘development deficit’ in public policy (1997, in, 
Newman, 2001: 59.).  This referred to the limited capacity of the public sector organisations 
to innovate because of legislative and other restrictions constraining them from exercising the 
full strategic freedom that they would have in the private sector.  Within the NPM 
‘managerial’ focus the emphasis placed managing departmental ‘efficiency’ before 
departmental policy ‘effectiveness’ (ibid: 60.).  Indeed, in such hostile ‘managerial’ 
circumstances and a central government tendency to draw upon the ideas of a few think tanks, 
the prospects for significant funds to be devoted to research and especially that which 
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involved the academic community were particularly limited.  Indeed it is easy to see how the 
new emphasis on business-like efficiency did not particularly chime with the complex 
ideational style of academics analysing multifaceted problems and solutions – moreover those 
which were seeking to expand government social policy capacity or did not fit into neat 
departmental silos, as EYEC policy does not.  In this way, the relationship between external 
expertise and government departments was in decline during the 1980s.  Indeed, even the 
small ‘nursery education’ lobby appeared to lose their position within the DES and there were 
very few reports commissioned76.  Moreover, as has previously been discussed, during the 
voucher period external academics had difficulties engaging the Conservatives to develop 
policy with reference to their evidence and part of that problem was due to the hostility of 
DfEE to expansion (Randall, 2000: 96.).  Summing up this trend, as the then Permanent 
Secretary for DfEE, Michael Bichard, stated, reflecting in 1999: 
 
“The thing that surprises me is the way in which –over the last 20 years – the 
development of policy has not received much attention. Within Whitehall and beyond, 
all of the focus has been on the way we manage executive agencies.  I think that the 
way we develop policy now needs a radical rethink… It should be research based and 
properly evaluated.  It is about including more people in the development of policy.  
Whitehall has not been nearly creative as it needs to be” (cited in, Newman, 2000: 
60.).   
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 To view a list of reports see Ball, 1994.  Indeed since the Bruner enquiry there was a notable gap in 
commissioned reports with external academics and advocates and it was not until the late 1980s/early 1990s 
when enquiries began to be funded and not until 1996 when external research was actually commissioned, this 
being EPPE.  Indeed the only route into the system for the education lobby was the parliamentary select 
committees.   
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Moreover, the then Permanent Secretary had once commented that the old Department of 
Education and Science was effectively a ‘knowledge free zone’ (Walker, 2000.).  Such 
departmental tendencies in the context of NPM to remain inwardly focused and to prioritise 
departmental budgetary interests over solving broad policy problems were criticised by the 
left-wing think tank the Fabian Society, which suggested that the process of governing social 
policy needed more attention.  As the Fabians stated: 
 
“The whole system of government is riddled with specialism and departmentalism.  
Political reputations are made by civil servants defending departmental interests, 
safeguarding their budget and warding off intrusions from other fiefdoms” (Wicks, 
cited in Newman, 2000: 60.).   
 
It appeared that NPM had served to make government departments focus upon managing (and 
in some ways hanging onto budgets) rather than developing and expanding policy and to be 
characterised by interdepartmental conflict and protectionism.  
 
Parts of New Labour’s modernisation programme arose out of a response to these growing 
institutional issues and indeed were even being recognised latterly by the Conservatives 
themselves.  Indeed, by the end of the 1980s the Conservatives felt the need to correct some 
of the fragmenting effects of their own reforms.  In the early 1990s, Michael Heseltine began 
to talk of the need for partnership and launch a range of initiatives which encouraged joint 
working (Perri 6 et al., 2002: 14.).  Moreover, as has been discussed, at the very end of the 
Conservative period the DfEE commissioned EPPE to give some relevant information on the 
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effects of different early years provisions with a view to informing subsequent policy 
initiatives.  New Labour’s modernisation programme would be an interesting mix of 
appropriated or opposing discourses; an evolving response to this existing institutional 
fragmentation and dominance of ‘business style efficiency’ over ‘policy effectiveness’, the 
general policy ‘development deficit’ and lack of innovation, and lastly a particular reaction to 
the ‘ideologically’ driven 1980s (from both ends of the political spectrum).  Some of the 
concrete institutional issues would only begin to be dealt with on entering power (especially 
joint departmental working), but several of them would be taken up during opposition and in 
so doing open the space for external expertise and evidence, especially those which could 
articulate convincingly ‘what [would] work’ in the policy field.   
 
Much academic debate has surrounded the issue of how to characterise and situate the ‘New 
Labour’ modernisation project within traditional ideological paradigms (Neo-
Liberalism/Social Democratic) and newer ones such as the ‘Third Way’ and Social 
Investment 77 (Giddens, 1998; Hall, 2003; Hay, 1999; Prideaux, 2005; Legget, 2002).  Some 
authors have assessed the extent to which New Labour’s reform agenda has exhibited a 
conversion to a LEGOTM paradigm, where early childhood investments are an optimal 
response to new social risks (Jensen and Saint-Martin, 2006).  Here is not the place to enter 
into an extensive consideration of which paradigm New Labour most closely exhibits in 
actuality.  Suffice to say that much of this extensive discussion is drawn around the way in 
which New Labour, as a reaction to the ideologically driven 1980s, characterised their 
modernisation project as ‘post-ideological’.  As Blair stated:  
                                               
77
 Indeed there are even more than this.  For instance Deacon (2000) considers the New Labour approach as 
Anglicanised Communitarianism. 
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“We will be a radical government.  But the definition of radicalism will not be that of 
doctrine, whether left or right, but of achievement.  New Labour is a party of ideas and 
ideals but not of outdated ideology.  What counts is what works (Blair, 1998, cited in 
Powell, 1999: 23.).   
 
Moreover, for Blair ‘modernisation is about adapting to conditions that have objectively 
changed’ (1999, cited in Leggett, 2002: 424.).  Within these two statements, it can be 
observed that New Labour appeals to a rhetorical transcendence of previous ideological 
divisions, a particular rhetorical appeal to ‘technical’ (almost ‘rational’) responses to evolving 
social and political changes and a favouring of ‘objective’ solutions to deal with them.  In 
many ways, and as some commentators observe, this represents a ‘dogmatic pragmatism’ 
which neatly elides the apparent rejection of the traditional left (and historical left wing 
allegiances) and a systematic attention to traditional left wing concerns such as equality, 
defending the welfare state and systematic structural change (Lister, 2003: 428.).  In this way, 
such ‘functionalism’ exhibits an underlying continuation or acceptance of neo-liberalism (or 
indeed capitulation to a neo-liberal hegemony) yet set within a more benevolent guise 
(Prideaux, 2005: 135; Hay, 1999.).  However others consider there to be a more (genuine) 
normative commitment to an ‘a profoundly apolitical form of politics’ but which thus does 
not have an explicit political direction (Newman, 2001: 48.).  Indeed as Blair’s statement 
above commits New Labour to ‘ideas’ but not ‘ideology’ and ‘whatever works’, these are 
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empty signifiers, which ideas are important and what counts as ‘working’ are not defined, nor 
definable without some overriding ideological set of values to use as a reference point78.   
 
For Andrews, as the New Labour modernisation project was explicitly centred around this 
‘apolitical’ doctrine, this created an openness to new (policy) ideas, from outside of the 
normal Labour Party ranks, from both left and right (ideally with no fixed ideological abode) 
and involving a ‘Nexus’ of academics, policy makers and the business community (1998: 
56.).  Whilst this eclectic mix can therefore potentially create a particularly contradictory mix 
of external influences and would certainly make New Labour tend towards a particularly 
unstable, hybrid (or equally inconsistent, contradictory) political formation, this normative 
commitment to policy openness and a commitment to ‘modernisation’ developed from a 
profound dissatisfaction with existing politics; the sense that government institutions would 
be unable to deal with complex social problems and an awareness that an overt focus on an 
economic calculus of efficiency would preclude the development of effective policy 
(Newman, 2001: 173.).  As think tanks such as the Fabian society had been feeding into New 
Labour, government departments and institutions were unable to innovate or develop policy 
having been stifled during the years of a ‘new public management’ ethos and a lack of 
research capacity within them.  Hence each of these would need to be subject to a 
modernisation programme, as would existing public services, even typically sacrosanct 
institutions such as the welfare state.  As Blair would assert during the first year of power ‘we 
say to business that it must be innovative… the same applies to government.  To often there is 
a fear of risk and change and experiment’ (1998, cited in Newman, 2001: 60.). 
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 Indeed some might argue that this is a deliberate abdication of ideological practice which masks an implicit 
conservatism. 
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In many ways, it appeared that despite obvious underlying tensions, New Labour wished to 
have its ‘Third Way’ cake and eat it.  Indeed in practice, the New Labour project appeared to 
selectively appropriate particular NPM discourses, for example to ‘root out waste and 
inefficiency’ in public services and to subject them to managerial forms of audit and control, 
but yet similarly wished to create effective social policy (and hence potentially expand state 
capacity, especially in research areas79) which would create specific policy outcomes, be that 
reducing child poverty, overcoming social exclusion or driving up education standards (Lister, 
2003: 429.).  New Labour’s early discursive commitment to being ‘objective’ and ‘outcomes 
focused’ would however betray (or condition) a tendency towards privileging particular forms 
of expertise and evidence-based policy ideas in the policy generating process.  Indeed, in 
many ways this discursive commitment tilts actor’s attention towards considering those 
quantifiable, empirical and indeed scientific forms of evidence which have epistemological 
claims to ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’80.  In so doing, as Clarke, Gertwitz and McLaughlin 
identify, there was a potential tension between New Labour’s preference for technicist, 
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 Indeed New Labour would follow through an early commitment to expanding the research capacity of 
government.  The Department for Education and Employment had doubled its research budget by 2000 and 
Whitehall set up six dedicated centres within the universities, including the London School of Economics and 
Birkbeck College and a new Centre for Evidence Informed Policy and Practice at the Institute of Education. 
These were to collect together examples of "what works" among policy recommendations and ensure the 
message is conveyed to ministers (Walker, 2000.). 
80
 Hence, it was not necessarily the case that by being ‘outcomes’ focused New Labour’s policy preference 
would be determined by ‘economic efficiency’ but that which could ‘measure’ or model particular policy 
outcomes.  For instance boosted attainment levels from attendance at early education; hence spending would be 
justifiable through returns of attainment increases in children.  The question of what constitutes valid knowledge 
is a much broader issue; most social scientists would question claims to neutrality even within the realm of 
science and moreover the dangers of driving policy through on the basis of evidence which is still, even within 
the fields of science, essentially contested.   
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managerial solutions to the problems of welfare governance and its apparent commitment to a 
variety of social goals, including democratic renewal, equal opportunities and particularly in 
education (2000: 22.).  Indeed, technical rationalisations, especially within social policy sit 
somewhat at odds with more traditional appeals to social rights and citizenship.  Despite these 
tensions however, it was clear that more than usual, New Labour in opposition were open to 
influence from external expertise in the consultation process and as such the policy space 
would be subject to greater contingency. 
 
A distinct and somewhat paradoxical development within the ideas of the Treasury would also 
lay an institutional basis conducive to the ascendency of certain EYEC ideas and would 
latterly help shape the trajectory of policy development in EYEC.  Indeed, despite the context 
of deep austerity, a Fundamental Review of Running Costs (FER, otherwise known as the 
Heywood review) became an opportunity for a major organisational appraisal and one which 
would turn the attention of the Treasury towards social policy issues and the idea of pro-active 
spending (Deacon and Parry, 2003: 108.).  Such a development is surprising, indeed until 
1990, the Treasury had an unimaginative view of social policy, it was seen as a source of 
insatiable demand that had to be restrained as much as possible but with limited hope of 
containment (Parry, 2003: 35.).  However, as Deacon and Parry identified in their extensive 
study of the changing role of the Treasury, the Heywood review, reporting in 1995, would 
change this view (2000: 77.).  Heywood was initially a typical efficiency exercise and 
programme review as had been carried out in the Thatcher years81, conducted by civil servant 
Jeremy Heywood and Colin Southgate, the former having been sent to Harvard Business 
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 Although it is out of the scope of this chapter, most of Heywood was devoted to efficiency savings and a 
significant reduction in the number of overall Treasury staff (Deacon and Parry, 2000: 81.).   
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School to absorb new ideas of ‘best practice’ (Deacon and Parry, 2003: 108.).  Out of this 
review came the idea of proactive spending and a new division within the Treasury.  As the 
review reported: ‘without losing sight of their crucial public expenditure control 
responsibilities the Treasury’s expenditure division should be more prepared to think 
proactively about how their departments’ spending or policies should might be adapted or 
developed to strengthen the economy’ (Deacon and Parry, 2000: 77.).  Here, an underlying 
human capital approach was forming where significant public increases could be justified 
within education and other ‘social areas’ in order to support the long term performance of the 
economy (ibid.).  To this end, the new proactive spending division was charged with 
identifying ‘the potential interactions between spending of social security, employment and 
education’ (ibid.).  As the then Treasury Permanent Secretary, Terry Burns stated ‘macro-
economic policy is very boring… so we are getting very interested in social policy’ (cited in 
Fawcett and Rhodes, 2008: 95.).  A small team of economists (Gill Noble, Peter Sedgwick 
and Norman Glass) were charged with investigating policies which would utilise public 
finance pro-actively to support human capital in the year leading up to the 1997 general 
election (Deacon and Parry, 2000: 80.).  Hence, even in the most austere times and from a 
most unlikely base, was a potential opening in the bureaucratic structure towards external 
evidence and expertise which could articulate the economic and human capital benefits of 
EYEC. 
 
3.2 A Moment of Open Space in the Policy Process: New Labour’s Early Years Taskforce 
 
As has been discussed, by the early to mid-1990s, a confluence of particular ideational and 
institutional developments had created a tipping point of pressures against the status quo 
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position of state non-intervention within EYEC.  As New Labour sought to define their 
manifesto priorities prior to the 1997 general election and to respond to these conditions and 
pressures, a contingent period of openness or space in the policy process was precipitated.  
The latent maternal care frame and private market model was under sustained attack from 
counter EYEC ideas articulated by the ‘early years network’ (and indeed from within the 
Labour party itself) and the developing knowledge and understandings of the importance of 
early years had added a rich ‘evidence base’ to the case for investing in EYEC and yet also a 
complex mix of different ideational/expert frames for understanding and conceptualising 
EYEC.  Indeed, whilst this ideational complexity lent EYEC policy a wide spectrum of 
resonance with different New Labour actors, particular internal discursive tensions were 
arising between different EYEC frames and these were elaborating through early policy 
discussions.  Indeed, in many ways this had always been the case, however the ‘early years’ 
networks efforts to layer rationalisation upon rationalisation and combine differently framed 
pieces of evidence into a rich ideational soup had exacerbated this trend.  Divisions within the 
network persisted over which elements of an ‘early years’ policy were most important and 
implicitly how such policy should be justified82.  In this way, the existence and persistence of 
multiple ideational frames for EYEC potentially opened up multiple paths for agential and 
policy action.  Moreover, New Labour’s modernisation project spawned a variety of 
consultative initiatives, creating a particular openness to new policy ideas, precipitating a 
further element of contingency in the policy generating process.   
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 As the previous chapter has outlined, child-centred and equal opportunities frames lean towards stressing 
rationalisations through concepts of citizenship rights whilst the ‘educative’, ‘social engineering’ and 
‘neuroscience’ frames lean towards empirically positivist rationalisations.    
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One consultative initiative, known as the ‘early years task group’ was set up in 1995 in order 
to investigate proposals for early years services and childcare.  The task group was chaired by 
Margaret Hodge, but was comprised of various New Labour party members, some of whom 
were in the shadow government, working on health, education and also those interested in 
childcare from a women’s issue perspective83.  Hodge had previously worked for Islington 
Council and had been closely involved in developing an early years centre84 in the early 1990s 
which had begun to experiment with integrated services for young children and childcare 
(Hodge, 2007).  The task group also comprised of many members of the ‘early years’ 
network, some of which who already had existing links with the Labour party but it also drew 
in a number of ‘early years’ advocates and academics who had previously been closed from 
mainstream policy debates (especially those working from a child-centred perspective).  It 
was the task group who were responsible for feeding through EYEC research and policy ideas 
and models.  The task group also spawned a network of regional and national meetings with 
the wider EYEC community (practitioners and voluntary and private EYEC providers) which 
was considered quite unusual (Pascal, 2006).  As one member of the task group had observed, 
New Labour’s reluctance to exclude anyone from the process had perhaps opened up the 
consultative process too far, as particularly the private and voluntary sectors had wildly 
differing agendas.  As such, there was a concern that not all interests could be reconciled with 
an effective overall EYEC strategy.    
  
Within the task group it was clear early on that the Labour party, in line with their 
modernising agenda, were particularly interested in the evidence base behind early years 
                                               
83
 In particular David Blunkett, the shadow minister for Education and Employment, Tessa Jowell from the 
shadow health and women’s issues and also Harriet Harmen, Estelle Morris (Labour, 1996: 3.).   
84
 The Margaret McMillan Nursery School, run by Mary Hart.   
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policies, as had been circulating through the Right Start reports and more broadly within 
DfEE, Select Committees and the Conservative party.  As Chris Pascal, a member of the task 
force had noted, they had been very clear that they wanted to use evidence and ‘evidence-
based’ policy making; not just at the policy formation period but wanted to utilise evidence in 
an on going manner, through the use of pilot programmes and ongoing research initiatives 
attached to these initiatives (2006.).  Hence the early years network, primed with various 
rationalisations for investment and yet also broader child-centred arguments, made the case 
for state investment in EYEC.  Clearly, New Labour had become receptive to this evidence 
and expertise as a particular discursive shift in the language of EYEC attests to.  From 
previously conceptualising EYEC as simply either ‘childcare’ or ‘nursery’, a broader 
discourse emerged stating the importance of the early years for subsequent development.  As 
the task force document, Early Excellence: A head start for every child, makes clear:  
 
“The early yeas are critical to a child’s development.  If we wish to promote equality 
and counter disadvantage, intervening at the earliest possible stage is essential… 
ensuring the best possible start for all our children whatever their background is 
central to the purpose of New Labour.  It is central to our resolve to raise standards, to 
develop skills and to enhance opportunities in the successful and competitive Britain 
that we are determined to build” (Labour, 1996: 7; 3.).   
 
No longer simply beneficial for children, drawing on neuroscienctific rationalisations, early 
years provisions were now considered ‘critical’ to subsequent outcomes and the report makes 
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reference to particular ‘educative’ and ‘social engineering’ pieces of research to support the 
case for early intervention for subsequent outcomes85.   
 
At this early stage, Early Excellence, appears to reveal a mix of different EYEC policy 
rationalisations reflecting the multiple agendas and discursive rationalisations within the 
network.  In places, EYEC is required to ‘meet the needs of young children… appropriate to 
the age and needs of the child’, ‘to give the best possible start to children academically and 
socially’, or ‘services which reinforce real choice and opportunity for parents’ (Labour, 1996: 
9; 4; 2.).  Out of this complex ideational soup however, emerged an idea for a pilot project 
which potentially offered a policy route to reconcile these different agendas.   
 
‘Early Excellence Centres’ were proposed as an experimental initiative which would provide 
‘a model of integrated early years services, bringing together on one site excellent early 
learning and high quality childcare facilities’ 86(Labour, 1996: 9.).  Such services would 
provide early education and care, from qualified nursery teachers and nursery nurses, 
alongside broader family support services and links to community health services, throughout 
the working day and year round (ibid.).  The early years network were particularly excited by 
this proposal, which linked together the different agendas without sacrificing quality or one 
aim at the expense of another.  Indeed, for some members of the network, it appeared that 
                                               
85
 In particular High/Scope, the Peers Early Education Project in Oxford, and a Newcastle University Study on 
nursery education and readiness to learn (Labour, 1996: 4.).   
86
 At the early stages it was suggested that some early excellence centres would pilot Chris Pascal’s Effective 
Early Learning Curriculum which was already being trialled but would be able to be subject to evaluation in 
order to measure the educative gains from the approach (Pascal, 2006). In a nod to the child-centred approach, it 
is suggested that early excellence centres should respond to local priorities and resources; to develop around and 
through the local community (Labour, 1996: 9.). 
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finally there had been a clear recognition within political circles of the necessity for the state 
to play an active and considered role in young children’s lives and help families to reconcile 
care and work.   
 
The overall government strategy on EYEC had yet to be fully developed however, and other 
policy proposals appeared to deviate from this single ‘integrated’ policy vision.  Indeed, with 
significant pressure from the ‘educative’ camp within the network, Early Excellence, makes a 
commitment to address problems within the existing Conservative nursery voucher system.  It 
suggests replacing the demand-side subsidy with a proposed early years ‘partnership’ with 
different early years providers, steered by local authorities so as to provide early education 
places for four year olds (with a longer aim of including three year olds) (Labour, 1996: 11-
12.).  It also proposes to improve early years ‘cognitive’ development through an early years 
curriculum and a requirement for qualified teachers to be involved in the planning and 
delivery of education services provided under the Early Years Development Plan (EYDP) 
(ibid.).  Secondly, owing to the feminist pressure within the labour party, a separate ‘national 
childcare strategy’ was suggested alongside the other policy proposals, in order ‘to enable 
parents to balance looking after their children with the imperative to work or retrain’ (ibid: 
15.).   
 
As such, some members of the ‘early years’ network grew concerned that the overall 
coherence of New Labour’s strategy on EYEC was in danger of separating out into distinct 
policy agendas driven by different rationalising frames and would ultimately lead to a 
fragmented system of EYEC.  So concerned were some members of the network, that they 
contacted both David Blunkett and Harriett Harman to propose that instead of maintaining 
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three separate EYEC policy agendas that they perhaps spend six months thinking through the 
future of early years services and to develop policy in a coordinated fashion (Penn, 2007; 
Moss, 2007.).  Clearly, the ability of multiple EYEC ‘frames’ to generate significant policy 
pressure had ironically become the Achilles heal of an integrated, effective policy model and 
split the agenda into three.  Indeed, developing EYEC in England was not going to be as 
straightforward as it may have first seemed and a discursive instability in EYEC was already 
apparent.  In this way, it appeared that particular EYEC frames would begin to jostle for 
ascendency in the policy process.  Indeed New Labour’s initial approach would actually serve 
to add to this complexity. 
 
3.3 Complex agendas and multiple EYEC frames: New Labour’s early ‘scattergun’ approach 
to EYEC 
 
The early period of the New Labour government’s policy endeavours within EYEC can at 
best be described as eclectic and at worst somewhat incoherent.  Rather than heed the advice 
of some members of the early years task group, the government appeared to wish to race 
ahead with the development of EYEC services and many of these early initiatives appeared to 
be driven by different EYEC frames.  As such, the resulting policies followed different 
trajectories.  Indeed, despite the commitment to stay within the Conservative spending limits 
for the first two years of government, one of the first policy initiatives that New Labour 
announced on securing power in 1997 (as had been promised in Early Excellence) was the 
abolition of the Conservative ‘voucher’ experiment and a commitment to universal, free part 
time early years education places for four year olds (with the intention to extend these to three 
year olds) (HC, 1997.).   
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Clearly driven by an ‘educative’ agenda and, in part, a strategic response to the previous 
‘vouchers’ experiment, the policy had been quickly drawn up by a civil servant within DfES, 
to extend nursery education places, initially using the £527 million utilised by central 
government for the voucher policy, returning this to the local authority Standard Spending 
Assessment so that local governments could draw up their Early Years Development Plans 
(EYDP) to provide places for every four year old by September 1998 (HC, 1997a).  
Subsequently, a ‘nursery education grant’ would provide money for local authorities to 
develop places for three year olds (initially through the maintained sector only) and ongoing 
places were funded through the Under Five’s Education Standard Spending Assessment sub 
block87 (HC, 2000a.).  By 2004, every three and four year old had access to a free place, for 
2½ hours each school day (12.5 hours a week) (DfES, 2004: 29.).  As had been proposed in 
Early Excellence, through the EYDP plans, the local authority would organise a ‘partnership’ 
between all providers of EYEC (the maintained, voluntary and private sectors) in order to 
generate these free part-time places.  In part, the idea of a partnership organised through the 
local authority was to provide a mechanism to distribute government resources between 
potentially competing sectors to ensure collaboration and an equitable distribution of the 
funding cake (Bertram and Pascal, 1999: 54.)88.  However, central guidance through DfEE 
(latterly DfES), provided detailed annual planning guidance to ensure the ‘educative’ quality 
and accessibility of these places and indeed plans required the approval of DfEE before 
funding was allocated to meet the costs of these new early education places (ibid; 54-55.).   
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 Each place whether in the private voluntary or maintained sector would receive £1,170 to provide the place 
(HC, 2000).   
88
 Indeed as a major criticism of the voucher policy was that it generated competition at the expense of expansion 
in places.  
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Early on, it appeared that the particular ‘educative’ quality conditions and the burden of 
administration which each provider was required to fulfil in order to be part of the EYDP 
plan, was putting pressure on providers, especially from the voluntary sector.  Even as early 
as 1998, the government announced that it would provide £3 million to support ‘good quality 
pre-schools forced with closure’ (Cmnd 3959, 1998: 7.).  The development of a new 
curriculum framework for the early years, the Foundation Stage (2000) (for children aged 
three to the end of the ‘reception’ year) and specific Early Learning Goals and curriculum 
guidance for early education providers for children under fives (QCA, 1999) would further 
increase the focus of publicly funded ‘early education places’ towards fulfilling ‘educative’ 
goals (Lewis, 2003: 226; Bertram and Pascal, 1999: 62.).  Indeed the ‘Early Learning Goals’ 
set out prescriptively what children should be able to achieve by the end of the reception year 
when children would be subject to a  Baseline Assessment (BREA, 2003: 21.).  Although the 
early learning goals and Foundation stage went some way to recognise the different 
educational needs of children aged three to five and emphasised personal social and emotional 
development, play and outdoor provision89, the requirement to fulfil specific learning 
objectives within literacy and numeracy created pedagogical tensions in this approach 
(Wandsworth, 2002: 57.).  Indeed, an inspection regime managed by Ofsted of all pre-school 
settings offering early education places emphasised the importance of the quality of pupil 
learning experiences in literacy and numeracy90 (BERA, 2003: 21.).  Hence, understandably 
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 The Six areas of the curriculum were Personal, Social and Emotional Development Language and Literacy; 
Mathematics; Knowledge and Understanding of the World; Physical Development; and Creative Development 
(Bertram and Pascal, 1999: 74.).    
90
 This was especially the case in England.  Indeed the Scottish and Welsh curriculum guidance documents did 
not place the same emphasis on letter and number knowledge or specific leaning objectives as the English 
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practitioners put their efforts into teaching aspects of the curriculum for which they were held 
publicly accountable (ibid.).  In this way, this policy appeared to be driven by an ‘educative’ 
perspective, as the requirements for ‘early education’ provision explicitly sought to raise 
‘educative’ outcomes in the broader education system.  Indeed as the government made clear, 
the test of the success of the approach would be ‘better outcomes for children, including 
readiness to learn by time they reach school’ 91(Cmnd 3959, 1998: 7.).  In order to do this, the 
DfEE’s EPPE project was already investigating the cognitive gains made by children in 
different pre-school settings and would make its final report in 2004 (Sylva et al., 2004.).  
Moreover, the policy was explicitly designed to be part-time (and therefore of no great benefit 
to working parents), reflecting the conceptualisation of these EYEC places as ‘early education 
classes’ which would necessarily be short in duration.  As Margaret Hodge asserted, the 
policy was specifically designed for the places to be spread throughout the week, as whilst 
taking the free places in two days ‘might be in the working Mum’s interest, but it wouldn’t be 
in the child’s interest’ (Hodge, 2007.).   
 
The government made another early commitment which appeared to be driven by a different 
conceptualisation of EYEC (and driven by a different frame) and would deviate from an 
overall coherent policy approach.  Owing to particular feminist pressure, especially from 
Harriet Harmen, for a separate ‘childcare’ agenda, a ‘national childcare strategy’ was 
                                                                                                                                                   
document (Wandsworth, 2002: 57.).  Indeed, the guidance is very specific: in the areas of literacy: to name and 
sound the letters of the alphabet; to read a range of familiar and common words and simple sentences 
independently; to begin to form simple sentences using punctuation; use their knowledge of phonics to write 
simple regular words (OECD, 2001: 115.).   
91
 Indeed a DfES target set in 2004 was to ensure that 50 per cent of children would reach a good level of 
development by the end of the Foundation Stage and the gap between the level of development reached by 
children in the 20 per cent most disadvantaged areas and other children will be closing (DfES, 2004: 29.).   
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announced in 1998, although the ‘childcare’ element did not appear to generate or command 
the same level of funding or policy development as ‘early education places’92.  Indeed, whilst 
the National Childcare Strategy was launched with the 1998 Green Paper, Meeting the 
Childcare Challenge, and stressed the aim to ‘ensure good quality affordable childcare for 
children aged 0-14 in every neighbourhood’ in order to ‘offer equal opportunities for parents, 
especially women, and to support parents in balancing work and family life’ underneath the 
ambitious ‘equal opportunities’ discourse was a distinct lack of policy commitment and 
funding to enact this aim, especially for pre-school children or regarding the quality of 
childcare services (Cmnd 3959, 1998).  It appeared that the government envisaged only a 
limited enabling role for ‘childcare’ (Wincott, 2006: 296.).  The government would not itself 
develop provision but sought to draw upon existing provision in the private and voluntary 
sectors.  To this effect the new Early Years Development Childcare Partnerships were given 
an extended remit to cover children 0-14, and the task of assembling information on childcare 
supply and demand (Cmnd 3959, 1998: 14.).  Their remit (and supply of funding) was mainly 
focused at developing ‘out of school’ childcare places for school age children (from £325 
million from a ‘New Opportunities Fund’ from the national lottery) to provide holiday 
schemes, before and after school clubs (Strategy Unit, 2002: 52.).  The actual Childcare Grant 
(£561 million over five years) was mainly to cover staffing support to EYDCP’s, but included 
some limited funding for Children’s information services in local areas, childminder start up 
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 Indeed between 2001/2 and 2003/4 the government allocated spending of £8.2 billion across all EYEC 
services, the bulk of which (£5.9 billion) was destined to establish, sustain and improve universal, free part-time 
educational provision for 3 and 4 year olds, whilst the Childcare Budget was only £561 million, with a further 
£325 funding for out of school activities for school age children (Strategy Unit, 2002: 10.).  However, an 
estimated £725 million would also be spent on childcare through tax credits support to low income families.      
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grants and funding for pump-priming93(ibid.).  In spite of this limited funding, Penn and 
Randall calculate that childminding places actually decreased by some 60,400 places between 
1997 and 2001 (2005: 80.).   
 
Conspicuous in its absence, there also appeared to be little policy attention towards 
developing childcare for pre-school children and especially those under three years of age.  
Indeed, Meeting the Childcare Challenge makes no mention of developing early years 
childcare in the maintained sector, save for the separate part-time nursery education offer.  
Moreover, there appeared to be little policy attention (unlike early education) directed to the 
quality of childcare.  As it was generally acknowledged childminder and nursery nurse’s pay 
was notoriously low but the Green Paper hoped that establishment of a minimum wage could 
mitigate this (Penn and Randall, 2005: 81.).   
 
Instead of generating significant supply or raising the quality of this supply, Meeting the 
Childcare Challenge, announced the creation of a new childcare tax credit (as part of the 
working families tax credit) which would provide help with childcare costs up to £70 per 
week for one child and £105 for two or more children who attended registered places (which 
included childminders, voluntary and maintained services) (Cmnd 3959, 1998: 14.).  Such 
provision however was only tied to those who were in employment 94 (Lewis, 2003: 225.).  
                                               
93
 A form of short term subsidy usually for provision in low income areas which gives financial support until 
they are established, after which they are assumed to become self-supporting businesses able to operate 
unsupported in the market (Cohen et al., 2004: 54.).   
94
 And as Lewis argues created difficulties for those seeking to enter employment as the tax credit assumed that 
employment preceded childcare, whereas getting into work and arranging childcare is chicken and egg for the 
women involved (2003: 225.).  Moreover, most of those at the lower income end would often seek to use 
informal care primarily.  Some help would be provided through the New Deal for lone parents.        
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Overall therefore, by concentrating on funding demand rather than supply, New Labour 
perhaps expected that much of the expansion in childcare would continue to be primarily in 
the private sector.  As Penn and Randall note, whilst New Labour claimed in its 2001 
manifesto that it had created 300,000 extra childcare places (which was an aggregate total of 
nursery, out-of-school and childcare) much of this occurred in private nursery providers and 
actual childcare places were very low 95(2005: 80.).  This was not considered a problem where 
affluent areas could afford (or presumed to afford) the market costs of childcare.  However it 
was apparent that the National Childcare Strategy was not generating places in disadvantaged 
areas (and hence would create significant barriers for poor parents to return to the labour 
market96).  With Treasury support (who increasingly viewed policies which aided labour 
market activation as contributing to poverty reduction targets), a remedial supply programme, 
the Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative was launched in 2001, providing three years of 
funding to create affordable 45,000 childcare spaces, for a minimum of ten hours a day, 
within 20 per cent of the most disadvantaged wards (HC, 2005b; HC, 2004).  Significantly, 
this was not simply a revenue project to subsidise places in existing day nurseries (although 
there was £243 million to support this).  With £100 million from the New Opportunities fund 
and £28 million from Sure Start capital allocations, extra nurseries were built (or refurbished) 
(HC, 2004a).  By August 2004, 1,279 nurseries had been created providing 45,000 places 
(HC, 2005b.).   
 
                                               
95
 Penn and Randall suggest that the figure of 300,000 probably also includes early education places and 73,800 
additional out-of-school places for school age children (2005: 80.).   
96
 Indeed local authorities were advised to locate neighbourhood nurseries near major roads, on a ‘travel to work 
basis’ with the intention of attracting higher income parents who would take up non Neighbourhood Nursery 
Places for sustainability (Smith, 2007: 13.).   
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At this early stage, whilst New Labour’s approach made a clear break from the past by 
abandoning the official policy of neutrality over maternal employment and going some way to 
recognise the costs of care, there was already a danger that ‘care’ appeared the poor relation to 
‘early education’ policy.  Despite significant feminist mobilisation behind getting childcare 
onto the government’s agenda, as those academics looking at policy through a feminist 
perspective assert, gender equity appeared to be given a low priority, as neither were the 
needs of children in daycare places 97 (Lister, 2003: 436.).  Indeed, despite the introduction in 
1999 of a National Framework of Qualifications in Early Years Education, Childcare and 
Playwork the training targets were low, set at NVQ level 2 for 50 per cent of any given 
workforce (ibid.).    
 
The most promising policy initiative, the Early Excellence Centres programme, went ahead as 
had previously been promised, following the White Paper, “Excellence in Schools” in August 
1997, to develop and promote models of high quality, integrated early years services for 
young children (from nought to reception) which would be responsive to local communities 
(Cmeduemp 33/302, 2001).  Set up as a pilot the programme operated in three successive 
phases, and by 2000 a total of 29 had been developed (ibid.).  A policy supported by the early 
years network and in many ways exhibiting a child-centred, holistic approach to EYEC, many 
of these centres were already in existence but were given ‘Early Excellence Centre’ status to 
                                               
97
 In part, this was a consequence of the main demand side subsidy sitting within the Treasury, as markets were 
considered the best way to deliver services and although Meeting the Childcare Challenge was developed in 
conjunction with DfEE and Ministers for Women, the educative concerns over quality were taken up within the 
early education policy – there did not at this stage appear to be a clear conception within DfEE that in order to 
fully promote early education that the quality of surrounding care was also vital.  Indeed, DfEE only just taken 
charge of day care on 1st April 1998 (previously it was held with the Department of Health) (HC, 1998)  
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demonstrate ‘good practice’ for EYDCPs98 (Cohen et al., 2004: 74.).  However, following the 
New Labour ethos, they were required to prove themselves.  Alongside the pilot study was a 
National Evaluation Programme, funded by DfEE, to produce evidence that the centres were 
cost effective, improved development and learning (both cognitive gains and physically 
socially and emotionally) and had impacts on social exclusion, employment, health and social 
regeneration (Cmeduemp 33/302, 2001).  In some ways an exemplar of the evidence-based 
policy approach, which sought to ascertain which particular elements of certain EEC’s were 
most effective before policy could be ‘mainstreamed’, the evaluation worked with a rather 
instrumental conception of outcomes which sat awkwardly with the holistic, child-centred 
ethos of the centres themselves.  
 
Despite already having generated a pilot ‘integrated’ model of EYEC another early years 
policy inactive emanating from the Treasury would also promote an ‘integrated’ multi-agency 
policy for the early years, although unlike the EECs would be based on a different EYEC 
frame and thus draw from particular EYEC evidence and would therefore develop 
qualitatively different services.  As had been described earlier, a small group of Treasury 
officials had been looking into pro-active spending policies which would support the human 
capital stock of the UK and had already become interested in the longitudinal studies from the 
US High/Scope and Head Start programmes which had produced results supporting 
investments in EYEC to support human capital and other macro social benefits (Glass, 1999: 
259.).  Hence the Treasury became actively involved (and indeed in many ways were the 
impetus behind) a comprehensive spending review carried out in 1997 which would take a 
                                               
98
 As such Local Evaluation Reports would be produced by each centre to be fed into the EYDCP and Children’s 
services plan (Cmeduemp 33/302, 2001).   
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comprehensive look at the pattern and level of public spending; one of which was to review 
services for young children (ibid.).  In one of the first New Labour commitments to ‘joint-
departmental’ working, the review was chaired by Tessa Jowell, Minister for Public Health 
(acting independently), Norman Glass from the Treasury taking the lead in the review process 
including officials representing 11 different departments99 (ibid.).   
 
The purpose of the review to look at policies and services for children under eight with regard 
to available research evidence in regards to the factors that contributed to the risk of social 
exclusion, the effectiveness of early interventions and to make suggestions for action in the 
UK (Clarke, 2006: 703.).  Indeed, in many ways it was already apparent that the review was 
already framed around ‘social engineering’ ideas (and perhaps reflected the Treasury interest 
in US programmes such as High/Scope and Early Start), which sought to ameliorate social 
and educational disadvantage and intergenerational transmissions of poverty for children at 
risk.  Indeed, whilst ‘social exclusion’ was a relatively new term circulating in political 
circles, the idea that poverty, social disadvantage and social problems could be engineered 
away through social policy interventions had much deeper ideational routes (as has been 
discussed in the previous chapter)100.  The review process involved a wide range of 
practitioners (from health, social services, education), campaigning groups, academics, and as 
Glass had noted ‘it was evident that there was a considerable expertise in the policy 
                                               
99
 Health, Education and Employment, Social Security, Environment and Transport, Region’s urban regeneration 
and housing, home office, the Lord Chancellors department, Culture Media and Sport, the Treasury (Glass, 
1999: 259.).   
100
 Although in part the term social exclusion was a reaction to the previous administration’s idea of an 
‘underclass’ which had deeper moral undertones than the idea of the ‘socially excluded’ who were primarily a 
socio-economic category.  In some ways the New Labour discourse was a muddle between the two see Clarke 
2006. 
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community which was eager to play a part in the development of policy… and the way 
forward was to make as much use as possible of this expertise’ (Glass, 1999: 260.).  Hence 
the review held a series of seminars of ‘what the research evidence said about what worked’ 
(ibid.).   
 
It was clear that during the review process, social engineering evidence and neuroscientific 
ideas had played a part in defining the review’s agenda.  Indeed as Glass asserted, the most 
important conclusions to emerge from the review was that ‘the earliest years in life were the 
most important for child development and that very early development was much more 
vulnerable to environmental influences than had previously been realised’ and that ‘multiple 
disadvantage for young children was a severe and growing problem, with such disadvantage 
greatly enhancing the chances of social exclusion later if life’ (ibid: 261.).  As such, the 
review brief was narrowed to look at services for under fours (Clarke, 2006: 703.).   
 
The conceptualisation of ‘risk’ appeared to be driven by social engineering ideas.  Indeed a 
strict following of neuroscientific evidence conceptualises ‘risk’ through particular universal 
‘critical’ time periods and universal physical categories such as low birth weight, however 
social engineering ideas prioritise socioeconomic and psychosocial profiles of risk (therefore 
rationalising a targeted approach) and defines particular macro social and economic 
benefits101.  As Tessa Jowell stated (and perhaps reflecting her own social work practice 
                                               
101
 And indeed on the flip side the consequences of non-intervention within the early years.  In some senses these 
social engineering ideas would have a particular effect upon the way that New Labour would conceptualise 
social exclusion which exhibits a tension between a moral discourse framed around a lack of ‘cultural 
preparation’ perpetuating poverty or socioeconomic structures limiting opportunities and that a lack of social and 
economic ‘goods’ perpetuated social exclusion and poverty.  
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background), the overall rationale for re-shaping children’s services was to ‘give best value to 
children but we can also get value for money by cutting the costs of crime and unemployment 
which can so easily follow if children do not get help at an early stage’ (1998, cited in Parton 
and Pugh, 1999: 230.).  The idea was that by providing help to the parents in their child’s 
early development (within both their health and their cognitive development and pre-natally) 
this would enable children to realise their potential within the education system hence avoid 
outcomes that are seen as the consequences of educational failure, including crime, 
unemployment and teenage pregnancy (Clarke, 2006: 699; National Audit Office, 2006: 6.).  
As a social engineering ideas prescribed, such micro solutions would potentially alter macro 
social and economic structures and could therefore contribute to New Labour’s broader aim of 
ending child poverty; indeed, just as economists in the US from the 1960s had asserted could 
be the case then.   
 
The policy programme to eventually emerge from the review, Sure Start, reflected this 
particular dual frame of social engineering and neuroscientific expertise.  Set up initially as a 
pilot, with £540 million ring-fenced within DfEE over three years to provide 250 centres and 
with its own cross departmental unit, the Sure Start Unit102, Sure Start was announced in July 
1998 as multi agency programme ‘to provide comprehensive support for pre-school children 
who face the greatest disadvantage.  It will include childcare and play, primary health care, 
early education and family support’103 (Blunkett, HC, 1998a).  In this way the programme had 
                                               
102
 Which was headed on an interim basis by a member of DfEE until Naomi Eistenstadt was recruited to head 
the unit. 
103
 Only some of these services would be free however, in particular the childcare (as opposed to early years play 
sessions) that Sure Start Centres provided would be paid for by parents, although theoretically the Child Tax 
Credits would cover most if not all of the costs for working low income families. However the audit office found 
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five main objectives: to improve social and emotional development, to improve health, to 
improve the ability to learn, to strengthen families and communities and to increase the 
productivity of operations (Sure Start 2001, cited in Evangelou and Sylva, 2003: 33.).  
Framed through social engineering ideas, such programmes would be targeted104 with the first 
60 trailblazer districts identified as having significant local deprivation.  A Sure Start Local 
Programme would convene a partnership to apply for Sure Start funding to improve and 
extend services in each area (HC, 1999).  In practice, each Sure Start Local Programme had 
some freedom to determine what services were provided around the core objectives, and 
services could include; childcare, crèches, speech and language development, toy libraries, 
baby massage and play sessions, pre and post natal classes and other health checks and 
education training and employment services (National Audit Office, 2006: 6.).  In keeping 
with the ethos of the policy and drawing from neuroscientific ideas of the importance of foetal 
development and the importance of supporting maternal nutrition, the Chancellor also 
announced in 1999 a Sure Start Maternity Grant (which from 2002 was £500) for those on 
income related benefits and Working Families Tax Credits (HM Treasury, 2001: 17.).  The 
2000 spending review extended the programme to over 500 local programmes by 2004, 
reaching one third of poor children under four in 524 centres (Clarke, 2006: 704.).   
 
Similar to the Early Excellence Centres, Sure Start would be subject to a rigorous evaluation 
programme (running from 2001 to 2008) and was required to meet particular Public Service 
                                                                                                                                                   
that Sure Start Centres by charging broadly market rates found that the care was still too expensive for 
disadvantaged families (National Audit Office, 2006: 22.).     
104
 Although targeted to area rather than taking the more potentially stigmatising option of profiling the clientele 
who could use these services. 
 144 
Agreement targets105.  The National Evaluation of Sure Start (NESS) would look in stages at 
outcomes in child social and emotional development, cognitive and language development, 
physical health of children and maternal psychological well being (NES, 2004: 6.).   
 
As such, in the first wave of EYEC reforms, distinct agendas and policies framed and 
orientated through different forms of expertise and ideas led to a scattergun approach to 
EYEC policy.  Indeed, many of the early reforms enacted by New Labour highlighted the 
conceptual differences (even confusion) within different areas of government over the relative 
importance of the early years for future outcomes; which groups of children and at which ages 
should be subject to government intervention and whether they should be subject to early 
education or simply care.  For a government which had so clearly stated its intention to 
implement ‘joined-up working’ and ‘joined-up-solutions’ it was some what ironic that behind 
the scenes, with particular policy agendas driven by different political agents seeking to 
establish a name for themselves, the approach could rather better be described as joined-up 
fighting106.  Moreover, it served to highlight the potential pitfalls of a purported ‘evidence-
based’ based policy agenda.  Indeed, even if political agents actually aim to model policy on 
evidence (rather than utilising it as a justificatory strategy) there is a danger that where 
multiple evidence-based frames become embedded in different policies (as was the case here) 
                                               
105
 The Public Service Agreements were gradually increased over the years but included reductions in numbers 
of children aged 0-3 who are re-registered on the child protection register; reductions in mothers who smoke; 
reduction of numbers of children with speech and language problems requiring specialist intervention by four; 
and latterly to ensure that 50% of children reached a good level of development at the end of the Foundation 
Stage and reduce inequalities between the levels of development achieved by children in the 20% most 
disadvantaged areas and the rest of England (see National Audit Office, 2006: 17.).    
106
 In particular, with Margaret Hodge backing the importance of early education, Harriet Harman protecting a 
childcare agenda and Tessa Jowell seeking to establish Sure Start as a mainstream policy programme  
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EYEC discourses become unstable, fragmented services arise, precluding an overall coherent 
agenda.  
 
What appeared striking was that despite the government’s rhetoric, as Gordon Brown stated, 
‘Our aim is that every child should have the best possible start in life’, most of policies 
enacted in the government’s first wave of programmes did not appear to be designed around 
the present needs and wellbeing of children (HC 1999a).  Indeed, the implication of the two 
main policy programmes split between sessional early education places and rather weak, 
privately dominated childcare market, was an inability for all services to link harmoniously.  
It was not always the case that places that provided early education could cover time periods 
in which parents were working and hence parents would need to organise packages of 
childcare around the free early education (be that a childminder or at another venue).  Whilst 
this was not particularly helpful to the parents it would also not be in the best interests of 
children (despite the rhetoric that part-time sessional places would be in the interests of 
children so as not to overload them).  Moreover by stressing the particular prescriptive 
outcomes which EYEC policies were required to achieve in order to be worthy of investment 
and by defining targets on the basis of macro societal outcomes and cognitive gains within 
formal literacy and numeracy, these policies were in danger of treating children 
instrumentally.  There also appeared to be a distinct split between how government policy 
conceptualised and treated different age groups; with state provisions for early intervention 
being defined (through a social engineering frame) by categories of social and economic risk, 
whilst for those aged three and above state provision was provided on a universal basis.  For 
those working from a child-centred perspective, this fragmentation in policy would have the 
potential to adversely affect the children to which policy was directed and ironically counter-
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act the intentions of the government to realise the full potential of every child.  It may have 
been expected that at this stage with departmental and ministerial interests in particular EYEC 
policies that the prospects for this scattergun and instrumental approach to be challenged 
would be limited.  However, two scrutinising functions, the Select Committee on Education 
and Employment and the OECD’s thematic review of ECEC would offer a space in which 
child-centred ideas and the early years network could potentially challenge the orthodox view 
of EYEC.    
 
3.4 Dissenting Voices: the Select Committee on Education and Employment and the OECD 
 
The Education Sub-Committee announced on the 28th July 1999 its intention to carry out an 
inquiry into Early Years Education (from birth to eight years of age107) and the various 
initiatives that government had enacted since 1997 (Cmeduemp 33/301, 2001).  It offered 
once again, an opening for the early years network to engage with the current policy 
initiatives and whilst not all were invited to be specialist advisors, many gave evidence.  
Particular influence from Peter Moss had steered the committee to undertake a field trip to 
Denmark (where a particular pedagogical tradition and state investment make one of the most 
comprehensive integrated systems of EYEC in the world).  Indeed the Committee’s report 
was extremely comprehensive and thoroughly engaged with existing evidence (both scientific 
and qualitative cross comparative), practitioner’s opinions, and those of other early years 
experts.  What emerged from the Select Committee was a well developed counter-voice to 
prevailing government ideas about EYEC and which exhibited a particularly child-centred 
                                               
107
 The inquiry had originally been charged with investigating early years education for children between 3 and 
Year 1 of primary school, but in the course of the investigation it was clear that the very early years were 
important also.   
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approach.  In particular, the Select Committee recommended a national model of integrated 
early education, care and community support services along the lines of the Early Excellence 
Centres pilot which had sought to demonstrate that the key to enhancing child development 
(upon which all anterior macro social, economic and educative objectives ultimately rested) 
was through policies which enhanced children’s wellbeing and attended to children’s and 
families needs holistically108.  Indeed, the Committee challenged the prevailing formal, 
Anglo-Saxon approach to early education alongside the low status and qualified childcare 
sector, seeking to instead promote the social pedagogical approach.  As the Committee report 
asserts: 
 
“we were impressed in Denmark by the standing of the ‘pedagogues’ who are well 
trained professionals working with children in early years settings…both written and 
oral evidence expressed an overwhelming concern with the training and the quality of 
people working in Early Years settings” (Cmeduemp 33/301, 2001).   
 
As a start, the Committee report notes ‘teaching in the early years demands particular skills in 
educators which go beyond the direct transmission of knowledge’ and the government should 
‘reconceptualise early years education and care as being about learning in the a much wider 
sense’ moreover ‘recognising that learning begins at birth, it does not begin at three’ (ibid.).  
As a beginning the Committee recommended that the ‘years from birth to five should be 
viewed as the first phase of education’; ‘that children below compulsory school age should be 
                                               
108
 Indeed the National Evaluation of Early Excellence Centres was subject to a cost benefit analysis which 
found that early intervention for children with special needs leads to greater likelihood of the child being 
successfully integrated for compulsory education in mainstream school, a saving for £7,000 per child-year hence 
£1 invested would save £8 on alternative sources (Bertram and Pascal, 2000).   
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taught informally in ways that are appropriate to their developmental stage and interests’; 
‘that DfEE should foster the creation and development of a ladder of training for Early Years 
Practitioners which could lead to a graduate qualification equivalent to that of qualified 
teachers’ (ibid.).   There was even some debate, on the basis of cross comparative education 
studies which supported results from existing developmental psychology studies, that a later 
school starting age (age 6 or 7) would be beneficial, provided that school is preceded by high 
quality pre-school provision (ibid.).  As the Committee noted: 
 
“skills such as reading, writing and maths require teaching, but there is no convincing 
evidence that teaching these skills early (before six) is advantageous… well resourced 
preschools that encourage the development of emotional, cognitive, social skills and 
feelings of self efficacy through natural activities such as play and exploration result in 
lasting social and educational benefits, especially for children from deprived 
backgrounds”  
 
In this way, whilst the Committee recognised the rich evidence base which had led to the 
development of Sure Start, the Committee noted that it was ‘not so much an education and 
care initiative but an integration of care and health services’ (ibid.).  Indeed within the 
minutes of evidence, Gillian Pugh suggests that ‘we need to look at the quality of children’s 
learning and make sure that Sure Start is fully docked in… Sure Start will only be effective if 
it becomes a mainstream strategy… it will only work if the lessons we learn from working in 
new ways with children under three are consistent’ (Cmeduemp 33/302, 2001.).  To bring the 
different policies together the Committee recommends ‘since education and care are 
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inseparable, there should be a universal service under the leadership of a Single Government 
Department’ (Cmeduemp 33/301, 2001).   
 
The DfEE’s decision to participate in the OECD’s thematic review process (1998-2001) also 
added to the critical voices of England’s fragmented system.  I shall analyse the development 
of the OECD perspective on EYEC in more detail in chapter six.  There I investigate the 
(impact of) the emergence and circulation of ideas related to EYEC within the OECD as an 
example of the role of the international level in policy change.  OECD perspectives shared 
with the Select Committee109, seeking to steer England’s EYEC policy towards a child-
centred frame (owing to particular links to the early years network) and many of the 
recommendations echoed the Select Committee’s concerns over the lack of a comprehensive 
early years strategy from birth, the ‘schoolification’ of early years education and the need for 
a central Ministerial lead for Children (OECD, 2000: 31; 41; 45).  The OECD added a 
questioning of the ‘dominance of a rather narrow and technical research paradigm’ to the 
debate (OECD, 2000: 46.).  Indeed the OECD urged the government to ‘develop knowledge 
of other perspectives and approaches, through cross national research, insights from post-
modernism, feminist post-structuralism and critical race theory which could offer alternative 
frameworks for understanding social change, intransigent social problems that impact on early 
childhood and education outcomes’ (ibid: 47.).  Moreover, by taking an overall cross national 
perspective, the OECD were in a position to demonstrate that comparatively public 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP was low in the UK (along with other ‘liberal’ welfare 
states) comparing to continental European countries in the middle and the Nordic countries 
                                               
109
 Indeed there were many links between the actors involved in compiling the background report and the Select 
Committee.  In particular Chris Pascal, a specialist advisor to the Select Committee, co-authored the background 
report for the OECD and the early years network were broadly connected to the OECD’s work.    
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which generally spent the highest proportion110 (OECD, 2001: 86.).  As Margaret Hodge, 
stated giving evidence to the Select Committee ‘we were very concerned, if you look at 
OECD comparative figures, that we probably invested less than any other country in the early 
years’ (Cmeduemp 33/301, 2001).   
 
3.5 The second wave of EYEC policy: The move towards an integrated, child centred policy 
model? 
 
In the context of significant external and internal (critical) interest in EYEC policy initiatives 
and indeed the recent policy activity across various government departments (not to mention 
the particular interest from the Treasury), two main developments would precipitate attempts 
to develop an integrated EYEC system and back this with greater spending.  Firstly, under the 
auspices of the Treasury and Strategy Unit it was announced in October 2001 that a second 
Interdepartmental Review of Child Care would take place, led by Baroness Ashton, in order 
to inform the 2002 Spending Review (Strategy Unit, 2002: 63.).   
 
The review develops a particular ‘employment and poverty’ rationalisation of EYEC which 
betrays influence from the Treasury.  Indeed, alongside the long term Sure Start project, 
increasingly policies which aided labour market attachment were viewed as contributing to 
reducing poverty levels.  As it states ‘new investment is particularly required to support the 
                                               
110
 Gathering reliable comparative data on EYEC was complex as recognised by the OECD as the multitude of 
different EYEC services and different starting ages for school made comparison difficult.  However, purely 
referring to pre-primary education (organised centre-based pre-school programmes) Denmark spent 0.85% GDP 
on early education with the UK spending 0.4% (OECD, 2001: 87.).  These figures were for 1998 and caused 
some frustration for UK Ministers with the publication of the consolidated report in 2001, as these figures did 
not account for the large increases in spending on early education from 1998-2001.   
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Government’s lone parent and child poverty targets’ (ibid: 6.).  The review also retained the 
technical, evidence-based approach that the previous comprehensive spending review had 
taken in order to rationalise EYEC policy, accounting for the ‘impacts on child development, 
educational attainment and labour market outcomes later in life’ (ibid: 64.).  Drawing upon 
ongoing EPPE, Early Excellence Centre and US data, the review concluded that ‘evidence 
supports investment in good quality, integrated childcare for pre-school in low income 
families…[it] also suggests that there are long-term educational outcomes which persist [and] 
there are other benefits: reduction in crime rates, improved health outcomes and attitudinal 
outcomes’ (Strategy Unit, 2002: 29.).  On the basis of this evidence and in order to realise 
these ‘outcomes’ the review proposed a doubling of investment in childcare by 2005/6 111 to 
be held in a combined budget with a new interdepartmental unit.  As the review noted, the 
current funding streams (with a plethora of short term grants) were particularly complex for 
local authorities to negotiate (ibid: 52.).  Recognising that there were too many uncoordinated 
programmes and that EYEC policy to date had not sufficiently ‘joined-up’, the review 
proposed, in order to produce an integrated overall strategy, that ‘responsibility for Sure Start 
and for early years education and childcare needs to be brought together at the centre, with a 
clear Ministerial lead’ (ibid: 54.).   
 
This latter proposal, which resulted in Margaret Hodge being appointed as the first Minister 
of State for Children within DfES, in 2003 with full responsibility for children and young 
people would mark a particular turning point in EYEC policy and specific attention towards 
child development.  Margaret Hodge had become something of an early years champion 
within the government and was particularly interested in the child development and learning 
                                               
111
 By 2005/06 the combined budget was expected to be £1.5 billion per year (Strategy Unit, 2002: 6.).   
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aspects of EYEC (Hodge, 2007).  As some commentators asserted this ‘marked the 
emergence under New Labour of an explicit, universal and child centred family policy’ 
(Williams and Roseneil, 2004: 184.).  Whilst, Margaret Hodge’s approach was initially more 
‘educative’ the engagement with child centred ideas was noticeable in her tenure as minister.  
Indeed, although the idea of integrated ‘Children’s Centres’ were first announced from the  
Interdepartmental Review, when giving evidence to the Select Committee earlier, Hodge had 
stated the intention to try to ‘get an integrated service, across care, education and health with 
the Sure Start programme and the Early Excellence programme’ (Cmeduemp 33/301, 2001).  
Indeed the policy was fully elaborated within the 2004 Ten Year Strategy for Childcare and 
Five Year Strategy within DfES, of which Hodge had significant input into both (Hodge, 
2007; Treasury, 2004; DfES, 2004.).   
 
Children’s Centres were the government’s main attempt to respond to the fragmented EYEC 
system that had developed in the first wave of reforms and indeed draw lessons from the 
evidence and contributions from both the Select Committee and to a lesser extent the OECD.  
They were initially a re-branding of Sure Start, Early Excellence and Neighbourhood 
nurseries, however, a key development was the mainstreaming of all different services to 
provide a ‘one-stop-shops’ or hubs for parents and children, offering early education and 
childcare, family support, health services, employment advice and specialist support (DfES, 
2004: 22.).  Moreover, going some way to recognise the importance of a seamless day for 
young children for their wellbeing and development, the policy recognised that ‘particularly 
in the earliest years, children learn through play and exploration and making an artificial 
distinction between education and care is unhelpful’ (ibid.).  As such, Children’s Centres 
would provide ‘educare’ combining care with early education, where the strict timetable for 
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early years education sessions were relaxed (although not entirely) so as to develop a more 
integrated play-based day rather than ‘early years lessons’ (ibid.).  It was expected that all 
Children’s Centres managers would attend a one year integrated leadership programme with a 
long term vision to ensure that these full daycare settings would be led by graduate qualified 
early years professionals 112(HM Treasury, 2004: 45.).  To develop the quality of early years 
workers, the government introduced first the framework document Birth to Three Matters 
which provided a set of resources to help those caring for babies and toddlers (DfES, 2004: 
24.).  This would latterly be superseded by the introduction of the Early Years Foundation 
Stage (EYFS) covering children from nought to five (DfES, 2004: 24; DCSF, 2007: 167.).   
Divided into sub-categories of age group and recognising the importance (and equal footing) 
of play and social and emotional development (if still somewhat prescriptive still on literacy 
and numeracy) EYFS became statutory within all settings offering provision for children aged 
0-5, including day nurseries, pre-schools, playgroups, childminders and maintained and 
independent schools so as ‘to ensure that children receive the same high quality experience 
whatever type of setting they attend’ (DCSF, 2007: 167.).  Whilst this maintains government 
commitment to ensuring quality across both early education and childcare, Children’s Centres 
with direct government funding would have higher levels of trained staff (indeed full daycare 
settings would be able to draw upon a Transformation Fund to recruit graduates to become 
full Early Years Professionals), whilst private and voluntary sessional providers and 
childminders are not required to have beyond NVQ level 2 (with the DfES strategic plan 2006 
stating that by 2008 transformation funds would be used to develop a higher proportion of 
providers at NVQ level 3) (DfES, 2006: 78.).  Without equitable wages and qualifications it 
                                               
112
 The latter Department for Children Schools Families (DCSF) report outlined that full day care settings would 
be led by a graduate by 2015, with two graduates per setting in disadvantaged areas (2007: 86.).    
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will remain to be seen how many of these latter providers will be able to implement this plan 
and negotiate this complex EYFS framework.   
 
There were also changes at the local level with EYDCP’s being replaced by Children’s Trusts 
(by 2008 all LA’s would have one), which gave more statutory power to local authorities in 
the provision of children’s services and integrated planning and commissioning with pooled 
budgets (ibid: 26.).  In this way, Local Authorities would be able to make decisions on how 
money was spent (and how funding would be divided between different providers).  Whilst 
this gives power to the local areas, there was a danger that with devolving power and 
suspending the ring fencing of funds once they run out113, that less committed local 
authorities would be able to cut specific services (for example outreach work) if funds became 
tight.  The latter Childcare Act of 2006 which placed a statutory duty on local authorities 
(from April 2008) to provide sufficient childcare went some way to condition local authority 
spending, although as Margaret Hodge feared, the commitment to quality and protecting 
specialised services could potentially be lost (HC, 2008; Hodge, 2007.).   
 
Despite these administrative tweaks the Children’s Centres policy initially appeared to not 
only introduce for the first time in England a child-centred integrated strategy but also a 
commitment towards universality.  Indeed the interdepartmental review had committed 
funding to deliver 2,500 Children’s Centres in the most disadvantaged areas and the Ten Year 
Strategy extended this commitment to 3,500 centres by 2010; as the government proudly 
declared ‘one Children’s Centre in every community’ (Treasury, 2004: 36.).  By now a clear 
                                               
113
 The Sure Start Local Programmes were ring fenced for ten years so many are coming to the end of the 
funding regime.  
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flagship policy of the New Labour tenure, the headline policy developments appeared 
increasingly to demonstrate the government’s commitment to children and to appear to be 
directing EYEC policy towards a child-centred model.  Whilst New Labour’s commitment to 
generate a new area of social policy is commendable, digging a little further into the 
implementation of the policy reveals a slightly different (policy) story and indeed can be 
explained by the pervasive influence of social engineering and educative frames which have 
served to temper the overall child-centred universal vision.   
 
Within the appendices of the Ten Year Strategy, the evidence and expertise from which the 
plan draws are outlined.  By this time EPPE was reporting outcomes from the longitudinal 
study which had found that high quality integrated settings achieved better cognitive 
outcomes than alternative provisions, that children who attended pre-school at two years old 
were 10-12 months ahead (cognitively) of those who had not and had better scores of 
independence, concentration and sociability, whilst for very young children there were mixed 
impacts (HM Treasury, 2004: 65-67.).  However the report also makes (somewhat conflicting) 
citing of the Early Head Start programme where a randomised control found improved 
cognitive, behaviour and health outcomes for young disadvantaged children (ibid: 69.).  On 
the basis of these two sets of evidence (drawing on respectively educative and social 
engineering ideas), very early education was a benefit for those profiled by risk whilst for the 
majority of children, there were no particular benefits.  This split in the evidence base was 
encapsulated in the government’s commitment to not purely universal services but 
‘progressive universalism’; ‘support for all and most support for those who need it most’ 
(ibid: 4.).  This idea was elaborated in the Children’s Centres Plans.  Indeed, despite making a 
commitment to universal Children’s Centres, it appeared that only those Children’s Centres in 
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the 30 per cent of disadvantaged areas which will be required to provide the gold standard 
‘integrated educare’ that would provide for services for five days a week, 48 weeks of the 
year (Moss, 2006: 167.).  In the ‘Children’s Centres light’ (as Moss himself referred to them) 
there would only be a minimum requirement to provide information and links towards other 
services (such as early education and childcare, health services and employment advice) 
retaining only the core ‘drop in early years play sessions’ and family support (National Audit 
Office, 2006: 14; DfES, 2006: 23.).  In these more affluent areas it is presumed that the 
private market will be able to fill the need for childcare and moreover that it is only those 
young children deemed at risk who require and benefit from integrated EYEC.  Similarly 
EPPE evidence was utilised to rationalise new EYEC policy.  Indeed, with reference to EPPE 
evidence the spending review announced a pilot would be set up to provide free part time 
early education for 12,000 two-year olds (beginning in disadvantaged areas in 2008) and the 
government extended the free 12 ½ hours entitlement 15 hours by 2010 with a longer term 
goal of 20 hours per week 114(Treasury, 2004: 53; HC 2005).   
 
In this way, whilst the government has clearly committed itself to making policy based upon 
evidence, it is the ‘scientific’ or hard empirical evidence which appear to have gained 
ascendency in the policy making process and in this way has set limits to the consideration of 
alternative forms of expertise and ideas.  In so doing, this has precluded the ascendency of 
child-centred and equal opportunities ideas and as such development of a fully integrated 
child centred policy model as appears in some Nordic countries.  Moreover, as New Labour’s 
EYEC policy model has developed, it is only early education which has secured the 
                                               
114
 Although the policy has been carefully regulated to ensure that these free early education places are spread 
over three days or more (HC, 2005).   
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commitment of government resources and which has been socialised by the state.  Early years 
care on the other hand, is still the weaker policy and still relies to a great extent upon parental 
funds115.  Even within full Children’s Centres, early education and intervention policies are 
free whilst the ‘care’ elements (the price of the hours over and above the free ‘early 
education’ entitlement) are funded by fees (which for some are subsided by tax credits).  In 
this way, unlike a fully child-centred vision the places are not provided on the basis of 
children’s needs and to a great extent rely on parental employment.  In so doing, the policies 
do not fully address gender equity concerns.  For the most part, parents with children under 
three will still be required to shoulder the majority of costs and most children will be cared for 
within private childcare services; hence many women will struggle with the increasing costs 
of childcare.   As Beverley Hughes, the Children’s Minister (2005-2009) comments on the 
fact that in 2006 private and voluntary sectors made up 81% of full day care places and 90% 
of sessional places: 
 
“That is good; it is what we want to see. Public sector provision is not driving private 
and voluntary sector providers into the ground—quite the opposite is true. The money 
that we have put in has allowed that sector to grow, and that is very important.” (HC, 
2006).   
 
                                               
115
 Although not strictly an early years policy, the ‘Extended Schools’ programme (developed in the 10 Year 
Strategy) committed money to develop childcare and after school activities which by 2010 would mean all 
schools would provide parents with children aged between 5-11 a guarantee of ‘affordable’ childcare between 
8am and 6pm all year round, either on site or in a partnership between voluntary and private sectors, including 
childminders.  The expectation is for such services to become ‘self-financing’ however through charging (HC 
2005a). 
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There is also the question of what will happen when the ring fenced funds for the Sure Start 
programme run out.  Whilst major injections of funds were committed during successive 
spending reviews, the 2007 budget committed a relatively modest increase in funds for early 
years services116.  It may be the case that the government expects that with funds injected to 
establish EYEC places, that with supply funding for low income families (which in 2007 was 
increased to 80% of costs up to £300 p/w, £175 for one child) alongside early education 
provision, EYEC will become self-financing (Treasury, 2007: 113.).  Yet the prospect of a 
fully integrated, universal EYEC service to develop without the continued investment 
substantial public funds is limited.  Indeed, where Sweden and Denmark currently invest 
around 2 to 2.5 per cent of GDP on EYEC, even with the significant increases in public 
spending, the UK only spends some 0.5% of GDP (in 2005) (HC, 2005c).  An EYEC service 
which attends to the holistic needs of children does not come cheap and requires substantial 
state subsidy, otherwise costs will be prohibitive, stratify children’s opportunities and the 
quality of such services will inevitably suffer.  Yet if neuroscientific evidence is correct and 
lends some ‘scientific’ weight to the child-centred approach that some countries have already 
developed, then investment in a universal EYEC system is essential and should be the first 
pillar of an effective welfare state and education system.   
 
In conclusion, as this chapter has sought to describe, England has made a particular and in 
many ways historic commitment to EYEC policy.  Indeed, when all the different policy 
initiatives are considered together, the scope and scale of change to the English welfare state 
is undeniable.  Tracing the development of EYEC policy shows that in some areas of the 
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 The 2007 budget announced increases in funding for Sure Start, childcare and early years of £340 million by 
2010-11 (Treasury, 2007: 113.).   
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welfare state, expansion not retrenchment has been the order of the day.  However, as I have 
sought to describe, there was no inevitability that as women entered the labour market in vast 
numbers that the agency of government would respond (or indeed respond in optimal ways) to 
such material changes to the social structure.  Indeed, as has been shown, EYEC policy, as it 
has developed over the last ten years has not fully engaged with the social risks created by a 
lack of adequate childcare, nor particularly addressed gender concerns.  Instead EYEC 
policies have been mainly developed in order to fulfil broader macro social, economic and 
educative goals.  In this way, welfare states do not simply respond to material incentive 
structures, indeed this process is highly mediated by the political process; hence not just 
actors and institutions matter, but discourses, ideas, scientific theories, representations and, in 
general, knowledge (Gottweis, 2003: 256.).  In order to understand how EYEC policy has 
developed in England and the qualitative texture of services that have been concretised in 
policy, particular attention has been given within the analysis to the ways in which particular 
persuasive yet competing EYEC frames have arisen in political and policy circles, 
destabilising the existing established maternal care ideas and which have subsequently fought 
for ascendency in the policy process.  Moreover, the specific interplay between these 
ideational frames and the institutions and practices of government which have, over time, 
increasingly privileged particular forms of evidence in the policy making process.  As I have 
sought to describe, the ability of early years academics to articulate the need for such services 
with reference to a variety of different evidential bases, discourses and indeed most 
importantly through the language of science, has both aided its ascendency within the highest 
political circles but unfortunately precluded the institutionalisation of a fully coherent and 
integrated EYEC system.  Indeed, particular frames stress different (policy) goals and whilst, 
overall, New Labour and various government departments have become increasingly 
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receptive to those technical ‘scientific’ frames and therefore set institutional conditions where 
social engineering, educative and neuroscientific rationalisations have ultimately gained 
ascendency, the interplay and elaboration of these different frames within policy has left 
England without a coherent overall rationale for EYEC.  As such, some elements of EYEC 
policy are potentially more vulnerable than others.  Indeed, whilst policies which have been 
informed by the educative frame have been universalised, Children’s Centres have been 
institutionalised as a marginal policy and as such may be more vulnerable to attack if another 
political party secures power, or indeed the national evaluation of Sure Start cannot generate 
enough convincing empirical evidence that such services produce the particular empirical 
outcomes on which they were rationalised in the first place.  Indeed frames which stress 
claims to empirical and scientific evidence and produce specific future outcomes will live or 
die according to such evidence; constructing policies on the basis of social citizenship rights 
where embedded as they have been in some Nordic states may prove more difficult to 
dismantle.  As was outlined in the previous chapter, many political analysts doubt the efficacy 
of purely micro solutions to broad structures of inequality, despite the benefits that some 
children may gain for their present well-being.  Indeed in some ways it is possibly too early to 
tell whether EYEC policy has become sufficiently embedded within the institutions of the 
English welfare state to survive changing political fortunes.  As the maternal care frame 
enjoyed a considerable a particularly long history it may yet take another significant period of 
time for a new ‘early years’ frame to become established.     
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: CANADA/ONTARIO: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
“The time has come for a truly national system of early learning and child care, a 
system based on the four key principles that parents and child care experts say matter 
– quality, universality, accessibility and development” (Speech from the Throne, 
Canada, 2004). 
 
When the Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, announced via the Speech from the Throne 
that the Liberal government would be entering into Federal and Provincial negotiations with a 
$5 billion plan to create a national system of early learning and childcare, there was a 
particular feeling of excitement amongst Canadian childcare advocates, child development 
experts and trade union members alike (Canada, 2005; CCAAC, 2004; CUPE, 2004; Friendly, 
2006).  The prospect of a set of bilateral agreements between the Federal government and the 
Provinces being secured and the enshrinement of a national system of early learning and 
childcare around four key ‘QUAD’ principles (quality, universality, accessibility and 
development) within Canada’s social policy framework was viewed by childcare advocates as 
heralding ‘a major social victory for Canada’ (Cool, 2007; CCAAC, 2004; Campaign 2000).   
 
For many EYEC advocates, the 2004 commitment represented the final realisation of a 
decade old Liberal Party promise to develop a national childcare system and embodied a 
recognition of the demands and advocacy efforts of the Canadian childcare lobby, whose 
members had worked continuously towards securing childcare as a national (and provincial) 
priority since the 1960s (Friendly, 2006).  Indeed, whilst the early 2000s had signalled rapid 
social policy innovation in early years policies and two previous ‘early years development’ 
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agreements had been forged, providing (unconditional) funding to the provinces with a view 
to broadly supporting discrete ‘early years’ policies, with the advent of the 2004 plan, the 
Martin government had made a clear commitment (and indeed break with the previous 
initiatives) to develop a pan-Canadian EYEC system; a system which recognised the 
importance of integrating both ‘early years interventions’ and ‘childcare’ policies and which 
would be a conditional requirement in order to receive Federal funds (Canada, 2005: 119).  As 
Paul Martin made clear, 
 
“we are not just talking about child care.  The focus here is on development, on giving 
children a leg up.  That means each child will get a better start and a better chance of 
thriving in school and in life.…. This is about making a permanent addition to our 
social foundation.  It’s about making clear that this program is here to stay – because it 
is right for Canadian families and it’s what is right for our children” (Liberal Party, 
2005; Martin, 2005). 
 
In this way, the 2004 commitment signalled the possibility of switching the tracks of the 
Canadian EYEC policy trajectory from a historically residual ‘welfare’ service (especially 
within childcare) towards the establishment of a universal and integrated system; for the first 
time the federal government would have a clear social policy role in the lives of young 
children.  Indeed, whilst maternal care ideas had quickly been destabilised in the post-war 
period and early policy initiatives had established a limited reconciliation of maternal care 
roles for low income or otherwise ‘at risk’ groups, like many other Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Canada did not continue onwards to develop a universal nor extensive (national) EYEC 
system, nor to establish a clear set of social policy relations between the state and young 
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children within the principles of the welfare state.  Instead, Canada has a legacy of limited, 
fragmented systems in most provinces117, where a multiplicity of discrete early education and 
care services and programmes had evolved arbitrarily, each with their own goals, objectives 
and funding arrangements (Friendly, 2000: 253).  Moreover, the prospect of a directive 
federal role in this policy area was all the more significant owing to complex federal, 
provincial and municipal relations and separate jurisdictions over elements of EYEC policy.   
 
However, whilst the federal Liberal government was on the cusp of enshrining EYEC as a key 
pillar of the Canadian welfare state and provinces such as Ontario had signed up to the 
agreements-in-principle which would ensure their share of the federal funds for developing 
this new EYEC system, the election of the Conservative, Harper, government in January 2006 
would signal a dramatic reversal of fortunes for those working within the EYEC field and cut 
short the prospect of a pan-Canadian EYEC system developing.  In January 2006, the 
Government of Canada gave one year’s notice that it would cancel the bilateral childcare 
agreements with the provinces and provide Federal funding for one year ending 31 March 
2007 (Cool, 2007: 7).  Instead, a ‘Universal Child Care Benefit’ would provide a taxable $100 
dollars a month allowance to all parents with children under six (ibid.).  Framed as a policy 
which provided ‘choice in childcare’ yet set at too low a level to offset actual childcare costs, 
the policy could be better conceptualised as a maternal care supplement, reflecting the 
influence and power of the maternal care lobby, REAL women, within the Conservative party 
and the tacit prioritisation of maternal care ideas and familial forms of care.  As the Minister 
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 With the notable exception of Quebec which remains distinctive in having a universal EYEC system since 
1997, where parents pay a full fee of $5 dollars a day in centre-based Early Childhood Centres.  For a full 
discussion of the Quebec case see Jenson, 2002.  Here I am concerned with the developments at the Federal level 
and within the Ontario Province. 
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of Human Resources Development and Social Development (HRSDC), Dianne Finley 
asserted ‘the most important investment we cans make as a country is to help families raise 
their children’ (HC Ottawa, 2006).  As such, the Canadian EYEC policy trajectory is 
complex; in many ways the debate over EYEC policy (at the federal level) has appeared to 
come full circle with the apparent (re)turn to maternalism, which had previously had a limited 
impact on social policy initiatives, save for the immediate post-war period.   
 
This chapter and the next account for the dramatic shifts in the Canadian EYEC policy 
trajectory at the federal level and within the province of Ontario.  Understanding and 
explaining policy developments in Canada is necessarily complicated due to the structure of 
federal, provincial and municipal relations which has historically split funding, policy 
development and delivery between different levels.  Indeed, childcare, education and other 
social policies have primarily been the responsibility of the provincial and municipal level.  
As such, each province has a distinctive EYEC programme, with different policy goals and 
aims, patterns of service delivery and levels of provision (Friendly, 2001: 30).  The federal 
government’s role has generally been seen as maintaining an overarching policy framework 
of national principles and to provide financing and hence influences policy by financing 
particular priority policies through cost-sharing programmes (with provinces) or utilising the 
tax system to subsidise the cost of childcare directly to parents (Scherer, 2001: 187; Friendly, 
2001: 30).  However, the federal role in social policy vis-à-vis the provinces has ebbed and 
flowed over time.  As such, any full Canadian policy analysis must necessarily take account 
of the different scaler relations and spatial dimensions of policy (Mahon, Andrew and 
Johnson, 2007: 41).  The structural (policy) relationships between 
federal/provincial/municipal levels are non-linear and in places reciprocal; new EYEC policy 
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initiatives and ideas have appeared at all three levels and policy ideas have at points travelled 
‘upwards’ as well as policy simply diffusing downwards.  Indeed, particular (external) policy 
agents and advocates operate at multiple contexts, facilitating ideational flow between 
different scaler levels, creating complex contours for strategic action and producing similar 
yet distinctive policy effects in particular places.  As such, this chapter will chart both federal 
initiatives, policy developments in Ontario and their elaboration (where necessary) with 
reference to the municipalities of York region and Toronto118.   
 
I take a historical approach and seek to account for significant shifts in the EYEC policy of 
Canada/Ontario at the discursive level and as concretised in policy.  I also address the 
interplay between (evolving) institutional policy making structures which have sustained 
particular relationships to external experts, forms of evidence and the state. These elements 
have generated the ascendance of particular EYEC ideational frames (and the bodies of 
expertise and evidence that support such frames), precipitating three key moments in which 
have defined the Canadian social policy trajectory.   As in the case of England, discussed in 
the previous two chapters, these discursive and policy changes are related to alterations in the 
social structure, especially shifts in gender roles and in particular mothers’ formal labour 
market participation.  It is hard to resist the argument that these changes have contributed to 
                                               
118
 I have chosen both Toronto and York as references as municipalities have some degrees of freedom as to how 
to plan and run services within the local community and implement policies differently.  Indeed since the 1998 
Services Improvement Act in Ontario, from 1999 the management of childcare and some early years services 
(save education which are dealt with by School Boards) were downloaded to the municipal level and since 2000 
municipalities have had to write service plans every five years (Tyyska, 2001: 139; Wagle, 2006).  Toronto is in 
some ways exceptional within Ontario, having one of the most extensive childcare systems in the province and 
as such I also refer in places to York region which is situated outside the metropolitan area of Toronto as a 
secondary case.   
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the emergence of EYEC as a significant policy issue in Ontario/Canada, just as we have seen 
they did in the English case.  Briefly, these social structural factors show relatively similar 
patterns across the two cases – with the growth of mothers’ labour market participation 
arguably occurring slightly earlier in the latter case.  In the UK, there was relatively little 
evidence to suggest that changes in mothers’ employment patterns directly triggered 
discursive change or the shifting influence of various EYEC frames.  The slightly earlier 
emergence of this structural trend in Ontario/Canada might have been expected to have 
produced significant policy change, and perhaps entrenchment, earlier than was the case in 
England – and issue to which I will return at the end of the analysis of Canada.  
 
This chapter begins with the argument that the early institutionalised policy divisions between 
childcare and early education and differing levels of policy commitment between them both 
shaped Ontario’s EYEC policy trajectory during the post-war period and conditioned the 
strategic priorities of early advocacy and other expert efforts towards securing the extension 
of the weaker (child) care aspects of EYEC policy.  With the growth of maternal labour 
market participation during the 1970s and 1980s and aided in part by the federal funding of 
feminist advocacy and research, a vocal childcare advocating lobby gained prominence, 
seeking to secure a universal not-for-profit childcare system based on ‘equality of 
opportunities’ ideas informed by feminism.  As this chapter explains, the Royal Commission 
on the Status of Women provided an open space and focal point in the federal bureaucratic 
structure for the expertise and policy ideas generated from a feminist perspective and with 
significant national media interest, sufficient ideational and material pressure was generated 
to secure federal and provincial attention on childcare policy.   
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However, as Canada entered a critical juncture over EYEC policy, with an incumbent 
government much less sympathetic to gender equity arguments, a debate over auspice and 
federal jurisdictions over provincial policy making would prove divisive and ultimately lead 
to the failure of a national plan.  With the absence of alternative EYEC frames (and attendant 
ideas and evidence) to motivate ongoing policy discussions and as federal policy making 
institutions became increasingly closed towards ‘equality of opportunity’ experts, policy 
momentum was lost.  Hence the prospects of a national EYEC system emerging in the future 
appeared increasingly unlikely.  This chapter concludes by discussing a neo-liberal politics of 
austerity and of New Public Management (NPM) ideas, where fiscal priorities over managing 
debt took precedence over social policy initiatives and precipitated a general federal retreat 
from social policy making, it increasingly appeared that both the federal and provincial levels 
would revert back towards, and lock into, a liberal, residual policy framework.  At the 
provincial level the neo-liberal Harris government embarked upon significant retrenchment of 
existing EYEC services.     
 
Paradoxically, however, the next chapter will show that certain institutional developments 
emerged from this same wave of federal reforms.  Alongside developing neuroscientific ‘early 
years’ ideas and evidence, these changes would open up a new avenue through which EYEC 
would become an important (policy) priority at federal and provincial levels; albeit in a 
radically new form.  The next chapter argues that the development of the National 
Longitudinal Survey for Children and Youth (NLSCY) and the establishment of the Applied 
Research Branch within the federal government, altered the context and form of federal social 
policy innovation; creating institutional conditions which privileged ‘evidence-based’ policy 
ideas and expertise, precipitating another contingent period of openness in the policy making 
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process, upon which a different set of EYEC expert actors could infiltrate social policy 
debates.  As will be shown, these particular institutional conditions allowed for the 
ascendancy of ‘scientifically informed’ neuroscience and educative EYEC frames and the 
particular influence of experts from the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research who made 
links between NLSCY child development outcomes and the necessity of early years policies.  
I argue that, once established, these ‘scientific’ ideas significantly altered Canada’s social 
policy priorities at both federal and provincial levels, generating political interest in early 
years of children’s lives and directing policy attention towards a broad spectrum of early 
years policy interventions, even within the height of broader neo-liberal restructuring and 
retrenchment.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s there was a rapid set of social policy 
innovations in the EYEC policy field, rationalised by this evidence.     
 
Initially, the injection of these ‘scientific’ EYEC frames into the policy process and the first 
waves of EYEC policy initiatives precluded the development of an extensive, coherent or 
integrated EYEC system.  Indeed, despite the broadening of the EYEC debate, feminist and 
early years experts operated in isolation rather than forming a broad ‘early years’ network, 
advocating for their distinct agendas rather than combining or linking them.  Hence the 
existence of multiple ideational frames added complexity and instability within the ‘early 
years’ discursive terrain, opening up divergent paths to policy action, rather than a common 
(policy) consensus.  As these frames fought for ascendancy, the disproportionate influence of 
neuroscientific experts and ideas in the policy making process would condition against 
alternative and existing EYEC frames.  Indeed, as shall be shown, the particular reading of 
neuroscientific ideas by early years experts in this case did not make explicit links to the 
importance of ‘childcare’ within EYEC policy, inhibiting the re-emergence of the ‘equality of 
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opportunities’ EYEC frame and also directed policy attention towards the very early years.  
Hence within Ontario, this precipitated a somewhat paradoxical social policy expansion 
through discrete ‘early intervention’ policy initiatives alongside a continued retraction of 
broader childcare and early education services.   
 
The OECD’s thematic review had a particular effect upon the Canadian EYEC policy 
trajectory at both levels of government.  It strengthened a ‘child-centred’ frame which 
articulated the link between integrating ‘care’ and ‘education’ and open up the policy process 
to formerly marginalised ‘childcare’ advocates, bringing disparate agendas together and 
reconfigure a holistic frame for (policy) action.  However, with a change of government at the 
federal level, opposed to federal involvement in childcare policy and greatly influenced by 
maternal care frames, the EYEC national plan has been suspended.  The next chapter will 
document attempts to continue developing ‘a child centred’ EYEC policy at the provincial 
levels and efforts from the Canadian Senate to re-ignite federal policy attention towards a 
child-centred EYEC frame.   
 
4.1 A (partial) ‘early years’ policy laggard?  Early EYEC policy initiatives at the provincial 
and federal levels and the institutional split between early education and care 
 
Mahon and Phillips argue that Canada’s childcare policy has been embedded in a broader 
‘liberal’ welfare regime, which tends to minimise the state’s role relative to families and 
markets (2002: 192).  Although when analysing childcare in isolation it is true to say that 
early policy initiatives did not establish a universal publicly funded system, other ‘educative’ 
elements of EYEC policy were quickly established as a free public service, with something 
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like a universal early education policy becoming embedded within many provinces, including 
Ontario.  Therefore, when looking across the ‘liberal’ regime family policy and more broadly 
at EYEC, initially Canada may not appear to be so much of a policy laggard or residual as 
other ‘liberal’ countries.  Moreover, at various points in Ontario’s history and at the federal 
level, there has been significant political interest in childcare policies and the needs of 
(working) mothers, despite the lack of a full realisation of feminist demands for universal 
childcare.  
 
Within Ontario, an early institutional split between care and education was enshrined in the 
provincial social policy framework.  Early education in the form of kindergarten has a long 
history in Ontario, which since the late 19th Century has been providing part-time classes to 
children under six, falling under the jurisdiction of the provincial education act (Friendly, 
2000: 265).  Junior kindergartens were originally established to ‘provide compensatory 
education for disadvantaged populations’, yet during the 1940s to early 1960s there was a 
steady growth of programmes and the extension of services towards the broader population 
(Kyle, 1991: 404; 370).  These provincially funded, free classes have generally been offered 
on a half day basis (although rural areas have alternate day schedules to save transportation 
costs) for children 3 years and 8 months up to 5 years old (in junior and senior kindergarten) 
(ibid: 404).  Viewed as exclusively educational, as the 1971 Birch paper asserts, ‘to prepare 
young children for formal schooling… their hours are necessarily tied to the hours of the 
school system and are therefore not suitable for working mothers’, the curriculum seeks to 
‘assist children to develop a positive attitude to learning… appropriate social behaviour with 
peers and adults, communication skills that set the foundation for learning’ (ibid: 373; Colley, 
2006: 19).  By September 1990 it was mandatory for school boards to offer half day senior 
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and junior kindergarten; and Ontario would provide funding to school boards that had the 
space and the desire to provide full-day senior kindergarten (Kyle, 1991: 434).  Kindergarten 
teachers are well remunerated having similar wages to that of elementary teaching staff, 
which in 2000, averaged $53,764 (compared to $19,000 per annum for childcare workers) and 
have access to full benefits, career ladder, holidays and professional associations119 (Colley, 
2006: 25).  As Mathien states, ‘kindergartens are firmly within mainstream childhood 
experience’ (2001: 220).  
 
In contrast, the childcare element of EYEC has not been subject to the same level of 
state/provincial involvement.  As in many liberal welfare states, extra-familial care has been 
viewed to some extent as the less appropriate than (or providing no significant advantages 
over) parental care and less valuable than broader early education policies.  However, it is 
important to note that the ‘maternal care’ frame focused on maternal attachment which served 
to prevent the development of post-war childcare initiatives in other Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states did not appear to shape Ontario’s policy discussions120 (despite their influence in other 
(eastern) provincial and federal contexts).  In a great part this was due to the way in which the 
first war nurseries were developed from the Federal/Provincial Wartime Day Nurseries 
                                               
119
 At a pan-Canadian level, the Canadian Teachers’ Federation (CTF), created in 1920, represents all the 
provincial/territorial teachers’ 61 associations. While it does not have collective bargaining powers of its own, it 
assists provincial/territorial teachers’ federations in collective bargaining by providing information on salaries, 
benefit levels and average workloads across the country (Doherty, Friendly, Beach, 2003: 60.).   
120
 Within the department of Public Welfare and latterly (1972) the Ministry of Community and Social Services 
(Collier, 2001: 126.).  
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Agreement121.  Indeed, within Ontario, a Day Nurseries Branch within the Department of 
Public Welfare sought to develop developmental (rather than simply custodial) childcare 
programmes from the federal funding and such programmes would provide ‘enrichment’ for 
all children, rather than providing special services for those purely ‘at risk’ (Krashinsky, 
1977: 17).  As such, municipal war nurseries were not established as simply places for 
‘neglected’ children or those whose parents could not provide adequate care; childcare could 
have positive benefits also.  This may have gone some way to prevent the influence of 
Bolwby’s attachment theory and wider maternal care frame (propounding the idea that 
childcare damages children) taking hold in Ontario as it had at elsewhere122.  Moreover, when 
federal funding was withdrawn at the end of the war, early advocacy efforts by mother’s, 
women’s and welfare organisations and the Communist Party123 secured a continued 
provincial commitment to support these centres, thus establishing childcare within the 
provincial social policy framework (Finkel, 2006: 195).     
 
The resulting Ontario Day Nurseries Act (1946) offered 50 per cent funding of operating 
expenses to any municipality undertaking or providing care (for pre-school children) and 
required licensing and inspection of day care and nursery schools (Krashinsky, 1977: 18).  
Municipalities tended to keep open the existing nurseries but balked at establishing new 
centres since they would be solely responsible for their capital costs and the maintenance of 
                                               
121
 In 1942 at the height of the Second World War, the federal government provided 50-50 cost sharing for 
childcare centres in participating provinces (of which Ontario and Quebec signed on) through the Dominion-
Provincial Wartime Day Nurseries Agreement (Prentice, 2000: 275.).   
122
 For a discussion of the influence of Bolwby’s attachment ideas at the federal level see Goelman, 1992.   
123
 The ending of the Federal/Provincial agreement prompted the establishment of the Day Nursery and Day Care 
Parents Association in Toronto in 1946.  The association, the first major childcare advocacy activity in Ontario, 
organised public meetings, wrote letters to newspapers and lobbied extensively to support their campaign. 
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the standards outlined in the Act (Finkel, 2006: 195).  Thus, the act did not lead to a growth in 
municipal childcare124 (especially outside of Toronto) and commercial and non-profit parent 
co-operatives developed to fill the vacuum, with most mothers making childcare 
arrangements without state assistance and within unregulated forms of care 125(Kyle, 1991: 
370).  Fees in regulated care were expensive; between 1948 and 1951 daycare fees in Toronto 
rose six fold (Finkel, 2006: 196).  However, despite the popular press trivialising maternal 
work as a ‘double work day for fanciful reasons’126, with the absence of a strong maternal 
care frame, the province did not actively discourage mothers (even for young children) from 
choosing paid work.  As such, childcare did not have same negative connotations as in places 
where the frame embedded more fully.  The central debate concerned who should receive 
provincial assistance towards the costs of childcare (which was extremely limited and 
unevenly spread) and how far provincial responsibility for care should extend.    
 
These policy debates and the subsequent policy trajectory would be influenced by the 
introduction of federal cost-sharing programme, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966 
when the issue of childcare was infiltrating national debates and federal policy discussions127 
                                               
124
 Indeed spending in Ontario between 1949 and 1964 hovered around $200,000 dollars and it would not be 
until the Canada Assistance Plan that spending would double year on year during the late 1960s/early 1970s 
(Krashinsky, 1977: 35.).   
125
 In a 1967 survey of working mothers with 3 and 4 year old children, half were cared for by relatives, a quarter 
by non-relatives and only three per cent by day care centres; the rest were cared for in a multiplicity of care 
arrangements or not at all (Krashinsky, 1977: 11.).   
126
 Often it was argued that working mothers simply wanted to ‘augment her husband’s respectable salary so that 
the household could pile up material possessions and engage in status contests with neighbours’ (Finkel, 2006: 
199.).   
127
 As Jenson, Mahon and Phillips, document the feminist voice was generally quiet during the 1950s and 1960s 
(before the feminist and childcare advocacy groups came to the fore) save for the Family and Child Welfare 
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as economic and social changes (especially with the increase in maternal labour market 
participation) created a greater demand for childcare.  It was not the case that the federal 
government was actively seeking to reconcile these particular demands (Pence and Benner, 
2000: 135).  Instead, CAP originated from a broader ‘war on poverty’ agenda which sought to 
prevent poverty by providing social assistance and a range of welfare services to a selected 
segment of Canadians.  It was not explicitly designed to fund childcare programmes per se, 
nor designed to induce the commodification of maternal labour 128(Friendly, Rothman, 
Oloman, 1991: 19; Mahon and Philips, 2002: 197).  Indeed, the federal government, where 
the material care frame and ‘attachment’ theory has a lingering influence, seemed to operate 
with a more restrictive concept of childcare than had been established within Ontario.  As 
Prochner argues: 
 
“When the [federal] government took on major responsibility for day care, it also took 
on traditional attitudes towards the service it was providing.  Day care never outgrew 
the stigma of its charitable origins or its reputation as a low-status inferior substitute 
for home care” (2000: 61).   
  
At the federal level childcare (funding) was conceived as a strictly residual welfare service, 
intended for needy families ‘who require financial assistance or who require social services to 
                                                                                                                                                   
Division of the Canadian Welfare Council, which became the focal point of a network of local social workers 
who voiced the need for help for low income families in arranging non-parental childcare (2003: 141.).   
128
 Indeed, some early arguments made by the Ontario Association of Social workers presented daycare as a 
means for enhancing the efficiency of women worker’s at home and in the work-place, however arguments 
presenting daycare as aiding full employment were not successful in Canada (as they were elsewhere – for 
example in Sweden) as the Trudeau government indicated that inflation not unemployment would be its main 
preoccupation (Finkel, 2006: 211.).  
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prevent, overcome, or alleviate the causes of poverty or child neglect’ (Status of Day Care in 
Canada, 1974, cited in Goelman, 1992: 246).  That is, childcare was conceived as a purely 
custodial service which might aid mothers’ labour market access where a single family 
income was insufficient.  CAP funding to the provinces was complex.  The federal 
government entered into open-ended agreements with provinces to reimburse up to 50% of 
childcare service costs (which the province shared 30% and 20% with the municipalities) 
through two main routes: a more generous ‘welfare services route’ which would provide fee 
subsidies for needy or low income parents and operating grants for regulated non-profit or 
government and a ‘social assistance route’ which simply provided ‘needs-tested’ fee subsidies 
within both non-profit and commercially operated programmes (Friendly, Rothman, Oloman, 
1991: 29).  Ontario (unlike most other provinces) chose the latter route.  Hence with the 
advent of CAP, eligible families in Ontario129 could receive fee subsidies up to 50% of their 
costs for childcare in provincial, municipal, or commercial facilities (Doherty, Friendly, Lero, 
1998: 8).   
 
As such, CAP had a significant policy effect within Ontario, markedly influencing the 
subsequent trajectory of development.  An underlying tension was created between the early, 
universal ‘developmental’ emphasis of the early childcare programmes and the structures of 
financing which directed policy towards those ‘at risk’.  With federal influence, the 
reconciliation of childcare costs was established purely for low income families and with 
other risk profiles; families which did not fall under the criteria of the needs test had to pay 
                                               
129
 The definition of financial need under CAP is vague, a ‘needs’ test would be required in order to obtain 
federal reimbursement of share of costs. In Ontario the needs test was a complicated form which required parents 
to document family income from which ‘allowable expenses’ were subtracted in order to calculate how much 
income could be spent on fees and how much would be supported by the province (Krashinsky, 1977: 20.).   
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full fees130 (Krashinsky, 1977: 21).  So, for example, York, which had previously provided 
some fee subsidy to all users of municipal daycare, phased out this system (ibid.).  Moreover, 
whilst CAP established a more stable income-base for childcare centres participating in the 
‘purchase of service’ scheme131, the childcare fee subsidies (paid to operators) never realised 
the full operating costs of providing childcare places (especially those which had established 
early development programmes) and as such, places were increasingly indirectly subsidised 
by low staff salaries, a lack of benefits and sometimes meagre facilities (Kyle, 1991: 371).  
Moreover, by allowing for federal-sharing of fee subsidies in commercially operated 
programmes, it laid the groundwork for the growth of for-profit programmes in Ontario, 
although purely provincial funding would continue to support non-profit and municipal day 
care centres only (ibid.).   
 
CAP in this way both aided the growth of childcare during the 1970s but also shaped 
provincial policy development.  Indeed, the 1970s saw significant expansion of childcare and 
provincial spending; with the number of spaces increasing at an annual rate of over 30% 
between 1971 and 1973 and almost doubled between 1973 and 1974.  100% capital grants 
                                               
130
 As of 1971 parents could deduct part of their childcare expenses under the Child Care Expense Deduction 
against tax but this required receipts and the majority of unlicensed caregivers (which invariably were the 
cheaper and more readily available form of childcare) and hence take up was low (Mahon and Phillips, 2002: 
194.).    
131
 The purchase of service agreements were the mechanism by which municipalities would organise the fee 
subsidies system.  Commercial, non-profit and municipal childcare centres would enter into purchase of services 
agreements with the municipality whereby the centres would receive the part payment of funds as defined by the 
Children’s service department of the municipality (the needs test) and eligible parents would therefore pay less 
to the centre (Wagle, 2006).     
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were made available by Ontario during the early 1970s132 for municipal and non-profit 
organisations to build centres (Krashinsky, 1977: 15).  Day care expenditure in Ontario had 
jumped from $615,269 in 1968 to $16,275,759 in 1975 and the number of centres increased 
three fold during the 1970s from roughly 500 centres in 1971 to 1,500 in 1980 (ibid: 35; 
Skelton, 1996: 67).  So, despite significant expansion in Ontario’s childcare (albeit from a low 
base), clear limits were in place on the extent to which the childcare system could to expand 
and on for whom care costs would be reconciled with the province.  Indeed, as the 1974 white 
paper, Day Care Services to Children, known as the Birch Paper (Ontario’s first major policy 
statement about childcare) stated: 
 
“We will not establish a system of ‘free’ universal day care across Ontario… a costly 
and unnecessary monopoly over day care services to young children – services that, 
for the most part, people are able to provide for themselves” (cited in Kyle, 1991: 
373).   
 
Following the CAP policy structures, provincial priorities for public funds would be similarly 
allocated for ‘those with the greatest social and financial need’ (i.e. handicapped children; low 
income families and native children) and with any remaining funds devoted towards ‘the 
growth of services to all children in Ontario’ (Krashinsky, 1977: 19).  As such, the setting of 
specific policy limits to childcare expansions meant that with the rapid growth of maternal 
labour market participation in Canada during the 1970s (from roughly 25% in 1970 to 47.5% 
in 1981) the need for childcare consistently outstripped supply (despite the fact that Ontario 
                                               
132
 One was Project Day Care which began in 1971 offering $10 million dollars to create 150 new nurseries 
serving 4000 children and in 1974 an amendment to the Day Nurseries Act allowed the Minister to establish 
100% capital grants for centres (for municipalities and non-profit organisations) (Krashinsky, 1977: 19).  
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has the lion’s share of childcare services across Canada – Goalman, 1992: 235; Truelove, 
1996: 37).  As Goelman notes: 
 
“The emerging tension was one in which the governmental system of supporting 
childcare was trapped in its early conceptual welfare framework that was no longer 
appropriate for the dramatic demographic and social developments in society” (1992: 
235).   
 
So, despite the provision of some childcare from early policy initiatives, the increase in 
maternal labour force participation rates generated significant demand for increased provision 
and it was apparent that a much broader reconciliation of (maternal) care via the state was 
required.   
 
4.2 The shaping of an equality of opportunities ‘childcare’ agenda: the Canadian EYEC 
advocacy and expert community 
 
The early division between early education vis-à-vis care and the stronger policy history of 
the former in Ontario conditioned the strategic priorities of provincial EYEC advocates and 
experts towards certain forms research and advocacy, particularly on extending and 
improving the care aspects of EYEC policy.  Because, in a sense, half the policy debate over 
EYEC policy had already been won (especially within Ontario) the evidence-base that 
developed and the framing of EYEC by advocates was shaped in a particular way.  The issue 
of early education for children has tended to be considered a closed topic and has rarely been 
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interrogated by Canadian advocacy groups or researchers133, arguably due to the distinct 
legacy of pre-school education in Ontario, together with provincial dominance of education 
policy.  Indeed pre-school education would not appear to be a significant part of the 
provincial and federal EYEC policy debate until the neuroscientific frame generated a 
reappraisal of early education policy in the mid to late 1990s.  Moreover, in the absence of a 
strong embedding of the material care frame (especially at provincial level), childcare was, at 
the very least, treated as a neutral custodial service supporting the welfare of low income 
families.  Indeed, many non-profit childcare centres were viewed as having positive benefits 
for children’s development.  Hence there did not develop (nor was there a particular need for) 
a specific counter-discourse and evidential base to attachment theory and the idea that that 
childcare damaged children.  In this way also, a specific line of research investigating the 
developmental, educative and social/emotional effects of EYEC upon children (in the 
Canadian context) did not develop.  It has been notably absent within the Ontario EYEC 
advocacy community or in ongoing policy debates134.  
  
Instead a distinct focus upon the (child) care aspects of EYEC policy framed through equality 
of opportunities ideas developed and defined both external and internal policy debates.  Early 
provincial advocacy efforts tended to arise through protest groups (often parents, childcare 
                                               
133
 One study of note during the 1970s was the 1973 University of Western Ontario Pre-School project initiated 
by Mary J Wright which assessed the impact of compensatory education (two years of kindergarten) on low-SES 
(Social Economic Status) children.  Over the long term (to grade 3) pre-school had positive effects on 
intellectual cognitive and academic achievement (Howe, Jacobs, Fiorentino, 2000: 226.).  However this study 
simply reinforced the existing policy structure of kindergarten.   
134
 Indeed during the early 1990s Doherty produced an annotated bibliography of 49 international research 
studies on childcare quality regarding development, of which only two were Canadian and one of which 
operationalised quality simply through licensing standards (Pence and Benner, 2000: 148.).   
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and social service workers, feminists and other advocates), which sought to maintain 
commitments to early childcare initiatives.  Subsequently these advocates engaged with 
provincial childcare policy debates in the late 1960s and 1970s, which had put upper limits on 
the state reconciliation of (child) care and which had allowed the growth of commercial 
childcare.  In particular, the Day Care Reform Action Alliance was set up in response to the 
Birch Paper’s rejection of universal childcare and the imposition of upper spending limits 
(Collier, 2001: 125).  Through the alliance’s demonstrations, pickets and actions in the 
legislature the common principles and concerns among activists were clarified, as Collier 
argues: 
 
“Many of the views that have characterised childcare advocacy in Ontario – the 
insistence on quality child care, the demands for better more extensive public funding 
and the concern that making profits on childcare was a disincentive to quality – had 
their beginnings in the advocacy efforts of this period” (2001: 125). 
 
In this way, research linked to provincial childcare advocacy comprised mostly technical 
policy studies; indexing structural levels of quality in childcare services differentiated by 
auspice 135 (Prentice, 2000: 277).   On the basis of these structural indices of ‘quality’, which 
included measures of staff to child ratios, health considerations, wages, working conditions, 
and age appropriate programming, a consistent finding was that non-profit centres scored 
                                               
135
 Krashinksy’s (1977) study, Day Care and Public Policy in Ontario, sought to make the case for establishing 
not-for-profit childcare and an extensive survey of the types of provisions/staff ratios/wage differentials in 
different childcare auspices.  Latterly Friendly (1986) and SPR Associates (1986) would conduct research into 
childcare quality and conclude that commercial care tended to fare poorly when measured on staff-to-child 
ratios, turnover rates and quality of programming (Prentice, 2000: 270.).   
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much higher on these measures than commercial care, whilst municipal facilities maintained 
reasonably uniform standards but provided the highest salaries (ibid: 275; Krashinsky, 1977: 
124).  Childcare advocates at local level began to form a distinct advocacy agenda constructed 
around the issue of auspice and sought to increase the availability of high quality, non-
profit/municipal childcare services in Ontario. 
 
At the federal level, representatives of thirty national women’s organisations formed the 
Committee for Equality for Women in Canada (CEW) and were successful in pressing the 
government to establish a Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) with a remit 
to ‘recommend what steps might be taken by the Federal Government to ensure for women 
equal opportunities with men in all aspects of Canadian society’ (Adamson, 1995: 253).  
While this represented an important recognition of the women’s movement, as Bakvis argues, 
royal commissions have been one of the more prominent ways to remove contentious issues 
of public policy into a more neutral area; indeed their recommendations often carry 
considerable weight but governments are not bound by them (2000: 81).  However, this also 
entailed a degree of freedom towards policy innovation and the inclusion of a wide base of 
external expertise; the RCSW would provide an institutional focal point and a national 
platform where various groups concerned with developing polices to create gender equality 
convened and established a federal funding base for ongoing research and advocacy.  Within 
this project, and of key importance to the broader EYEC debate, childcare was identified as an 
essential for women’s equality and the RCSW made the first official recommendation for a 
national, universal childcare programme (Doherty, Friendly, Beach, 2003: 2.).  As such, the 
RCSW provided a national focal point for provincial childcare advocates, the labour 
movement and feminists to begin to work together; blending the technical policy and survey 
 182 
research from (provincial) childcare advocacy and a broader (policy) agenda informed by 
social knowledge shaped by second wave feminism136.  As Friendly, Rothman and Oloman 
note: 
 
“An important feature of the debate about childcare was the consensus about 
fundamental principles for a childcare system that developed among child care 
advocates and a broad range of other groups including women’s labour and 
professional organisations” (1991: 22). 
 
In this way, a vocal ‘childcare’ lobby was formed framing EYEC through ‘equality of 
opportunities ideas’.  With federal funding from the Canadian Council on Social 
Development and the department of Health and Welfare, two national conferences were held 
in Winnipeg (the first being in 1971 and the second in 1982), which would increasingly shape 
local and national debates.  Based on the recommendations from the first conference, the 
federal government established the more permanent Canadian Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women (CACSW) and the National Day Care Information Office within Health and 
Welfare Canada, which in 1973 began issuing the annual Status of Day Care in Canada 
reports (Pence and Benner, 2000: 141).   
 
                                               
136
 Indeed some advocacy groups form the early 1970s (especially with a large representation from the labour 
movement) initially argued for ‘free universal and quality state daycare.  Yet with the interaction with the 
knowledge and expertise of provincial advocates (who stressed that non-profit childcare maintained high quality) 
and in part to gain more mainstream support groups such as Action Daycare (latterly Ontario Coalition for Better 
Daycare) moved to lobbying for ‘universally accessible, publicly funded not-for-profit and non-compulsory 
daycare system’ (White, 2001: 100).   
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The 1982 ‘Second National Daycare Conference’ held in Winnipeg, was a particularly 
important moment for national childcare advocacy, with the establishment of Canada’s main 
lobbing body, the Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAAC) and the more 
professionally orientated Canadian Childcare Federation, Canadian Childcare Federation 
(CCCF)137.  Here a consensus developed on the fundamental principles for a potential 
childcare system shaped by an equal opportunities frame for EYEC.  They argued for a 
universally accessible, comprehensive, non profit, non-compulsory childcare system. Within 
this, childcare centres which would operate for full, short or long days or extended or unusual 
hours, located in residential communities, at or near workplaces, in schools or in the other 
locations, available on a full-time or part-time basis’ (Friendly, Rothman, Oloman, 1991: 5).  
Moreover childcare should be of ‘high quality’ as the groups were against ‘false solutions 
which encourage inequitable access, entrenching poor quality care and limit real choices for 
women’ (ibid: 22).  High quality in this case was discursively linked with working conditions 
of the childcare staff (invariably due to the high representation of labour groups attuned to the 
importance of employment rights), which dovetailed neatly with a broader feminist agenda to 
ensure better employment rights and equality in areas where women had traditionally been 
disproportionately employed.   Moreover and certainly linked to this framing of high quality 
was auspice; to ensure state support purely for not-for-profit childcare centres.  For the 
CDCAA and its supporters, high quality through good wages and provision could only be 
assured through either state-run (usually municipal) or not-for profit childcare centres, 
preferably where parents should also have a role in the delivery of childcare programmes 
(Rothman and Kass, 1999: 264).  High quality could certainly not be assured by the 
                                               
137
 CCAAC was previously called the Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association (CDCAA) and CCDF was 
previously called Canadian Child Daycare Federation (CCDF).   
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commercial sector138 which, as businesses, were required to make a profit from what the 
advocates viewed in contrast as a social service, akin to education or healthcare (Jenson, 
Mahon and Philips, 2003: 142).  Hence the most critical struggle according to the lobby was 
to ensure that the commercial sector did not usurp the public funds in the hoped for period of 
childcare expansion (Rothman and Kass, 1999: 264).   
 
4.3 Developing a childcare system through an ‘equal opportunities’ frame? The highs and 
lows of feminist advocacy and the limits to childcare expansion within Ontario 
 
In many ways, the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s were the highest and also the 
lowest point for childcare advocates working with an ‘equality of opportunity’ agenda and 
also for those working within childcare services in Ontario.  As a General Manager of 
Children’s Services in Toronto remarked  
 
“If people had told me I was having the best year I was ever going to have in 1990 
then I would have enjoyed it better, because after 1990 we started having shortfalls 
and financial problems, up until then the system was growing because provincial 
governments were funding it” (Patterson, 2006).   
 
Indeed there was a great deal of federal interest across Liberal and Conservative governments 
in childcare policy, in a great part facilitated by the ascendancy of equality of opportunity 
ideas within federal institutions such as the CACSW and within Health and Welfare.  
                                               
138
 The commercial sector is represented by the Canadian Child Daycare Federation (CCDCF) which included in 
its ranks both professional early childhood educators and commercial childcare providers (Jenson, Mahon, 
Philips, 2003: 142.).   
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Through such contexts and reporting (especially through the Status of Daycare reports) there 
was a clear articulation of the changing economic base of families and the inability of the 
current policy framework to respond to rapid changes within the social structure.  It was not 
something that the federal government could therefore easily claim to be unaware of.  
Moreover, as Lynne Westlake remarked on her time working in the childcare movement in 
the early 1980s, ‘you couldn’t have a more friendly press corps following the issue, it was 
easy to get coverage and they would call and things would be in the national media very 
quickly because it was a hot issue’ (Westlake, 2006).  In this way, sufficient pressure was 
generated that all three national party leaders pledged themselves to a national day care 
programme to improve the situation on a televised leader’s debate during the 1984 federal 
election (Finkel, 2006: 213).   
 
The ‘childcare crisis’ was now established as a national priority and the federal government 
acknowledged its role to respond by establishing two federal task forces on childcare, which 
both recommended a clear federal role in developing a national childcare system but differed 
greatly over the issue of auspice.    
 
The first Ministerial task force headed by Dr Katie Cooke had been appointed by the outgoing 
Liberal government in 1994.  It undertook an extensive research and review process with a 
clear ‘equality of opportunities’ focus, drawing from this specific research base, which framed 
its eventual recommendations.  These stated that the federal government should take an active 
lead in policy and should develop a comprehensive system of publicly-funded, high quality, 
universally-accessible, non-profit childcare and expand paid parental leave.  In short, Cooke 
recommended a system which would be as ‘accessible and competent as our systems of health 
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care and education’ (Friendly, Rothman, Oloman, 1991: 25).  Significant to the tracing of 
EYEC discourse and framing at the Federal level, whilst the Cooke report made reference to 
childcare akin to comprehensive systems such as ‘education’ it was clear that early education 
and care continued to be viewed as discrete policies, reflecting the singular influence of the 
equality of opportunities frame in conceptualising (child) care policy.  Indeed, the Cooke 
report recommends (for the provinces which had not already done so) provisions to provide 
half-day nursery schools for pre-school children (Goelman, 1992: 237).  However Cooke did 
not consider the potential integration these ‘educative’ policies with broader childcare 
services and indeed following the consensus at the time, educative or child developmental 
factors neither constructed definitions of ‘quality’ within childcare (which instead made 
reference to structural indices as outlined above).  However, Cooke articulated a clear agenda 
which sought to broadly socialise childcare and would have formed the significant basis on 
which childcare and broader EYEC policy could develop139. 
 
Cooke reported in 1986 to the Progressive Conservative government which was much less 
sympathetic to gender equity concerns.  Nevertheless, owing to the pressure surrounding the 
childcare issue, that government mounted a second inquiry, the Special Parliamentary 
Committee on Child Care (reporting in 1987).  This formed the basis of the Progressive 
Conservative’s proposals for a National Strategy on Child Care and led to the tabling of the 
Canada Child Care Act (Bill C-144) and the provision of extra research funding through the 
                                               
139
 Indeed as in Sweden, whilst care may have started as custodial with a significant number of municipal centres 
developed, latterly the form of care within these centres can be augmented to provide enrichment without 
inflating the cost of care for families. 
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1988 Child Care Initiatives Fund, primarily for children at risk 140 (Friendly, 2000: 258).  
Taking a different approach from Cooke, the Committee argued that the state should not take 
an active role in socialising childcare and defining national principles but should ‘assume its 
share of responsibility for childcare by supporting, where possible the role of parents, 
employers, provincial and territorial governments and childcare providers by using its taxing 
powers’ (Goelman, 1992: 239).  The recommendations included the lion’s share of federal 
funding devoted to childcare tax breaks for parents which therefore proposed undirected 
childcare ‘supply side’ funding (across multiple settings) rather than directing parents towards 
centre based (and non-profit) care and further entrenching the principle that federal childcare 
support would be conditional upon labour market attachment and more broadly that childcare 
was simply custodial.  The Committee also recommended capital and operating grants to 
childcare providers should be available for both non-profit and commercial childcare 
programmes (Friendly, Rothman, Oloman, 1991: 25).  The Child Care Act proposed $4 
billion over 7 years for this plan, taking childcare funding out of the open-ended CAP 
structure of finance.  This would put limits upon federal childcare spending and a ceiling on 
growth in order to provide the new system (Mahon and Phillips, 2002: 201).  To summarise 
the approach, the Mulroney government proposed childcare expansion but not necessarily 
‘quality’ expansion.  Given the position on non-profit auspice and limits on childcare funding 
expansion (due to the exclusion of childcare policy from CAP), the CDCAA and other 
childcare advocacy organisations vigorously opposed this Bill.  As White states ‘their view at 
the time was that it was better to have no childcare system at all than a deeply flawed, 
                                               
140
 The CCIF was mainly focused upon setting up childcare demonstration projects (i.e. to integrate special needs 
children into normal child settings) and the research primarily focused upon needs assessments and feasibility 
studies.  As a CCIF staff member commented ‘these studies provided a clear picture of what was needed but 
there is no more need for them.  Other areas of research were neglected’ (Pence and Benner, 2000: 137.).    
 188 
commercial one with no national standards’ (2000: 102).  Following legislative committee 
hearings where all submissions opposed the legislation, Bill C-144 died in the Senate on the 
eve of the 1988 federal election (Friendly, Rothman, Oloman, 1991: 25).   
 
In 1990 the re-elected Progressive Conservatives placed a ceiling of 5% growth in CAP 
contributions (in the four richer provinces which included Ontario), directly limiting federal 
contributions to childcare expansion.  Where provinces wished to expand spending further, 
faced had to meet the relevant costs (White, 2000: 103).  White argues that the childcare 
advocate’s opposition to the bill was a strategic mistake, even though the Bill might have 
been ‘bad policy’.  By taking an all or nothing attitude to childcare its failure prevented 
piecemeal expansion (albeit across different auspices) which could have been remedied in 
future revisions to the legislation (ibid: 105).  Jenson, Mahon and Phillips (2003) see the 
decision to hold out for more was understandable, when placed in context.  The shift towards 
neo-liberal policies of austerity had yet to be fully institutionalised and with the high profile 
accorded to the childcare issue it did not seem unrealistic to press for an adequately funded 
policy that designed to ensure universal access to quality childcare across the country (2003: 
142).  While Ontario already funded both commercial and non-profit centres under CAP (so 
the legislation would not have made very much of a difference to texture of childcare 
services), in other provinces this revision might have radically altered the ratio of private and 
non-profit auspices. 
 
The ‘equalities of opportunity’ frame had brought childcare to the top of the agenda, 
becoming embedded within particular semi-autonomous advisory council and other 
institutional contexts.  It does, however, seem that by constructing the EYEC debate through 
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this frame in isolation, its fate relied on a government broadly sympathetic to gender equity 
arguments.  In the absence of this – with Mulroney incumbent – the potential resonance of 
EYEC policy with different (government) actors was limited, particularly given the divisive 
issues of quality and auspice which had led to the collapse of the national plan.  The evidence-
base on which arguments for EYEC were being made was rather narrow.  So too were 
articulations of EYEC services.  Intuitively the discourse of ‘high quality childcare services’ 
(according to the structural definitions laid out by advocates) might seem best for children 
(their wellbeing and development).  However, this line of argument was neither pursued nor 
supported by research; it was largely absent from the policy agenda.  The advocates 
considered it somewhat of a given.  So, while they strongly opposed expansions in ‘low 
quality’ purely custodial commercial centres they did not present a particularly strong 
counter-thesis (for example demonstrating that child wellbeing, developmental or educative 
outcomes could only be supported in not-for-profit/municipal centres) which might have 
resonated with those governmental actors who were not receptive to gender equity arguments.  
To some extent, there was recognition of the need for an expanded research base, which had 
precipitated the federal government to create a Child Care Initiatives Fund to develop 
research.  However, the 1988 National Childcare Study which arose from this endeavour 
continued to work with a rather limited conception of EYEC as broadly custodial.  Indeed it 
defined childcare as ‘any form of care… while parents were engaged in paid or unpaid work, 
study or other personal or social activities’ (Friendly, 2001: 27).  As ‘equality of 
opportunities’ ideas were losing ground in federal political debates, there was a telling 
absence of alternative EYEC frames (and attendant expertise and evidence) circulating at the 
time, to provide an alternative ideational basis to motivate further policy discussions.     
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At the provincial level, there was a similar move towards and subsequent step back from the 
establishment of a universal childcare system.  It broadly mirrored the trajectory of 
developments at the federal level, as provincial policy makers also engaged with the equality 
of opportunity frame forwarded by provincial advocates.  These endeavours were ultimately 
financially hampered by the federal rejection of the equality of opportunity frame and broader 
measures to cut (federal) spending.   
 
Childcare expenditure in Ontario continued to grow during the 1980s, but the nature and 
texture of the ‘welfare’ policy framework remained.  By 1989, 35.6% of licensed childcare 
spaces were run by commercial centres against 64.5% non-profit/municipal (Kyle, 1991: 392-
3).  One small but nevertheless significant development in Ontario’s EYEC policy which was 
nested into this ‘welfare framework’ was the establishment of small scale project in 1981 to 
create a number of ‘Family Resource Centres’ (often in rural or small communities but some 
appeared in more urban areas) which provided community based and often specific services 
for ‘at risk’ individuals (ie teen parents), such as childcare registry, playgroups, toy lending 
libraries and caregiver support (such as education) and other informal local initiatives 
(Toronto, 2005: 12).   
 
Most policy attention was, however, directed towards childcare for working women.  The 
prominence of childcare federally during the early 1980s was matched by the recently formed 
Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care (OCBCC)141 and developed by the (provincially and 
                                               
141
 Which had formed from various smaller advocating lobbies in 1981 and was instrumental in promoting 
childcare and received funding from the federal Secretary of State, Women’s programmes, within Health and 
Welfare).  The OCBCC secured representation on the Standing Committee on Social Development (1984) which 
was considering the possibility of a new childcare act and which eventually concluded with ‘the rights of women 
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federally funded) Child Care Resource and Research Unit (CRRU).   By 1987, a Liberal-New 
Democrat (NDP) coalition assigned childcare a high priority.  A government initiative known 
as ‘New Directions in Social Policy’ would bring childcare to centre stage, informed by an 
equality of opportunity frame (Goelman, 1992: 250; Friendly, 2006).  New Directions 
promised ‘a comprehensive child care system that will meet the needs of all citizens; a system 
that would move childcare from a welfare connotation toward one of public service’ and a 
‘comprehensive, integrated approach to childcare embodied in the drafting of a new Child 
Care Act’ (Kyle, 1991: 431; 482).  New Directions was a $325m three year plan, which 
implemented wage enhancement grants142, funded direct operating grants in response to the 
low levels of compensation in the childcare field, addressed stability in the service sector and 
also implemented capital grants to provide childcare space in all new build schools143 (York, 
2005: 45; Kyle, 1991: 433).  Under sustained pressure from advocacy lobbies, the operating 
grants and wage enhancements which had been provided to non-profit and existing 
commercial centres were phased out by the NDP government in 1990.  Thereafter, only non-
profit/municipal centres were to receive grants 144 (Prentice, 2000: 285).  However, 
                                                                                                                                                   
to attain full and equal employment opportunities’ (Kyle, 1991: 380). OCBCC also ran a particularly prominent 
campaign during 1987 called ‘kids not cash’ attempting to press the provincial government for a comprehensive 
system of non-profit childcare and provided more research on the lack of quality in commercial centres (by 
salaries, benefits and working conditions) to press the provincial government to fund direct operating grants to 
the non-profit sector and to phase out funding to the commercial sector (Rothman and Kass, 1999: 266).   
142
 This wage enhancement policy was significant, increasing salaries by $2,000 resulting in (at that time) 
Ontario having the second-highest staff salaries in Canada (Tyyskä, 1999: 136).   
143
 This latter policy precipitated a report in 1990 entitled Early Childhood Education by the Select Committee 
on Education which floated but ultimately rejected the idea of the Ministry of Education taking over control of 
childcare for children from the age of 3.8 which may have established much earlier a basis for policies to 
integrate early education and childcare (Kyle, 1991: 434).    
144
 Precipitating one major commercial provider, Mini-Skools, a division of Kinder-Care Inc to be ‘stopped dead 
in its tracks’ and pulled out of expansion in Ontario (Prentice, 2000: 286.).       
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highlighting the interrelationship between federal/provincial policies, the proposed Child 
Care Act, which could have defined a broader policy framework for EYEC did not get off the 
ground.  Neither did the latter NDP plan to convert for-profit into not-for-profit places, largely 
because of the failure of the federal bill (and hence funding) and the subsequent CAP 
restrictions which put limits to growth in childcare funding (Tyyskä, 1999: 137).  As the 
leader of NDP, Bob Rae, commented the federal government ‘chopped every source of 
funding that Ontario had to run the childcare programs that we had already started’ (Rae, 
2001: 65).  From the perspective of the childcare advocates and provincial officials working 
towards securing a more extensive childcare system, much worse was to come and indeed 
processes of federal bureaucratic and programmatic reform would signal a (re)turn to and the 
(re)embedding of EYEC policy within a framework characteristic of the residual, liberal 
welfare model.   
 
4.4 The end of the line for a national childcare plan? Austerity politics, the new public 
management and the marginalisation of feminist ideas: the liberal social policy model remade  
 
With the failure of the national childcare plan and the limits imposed upon CAP spending, it 
was apparent that the equality of opportunity frame had lost ground in political circles; 
moreover, within a general climate of austerity the prospects for social policy expansion 
appeared increasingly slim.  This section traces ‘new public management’ reforms instigated 
by the federal Progressive Conservatives which further marginalised feminist advocates from 
the political process.   By severing the relationships between external expertise and various 
government institutions, these reforms would alter processes of (social) policy innovation and 
consequently close down the spaces for equality of opportunity ideas in the federal 
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bureaucratic structure.  In addition, as both the Progressive Conservatives and Liberals 
became increasingly pre-occupied with fiscal issues and the burgeoning federal deficit, the 
federal Finance department would find itself in a position where it was able to take control of 
and define the whole spectrum of public policy, of which social policy ‘special issues’ such as 
childcare were just one small part (Nicholson, 2006).  Increasingly aggressive cost-cutting 
measures both precipitated and supported broader neo-liberal retrenchment policies at the 
provincial level and limited the federal role in shaping future social policy trajectories.  Hence 
as EYEC policy became situated within a residual ‘liberal’ welfare framework and with 
counter voices marginalised, by the mid to late 1990s, from the vantage point of feminists and 
many EYEC advocates, the door appeared to be firmly shut against the development of a new 
national childcare plan. EYEC policy seemed likely to lock into a trajectory of retrenchment.   
 
Whilst it was apparent that the equality of opportunity frame had lost ground in particular 
political circles, the broader bureaucratic structure had continued to support and maintain 
institutional spaces in which feminist ‘equality of opportunity’ ideas could be articulated.  As 
we have seen, the vibrancy of the Canadian feminist lobby rested to a great extent upon the 
institutional focal point of the RCSW (latterly the CACSW) and the federal resources devoted 
to policy analysis and (feminist) advocacy.  In particular, the variety of granting mechanisms 
(primarily from Health and Welfare) had provided a large federal funding base from which to 
engage both government civil servants with their research and to campaign more broadly.  
These institutional spaces, moreover, had embedded a set of reciprocal relationships between 
external expertise and the broader federal policy machinery.  Indeed, the various semi-
autonomous advisory councils, royal commissions and their economic cousin, the Economic 
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Council of Canada145, formed a policy system though which both academic and the broader 
policy community’s expertise could be channelled or input into the policy system and 
established complementary mechanisms by which the government could, at times, harvest this 
external research and independent advice in policy formation.  Elsewhere in the bureaucratic 
structure, external research was commissioned and tightly controlled through ‘requests for 
proposals’ (RFP) instruments and as such the government defined and delimited the research 
that was conducted (Bakvis, 2000: 75.).  Hence, as Bradford argues, it was the former, 
relatively autonomous institutional spaces, rather than the broader bureaucratic structure, 
which were the primary sites for new policy ideas and innovation; injecting policy discourses 
that in turn become the basis for administrative political action (1998: 159-160.).  Whilst 
governments were not bound by the recommendations made by the advisory councils, they 
had provided an important ongoing place and a voice for childcare policy, maintaining the 
issue at the federal level.  However, by the early 1990s, this system was under threat from 
new public management ideas and along with it, the position of feminist childcare advocates 
and experts working with an equality of opportunities frame. 
 
During the Mulroney era the established bureaucratic emphasis towards institutional ‘policy 
analysis’ was subject to significant challenge by new public management ideas, which instead 
emphasised the virtues of program implementation, management, efficiency and downsizing.   
Indeed, there was a general feeling that both permanent government officials and to an extent, 
politicians had been mesmerised by the glamour of policy at the expense of innovative 
                                               
145
 The Economic Council like the Royal Commission policy instrument, acted semi-independently of the 
government and provided long term and medium term economic planning advice and was an important source of 
funding for independent scholarly research on comprehensively defined problems such as education and health, 
albeit from an economic perspective (Doubuzinskis, 2007: 331.).   
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management and hence the challenge was to refocus the civil service so as to stress 
management rather than policy making (Savoie, 2003: 98.).  Moreover, in increasingly austere 
times, it was acknowledged in political circles that the structure of the executive, given its size 
and a highly fragmented set of portfolios and departments (which often represented highly 
specific regional and sectoral constituencies), presented a major structural obstacle to 
expenditure restraint (Aucion, 1995: 119.).   Hence as Auction states, by the end of the 1980s, 
‘it was hardly a state secret, at least in the senior echelons of the public service that some form 
of substantial restructuring and downsizing was on the horizon’ (ibid: 132.).  Mulroney duly 
instigated the 1989 ‘Public Service 2000’ initiative, although initially this had relatively little 
impact on the structure and size of Canadian civil service, save that ‘in house’ policy capacity 
of a number of departments was sidelined and budgets were gradually eroding (ibid: 15; 
Voyer, 2007: 221).  Mulroney’s outgoing reform would prove more significant however.  In 
one of his government’s last acts, Mulroney abolished 20 of the federal government’s arm’s 
length advisory bodies, including the CACSW, but also the ‘flagship’ Economic Council of 
Canada146 and cancelled the Royal Commission policy instrument (Bakvis, 2000: 81).  With 
the loss of what was, for many civil servants important tools for ongoing policy analysis, the 
civil service monopoly on policy advice (and the external expertise routed through it) was 
destabilised and instead moves were made to establish ‘more responsive’ external policy 
advice direct to the political centre (ibid; Savoie, 2003: 104.).  The government was aided in 
this endeavour by the growth of politically orientated think tanks.  Indeed now the advice of 
public servants was contestable and contested (ibid.).  In this way, the relationship between 
                                               
146
 When the Economic Council was disbanded, the last leader, Judith Maxwell regrouped some of the expert 
contributors to form the Canadian Policy Research Network (CPRN), a think tank and co-ordinating mechanism 
linking researchers, policy makers, universities and other think tanks.  CPRN would increasingly question the 
individualisation of neo-liberal economies and stress the need for social cohesion (Dobuzinskis, 2007: 333.).   
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external expertise and the bureaucracy was severed; now academics and experts would be 
forced to seek research grants and commissions from individual policy departments and 
moreover it would not necessarily be the case that any research or policy findings would 
necessarily be fed back into broader government policy debates and decision making 
structures.   
 
The task of internal civil service restructuring would be left to the brief tenure of Kim 
Campbell during 1993 and would further isolate feminist childcare advocacy from the policy 
process.  In the process of seeking to downsize and streamline the federal bureaucracy (and 
the number of Cabinet portfolios), the department of Health and Welfare was split into two, 
with Health becoming a stand alone federal department and the smaller, ‘welfare’ social 
policy element (including childcare) becoming absorbed into a large and complex department, 
named Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC)147.  At the centre of HRDC was the 
department of Employment and Insurance and the Department of Labour, but it also absorbed 
significant components of the Secretary of State and selected programmes of the Department 
of Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Good, 2003: 29.).  With the dissolution of the CACSW, 
the remaining federal women’s policy machinery including the Women’s Programme (which 
funded the majority of childcare advocacy) was absorbed into a much smaller unit with 
reduced functions, named ‘Status of Women Canada’.  Status of Women Canada was made a 
special unit of a line department within HRDC, now only reporting to a junior minister, who 
was not a full member of cabinet.  The re-organisation thereby greatly reduced the 
prominence of women’s issues and, in this way, the equality of opportunities frame and 
                                               
147
 Indeed the new department represented half of the government’s expenditure budget ($69 billion in 1993-
1994.) (Good, 2003: 29.).   
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childcare issues within government circles and going forward (Dobrowlsky and Jenson, 2004: 
166; Malloy, 2003: 22.).  Moreover, with a significantly downsized team, the ability of the 
federal government to collect provincial childcare data and channel this into federal debates 
was reduced148.   
 
Despite the Progressive Conservative’s attempts to reduce the influence of ‘special interest’ 
groups, such as the childcare lobby, childcare advocates had become hopeful that with the 
election of the federal  Liberals, led by Jean Chrétien, in 1993, that childcare would be 
brought back as a national priority.  Indeed, the Liberal platform, Creating Opportunity: The 
Liberal Plan for Canada, known as the Red Book had promised to reinvigorate the federal 
social policy presence and within this broad endeavour promised a $720 million for a federal-
provincial cost-shared programme that would expand existing childcare by as much as 
150,000 spaces over 3 years if annual economic growth was at 3% and provincial agreement 
was obtained (Mahon and Phillips, 2002: 202).  The new HRDC Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, 
reignited the debate by producing a discussion paper, Child Care and Development, which 
made a ‘commitment to improving Canada’s childcare system and to developing a national 
framework for child care and development’ (Friendly, 2001: 34).   
 
The prospects for a new national childcare plan being implemented rapidly faded however, as 
the Liberal government became increasingly pre-occupied with fiscal issues.  Indeed, as had 
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 Martha Friendly of CRRU noted that in a meeting with a federal bureaucrat that she had been asked to collect 
national data as there wasn’t the federal capacity any more (Friendly, 2006).  The Status of Daycare reports 
continued, however, the final report being issued in 1998 and since then there has been no national calculation of 
numbers of children with mothers in the labour force and the number and auspice of regulated childcare spaces 
(Doherty, Friendly and Beach, 2003: 82.).   
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begun with the ‘cap on CAP’, the Mulroney government had been grappling with Canada’s 
deficit (the ratio of revenue to spending) and by the beginning of 1995 the situation had 
deteriorated to the extent that the Finance Minister, Paul Martin pressed the case that unless 
Canada’s debt and deficit were brought under control, the country risked a huge loss of 
economic confidence 149(Bashevkin, 2002: 81).  In this austere context and with the loss of 
Economic Council of Canada, the federal Finance Department found itself in a unique 
position of power to implement wide-ranging cost-containing reforms and to effectively 
highjack the entire federal policy agenda (Nicholson, 2006.).   
 
In order to rein in government spending, Finance implemented ‘Program Reviews’ across all 
departments to assess cost-cutting measures within both staffing and policy programmes150 
(Bakvis, 2000: 84.).  Indeed it was during program review that the significant civil service 
retrenchment occurred, although as Arthur Kroger, a former deputy minister, stated this was 
an entirely unscientific process as ‘there was not much alternative and there was no time for 
elaborate evaluation studies’ (Savoie, 1999: 181.).  Indeed, despite HRDC being in the 
process of its own social security review, in the absence of significant savings being 
implemented, Paul Martin imposed flat rate expenditure reductions of $1.1 billion annually 
and a 20 per cent cut of its 25,000 staff over three years.  These headline cuts hit childcare 
                                               
149
 Indeed the Finance Minister was aided in this assertion by the publication of an editorial in the Wall Street 
journal on the 12th January 1995, entitled ‘Bankrupt Canada’ arguing that given its high accumulated 
government debt and he scrutiny by international financial markets it was not inconceivable that Canada could 
hit the debt wall and have to call in the IMF to stabilise its failing currency (Savoie, 1998: 178.).   
150
 In many ways reviewing programmes involved the privatisation such as the privatisation of Air Canada.  
Under this review departments were asked to apply six tests, which included the key question of whether the 
programmes of any given department were ones that should continue and if so whether they should be delivered 
by the department, by a non-departmental organisation, the private sector or by another level of government 
(Bakvis, 2000: 82.).       
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advocacy funding most severely.  Indeed, Federal grants to childcare advocacy groups were 
subject to deep and continuous reductions, hitting the CCAAC who were working at the 
federal level, particularly hard (Mahon and Phillips, 2002: 205).  At the provincial level, the 
OCBCC lost all base funding from the Status of Women Canada, which now only provided 
project research funding.  Over time, smaller organisations lost all of their funding, even for 
projects.  With the loss of such funding, the OCBCC was forced to focus more on research 
than advocacy, spend much more time fundraising and to get by with a greatly reduced staff 
(White, 2001: 113).   
 
Despite the severity of Program Review spending cuts, Finance encroached further into the 
social policy realm, with a plan to further rein in Federal transfers to the provinces known as 
the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), announced in the 1995 federal budget 
(Bakvis, 2000: 84).  The Caledon Institute of Social Policy identified CHST as introducing 
the most profound change to social policy since Canada constructed its social security system 
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and gave licence to the federal government to get out of the 
health and welfare business (Friendly, 2001: 36).  The elements of the CHST were relatively 
straightforward.  It combined the money from the Established Programs Financing Act (EPF) 
for health and education and the ‘open-ended’ CAP cost-sharing function into a single block 
transfer with few conditions (English and Young, 2006: 60).  In effect, it eliminated the 
legislative basis that had underpinned federal spending in the social area and cut federal 
transfers to the provinces by $2.5 billion for 1996-1997 and by an additional $2 billion for 
1997-1998 (ibid).  This constituted about a 40% reduction in federal social transfers to the 
provinces (Bashevkin, 2002: 82).   
 
 200 
In such hostile circumstances, where social policy retraction rather than expansion was the 
order of the day, the mooted ‘childcare plan’ was quickly dropped from the federal agenda151 
and neither childcare nor social policy emerged as issues in the 1997 federal election 
campaign.  As Paul Martin’s policy advisor explained,   
 
“what you have to understand is that probably from late 1994 to probably 2000, 2001 
even, the Government was completely dominated by finance and they could control 
the policy agenda across a very broad spectrum…. Also to have tried to mount a new 
programme when you have already been cutting back on existing transfers, I mean, it 
would have caused a firestorm” (Nicholson, 2006). 
 
Indeed, the one social policy concession to be announced during the move from CAP to 
CHST, the National Child Benefit (NCB), betrayed the dominance of Finance152 over, and its 
ability to shape, the social policy agenda.  Moreover, as some commentators have observed, it 
had a particularly neo-liberal ‘children at risk’ flavour’ 153(McKeen, 2007).  The NCB, a tax 
measure (and a supplement to the existing means tested Child Tax Benefit) to assist low 
income families, was designed to ‘build bridges’ between low wage jobs and the world of 
                                               
151
 Although there was one brief proposal for another federal/provincial agreement with the next HRDC 
Minister, Doug Young at the end of 1995 and beginning 1996 which had briefed the provinces to respond within 
six weeks whether they would participate in a new childcare agreement.  However, in the climate of the time and 
with what the federal government described as ‘not sufficient interest’ in the proposal the plan was quickly 
dropped (Friendly, 2001: 37.).    
152
 Although the substance of the policy was commissioned and designed by the external social policy think tank, 
the Caledon Institute.   
153
 Indeed as McKeen argues such policies were clearly situated within a neo-liberal residual framework which 
emphasized targeting over universality and an individualist frame of employability over collectivist measures 
(2007: 152.).  As the Treasury Board of Canada report outlined the NCB two main goals were to reduce child 
poverty, promote attachment to the labour market which lends some support to McKeen’s thesis (Ottawa, 2008.).   
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social assistance, or to ensure that working families would not be penalised when they entered 
the labour market as they came off social assistance154 (ibid: 160).  With the savings made by 
reductions in provincial welfare benefits, provinces could re-invest the savings for low 
income families with children (which could include childcare, social services or healthcare) 
(Battle and Mandleson, 1997: 1).  Whilst some provinces could theoretically use such funds to 
invest in childcare on top of what they determined they would spend through CHST, the onus 
was on the provinces to decide policy, representing a further entrenchment of the federal 
retreat from directing provincial social policy and in this way also, a national childcare plan 
(Mahon and Phillips, 2002: 207).  As a federal cabinet minister explained to the Globe and 
Mail newspaper, ‘we cannot implement a national childcare program; this is not something 
we have the ability to initiate.  In lieu of that we came up with the National Child Benefit’ 
(Friendly, 2001: 41).   
 
At the provincial level, the election of the Conservative Party in Ontario (within months of the 
1995 federal budget) would signal the (re)turn to a residual model for EYEC with significant 
retrenchment of childcare and early education services which had been built up during the 
1970s and 1980s.  Elected on a ‘common sense revolution’ platform, the Harris government 
immediately made moves to cut provincial childcare costs; the NDP plan to convert profit to 
non-profit auspice was cancelled and between 1995 and 1998 funding for childcare dropped 
by some 15%; from $564 million to $493 million (OCBCC, 2003: 7).   
 
                                               
154
 The payment was for low income families earning less than $22,020 (two parent families) and $31,753 
(family of four) with a maximum payment of $3,476 (Battle and Mandleson, 1997: 25.).    
 202 
Whilst the federal funding issue would have inevitably put breaks on growth in provincial 
EYEC services (as in other provinces funding was maintained or slightly reduced), it was 
clear that the Harris government were seeking to scale back provincial funding and to 
promote growth in the commercial sector.  As a joint report by the OCBCC and the Canadian 
Union of Public Employees (CUPE) stated, childcare was subject to ‘deregulation and 
privatization, the two cornerstones of the Harris government’s overall social and economic 
policies’ (OCBCC & CUPE, 2001: 11).  This agenda was reflected in the Minister for 
Community and Social Services, 1996 childcare review report, Improving Ontario’s Child 
Care System, which asserted that childcare should ‘include as many different kinds of quality 
care as possible’ (1996, cited in Tyyskä, 2001: 139).  
 
The recommendations, which were quickly implemented included; a reduction in the 
minimum staff and child ratios; a dilution of minimum staff qualifications (e.g. to allow 
recreation certificates and volunteers); to allow fee subsidies to flow to unregulated 
programmes (which would therefore include low cost unregulated home care155); reducing 
requirements for facilities and licensing enforcements; the elimination of major capital 
funding for non-profit centres; and lastly and probably the most significant, a re-directing of 
childcare workers wage subsidies in non-profit centres to fund low income fee subsidies, 
resulting in wage reductions of up to 25% for 83% of Ontario’s childcare workers (ibid; 
OCBCC, 2003: 9).  In one final blow to prospects for childcare growth, in 1997 it was 
announced that the traditional cost-sharing agreements between provinces and municipalities 
                                               
155
 Indeed when the National Child Benefit was introduced Ontario used the reinvested funds to introduce an 
Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Families which allowed subsidy fees to flow directly to working 
parents and principally designed to aid job placement in the Ontario works programme and as such could be used 
for unregulated childcare programmes (Vosko, 2006: 152.).   
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which were set at 80% provincial and 20% municipal were now realigned 50/50 in the areas 
for wage grants, special needs provisions and minor capital program commitments, with all 
major capital funding eliminated (Tyyskä, 2001: 140).  In addition, in 1998 amendments to 
the Day Nurseries Act, sole responsibility for managing and planning childcare and other 
services was downloaded to municipalities; now municipal governments would be responsible 
for writing five year service plans without provincial input (CRRU, 1998; Wagle, 2006).  
Although never formally announced, the provincial government also suspended the year on 
year inflationary increases to the base money (typically for fee subsidies and other operating 
grants) from 1995 onwards, severely eroding municipalities ability to maintain existing 
subsidised childcare places (Patterson, 2006).  Hence municipalities were caught between 
maintaining places and retaining quality, as the Childcare Services Manager for Toronto 
explained:  
 
“for a number of years we weren’t increasing the rates we were paying to operators, 
we were making them absorb whatever the increases were in their operating by 
making them make decisions to cut where they could cut… in the late 1990s 
programmes started reducing the number of trained staff that they had to a bare 
minimum and holding off of repairs” (Patterson, 2006).   
 
In many ways, the reforms in childcare created an insidious deterioration over time in both the 
quality and quantity of childcare services across Ontario.  Even then, this was not the only 
element of EYEC which was subject to significant retrenchment.  Indeed, the NDP/Liberal 
policy to build childcare centres in new schools was reverted in the provincial economic 
statement in 1995 and it also cancelled any financial support to childcare centres already 
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created within schools156 (Johnson and Mathien, 1998: 9).  The government also announced 
that junior kindergarten which had become near universal in Ontario would no longer have to 
be provided by school boards and funding was cut by 9% in grants per child space.  By 1998, 
22 boards had exited the programme, resulting in a loss of more than 20,000 junior 
kindergarten spaces and 1,400 teacher jobs (ibid).  Taken together, by the end of the 1990s 
these reforms left a skeleton set of services and residual rump of EYEC policy which left 
remaining childcare funding directed to support employment for the most needy families and 
significantly undermined the capacity of childcare centres to provide the developmental and 
educative elements of EYEC which had been developing with provincial support and indeed 
had always been a feature of Ontario’s (non-profit) EYEC services.     
 
When taken all together, the federal institutional developments and programmatic 
retrenchment of EYEC in Ontario radically altered the EYEC policy trajectory.  As Mahon 
and Phillips wrote in 2002: 
 
“a truly national childcare strategy seems as remote as ever… intergovernmental 
process takes primacy over federal leadership… [ensuring] the protection of 
jurisdictional autonomy, with a reluctance to create anything national in scope; it also 
establishes a political process largely closed to the influence of nongovernmental 
actors’ (2002: 210).   
 
                                               
156
 Some 40% of licensed childcare spaces in 1995 were located in schools which presented a severe blow to the 
EYEC system (Tyyskä, 2001: 138.).   
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Indeed, the extent and nature of retrenchment is exhibitive of what Paul Pierson describes as 
both programmatic (direct attacks on social programmes) and systemic retrenchment (the 
contextual changes which alter the context for future spending decisions, modifications in 
institutional design changing the way that decisions over social policy are carried out and the 
weakening of pro-childcare interest groups) (1994: 146-148).  In such hostile and austere 
political contexts, it may have been expected that Canada’s EYEC policy trajectory which 
was increasingly being re-engineered into a liberal residual model would increasingly lock-in, 
the state absenting itself from a strong role in children’s care and early education and hence 
any expansion in EYEC left to the private market and informal sectors.   
 
However, as the next chapter will show, whilst all prospects for a national EYEC system 
constructed through an equality of opportunity frame had appeared to close down, certain 
institutional developments occurring during the same period would precipitate another ‘open 
space’ in the policy process, upon which EYEC policy would once again become an 
important federal and provincial priority, albeit with reference to a distinctly different set of 
ideas, evidence and expert actors.       
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: CHILDCARE IN ONTARIO/CANADA: NEW IDEAS AND 
EVIDENCE 
 
5.1 Evolving institutions, a national longitudinal study and an open space for ‘evidence-
based’ ideas in the federal bureaucracy 
 
It may be considered somewhat ironic that the very process of institutional reform carried out 
in the early 1990s under the rubric of neo-liberal and NPM ideas which had systematically 
closed down the spaces for equality of opportunities EYEC frame within the bureaucratic 
structure, would simultaneously precipitate another period or window of ‘open space’ in the 
policy process for other EYEC ideas and frames and create an avenue for renewed attention 
towards EYEC policy.  However, by retracing the reforms from this time, two key 
developments at the federal level would re-establish institutional places open to external 
expertise and mark the embryonic beginnings of an evidence-informed policy making 
process, structured in such a way to aid the latter ascendancy of evidence-based, scientifically 
informed EYEC ideas.  
 
Although it was not particularly obvious at the time, several federal initiatives originating 
during the early 1990s and the broader process of reform in the bureaucratic structure would 
help establish an institutional base and sow the seeds for the emergence of evidence-informed, 
social policy analysis within HRDC.  The first and perhaps one of the most important, was a 
joint initiative on behalf of Health and Welfare and Statistics Canada to create a National 
Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth (NLSCY).   
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Despite the context of austerity during the early 1990s and moves to retract ‘social Canada’, 
the decision for Canada to co-host the 1990 World Summit for Children at the United Nations 
and the subsequent ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child would 
motivate some federal discussion on the issue of child poverty; indeed at this time all parties 
committed to the eradication of child poverty by the end of 2000 (Dobrowolsky and Saint-
Martin, 2002: 19.).  Mahon argues that such an agenda dovetails with a broader neo-liberal 
residual social policy framework; whilst children do not generally figure large in neo-liberal 
discourse, there is some, albeit limited, room for remedial state action to ‘save’ children from 
the cycle of poverty through targeted interventions (Mahon, 2005: 6.).  This also leads Jenson 
(2004) to argue that the attention to child poverty marked the beginnings of a specifically 
child-centred policy agenda (in the absence of broader social rights and equality) and which 
McKeen (2004) argues was primarily centred on policies for children ‘at risk’.  Certainly 
during this time a limited number of targeted initiatives were developed (and were broadly 
consistent with the social engineering frame), including ‘Brighter futures’, an umbrella 
initiative for First Nations and Inuit Communities which led to the development of Aboriginal 
Head Start on Reserve157 (McKeen, 2007: 155; Jenson, 2004: 186.).  However, these 
programmes - directly funded and operated by the Federal government - were not extended 
out to the broader population and did not feed into broader social policy debates.  In addition, 
on the recommendation of a federal report on child abuse, a Children’s Bureau was 
established within Health and Welfare with a specific mandate and function ‘as the 
                                               
157
 Brighter Futures is described by a Government of Canada report as a programme which ‘assists First Nations 
and Inuit communities in developing culturally appropriate programs for community mental health, child 
development, injury prevention, parenting and healthy babies…Communities may use the funding for awareness 
and prevention activities related to such matters as family violence, suicide and its aftermath, counselling and 
parenting courses, as 
well as cultural activities (Canada, 2005: 67).   
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responsibility centre within the federal government for a broad range of children’s interests’, 
which included child poverty and abuse, but primarily looked at children’s policy from a 
health perspective 158(Canada, 1990.).   
 
However, to argue that the NLSCY project itself was necessarily situated within this broader 
neo-liberal ‘children-at-risk’ agenda and would therefore potentially generate evidence which 
would focus policy towards socio-economic profiles of risk (and perhaps support the social 
engineering frame and lend weight to developing targeted EYEC policies across the broader 
Canadian population), would not be strictly accurate.  Indeed although the NLSCY originated 
from within the Children’s Bureau, it had much broader aims.  As Laurie Goldman from the 
NLSCY project noted: 
  
“There was a growing recognition that we really didn’t have an understanding of 
children in Canada.  If you looked at a lot of our national data sources, they pick 
people up at 15 years of age, so we didn’t have any read detailed depth data sources 
about how children in Canada were doing, what their development was like… it is 
much broader than focusing on a specific target population, it’s focusing on children 
as a whole and looking at their development (Goldman, 2006). 
 
Indeed, as had been elaborated earlier, the Cooke report and Parliamentary Special Committee 
had noted the lack of a specific evidence base on children’s development and hence, the 
NLSCY’s objective, rather than investigating the effects of particular (social) policies upon 
                                               
158
 Indeed as one federal bureaucrat noted some internal social policy capacity and the new Children’s Bureau 
had been situated within the Health side of Health and Welfare as this was modelled upon and consistent with 
the practices of the World Health Organisation (Westlake, 2006).   
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children or studying particular (socio-economic) risk groups, was to establish a national 
database on the characteristics and life experiences of all children and youth in Canada, 
examining a variety of factors influencing child growth and development.  The NLSCY’s 
focus was to capture a range of environmental influences on child development and as such 
was not explicitly designed to capture the effects of different types of EYEC on outcomes 
(simply capturing whether children were in non-parental care or at home) 159.  Its main goals 
were to provide data to support longitudinal analysis on the prevalence various biological, 
social and economic characteristics among children and youth, including the environments in 
which they live and to support diagnoses of the reasons for poor outcomes and predictors of 
good outcomes.  In this way, the NLSCY would support the understanding of broad factors 
affecting child development and well-being and the way they influence child outcomes (ARB, 
1999: 2).  The original cohort was 0-11 and first picked up in 1994, the idea being that the 
NLSCY would track the same children until they were 24-5 (Goldman, 2006).  It would also 
be an open source of data for academics who wished to use the data in their own research and 
publish papers (ibid).   
 
The second key institutional development and which would have important implications for 
the first, was the creation of an Applied Research Branch within HRDC as part of the major 
consolidation of federal departments that took place in the early 1990s.  As part of this 
reorganisation (and perhaps somewhat unexpectedly), the health orientated Children’s Bureau 
                                               
159
 Information was collected on a wide variety of outcomes; health, language, cognitive, social, emotional, 
behavioural determinants against characteristics of the child’s family; socio-economic status, structure, parenting 
style, family functioning, social support, non-parental care (hence NLSCY did not distinguish by type of ‘non-
parental care’ or as such specifically types of childcare), school and neighbourhood.  Outcomes were measured 
both by direct assessments of vocabulary, maths and reading skills along with qualitative interviews and reports 
from the key people in the child’s life, parents, teachers, principals (Brink and McKeller, 2000: 111-2).   
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along with Health and Welfare’s small social policy department were absorbed into HRDC.  
Both were consolidated within a larger ‘Strategic Policy’ division of the newly created 
‘Applied Research Branch’ (ARB) which anchored around the nucleus of the old 
Employment and Immigration policy team.  Whilst the move entailed the loss of the separate 
identity of the Children’s Bureau and hence may have appeared regressive for children’s and 
broader social policy issues, as a federal bureaucrat noted, ‘social policy things had always 
felt like the carbuncle on the big ship in both cases’ (Westlake, 2006.).  The change of context 
however was much more significant in shaping the emerging children’s policy capacity at the 
federal level; shifting the strategic focus of the children’s policy team, broader social policy 
planning and small projects (including the NLSCY) from a primarily health perspective to a 
broader employment, skills and learning context (Westlake, 2006).  In this way, it widened 
the potential (policy) ideas linked to ‘children’s services’ and also the types of evidence and 
expertise which could be utilised in children’s policy analysis and discussions.  Indeed, now 
both social and children’s policy was situated within a multidisciplinary policy research and 
management team, covering labour market, human capital development, income security, 
social development, labour market innovation issues (Voyer, 2007: 228).   
 
Whilst in effect a cost-cutting and streamlining ‘NPM’ initiative, the creation of the ARB 
would offer some protection against latter Program Review cuts, having incurred a significant 
downsizing during the consolidating process and also through particularly creative efforts to 
regroup remaining research resources to retain critical masses of policy capacity (Voyer, 
2007: 229.).  Indeed the ARB would become an important institutional locus upon which to 
begin to rebuild both internal (social) policy capacity and external relationships with 
academic and other outside policy communities.  In particular the Strategic Policy division 
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would regroup a critical mass of what Howlett terms ‘policy analytical capacity’; the ability 
of government to conduct or access research in order to acquire knowledge to be utilised in 
the policy process (2009: 162.).  However it was clear that this re-shaping of (social) policy 
capacity would privilege a particular form of knowledge.  Indeed it would establish a basis 
within the federal bureaucratic structure for ‘evidence-based’ social policy initiatives.  
Building upon the Employment and Immigration’s model for managing mid-term policy 
research which encouraged fact-based research, surveys, program evaluation and advanced 
modelling techniques and interpretation, Strategic Policy took the policy lead for the NLSCY 
project and was charged with developing social policy ideas in conjunction with the research 
outcomes from NLSCY evidence (Canada, 1996; Goldman, 2006).  Whilst some of this 
policy work remained ‘in house’, the open source nature of the NLSCY data meant that 
interested researchers working with the data could potentially establish collaborative links 
with the ARB team; thus establishing a new opening in the bureaucratic structure - albeit 
narrow - for external policy communities and academics in social policy planning. 
 
The ARB was uniquely positioned to secure increasing federal funding and prominence as the 
Liberal government sought to correct the perceived lack of mid and long term policy capacity 
across government in the wake of both their own and the previous administration’s ‘NPM’ 
inspired cost-cutting measures and with the loss of other sites of policy innovation such as the 
royal commissions and advisory councils.  Indeed, within just two years of the Liberals return 
to power, concern was expressed amongst senior officials160 over the government’s ability to 
                                               
160
 Most notably by Jocelyn Bourgon, Secretary to Cabinet and Clark of the Privy Council 1994-1999 who 
mandated the launch of the Ministerial task force and Arthur Kroger a former deputy minister involved in 
Program Review who stated “In hindsight we made some bad decisions.  I do not for example think that we 
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generate ideas and to manage the policy process (Bakvis, 2000: 90).  It appeared that the 
pendulum had swung too far in direction of economic efficiency at the expense of policy 
innovation and broader policy effectiveness.  A special Deputy Minister task force led by the 
government’s chief statistician, Ivan Fellegi, was launched in response at the end of 1995.  
Rather than reinstate the semi-autonomous, partisan councils161, the task force report, 
Strengthening Our Policy Capacity recommended significant investments within in-house 
internal research capacity, noting that the ARB was an exception to the (policy deficit) rule 
and had the promising beginnings of a strong long term forward planning and research unit162 
(Canada, 1996: 5).   The particular support for the ARB’s emerging ‘evidence-based’ policy 
innovation model was underpinned by a specific conception that good policy advice is 
empirical, quantifiable, and objective and technical163.  As the report states: 
 
“an aspect of policy analysis requiring greater attention is the rigorous assessment of 
the expected outcomes in both qualitative and whenever possible, quantitative terms.  
Lack of rigour diminishes the value of analysis, weakens the decision process and 
makes subsequent evaluation tenuous and subjective” (Canada, 1996: 6.).  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
should have cut research and development as much as we did but we had to move quickly… we were under the 
gun there is not question about that”(Bakvis, 2000: 87; Savioe, 1999: 177.). 
161
 Owing to the perceived cost and apparent unmanageability.  Indeed the last two royal commission’s prior to 
abolition of the policy instrument had as Bakvis argues ‘taken on nightmarish qualities, with public conflicts 
among commissioners, long delays and huge cost overruns’ (Bakvis, 2000: 81.).   
162
 As the report stated ‘Human Resources Development Canada has dedicated resources to defining its longer 
term policy research agenda, including the definition of its statistical needs as part of its strategic planning’ 
(Canada, 1996: 6.).   
163
 And perhaps therefore reflecting the particular positivist paradigm in which the discipline of statistics is 
situated.  
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In so doing, the Felligi report reinforced this conceptual shift in social policy analysis within 
the federal government.  It moreover reinforced the importance of developing relationships 
with academic and other external experts as ‘a way to contribute to the quality of public 
policy across Canada at a relatively small cost’ and especially with regards to ‘considering 
major horizontal issues of public policy’ 164(ibid: 33-34).  In this way, the ARB established an 
important institutional site and an ‘open space’ in the policy process for the (re) emergence of 
external (and internal) evidence and experts in the policy generating process and a particular 
form of policy innovation privileging outcomes focused, evidence-based ideas (Brink and 
McKeller, 2000: 111).   
 
5.2 The importance of the early years: the rise of the CIAR and the ascendance of the 
Neuroscience EYEC frame at federal and provincial levels 
 
It would become increasingly apparent that there indeed were particular external researchers, 
academics and expert bodies who were seeking to both exploit the data from the NLSCY and 
keen to infiltrate and shape the federal (social) policy agenda.  In particular, researchers from 
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) were primed with just the kind of 
outcomes driven and ‘evidence-informed’ policy research that the ARB was seeking to 
acquire in order to inform and advise the federal government on mid and long term policy and 
were quick to fill the policy vacuum.  Indeed in the early 1990s, the CIAR president, Dr 
                                               
164
 To this effect, although Strategic Policy in conjunction with the NLSCY statistics team were already sharing 
data, in 1998 a national task force, the Canadian Initiative on Social Statistics, recommended the creation of 
research facilities to give academic researchers improved access to Statistics Canada’s micro-data files to allow 
researchers in the social sciences to build expertise in quantitative methodology and analysis and to improve the 
availability of ‘rigorous’, policy relevant research (Voyer, 2007: 226.). 
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Fraser Mustard165, a medical doctor and researcher by training and somewhat of an ‘early 
years’ activist, set up a Human Development Group within CIAR, bringing together leading 
North American researchers from a range of health, education and social science backgrounds 
(Pence and Benner, 2000: 151).  CIAR members166 formed a small yet internally 
heterogeneous ‘early years development network’ who were exploring (international) 
ideational developments in ‘early years’ evidence, including the latest scientific 
neuroscientific ‘brain’ evidence and population health ideas which stressed the ‘critical’ 
importance of the early years for subsequent health, education and other developmental 
outcomes.  With the advent of the NLSCY data base, CIAR researchers were beginning to 
investigate the application of neuroscientific and also educative ideas167 to social policy 
research specific to the Canadian context168.   
 
As has been discussed in the first chapter, the application of neuroscientific frame with 
regards to specific EYEC policy programmes, is relatively diffuse (although narrowed to the 
earliest years), including various social policies such as maternal health/foetal development, 
                                               
165
 Fraser Mustard was the Dean and Vice-President of Health Sciences, McMaster University from 1972 to 
1982, and was the founding president of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) from 1982 to 
1996 (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 1.). 
166
 In particular the work of Doug Willms, Dan Offord, Richard Tremblay, George Cleveland and Michael 
Krashinsky, Clyde Hertzman, along with Fraser Mustard himself, would make important contributions to the 
broad ‘early years’ research efforts within CIAR and Canada.   
167
 In this case measuring kindergarten on future cognitive outcomes 
168
 Even though with the NLSCY being so new, researchers could only make some preliminary conclusions (or 
effects over 2-4 years) on the effects of various ‘environmental’ influences (including non parental care) on 
subsequent educative, behavioural and emotional development (as was discussed in the first chapter see 
Hertzman and Cohen 1998; Lipps and Yiptong-Avila, 1999; McCain and Mustard, 1999).  Indeed as was 
discussed in the first chapter, the relative infancy of neuroscientific ‘science’ and the use of experimental 
scientific data meant that for the most part, it was simply neuroscientific theory which informed particular social 
policy discourses and frameworks, as opposed to a strict definition of ‘evidence-based’ practice.  
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early years education and child development and enrichment programmes.  Being in its 
infancy, the neuroscientific frame was lacking in a fully worked, prescriptive or integrated 
policy model or system for EYEC; in many ways the various evidential threads rationalised 
various discrete early years enrichment, development and health programmes.  Despite the 
ideational complexity, when considered together, these ‘scientific’ ideas made a powerful 
discursive imperative for broad investments and policy interventions in the early years of 
children’s lives and highlighted a broad social policy deficit in this area.  Indeed, the 
neuroscientific frame challenges the state to actively support all parents in children’s early 
development and health, as opposed to only stepping in to support those traditionally profiled 
‘at risk’ and only becoming fully responsible for children’s early education in later childhood 
(through formal schooling).  The consequences of allowing a general ‘developmental deficit’ 
would be stark.  Indeed as a member of the NLSCY policy team noted ‘the notion of the little 
brains getting hard wired, that language was really compelling and I think that it had a huge 
impact’169(Goldman, 2006).   
 
At the federal level, the NLSCY and the collaborative work with Strategic Policy would 
provide an avenue into the federal structure to establish the CIAR as an influential external 
policy network and a place where ‘scientific’ neurosceintific ideas would resonate and hence 
become perceived as credible.  Indeed, as federal bureaucrat Lynne Westlake noted of Fraser 
Mustard’s advocating activities: 
 
                                               
169
 Indeed by constructing a ‘critical’ need for early intervention, there is a sense that remedial social and 
educative policies would be rendered ineffective and as such, leaving children’s early years as the preserve of 
parents and varying degrees of early enrichment and non-specialist ‘nurture’ would be dangerous indeed.   
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“I was working in the Children’s Bureau in 1990 and the person who was managing it 
said come take a look at this guy, some of his theories are way out there, at that point 
he has a long medical and academic record but as a player and a thinker whose 
thinking would shape public policy, he wasn’t on the landscape, but by 1996 he had a 
huge influence” (2006).   
 
The culmination of collaborative efforts was the HRDC conference, Investing in Children: A 
National Research Conference, convened in October 1998 and marked the embedding of 
neuroscientific and educative frames for EYEC within HRDC’s research framework.  Its 
objective was ‘to showcase the most recent NLSCY research on children and families and to 
engage researchers, practitioners and policy makers in discussion on the application of these 
findings to policy and program development’ (ARB, 1999: 1).  Fraser Mustard’s closing 
address, presented the major neuroscientific findings which stated that ‘brain development 
occurs largely before the age of five… [hence] a lack of intervention and prevention strategies 
leads to much higher social and economic costs later on’ (ARB, 1999: 4).  Regarding 
potential policy frameworks, Mustard presented the case for introducing universal EYEC 
programmes ‘to avoid creating an ‘us versus them’ mentality’ and also partly due to the 
extremely technical nature of the neuroscientific frame’s conception of early learning and 
development, which necessitated universal enhancement of ‘parenting skills’ to develop 
children’s early capacity (ibid.).  Hence it was imperative to ‘encourage the federal 
government to support all parents through more parent education programs, parental leave and 
to support early child development programs’ (ibid.).  Moreover as a CIAR member Clyde 
Hertzman demonstrated from NLSCY the developmental payoffs would be realised across 
society: 
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“The gradient in child development in Canada demonstrates that there is room for 
improvement in the environments in which most children grow up, right across the 
socio-economic spectrum and not just for those traditionally considered ‘high 
risk’”(2000: 15.).  
 
These (policy) ideas were taken up by the report compiled from the conference which 
concluded that ‘the early years are crucial to setting the stage for social, emotional and 
cognitive development’ and on the basis of the compiled research recommended the 
development of various ‘support initiatives [which] would include prenatal nutrition and 
education; home visiting programs; pre-school education; mobile and satellite community 
programs’ (ibid: 109).  Moreover, that these ‘programs and policies supporting early child 
development should have a universal component where first and foremost all families are 
supported’ (ibid).  Notably absent in the conclusions of the report was the issue of (custodial) 
childcare and how this might fit into an EYEC policy framework, aid children’s development 
or contribute to gender equality.  In part, NLSCY data was not particularly helpful in this 
regard having not been designed to capture the different childcare/early years settings170; but 
the focus of the majority of CIAR members, following educative and neuroscientific ideas 
                                               
170
 Indeed as one ARB policy study noted it was difficult to ascertain the effects of different forms of childcare 
on development as the NLSCY measure ‘non parental care’ could not establish particular developmental 
outcomes from different settings.   The study recommended to the NLSCY team that NPC (Non Parental Care) 
be differentiated by structural indices of quality, centre-based/home-based care (Conner and Brink, 1999, p.27.).  
As the ARB conference report noted childcare was a ‘controversial topic’ and the submitted paper by Kohen and 
Hertzman (1999) and it was difficult to ascertain clear benefits of childcare on developmental outcomes, suffice 
to say that those children who did attend some hours of non-parental ‘EYEC settings’ outside the home showed 
improved cognitive skills (ARB, 1999: 29.).   
 218 
were ambivalent towards centre-based care for very young children171 and hence a strong 
discourse of early development and education rather than care prevailed in the conference 
findings.   
 
It was also clear that the work of the CIAR and in particular, Fraser Mustard, was becoming 
influential at the provincial level.  Indeed, following an exposition piece in national 
newspaper the Globe and Mail172, Mustard quickly established links with the Ontario 
Progressive Conservatives, presenting to the caucus before the 1995 election (Senate, 2008).   
Mustard was subsequently appointed as the Premier’s council on Economic renewal (an 
advisory body) and asked to review the research on the life-long impact of child development 
(Saint-Martin, 2007: 292).  The result was Reversing the Real Brain Drain: The Early Years 
Study co chaired by Fraser Mustard and Margaret McCain, reporting in early 1999.   
 
The Early Years synthesised Mustard’s reading of the neuroscience ‘story’ and sought to 
recommend what steps the Ontario government could take to develop ‘vision for an early 
child development and parenting framework to improve the outcomes for the early years for 
children in all sectors of society’ (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 3).  The key issue for the report 
is the importance of neuroscientific evidence which according to Mustard’s reading 
rationalises ‘the need for a continuum of parent-focused and child-focused activities for 
                                               
171
 Indeed for very young children, Mustard in particular appeared to assume that parental care would be most 
appropriate for development and as such claimed that ‘parenting is what matters’ (ARB, 1999: 4.).   
172
 As Mustard explained to the Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, a university in 
Winnipeg had asked him to give a paper at conference on the university role in a knowledge-based societies and 
Mustard chose brain development in the very early years.  In a fortuitous twist of fate a reporter from the Globe 
and Mail was present and owing to a general shortage of other stories the Globe and Mail put the article on the 
front page precipitating a significant amount of government and broader academic interest (Senate, 2008).   
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optimum brain development in the early years’ 173(ibid. 1).  As Mustard previously revealed at 
the HRDC conference and which was also elaborated within The Early Years, was a particular 
ambivalence towards custodial care and by virtue of this, gender-based concerns.  Indeed, 
rather than viewing an EYEC policy as a fully integrated system or a ‘policy synthesis’ of 
both developmental and custodial care (therefore retaining a crucial role for Ontario’s 
childcare centres and rationalising an augmentation of existing developmental components), 
Early Years instead makes the case for a variety of discrete EYEC child development 
programmes which help primarily help parents to develop their children’s cognitive capacities 
in the very early years.  Indeed as the report makes clear ‘early child development’ can occur 
in a variety of settings, however: 
 
“It is not the setting that defines early child development; it is the activities.  In our 
view, activities must focus on parent interaction with their children and play-based 
problem solving with other children that stimulate early brain development through 
the sensing pathways” (ibid: 37; 52.).   
 
In some ways, directing the policy rationale towards parents makes sense in the context of the 
neuroscientific evidence which casts policy attention down towards the earliest period of life 
(indeed to pre-birth also)174 but the assumption that parents will be and should be the primary 
source of both care and early child development is specific to Mustard’s reading which 
                                               
173
 As the report states ‘evidence that children who do not receive the nutrition and stimulation necessary for 
good development in the earliest months and years of life may have great difficulty overcoming deficits later’ 
(McCain and Mustard, 1999: 6). 
174
 As Mustard explained to the sub-committee on children and youth ‘experience-based brain development is 
crucial in utero and during the first three to four years of life… early brain development affects not only your 
capacity to learn and your behaviour, it effects significant health risks (SCYR, 2002). 
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informs this policy framework175.  In this way, Early Years recommends the development of 
‘Early Child Development and Parenting Centres’, the central components of which would 
include universal early child development and parenting activities at the centre; home visiting; 
home-based satellites and early problem identification and intervention (ibid: 21).  As the 
Early Years makes clear: 
 
“The evidence is clear that good early child development programs that involve 
parents or other primary caregivers of young children can influence how they relate to 
and care for children in the home and can vastly improve outcomes for children's 
behaviour, learning and health in later life. The earlier in a child's life these programs 
begin, the better.  These programs can benefit children and families from all socio-
economic groups in society” (ibid: 44.). 
 
Following the neuroscientific rationale (which articulates common developmental outcomes) 
a universal approach to early development would be necessary (with extra provisions for 
                                               
175
 Indeed as The Early Years takes Kohen, Hertzman’s and Willms analysis of NLSCY data of childcare and 
subsequent outcomes in a forthcoming chapter in Willms (2002) ed, which found that for low income and middle 
income children, attendance in care outside of the home resulted in increases in vocabulary skills on the PPVT-R 
test and concluded that these findings ‘suggest the important of making high-quality care arrangements available 
to all Canadian children who need them’ and as such stress the importance of integrated care and development 
aspects of EYEC whilst McCain and Mustard read this evidence as rationalising ‘support outside the home’ 
neglecting the care element (Kohen, Hertzman, Willms, 2002: 275; McCain and Mustard, 1999: 83.).  Indeed 
Mustard’s conception of parental support and interaction would appear to assume a significant amount of time, 
‘parenting involvement is more than occasional visit to see how the child is doing at the pre-school 
program…the early child development programs that involve parents will help them be better educators’ 
(McCain and Mustard, 1999: 37.).   
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those with physical risk profiles176), hence policy would establish ‘clear principles for early 
child development and parenting centres, but multiple strategies with a universal outcome 
measure’ (ibid: 171).  Rather than advocating ‘a centralised bureaucratic model’ to ensure 
this, with the intention to support community choice (and diversity) Early Years recommends 
‘involving the private sector as well as the public sector’ (ibid: 171-2.).  However, this 
approach entailed an apparent tension between a standardising universal vision or outcome 
and a possible divergence (and quality variability) in implementation. 
 
As such, at both federal and provincial levels, through an institutional openness to evidence-
based ideas, CIAR research filtering into the ARB policy planning unit and a powerful 
‘scientific’ discourse forwarded by an advocating actor who had particular credibility within 
various political circles177, significant ideational pressures were being generated regarding the 
necessity of investments in the early years.  Indeed, as a federal bureaucrat noted regarding 
Fraser Mustard, ‘I mean he was a doctor who’d had medical training; he wasn’t some 
sociologist sitting in an office somewhere’ (Goldman, 2006.).  As has been discussed, the 
growing dominance of the neuroscientific frame and especially Mustard’s particular reading 
of it, was acting to further mitigate ‘equality of opportunities’ ideas at the provincial level 
and, to a lesser extent, the federal level (where a broader range of EYEC evidence and ideas 
were circulating).  In both contexts, with an overt focus upon stimulating children’s early 
‘neural’ development, the ‘care’ element of EYEC policy (and indeed the importance of care 
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 But as Early Years asserts, health targeting within a universal approach does not profile risk through a socio-
economic measure (McCain and Mustard, 1999: 16-17.).    
177
 As a federal bureaucrat noted the provincial Early Years report was both influential at the federal level (in 
some part due to significant national media coverage) in addition to simply being a provincial concern 
(Westlake, 2006).    
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to children’s wellbeing) had receded and with this, the idea that EYEC should provide both 
integrated (custodial and developmental) ‘care’ and ‘education’.  Hence childcare and indeed 
in some ways also, kindergarten, were just other (satellite) policy programmes that could 
broadly be associated with ‘early years’ programme but were not a central part of the ‘early 
years development’ message nor the emerging policy agenda within HRDC.  In this way, the 
growing complexity of EYEC policy and particular discursive tensions between the equality 
of opportunity frame and the neuroscientific frame set up an opposition between the early 
child development network and childcare advocates, who were seeking divergent paths to 
policy action, rather than forging a common policy consensus.   
 
5.3 Social policy expansions in an era of austerity: early years ‘evidence-based’ policy 
innovations at the federal and provincial levels 
 
The debate over EYEC and early years evidence in the late 1990s that had arisen by virtue of 
the work of the ARB and the CIAR occurred in a somewhat timely context which dovetailed 
with a broader agenda within the federal government to (re)develop its social (and economic) 
capacity in the aftermath of the fiscal conservatism wrought by the deficit crisis.  Much 
academic debate has sought to characterise and position the Liberal’s renewed attention 
towards social policy and particularly ‘early years’ policy, in this seemingly austere context.  
Some authors have identified these social policy developments as conditioned by, or a 
exhibiting a new phase of, the prevailing neo-liberal order178 (Mahon and Phillips, 2002; 
                                               
178
 Often by picking up on elements of policy which target ‘at risk’ populations, such as the health aspects of 
EYEC, the neglect of gender concerns or construe attention to children as fitting within a broader neo-liberal 
paradigm which eschews equality across class and gender lines but retains a sympathy for children.  Whilst in 
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McKeen, 2007).  Others argue that these endeavours aimed to forge a third way (Bashevkin, 
2002) or exhibit a transition towards the reconciliation of economic and social concerns and 
to address ‘new social risks’179 through a social investment approach, informed by human 
capital ideas (Dolbrowolsky and Jensen, 2004; Jensen and Saint-Martin, 2003; 2006; 
Dobrowolsky, 2006; Saint-Martin, 2007).   Whilst most authors would agree that in the post-
deficit era, Canada’s social architecture had been profoundly altered in both material and 
discursive terms, and hence a wholesale return to the post-war social democratic ideals was 
unlikely, this theoretical disagreement is telling, and as Dobrowolsky perceptively notes, 
reflects perhaps an uneven and complex process of restructuring (2006: 182.).  Indeed 
ideological/policy paradigms do not simply fall from the sky, nor occur in a vacuum and 
hence reflect the complex responses of reflexive agents intervening and developing strategies 
to deal with the intended and unintended consequences of ongoing institutional and 
programmatic reforms and negotiating the policy spaces and gaps in between.  Moreover it is 
greatly reflective of the complexity exhibited by competing EYEC frames and hence the 
discursive instability of EYEC policy discourse, where multiple frames and policy 
frameworks rationalise in places universal collectivist approaches, or centre (and target) 
policy attention upon specific (often age-specific) clienteles. 
 
In many ways, a highly contingent ‘perfect storm’ of institutional and ideational 
developments was unfolding, producing a strategic context highly conducive to social policy 
                                                                                                                                                   
some ways plausible, the qualitative texture of EYEC policy as framed by particular evidential frames, cuts 
across different ideological paradigms and does not necessarily fit within any one.   
179
 These can be summarised as the income and service gaps generated by the transition to post-industrial labour 
markets and societies, the decline of well paid and traditionally male industrial jobs and an increase in low-paid 
and often precarious service jobs as well as a rise of the female employment rate overall (Jenson and Saint-
Martin, 2006: 430.).   
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innovation and change at the federal level and which favoured and, to an extent, was 
reciprocally shaped by the ongoing (evidence-based) policy work within HRDC, centred 
around the evidence of the neuroscientific frame.  Indeed the federal project of social policy 
reconstruction was situated in an emerging broader performance regime which emphasised an 
evidence-based and outcomes driven agenda (Aucion and Heintzman, 2000: 255.).  As had 
developed initially within HRDC and spread across government circles, was a growing 
constituency for a strong focus on measurement, evaluation and public reporting of 
outcomes180 (MacLeod, 2001: 77.).  Moreover, following the Felligi report, (which had 
sought to strengthen internal policy capacity) a policy capacity task force was tasked with co-
ordinating horizontal, future orientated policy and to identify ‘the pressure points which are 
likely to arise in Canadian society by 2005 as a result of economic, demographic and social 
trends’ which could then feed into a broad ‘innovation strategy’ aimed at revitalising 
Canada’s flagging economy (Canada, 1996a; Stewart, 2006).  From the two reports 
produced181, the key pressure points were identified as ‘growth, human development and 
social cohesion’ in the context of an increasingly ‘globalized and knowledge-based’ economy 
(Canada, 1997: i.).  In this context, HRDC’s EYEC work appeared as an ideal piece of 
evidence-based policy of which particular (social, educative and economic) outcomes and 
payoffs could be modelled and could be strategically attached to background work for 
                                               
180
 Indeed as Good comments 1997 was the year for results in the government’s capital with all federal 
departmental agencies required to submit performance reports to Parliament, following HRDC’s efforts in 1996 
to put in place a results-based accountability framework which established twelve key performance measures for 
its four major program areas, along with a series of secondary measures to monitor operations (Good, 2003: 40.).  
181
 The first report, Growth, Human Development, Social Cohesion, 1996 and followed up by Canada 2005, 
Global Challenges and Opportunities 1997.   
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Canada’s innovation strategy under the theme of lifelong learning182.  Hence, as the HRDC 
Minister (1999-2003) Jane Stewart described, in the context of ‘a more economically 
perceived agenda, the timely dovetailing of this [research work] was like gasoline on the fire, 
the policy directions were crystallising themselves very well’ (ibid.).   
 
The elaboration of an evidence-based, outcomes focused, social policy agenda first becomes 
visible through the two year exploratory dialogue between the Federal-Provincial-Territorial 
Council of Ministers on Social Policy Renewal, chaired by the HRDC Minister183 to create a 
National Children’s Agenda (NCA), agreed in May 1999 (NCA, 1999).  The NCA sought to 
define a ‘comprehensive strategy to improve the well-being of Canada’s children’ and 
although initially comprised a broad vision statement which included children up to the age of 
18 and involved an equally broad range of stakeholders, through the influence of the CIAR 
within HRDC and neuroscientific ideas, the focus quickly turned to early childhood 
development, ‘with the direction provided by research’ and more specifically; 
 
“strong evidence, including scientific research that what happens to children when 
they are very young shapes their health and well-being throughout their lifetime.  
Science has proven what we have intrinsically known all along; healthy children grow 
into healthy, successful adults who will shape our future” (NCA, 1999). 
 
                                               
182
 Jane Stewart stated that whilst the Innovation Strategy would typically be driven by Industry Canada, HRDC 
was able to force a partnership during the process, arguing that a critical component of any innovation strategy 
should involve people.  Following what was described as ‘tough policy work’, the policy team settled upon a 
‘lifelong learning’ theme and were able to attach HRDC work on early years (Stewart, 2006).   
183
 Which initially was Pierre S Pettigrew but taken over by Jane Stewart in 1999.   
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Indeed as Jane Stewart noted ‘a big shift was having the early years studies, having good 
longitudinal data, having an empirical basis for what intuitively people would just know, 
changed the tenor completely’ (2006).  As such, the 1999 Speech from the Throne indicated 
that the 2000 budget would be a children’s budget.  HRDC were given the go ahead to work 
with Health and Justice Departments to develop a framework for EYEC policy with the 
Provinces, which would form the first and an integral plank of a new federal/provincial Social 
Union Framework Agreement (SUFA); an intergovernmental commitment to ‘make social 
programmes more efficient and effective’ and ‘to promote equality of opportunity for all 
Canadians’ (NCA, 1999; Social Union, 1999).   
 
SUFA codified and concretised what Phillips describes as the new ‘instrumental federalism’.  
As the Treasury Board Secretariat commented, the essence of SUFA is ‘doing what works for 
Canadians’ (Phillips, 2001: 8.).  Indeed, there would be no more blank cheques from 
government; social policies and investments would have to demonstrate measurable ‘results’ 
and performance outcomes which could be publicly reported, although with CHST block 
transfer method, it would be primarily for the public to hold Provincial governments to 
account on how the money was spent (MacLoed, 2001: 77.).  Ultimately this placed evidence 
at the centre of policy making, indeed SUFA contained specific language on this point; 
‘research, knowledge and information are the foundations of evidence-based decision-making 
and are critical to informed policy development’ (Social Union, 2000).   
 
As has been discussed in the preceding discussion, the ascendance of neuroscientific ideas of 
early child development had brought EYEC policy to the top of the federal agenda and the 
particular influence of this frame is clearly inscribed upon the first federal agreement on 
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EYEC policy, the Early Child Development Agreement, (ECDA) signed in September 2000, 
which aimed to ‘promote early childhood development so that, to their fullest potential, 
children will be physically and emotionally healthy, safe and secure, ready to learn and 
socially engaged and responsible’ (Canada, 2000.).  The embedding of a strong discourse of 
child development and education within HRDC’s conception of EYEC policy and which 
elaborated through federal and provincial negotiations had led to a particular focus on the 
health and educative side of early development and discrete parenting and family supports at 
the community level whilst sidelining the ‘care’ aspect of EYEC and in this way the notion of 
an integrated system.  Indeed, the eventual agreement committed $2.2 billion (over five years) 
to be shared between the Provinces for investment in four key areas; promoting healthy 
pregnancy, birth and infancy; improving parenting and family supports; community supports; 
and strengthening early childhood development, learning and care, for young children, 
prenatal to age 6 (Canada, 2000).   
 
The investment area of ‘early child development, learning and care’ had been a particular 
sticking point in the development of a federal agreement and in many ways entailed a 
compromise between Provinces which were seeking to develop a base of childcare and early 
years infrastructure184 and other Provinces such as Ontario who (following the embedding of 
the neuroscientific rationale) vigorously argued that an early child development agreement 
should be exclusive of a broader childcare system and funding (Stewart, 2006).  In any case, 
the ECDA was specific in its choice of language; that where investments in (existing) 
                                               
184
 As Jane Stewart explained, the Provinces were starting from very different places and hence in some 
Provinces in Atlantic Canada the priority was to develop infrastructure and increase wages as a first step, 
whereas other places (such as Western Canada and in many ways, Ontario) had already developed systems 
which could subsequently be augmented or developed upon (2006.). 
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programmes were made they should be to directed towards children, to ‘promote healthy 
development, provide opportunities for interaction and play and help prepare children for 
school’ without reference to incorporating a custodial service for (working) women (Canada, 
2000).  Hence it was apparent that the position of childcare advocates, who had steadfastly 
argued for a regulated non-profit (centre-based) childcare system, against the prevailing 
discourse of child development and parental support, had been marginalised185.  As HRDC 
Minister Jane Stewart had noted: 
 
“one of the biggest successes was moving it away from a gender-based strategy [and] 
we were fighting all the time that it was child development and not women in the 
workforce only” (2006.).   
 
The neuroscientific and educative EYEC frames had the added benefit of being clearly 
operationalisable in conjunction with SUFA principles to report comparable indicators of 
policy outcomes or ‘effectiveness’ generated by federal investment.  Indeed, as part of the 
agreement, the Provinces agreed to report annually (to their citizens) upon early childhood 
development expenditures along the four investment areas and to develop a shared reporting 
framework of ‘child wellbeing’ by 2002 (Canada, 2000).  The devised framework measured 
                                               
185
 As the Minster, Jane Stewart had noted there was particular divisions between the early child development 
and health experts on one side and childcare advocates, who had adopted a position of ‘childcare, nothing more, 
nothing less’, so rather than coming together cohesively and ‘hammering out a recommendation’ for the 
government, representatives remained divided.  This is in contrast to Mahon and Phillips (2002) view that 
coalitions formed to increase the ‘bandwidth of the message’ or that the federal government had followed the 
‘politics of pragmatism’ by choosing to base its claims on a discourse of child development assuming this 
strategy would stand a greater chance of success rather than a tighter focus on childcare (see Jenson, Mahon, 
Phillips, 2003: 145.).   
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11 common indicators186 from five main dimensions of child wellbeing; physical health and 
motor development; emotional health; social knowledge and competence; cognitive learning; 
and language communication187 (Canada, 2002.).  In many ways, these prescriptive measures 
underlay a rather narrow, instrumental goal and future-orientated conception of children’s 
wellbeing and childhood; policy was directed at children certainly, but not specifically child-
centred in the sense that policy would attend to their holistic needs and present well-being.  
Indeed the neuroscientific and educative discourse constructs ‘social and emotional 
development’ as individual measures of social competence and emotional maturity (and rated 
negatively) rather than relational concepts of peer interaction and sociability or indeed social 
rights188 (in positive terms).  In addition, to complement the ECDA, the federal government 
authorised an extension of the NLSCY project, called Understanding the Early Years (UEY).  
Initially developed in 12 pilots189 and following neuroscientific rationale, UEY sought to 
capture the effect of familial structures (such as background, education levels and income), 
practices (family functioning, parenting style and mental health) and community 
characteristics (social capital, supports and recreational and educational resources) upon 
children’s developmental outcomes (Willms, 2005: 1.).  With the focus on familial 
                                               
186
 The full indicators were health birthweight; incidence of meningococcal Group C disease; incidence of 
measles; incidence of haemophilus Influenzae; infant mortality rate; motor and social development; emotional 
problem-anxiety; hyperactivity-inattention; physical aggression-conduct problem; prosocial behaviour; language 
development.   
187
 This framework was derived in part from the Early Development Instrument framework, developed by child 
psychiatrists Dan Offord and Magdalena Janus at McMaster University.  The EDI is a population based measure 
based on the five developmental domains drawn from a rating system used by kindergarten teachers after 
children have been in school for several months.  It provides an aggregate picture of kindergarten-readiness in 
particular population sets; schools, neighbourhoods and provinces (Cleveland et al., 2006.).   
188
 In this way also the developmental model is constructed through particularly middle class values which seek 
to promote social engagement and responsibility.  
189
 Of which York region was one of the first. 
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characteristics, the UEY research continued to direct discursive and policy attention towards 
parental practices and community supports, with external, non-parental EYEC conspicuously 
absent as a potential contributing factor to children’s development. 
 
At the Provincial level, the influence of the neuroscientific frame in recasting EYEC policy 
and directing policy interventions is most marked, despite the context of austerity and during 
(somewhat paradoxically) processes of broader retrenchment of childcare and kindergarten.  
Indeed, a year prior to the federal ECDA, the Harris government established a Children’s 
Secretariat led by a new Minister for Children, Margaret Marland.  In September 1999 the 
Secretariat funded demonstration projects in five communities190 under community led panels 
which were tasked with developing small (non capital) early development initiatives (through 
existing agencies) based on recommendations from the Early Years study (Ontario, 1999: 6.).  
As one appointed community ‘early years champion’ in York region noted, from the outset, 
the early development pilot project’s strict early development and health focus did not sit well 
with existing municipal childcare services and programmes and in the initial stages it 
appeared that there would be some overlap with existing targeted Resource Centre 
programmes191 (Wagle, 2006).  Concerns that an overt focus on early development would lead 
to services exclusive of childcare and kindergarten services (and the implication of possible 
continued retrenchment), led the City of Toronto in partnership with the Atkinson Charitable 
Foundation and Toronto District School Board to begin development of an experimental ‘First 
                                               
190
 South East Grey, London, North Bay, York Region and Ottawa 
191
 Indeed the first demonstration pilot of an ‘early years and parenting centre’ in York region utilised existing 
Family Resource Centre infrastructure to begin delivering services for 18 months before the process was 
suddenly stopped by the Provincial government who decided to develop and implement their own action plan 
without local level input (Wagel, 2006).  
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Duty’ pilot initiative in 2000 to explore new policy approaches to bring childcare, 
kindergarten and family support services into a single accessible programme located in 
primary schools, co-ordinated with early intervention and family health services 192(Corter et 
al., 2006: 5).  It was hoped that Toronto First Duty would provide ‘evidence-based story 
telling’ and an alternative model with which to influence the Provincial government 
(Patterson, 2006.).     
 
An Early Years Task Group was quickly appointed by the Provincial government to table 
community and municipal recommendations (as general service managers) for a province-
wide Early Years Programme and suggested possible frameworks for integrating early 
development programmes into existing services and hence may have potentially led to the 
beginnings of an integrated EYEC system (ibid.).  However, the process was abruptly halted 
in spring 2001, when the Province decided to absorb the Children’s Secretariat within the 
Ministry of Community and Social Services and to develop a plan at the Provincial level 
                                               
192
 Toronto First Duty was a $5.1 million project funded by the City of Toronto and partners (in great part due to 
the work of councilor Olivia Chow, Toronto’s children’s advocate) which established five sites in 2002: Bruce 
Wood Green Early Learning Centre; Corvette Early Years; Queen Victoria Partners for Early Learning Project; 
York Early Years Wilcox Project; and Action for Children Today and Tomorrow Secord-Dawes Hub (Corter et 
al., 2006: 8; Mustard, McCain and Stewart, 2007: 123.).  In many ways, this innovative project was the first 
project in Ontario to integrate EYEC services.  As integration was a new concept the process developed over 
time and sought to iron out the considerable differences in regulatory differences between childcare and 
kindergarten and the vast differences in  compensation and working conditions between different EYEC workers 
(Corter et al., 2006: 14.).  The demonstration project was also subject to a rigorous evaluation programme to 
measure quality using the Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale Revised (ECERS-R), qualitative 
interviews with parents, children and EYEC workers, and used the EDI instrument to assess child development 
in communities with TFD sites. Also in 2003 and 2004 a sample of 76 children were measured using the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and Test of Early Reading ability (TERA), Number Sense and Social 
Understanding (ibid.).  Vocabulary scores, total TERA and number knowledge were significantly higher after a 
year in the TFD project.   
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instead (McCain and Mustard, 2002: 29).  The outcome of Provincial process was the Ontario 
Early Years Plan (OEYP), launched in May 2001, which outlined how Ontario would spend 
its $114 million share of the ECDA funding (Ontario, 2003: 1.).   
 
In what would create significant administrative difficulties for municipal managers193, OEYP 
did not seek to engage municipalities or incorporate existing service structures.  Instead, the 
OEYP layered on top of existing programmes, various early child development and health 
initiatives, led by the neuroscientific rationale of The Early Years and reporting commitments 
to the ECDA194.  In this way, nearly half of the $114,000 million ($52,484,500195) was 
devoted to maternal and infant health projects, which included a mixture of targeted 
programmes, such as Community Health Centres and services directed towards children with 
specific health issues such as developmental delays, hearing, mental health, autism; services 
for pregnant women with addictions, including prevention of foetal alcohol syndrome but also 
universal programmes such as campaigns for folic acid use in pregnancy and breastfeeding; 
                                               
193
 Indeed, owing to the changes to the Day Nurseries Act, which required municipalities to take over the service 
system manager roles within childcare, fee subsidies and Resource Centres, municipal governments were 
required to complete their first five year service plan to administer and secure provincial funding for these 
services (Patterson, 2006).   
194
 In this way $4,635,000 were committed by OEYP to conduct research and evaluation in child outcomes, child 
health and evaluation of programmes (Coffey and McCain, 2002: 37.).   
195
 Services for Children with Autism, $20,000,000; Infant Development, 3,400,000; Children’s Mental Health, 
6,900,000; Pregnant Women with Addictions, $2,500,000; Infant Hearing, $600,000; Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, 
$1,400,000; Prenatal HIV Testing, $414,000; Aboriginal Nutrition Program, $1,000,000; Community Health 
Centres, $2,700,000; Healthy Babies, Healthy Children, $3,550,000; Prenatal and Postnatal Nurse Practitioner 
Services, $250,000; Provincial Early Childhood Resource Centre, $500,000; Healthy Pregnancy and Child 
Development Promotion, $2,300,000; Support for At-Risk Pregnant Women, $70,000; Funding for Public 
Education and Awareness, $175,000; Prevention of Neural Tube Defects, $135,000; Breast Feeding, $150,000, 
plus $6,440,000 extra funding for LEAP programmes [provincial childcare and resources for teenage mothers]; 
Sexual Assault Services and Injury and Family abuse prevention (Ontario, 2003; Coffey and McCain, 2002: 37.).    
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prenatal and postnatal nurse practitioner services and Healthy Babies Healthy Children 
initiative to assess children’s early development (Ontario, 2003: 14-31.).  Whilst such 
programmes were congruent with the ECDA initiatives and in many ways to be welcomed, 
municipal managers were concerned that with the bulk of funding was being channelled 
through Boards of Health, services would operate exclusive of and fragment, broader EYEC 
services (Toronto, 2003: 63; Patterson, 2006).  Such concerns would equally apply to the 
second plank of OEYP; the development of Ontario Early Years Centres ($36,500,000196) and 
the introduction of a complementary Early Years Challenge Fund ($15,400,000).   
 
The Ontario Early Years Centres (OEYC) purported to reflect most closely the 
recommendations of the Early Years report.  As such, OEYC’s were directed at enhancing 
parenting skills and the early development of children aged zero to six.  Following the 
neuroscientific frame’s rationale and to some extent against the prevailing ‘neo-liberal’ 
framework of broader social policy, OEYCs were designed as a universal programme as 
opposed to targeting those ‘at risk’.  Indeed they were designated as stand alone (and heavily 
branded) community centres, which would each provide free resources and encourage all 
parents and caregivers to participate, including literacy and interactive learning activities for 
caregivers and children; specialist ‘early child development’ parenting programmes, resources 
(such as toy libraries and early development materials), outreach activities and links to other 
ECD services (Ontario, 2003: 27; York, 2005: 57.).  Such uniformity dovetailed with the 
broader agenda to measure child development outcomes from the investments and subject 
                                               
196
 $30,000,000 for the Early Years Centres and $6,500,000 for capital projects. 
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OYECs to stringent programme evaluation197.  Crucially however, the services provided were 
part time or sessional (during normal working hours and at evenings/weekends) and hence did 
not constitute a form of custodial care, relying upon a parent or childminder to participate198.  
In this way, OEYC’s implicitly supported familial, unregulated and informal care systems, 
but unlike a straight forward strategy of familialisation, the government would shoulder some 
responsibility for children’s development199.   
 
Funded directly from Provincial funds, OEYCs were another example of provincial layering 
of discrete aspects of EYEC policy on top of and to the exclusion of existing EYEC services.  
Indeed, the OEYP stated that 103 OEYCs would be established in each provincial riding by a 
provincially appointed Community Champion who would run the process without municipal 
input (42 Centres in phase I, 2002 and the remaining 63 in phase II in 2003) (Toronto, 2002: 
8.).  In this way, the Province assumed direct responsibility as the service system manager for 
OEYCs and subverted the local level planning process which aimed to distribute services on a 
                                               
197
 The OEYP committed $2 million for Program Effectiveness Measurement and $500,000 to fund McMaster 
University to implement the EDI on children in Ontario (Ontario, 2003: 32.).   
198
 As an example the Brant OEYC centre operated drop in sessions during 9 and 5pm weekdays alongside some 
evening sessions, including one hour ‘baby and me’ sessions, scheduled appointments for speech and language 
screenings, parenting workshops, communication strategies for infants and toddlers, first aid, handwriting for pre 
kindergarten, child development in the first two years, infant sign language, baby massage classes, preparation 
for kindergarten sessions, learning ABCs and reading sessions with an early literacy specialist, baby yoga, kids 
kitchen workshop (Brant OEYC, 2006).     
199
 And in this way was congruent with Harris’s existing plan to privatise and support unregulated care.  In some 
ways the policies supported also the idea of a nuclear family with one parenting providing the bulk of care, as 
Vosko (2006: 148) argues the policy sat within a conservative framework of familialisation but rather than a 
strict ‘maternal care frame’ which considers familial care to be sufficient for child development and wellbeing, 
the neuroscientific discourse rationalised enhancing or developing all parental styles.   
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per capital basis200 and (following the welfare orientated framework) direct money to 
deprived areas as first priority (Patterson, 2006).  In addition, the OEYCs had an impact on 
the Family Resource Centres which in some ways overlapped policy and services in certain 
areas and also conflicted with the OEYP to implement a standardised, universal and outcomes 
driven approach to early child development201.  Hence some were absorbed and became 
OEYCs202 or faced a funding crisis when the provincial government determined that its 80% 
share of funding would be redirected to OEYCs.  This precipitated the York region 
government to terminate five of the six resource centres effective 30th April, 2002 (York, 
2005: 56.).  Remaining Resource Centres had to demonstrate unique services for specific local 
need to retain funding (Wagel, 2006).   
 
The Ontario Early Years Plan did not direct any funding towards regulated (centre-based) 
childcare, nor saving a portion of funding to reduce class sizes in junior and senior 
kindergarten, did not reverse the general retrenchment of early education in junior 
kindergarten203.  Indeed total provincial ECDA dollars contributed only marginally towards 
                                               
200
 As the Toronto report into the impact of the OEYP noted in provincial ridings with larger populations, OYEC 
centre funding per child was almost a fifth less than in ridings with smaller populations (Toronto, 2005: 4.).    
201
 As Brenda Patterson (2006), Manager of childcare services in Toronto noted Family Resource Centres being 
community orientated and highly specific were not particularly accountable to public funds, or quantify how 
their services operated effectively (ie in terms of numbers served or generate outcomes) whereas OEYCs were 
more rigorous and hence better at reporting service levels and child outcomes.   
202
 For instance in Toronto, 22 provincial ridings obtained OEYCs.  Prior to their opening, there were 34 cost-
shared agencies providing family resource programmes.  By the end of the OEYC planning process 11 had 
become OEYCs.  Of the remaining 23 agencies, 5 contracts with the City were terminated (Toronto, 2005: 12.).   
203
 Indeed the 2000 budget committed $101 million annually to reduce average class sizes in Junior Kindergarten 
to Grade 3, but did not specify how much would be spent by age group (Ontario, 2000: 12.). Maximum average 
class sizes for Junior Kindergarten, Kindergarten, and Grades 1 through 3 would be reduced to 24 students 
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the costs of delivering services in the four areas (with the first years money representing a 
similar amount to the 1995 CAP funding for childcare), hence in the absence of stringent 
conditions under SUFA to invest block funds in all four areas of the ECDA and with the 
neuroscientific discourse prioritising an exclusive policy focus on early child development, 
the total childcare budget was further reduced from $493m in 1998 to $470m in 2001 (Vosko, 
2006: 151.).  As many provincial childcare advocates put it Ontario would spend ABC 
‘anything but childcare’ 204(Coffey and McCain, 2002: 20.).  Indeed, the Early Years 
Challenge Fund which complemented OEYCs in providing extra funding for local ECD 
initiatives (specifically aimed at charities and not-for-profit organisations) was explicit in 
excluding funding for any form of childcare (Ontario, 2000a: 8.).  In this way, whilst the 
Toronto First Duty project contained a clear element of early child development, none of the 
projects were approved for funding (Toronto, 2005: 4.).  
 
It was clear that the Harris government’s approach, somewhat paradoxically, but entirely 
congruent with the discursive imperatives of the neuroscientific frame, further embedded the 
historical fragmentation of EYEC policy and in so doing, reinforcing an artificial divide 
between care, early development and education.  The sum total of the Harris government’s 
reforms had attempted to reshape and redirect care aspects of EYEC to 
parental/informal/unregulated sectors whilst simultaneously seeking to augment these forms 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Ontario, 2000b: 2).  However, there was concern that the funding would not be enough to cover the hiring of 
new teachers, which would put pressure on the Grades further up the Grades.   
204
 Indeed a leaked internal provincial policy paper from the Toronto Star outlined, the Harris government had 
considered cutting the $470 million childcare budget down by $200 million and even eliminating the entire 
childcare budget (including family resource programmes) and turning the funds into cash payments for low 
income working parents.  However, with the press exposure, neither of these options made their way into the 
2002 Ontario budget (CRRU, 2001; Friendly, 2006).   
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of care through discrete enrichment in the earliest years.  However, by explicitly neglecting 
custodial aspects of care, the existing childcare system and in this way an integrated 
framework, the OEYP and EYEC framework did not exhibit a truly universal (or child-
centred policy) framework in the sense that it would cater for children irrespective of parental 
employment status and care choices.  Indeed these reforms potentially polarised opportunities 
between those children in increasingly under funded, but regulated centre-based childcare and 
those in informal/parental care but who had access to developmental opportunities in OEYCs. 
 
5.4 Implementation gaps and the neglect of early education and childcare: The Multilateral 
Framework on Early Learning and Childcare 
 
To some extent, the ECDA agreement highlighted the potential pitfalls of employing an 
evidence-based policy strategy without adequate consideration of the political and policy 
realities in which the implementation of the ECDA took place.  As the case of Ontario had 
demonstrated, the overt focus on early development had precipitated a significant neglect of 
other aspects of EYEC policy and if left unchecked may have potentially led to the 
dismantlement of the regulated parts of the system.  Whilst the federal government had sought 
to establish a new tier of early development policies in the provinces, it was not expected that 
such developments would be to the detriment of other existing aspects of EYEC policy.  
Indeed, alongside concerns from municipal levels, criticism was voiced from within the 
Liberal caucus social policy committee that there had been a particular neglect of childcare in 
most provinces (Mahon, 2004: 8.).  As Mustard, McCain and Shanker more sympathetically 
noted, the ECDA did not offer sufficient funds to encourage investment in ‘big ticket’ items 
such as the childcare programmes (2007: 111.).  In response to these concerns and 
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suggestions that the overall quality of the EYEC system was suffering, the Federal 
government entered into renewed negotiations to develop a second Multilateral Framework 
which would direct funds more clearly towards early learning and childcare (Stewart, 2006).  
It was clear, however, that the federal government still treated early education and care 
discretely.  Indeed, the negotiated agreement announced in March 2003 committed $1.05 
billion over five years through the CHST in order to complement the ECDA and support 
provincial governments to fund programmes and services that would ‘provide direct care and 
early learning for children’ in settings such as ‘childcare centres, family child care homes’ or 
‘pre-schools and nursery schools’ (Social Development Canada, 2005: 29.).  In rationalising 
renewed investments, whilst early education was clearly identified with child development on 
the basis that ‘participation in a quality preschool program promotes cognitive development in 
young children’, this developmental conception of quality was not specifically linked to 
investments in childcare (Canada, 2003: 116.).  Instead childcare investments were to 
primarily ‘support parents to participate in employment or training’ and hence whilst the 
agreement specified that some funding should be directed towards regulated care, quality was 
rather weakly defined as ‘programs that meet the quality standards that are established and 
monitored by provincial governments’ and augmenting licensing standards205 and hence could 
support both the regulated commercial market and home care as well as non-profit centre-
based care (Cool, 2003: Canada, 2003: 67.).  As Vosko notes however, the agreement 
extended minimal funding to provinces, even relative to the ECDA (2006: 164.).  In this way, 
without extensive funding and the continuing treatment of EYEC policy as discrete entities, 
                                               
205
 Such as child/caregiver ratios, physical environments, health and safety and training and supports (Canada, 
2003: 116.).   
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the prospect of the Multilateral Framework supporting the development of a comprehensive 
and integration of EYEC at the provincial level was rather limited.     
 
Indeed, at the provincial level, following the election of the provincial Liberal Party under 
Premier Dalton McGuinty in October 2003, the first $9.7 million payment under the 
Multilateral Framework went towards ‘stopping the bleeding’ in the childcare system that had 
been caused by chronic under funding since 1995 and as such was directed towards health and 
safety needs related to licensing standards (Patterson, 2006.).  As such, the limited funding 
was approved for essential repairs, furnishings and replacing equipment and did not extend to 
expanding places or strengthening wage grants (Ontario, 2004: 13.).  In addition to shoring up 
the childcare system, picking up on the federal commitment to invest more in early education 
and in many ways to reinstate what had once been a policy priority in Ontario, the November 
2003 speech from the Throne, committed to implementing an Excellence for All education 
plan to reinvest in early grades (including junior and senior kindergarten)206 and also to 
develop a ‘Best Start’ Plan for ‘early childhood education’ (Ontario, 2003a: 9.).  At the initial 
stages, Best Start appeared to be driven by an educative frame; the rationale being to ‘ensure 
our children arrive, on the first day of school prepared to learn’ (Ontario, 2005: 5.).  Indeed, 
alongside commitments to hire specially trained literacy and numeracy experts for junior and 
senior kindergarten to develop outcomes in ‘reading, writing and math strategies’ and to 
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 In part Excellence for All was a re-investment strategy which committed a base increase of $2.6 billion in 
additional funds for JK to Grade 12 across the McGuinty government’s mandate, which included a rise of $800 
million in 2003-2004 period, rising to $1.08 billion in 2004-2005 and 1.86 in 2005-2006 (Ontario, 2004: 3.).  But 
the plan also committed for the first time that every elementary school will have a specially trained lead teacher 
in JK to Grade 6 to literacy and numeracy (Ontario, 2004a: 4-5.).   
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further reduce class sizes to a cap of 20 by the end of the Liberal mandate207, Best Start 
proposed reinstating the previous capital programme to establish childcare in new schools and 
in particular to develop a wrap around programme to complete a full-day of EYEC for four 
and five year olds with working parents in order to give more access to pre-school (Friendly, 
2008: 46.).   
 
In this way, with the existence of multiple agendas directing elements of EYEC policy 
towards subtle but qualitatively different trajectories of development and in the absence of 
significant funding to leverage a more comprehensive system, it would perhaps be expected 
that at the provincial level, the Liberal reform agenda would affect a piecemeal and ad hoc 
approach with regard to EYEC policy and would not significantly alter the historical 
fragmentation between early education and care, nor define a clear government social policy 
role in the lives of young children.  Moreover, that ‘early education’ being situated more 
closely within an outcomes driven agenda and able to generate quantitative ‘cognitive 
gains’208 would be given priority in policy and investment terms over childcare.  However, at 
this juncture, the intervention of the OECD and the process of engaging in a thematic review 
would both open up and broaden the EYEC debate and offer a new vision and 
conceptualisation of EYEC.  By injecting a new child-centred policy discourse into the policy 
stream and by challenging dominant EYEC discourses, the OECD would question 
conventional views of EYEC and existing policy endeavours and generate renewed attention 
towards EYEC policy at both federal and provincial levels; precipitating another wave of 
                                               
207
 By 2005, 2,100 had reduced junior kindergarten class sizes from the hiring of 2,400 new teachers (Canada, 
2005: 5.) 
208
 Indeed outcomes from investments in early education through the kindergarten system would most clearly 
become visible through the ongoing EDI project to map school-readiness in communities.   
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policy innovations and indeed the possibility of moving EYEC out of the characteristic liberal 
residual model.    
 
5.5 Critical interventions: The OECD and the influence of a Child-Centred Frame for EYEC 
at federal and provincial levels  
 
Canada’s participation in the second round of the OECD’s thematic review of Early 
Childhood Care and Education, during the latter months of 2003 and through an engagement 
with the review findings compiled in the OECD Country Note published in October 2004 
(although circulated earlier at the Federal level), would offer a unique opportunity to 
reappraise existing EYEC policy endeavours and would have a significant re-framing effect 
on both national and provincial policy discourse and its concrete elaboration in EYEC 
services.  As has been discussed, until this time, EYEC policy initiatives had been defined by 
discrete and unreconciled agendas, which variously directed attention towards early 
development and education or care.  For the most part, the broadly ‘scientific’ neuroscientific 
and educative frames had taken precedence over the equal opportunities frame and as such 
policy endeavours had directed the bulk of investment (moving towards universal coverage) 
towards achieving narrow ‘educative’ and developmental goals.  In contrast, care had 
continued to remain the lesser aspect of EYEC policy and access to regulated childcare was 
limited.  Indeed, in 2004, despite a labour force participation rate of 67% there were licensed 
spaces available for only 15% of children 0-5 years in Ontario (OCBCC, 2006: 4.).  Whilst 
the neuroscientific frame had generated new policy innovations towards the early years, other 
aspects of EYEC had continued to be developed through the lens of historical policy 
frameworks, which had very much reinforced a fragmented system and created a patchwork 
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of different EYEC services.  However, the OECD significantly challenged the prevailing view 
of EYEC, in particular questioning the narrow outcomes driven approach of dominant EYEC 
frames and previous policy endeavours (OECD, 2004: 79.).  Instead the OECD offered a 
potential route to reconcile discursive tensions and the disparate agendas and reconfigure 
these through an integrated ‘child centred’ frame for policy action.  Indeed, the OECD’s 
critical engagement Canadian EYEC policy sought to re-examine the idea of what constitutes 
quality in an EYEC system and to introduce a child-centred idea of holistic pedagogy as the 
central feature of a high quality system 209(OECD, 2006: 3-4.).   
 
The social pedagogic approach, which informs the child-centred frame and is common in 
Northern European countries yet rare in North America, places children’s social rights, care, 
holistic wellbeing and learning at the heart of a successful child development strategy.   This 
greatly contrasts with what the OECD refers to as the dominant ‘pre-primary approach’ (and 
similarly applies to neuroscientific frame) which seeks to impose prescriptive, goal oriented 
and formal learning strategies upon children (ibid: 61.).  Crucially, this brought centre-based, 
regulated care (as inextricably linked to education and development) to the fore of policy 
development and particularly through the figure of the pedagogue, the importance of 
professionally led, developmentally orientated care, with attendant status and remuneration.  
Placed in this context, whilst Canada had made investments in early development and 
education, with the neglect of spending and policy commitment towards (centre-based) ‘care’, 
it remained a policy laggard and comparatively, the lowest spender by proportion of GDP in 
                                               
209
 As Starting Strong II, outlined by way of summary, governments should develop a ‘systematic and integrated 
approach to ECEC policy [which] attends to the social context of early childhood development, places well-
being early development and learning at the core of ECEC work, whilst respecting the child’s agency and natural 
learning strategies and achieve quality pedagogical goals (OCED, 2006: 3-4.).   
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the OECD group210.  Hence in order in order to leverage a comprehensive child-centred 
integrated system, which would give all children the opportunity to participate (regardless of 
parental work choices) much more significant funding would be required and a new approach 
to EYEC policy.   
 
It is true to say that the OECD’s re-framing of EYEC policy diffused throughout and had had 
particular effects at each level of the Canadian government.  It also galvanised childcare 
advocates who found that, through the child-centred frame, regulated (centre-based) care was 
finally becoming an integral part of EYEC policy and hence their aims in many ways 
dovetailed and so got behind the new agenda211.  In particular, the early release of the Country 
Note to the federal Liberals had provided the impetus and a policy blueprint for the 2004 
election platform and subsequently brought EYEC policy once again to the top of the federal 
agend, precipitating another round of policy innovations in EYEC, which finally offered the 
prospect of developing a national EYEC system, centred around a child-centred frame.   
 
The 2004 Speech from the Throne committed the federal government to doing more for early 
learning and childcare in Canada.  Specifically, it committed the government to work 
collaboratively with the provinces to build the foundations for a shared Early Learning and 
Child Care (ELCC) initiative with $5 billion for investment over five years (Canada, 2005).  
The ELCC initiative made a clear break with previous initiatives by seeking to develop a 
                                               
210
 As the OECD reported, Canada was the lowest OECD spender on EYEC services (0-6 year olds) in 2004 
spending in the region of 0.3% GDP, whilst the Nordic States spent between 1.5% to 2% of GDP (OECD, 2006: 
105.).    
211
 Indeed, the OECD’s child-centred frame was also some extent taken up by the early child development 
network, see (Mustard and McCain, 2002: McCain, Mustard and Shanker, 2007.).   
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national system based on common guiding principles; quality, universality, accessibility and 
development (QUAD principles) (ibid.).  Indeed the intention was to develop EYEC as a 
‘pillar of Canada’s social foundations’ and not simply a typically ‘liberal’ marginal policy or 
directed at specific (discrete) goals (ibid.).  As the new Minister for Social Development, Ken 
Dryden stated ‘it wasn’t just $5 billion over five years, it was to create a national system; 
something that wouldn’t come and go in five years and to move childcare ahead in such a way 
that it is there forever’ (Dryden, 2006).  This ambitious vision was politically contentious 
however.  During the negotiation process to develop a multilateral agreement, a sticking point 
was the requirement to report on measurable outcomes related to QUAD principles and 
whether only non-profit/state funded systems would be supported (Cool, 2007: 6.).  As such, 
the federal government moved to create bilateral agreements in principle with those provinces 
who would commit to developing EYEC through QUAD; providing a $700 million trust 
($271.9 million for Ontario) in the interim to be accessed by provinces by 31 March 2006.  
Ontario, in the midst of developing its Best Start vision, was one of these. 
 
The Agreement in Principle between the Government of Canada and Ontario, negotiated 
during the early part of 2005 and signed in May 2005, elaborates the beginnings of an 
integrated and child-centred EYEC vision.  Through the QUAD guiding principles, Ontario 
commits to investing in: 
 
“developmental early learning and child care [that] is child centred, reflects family and 
community contexts and encourages meaningful partnerships between parents and 
child care providers” (Canada and Ontario, 2005: 3.).   
 
 245 
In this way, Ontario states that it will invest in ‘high quality early learning and child care 
supports’ including ‘an appropriate complement of staff and child care providers qualified in 
early learning and child care’, make early learning and childcare ‘affordable to all parents 
who choose to use it’ and to be sensitive to ‘children with various cultural and linguistic 
circumstances’ (ibid.).  In addition, in order to guide the process of making improvements in 
the ‘quality and developmental component of early learning and child care programs’ the 
agreement states that Ontario would establish a College of Early Childhood Educators to 
develop and monitor professional standards and to be guided by two expert panels; an Expert 
Panel on Early Learning and an Expert Panel on Quality and Human Resources (ibid: 5.).   
 
The two expert panels, headed by Professors Jane Betrand and Donna S Lero respectively, 
comprised a much broader panel of EYEC experts and also provided formally marginalised 
Canadian advocates (including those with transatlantic links to an alternative ‘child-centred’ 
EYEC network) and municipal policy development officers212 a route into the provincial 
policy stream.  Indeed going much further than The Early Years, the expert panels conducted 
an extensive review of both EYEC evidence and cross national research, including different 
pedagogical approaches, broad holistic notions of development, practices for seamless 
integration across different EYEC services and equitable compensation for EYEC workers 
213(BSEPEL, 2006; BSEPEL, 2007; BSEPQHR, 2007).  Central to the Best Start Expert 
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 In particular Julie Mathien, Policy Development Officer within the Social Development, Finance and 
Administration in Toronto developed links with the OECD’s thematic review team, to conduct cross-national 
research and develop the municipal position (including the Toronto First Duty Project) on EYEC (Bennett, 
2005).  It also brought the Toronto First Duty project to centre stage.  
213
 The Best Start Expert Panel on Quality and Human Resources recommended significant increases in 
investment and a comprehensive streamlined funding model for regulated early learning and care services that 
recognised the costs of providing high quality programmes and a longer term vision to increase accessibility by 
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Panels’ work was to ‘ensure that Ontario’s Best Start reflects the principles of diversity, 
equity and inclusion for all children and families’ (BSEPEL, 2007: 159.).  Moreover by 
acknowledging that ‘care and learning are inseparable concepts….early childhood settings 
[should] provide both care and education, a caring nurturing environment that supports 
learning and early development’ (BSEPEL, 2007: 4.).  Indeed questioning the growing 
tendency towards a formal approach in early education settings and a downward slide of 
prescriptive ‘cognitive goals’ within EYEC settings (including, in particular, OEYCs), the 
Early Learning Expert Panel suggest instead that these should be informed by ‘pedagogy 
rather than a specific curriculum’ and ‘situate children within the context of a developmental 
continuum that extends from birth to age eight, rather than evaluate their performance against 
age related expectations’ (BSEPEL, 2007: 4.).  Indeed congruent with a child-centred frame’s 
conception of a ‘children’s space’ the Expert Panel state that ‘learning is fundamentally social 
and takes place within children’s cultural contexts… children learn through active 
engagement, activity, experimentation, play and social interactions with others’ hence the 
guiding principle for EYEC settings should to promote children’s well-being; ‘to value 
children’s play [and] create a climate of delight that honours childhood’ (ibid: 14-15.).   
 
The influence of these critical interventions had a marked influence on Ontario’s EYEC 
policy, both discursively and within concrete policy implementation.  Indeed under the 
recently created Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MCYS), which had taken over 
                                                                                                                                                   
ensuring that parents pay no more than 20 to 25% of the cost of EYEC programmes (on the recommendation of 
the OECD) (BSEPQHR, 2007: 38.).  It also recommended by 2009 all early childhood assistants would be 
enrolled in an accredited ECE, ECA programme, by 2010 all directors and supervisors of centre-based EYEC 
programmes have a degree in early childhood education and all pedagogical leaders/assistant supervisors of 
resource centres/OYECs and childcare centres have a degree and that all teachers in kindergarten are enrolled in 
an appropriate ECD course (BSPHR, 2007: 42.).   
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responsibility for programmes for children (although the Ministry of Education continued to 
be responsible for kindergarten), the provincial Best Start Plan was augmented to include the 
development of ‘Best Start Hubs’ which would be more consistent with QUAD principles and 
in this way, elaborated a child-centred frame for policy action (Ontario, 2005a: 1.).  The Best 
Start hubs initiative entailed a long term plan to ‘create a comprehensive system of services 
that supports children, including Francophone, Aboriginal and children with linguistic, 
cultural and special needs from birth to the transition to school’ (Ontario, 2005a: 2.).  As the 
MCYS addendum guide to implementing Best Start hubs described, the focus should be on 
developing ‘a system rather than services [that] positions child development within a broader 
context, recognizing that child development must be viewed as inseparable from the child’s 
social context’ (Ontario, 2006: 6.).  In this way, key to implementing this initiative (and in 
marked contrast to the previous OEYP and OEYCs), the Best Start hub programme, along 
with all other Best Start initiatives would be developed through 47 partnerships between 
MCYS, the Ministry of Education, municipalities and local community members, allowing 
local co-ordination and giving a local flavour and community ethos to each hub (Ontario, 
2006a: 2).  The hubs would plan to offer a single integrated, seamless point of access to 
services and supports based on local needs and available resources (Ontario, 2005b: 3.).  The 
central elements would include: 
 
“high quality learning and care environments, an early years staff team that would 
include teachers, early childhood educators; educational assistants and family support 
staff who would work together toward common goals; inclusive access meeting the 
needs of children and families; and parent participation, through direct involvement in 
programs, planning and decision making” (Toronto, 2006: 9.). 
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The core services, which would be located in schools (as first preference), upon new sites or 
developed in non-profit childcare centres, would each include ‘licensed developmental 
childcare for children from birth to four years; an integrated licensed childcare/kindergarten 
program with option to attend half day, a full day or an extended day for four and five year 
olds; links to public health and early development programs; parenting resources and a wide 
range of high quality, developmentally and culturally appropriate before and after school 
programs, including sports, art, music and library services’ (ibid: 10.).  In summary, and 
greatly reflective of the child-centred frame, the York Childcare Services Plan state that hubs 
would ‘support a holistic approach to child development through an integrated approach to 
service delivery’ and as Toronto’s Vision for Best Start succinctly encapsulates; ‘basic to a 
good society is that children are welcome, are given a good environment during childhood 
and are the concern of the whole society’ (York, 2005: 70; Toronto, 2006: i.).  In this way, 
Best Start articulated a clear social policy role for the government in shaping the lives and life 
chances of children, breaking down the notion that parents have the sole responsibility for 
children and instead placing children’s care and wellbeing at the heart of the community.  
 
The augmented Best Start Strategy was heavily reliant upon the federal ELCC investment.  
Indeed, to ease the pressure on municipal budgets, the province determined that the federal 
funds would be provided at 100% (as opposed to 80/20 cost sharing) and would proceed in 
two main phases.  Between 2005 and 2008 in phase I, funding (including the $271 trust to be 
accessed by March 2006 and subsequent £1.9 billion per year) would create 12,500 spaces by 
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2005/6 leading to 25,000 new EYEC spaces214 across Ontario by 2007/08 through both 
renovation and new construction (Ontario, 2005a: 4;Ontario, 2005c: 6.).  Priority in 
developing spaces would go to integrated EYEC places for children in junior and senior 
kindergarten (which would follow the school year) and a gradual expansion of licensed EYEC 
places and subsidies for children 0-4 years (York, 2006: 5.).  Three pilot communities for 
‘Hubs’215 would implement the full Best Start Hub vision at an accelerated pace, creating 53 
Hubs and 3,500 new EYEC places by 2008 (Ontario, 2005a: 5.).  Other communities would 
develop transition plans by January 2006 to develop a smaller number of pilot hub models 
(York, 2006: 33).  In phase II (2006/8- 2011) all regions would implement the full hub model, 
create wholly free, universal, full time integrated EYEC places for junior and senior 
kindergarten and free part time EYEC places for children aged 2 and a half to four years old 
(2-1/2 hours per day) with subsidised wrap-around care (Colley, 2006: 99.).  To make these 
EYEC places more accessible (including the 0 -2 age group), the old needs system of 
determining eligibility would be altered to a more straight forward income test which would 
give families of net income below $20,000 receiving full subsidy for childcare costs, 
increasing thereafter on a sliding scale with families with a net income of $40,000 receiving 
subsidies to reduce costs to $8 per day, with those on $70,000 and above paying full costs (at 
an average $43 per day) (Ontario, 2007).   
 
The Best Start Plan through the ELCC initiative was welcomed amongst childcare advocates, 
municipal managers and early development experts alike (OCBCC, 2006a; Friendly, 2006; 
                                               
214
 As of the 31st March 2004, Ontario had an estimated 124,442 licensed spaces for children aged 0 to 4 
(Ontario, 2005b: 5.). 
215
 In rural areas of Lambton and Chatham-Kent, the District of Timiskaming and Hamilton’s East End (Ontario, 
2005a: 4.).   
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Wagle, 2006).  Indeed as both municipal managers for York and Toronto noted, Best Start 
would have given them a lot more money, representing about a third of the budget and some 
25% increase in spaces (Patterson, 2006; Wagle, 2006).  But for Brenda Patterson it was more 
than just an expansion, indeed Best Start finally gave recognition to the latent municipal 
conception that childcare was an important service for children, benefiting them and 
developing their potential and not just a ‘welfare’ custodial service for working women 
(despite historical structures of financing directing it this way) 216(2006).  Whilst there was a 
concern that proposed expansion did still not take account of the inflationary costs of 
childcare and hence may have led to future funding deficits in supporting the expanded 
system, the two commitments represented a clear change in strategic direction for EYEC 
policy and may have embedded the principles of this new integrated system upon which 
future investment could be directed (Wagle, 2006).  Indeed, for possibly the first time, each 
level of the government appeared to be bound by a common direction for EYEC policy and 
this presented a moment of opportunity to effectively switch the tracks of Ontario’s previous 
fragmented system, in which the government’s reconciliation of care was marginal and 
‘welfare orientated’, towards a universal and inclusive system.  Indeed, with ongoing strategic 
direction provided by the two Expert Panels, it offered the prospect of developing and 
embedding a child-centred frame, which would put children’s experiences and wellbeing in 
the here and now (as opposed to instrumental future ‘investments’) at the heart of policy 
initiatives.  Unfortunately, at this point, the election of the Federal Reformed Conservative 
                                               
216
 Indeed despite federal and provincial structures of financing which directed subsidies to the lowest paid, in 
municipalities, especially within Toronto, there had always remained a latent idea of ‘quality and developmental’ 
childcare; as Brenda Patterson stated ‘if all we were concerned about was parents who just need to work, then we 
would have just given them money and said just find a baby-sitter; but we believe that childcare actually 
improves community outcomes’ (2006.).    
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Party would dramatically hamper the provincial Best Start plan and cut short the prospects for 
the full Best Start vision to be implemented. 
 
5.6 The End of a National EYEC Plan: the Federal Reformed Conservatives, the re-turn of the 
Maternal Care Frame and a Universal Child Care Benefit 
 
The election of the Federal, ‘Reformed Conservative’ Party in January 2006 and the 
immediate announcement that the government would give one year’s notice that it would be 
cancelling the bilateral agreements with participating provinces, precipitated what can only be 
described as a devastating blow to Ontario’s emerging EYEC policy strategy and indeed cut 
short any prospects of developing a national system of EYEC across Canada.  Instead the 
federal government stated that it would provide a new ‘Universal Child Care Benefit’ of 
(taxable) $100 per month for each child under six, starting in 2006, at a cost of $2.4 billion 
(Cool, 2007: 7; Canada, 2007: 1).  Framed as providing ‘choice in childcare’, although clearly 
not intended to recognise the actual costs of childcare or to support systems and 
infrastructure, the payment is better conceived as a (token) ‘maternal care supplement’ and in 
many ways reflected the influence of the social right caucus and anti-feminist group, REAL 
women in the ‘reformed’ Conservative Party, whose stated aims had been to give ‘women 
greater opportunity to stay at home with their children’ (Pierson, 1995: 27.).  As Indeed as the 
federal minister for Human Resources and Social Development stated ‘we think that parents 
know what is best for their families based on their own circumstances’ (Canada, 2007).  The 
policy in this way represented the surprising resurgence of the maternal care frame, although 
as a HRDC bureaucrat noted it represented a backlash, on the part of the social right, against 
the neuroscientific frame ‘which in some quarters is read as parents aren’t good enough’ and 
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the federal move towards implementing universal (centre-based) EYEC ‘which in spite of all 
this research, intuitively some people think that children would be better off at home with 
their parents’ and hence reflected the outcome of an inter-Conservative debate over the place 
and value of parents in children’s care and development (Westlake, 2006).   
  
At the provincial level the government was faced with a significant loss of funds (some $1.4 
billion), the federal government having determined that a one-time final payment of $254 
million in respect of 2006/07 would be made to Ontario (Ontario, 2006: 5.).  Ontario was 
caught in a dilemma.  Having already created a projected 14,000 spaces by September 2006 in 
the first phase of Best Start, the province determined that the final payment would be used 
over four years to secure and sustain these places (through fee subsidies, wage improvement 
and administration) and to continue the pilot hub project in demonstration communities (ibid: 
37.).  This left other municipal governments in a difficult position regarding the 
implementation of their own pilot hub models.  Indeed the province required that each 
municipality write Best Start Addendum plans for 2005-2008.  The York Region Plan states 
‘there is no provincial funding approval for program funding for hubs’ (York, 2006a: 7.).  In 
short, municipalities were expected to continue processes of integration, but without any 
money (Wagle, 2006).   
 
In this context, it would be apparent that Ontario would have to make choices as to which 
elements of Best Start would continue (with Provincial funding only217) and which elements 
would be sidelined.  In many ways, Best Start revered to the ad hoc and piecemeal approach 
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 And also following the failure of the federal government’s ‘child-care spaces initiative’ which was intended 
to provide $250 million across Canada for private employers to develop childcare space, the federal government 
determined that the annual $250 would go direct to the provinces to create spaces (Sentate, 2009: 71.).   
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that had previously characterised Ontario’s EYEC initiatives.  Indeed, expansion in EYEC 
places has slowed, with the province allocating funding in 2007 for 7,000 new spaces through 
$105.7 million additional provincial dollars and a small wage increase of approximately 3% 
for Ontario’s 33,500 EYEC workers with $24.8 million funding (Ontario, 2007a).   With the 
changes in subsidy rules, which gave greater potential access but were not being realised due 
to slower growth, Ontario announced in July 2008 to fund an extra 3,000 spaces with 
additional $25 million investment (Senate, 2009: 161.).  However, as the Childcare Resource 
and Research Unit estimates, in 2008 there are only spaces in centre-based EYEC for 19.6% 
of children aged 0-5 and it is likely that the waiting lists for places run into the tens of 
thousands (Beach et al., 2009: 202.).   
 
The commitment to establish the College of Early Childhood Educators went ahead in 2007 
with $12 million funding and by February 2009 became fully operational to ‘establish high 
standards for the profession and recognition to the role of early childhood educators have in 
the lives of Ontario’s children’ (Ontario, 2009: 7).  $2 million was earmarked for improved 
access to training for supervisors and directors (Senate, 2009: 163.).   
 
Whilst Ontario has continued to develop elements of quality in EYEC, the issue of integration 
and the Phase II commitments have been more piecemeal and will hamper the purported 
‘child-centred’ intentions of Best Start.  Indeed it is apparent that policy discourse and actual 
policy implementation has begun to diverge in the light of funding issues.  In perhaps a 
pragmatic move (owing to most of the infrastructure already being in place), Ontario focused 
on developing junior and senior kindergarten age groups, appointing an early learning advisor 
in 2007, Dr Charles Pascal, to table recommendations to develop integrated, full day (and year 
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round) EYEC (utilising a play-based pedagogical approach) for junior and senior kindergarten 
which will start in 2010 and roll out across the province by 2013 (Ontario, 2009: 7; Beach et 
al., 2009: 80.).  Whilst the MCYS results-based plan briefing document states that it ‘will 
continue to support the 24 Best Start  Networks developing neighbourhood hubs’ there is no 
mention of (capital) funding allocations for infrastructure (ibid.).  Such policy absence for 
children under 4 somewhat conflicts with the MCYS’s first strategic framework launched in 
2008, which states its core principles for services are ‘child and family-centred, community 
driven and situated; integrated and collaborative; developmentally appropriate and socially 
inclusive’ (Senate, 2009: 160.).  Indeed this child-centred framework, for all its commendable 
discursive commitments and ambitions, will not be fully elaborated in policy and services 
without additional funding a renewed commitment to the hub project and a change of policy 
direction at the federal level.    
 
At the federal level, efforts have been launched by the Standing Senate Committee on Social 
Affairs, Science and Technology, releasing a report in April 2009 entitled Early Childhood 
Education and Care: Next Steps to convince the Federal government to reconsider a 
multilateral framework for EYEC, based on the release of the OECD’s report, Starting Strong 
II, which rated Canada last (in spending terms) amongst 14 other countries in the second 
round of the review (Senate, 2009).  Canada currently spends just 0.25% of GDP on EYEC, 
less than the United States.  If Canada were to spend 1% GDP that would be equal to $10 
billion, to realise a Nordic 2% of GDP level of investment some $20 billion would be 
required.   There has not as yet, been a response from the government and it seems Canada, 
for all the recent good intentions, in order to move forward on EYEC, as the OECD states 
‘significant energies and funding will need to be invested in the field to create a universal 
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system in tune with the needs of a full employment economy, with gender equity and with 
new understandings of how young children develop and learn’ (Senate, 2009: 1.).   
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter and the one before have demonstrated that the Canadian EYEC 
policy trajectory remains in flux, with no sign of a stable EYEC policy consensus in Canada.  
The role of the state in the early years of children’s lives, in terms of their care, early 
development and early education – even whether this role should fall to parents (and private 
choices) – continues to be hotly debated.  It is this discursive instability and the continuing 
interplay of different EYEC frames, both over time and particularly now between different 
administrative levels of government which has, as yet, precluded the development of both a 
comprehensive and coherent policy framework for EYEC.  This has implications for a 
number of potential interpretations and explanations of EYEC policy development.   
 
Firstly, it is difficult to argue as Dolbrowolsky and Saint-Martin (2002), Jenson (2004) have 
previously, that recent policy developments in Canada represent a clear paradigm shift from a 
‘family responsibility paradigm’ to an ‘investing in children paradigm’.  The same applies to 
the Jenson and Saint-Martin (2006) argument that the Canadian case converges on a ‘LEGO 
paradigm’ with a clear state role in early childhood which rationalises particular social 
investments to develop the human capital of the nation and to activate female labour market 
participation.  The notion of a singular overarching ‘paradigm’ stresses a greater level of 
ideational and strategic coherence than has defined the Canadian EYEC policy trajectory, 
especially recently.  As Hall states, ‘only in some cases will it be appropriate to speak of a 
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fully elaborated policy paradigm.  In others, the web of ideas affecting the direction of policy 
will be looser and subject to more frequent variation’ (1993: 291.).    
 
Secondly, as this chapter has demonstrated, feminist childcare advocacy emerged earlier and 
achieved more significant influence in Ontario/Canada compared to England, reflecting 
perhaps the historic weakness of the maternal care frame in Ontario and earlier growth of 
maternal/female labour market participation.  However this did not precipitate the 
institutionalisation of an EYEC system in Ontario/Canada which has appeared to have 
suffered as much as England from the mismatch between social risks and policy provision.  
Moreover, we have seen that at the Federal level a paradoxical re-emergence of the latent 
maternal care frame at a comparatively late stage.  Such findings reduce the efficacy of 
explanations of change which focus primarily on social structural change and instead 
amplifies the role of ideas, discursive mediation and agential innovation. 
 
Owing to these complexities, I have not sought to ascertain whether recent social policy 
developments have forged a new paradigm of welfare state practice.  Instead I have taken the 
more modest and nuanced task of documenting how particular EYEC frames have arisen in 
political and policy circles, through the efforts of various networks of advocates, academics 
and other expert actors and organisations (at the domestic and international level) who have 
sought to exploit institutional spaces and moments of openness to bring EYEC to the top of 
the political agenda, with varying success.  In this way, the focus of this chapter has been 
upon the creative aspects of political life, the dynamics of policy innovation and the 
qualitative texture of services that have been concretised in policy (Bradford, 1998: 2.).   
 
 257 
I have shown that EYEC policy in Canada/Ontario bears the legacy of historical 
fragmentation, with kindergarten embedded into the principles of the welfare state and 
defining a role for the state in early education, but had remained neutral over maternal 
participation in the labour market, leaving decisions about care, development and wellbeing 
of children as a largely private matter and embedded childcare as a marginal ‘welfare’ policy 
(with the state reconciling care only for those at risk of poverty).  It was both this official 
neutrality (in the absence of a strong embedding of maternal ideas of attachment) and federal 
support for feminist advocacy which aided the ascendancy of the equal opportunities frame, 
directing attention towards reconciling maternal care roles.  Whilst the equality of 
opportunities frame was clear on the gender dimension of EYEC policy, it was less clear upon 
and lacked a supporting evidential basis for the developmental and educative benefits of 
childcare and hence had difficulty articulating the need for ‘high quality non-profit care’ as 
opposed to simply custodial care, which contributed to the failure of the first national 
childcare plan.  Hence as neo-liberal and austerity policies reinforced a minimal state role in 
EYEC and in so doing, private and informal forms of care it looked likely that EYEC would 
remain a marginal policy, where state interventions were left for those at risk.  As this chapter 
has described, state interventions directed marginal efforts to combat poverty for low income 
families (through the NCB) and highly targeted Aboriginal Head Start programmes.  But 
these policies appeared to further entrench a liberal, residual policy framework and alongside 
parallel new public management reforms which closed down spaces for feminist advocacy 
and broader debates about gender equity. 
 
Hence the appearance of significant federal investments in EYEC during the early 2000s was 
unexpected and puzzling.  This chapter has analysed how EYEC returned to the top of the 
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federal and provincial agendas, through a detailed analysis of the institutional changes and 
responses wrought by new public management that presented opportunities and not simply 
constraints for social policy innovation.  These new institutional practices initially favoured 
particular forms of evidence and expertise, opening the policy process to early development 
experts and the ascendance of ‘scientific’ neuroscientific and educative frames.  These EYEC 
frames forced a re-appraisal of both the significance of childhood as a phase of life for future 
outcomes and the implications of a welfare state framework which leaves children’s 
development and early education as a private matter (although were silent on matters of 
gender equity).  As this chapter has shown this precipitated rapid social policy innovation and 
expansion in EYEC policy.  This period of innovation has been marked by significant phase 
of policy experimentation through particular EYEC frames and this relative openness has 
offered opportunities for domestic and international actors to critically intervene, injecting 
new EYEC frames which have sought to deepen the notion of a ‘child-centred’ early years 
policy and an expansive (state) role in children’s care and wellbeing.  However, it has also 
precipitated a discursive instability and fluidity which has frustrated efforts in Ontario and 
precluded the full embedding of an extensive EYEC system.  Whilst there may be a general 
consensus on the importance of the early period of children’s lives, whether the state should 
provide this directly or invest in parents is, as yet, unreconciled in Canada. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: EYEC FRAMES IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, NETWORKING AGENTS AND CHANNELS OF 
COMMUNICATION 
 
Policy analysts have become increasingly interested in the possibilities for ideational 
circulation between and above national borders and the hypothesised mechanisms (both 
agential and structural) which facilitate (and mitigate) these processes.  Much of this work has 
focused upon; the spread of economic ideas (Blyth, 2002; Somers and Block, 2005); the 
spread of neo-liberal workfare policies (King, 1999; Cebulla and Greenberg, 2004); a general 
trend towards the Americanisation of welfare policy (Deacon, 2000; Prideaux, 2001; 
Holmwood, 2000); and empirical analyses of direct policy transfers between the US and UK 
(Daguerre, 2004; Dolowitz, 2003; Rose, 2001; Evans, 2004.).  Linked to this literature has 
emerged work identifying the changing structures, contexts and levels within which political 
action takes place.  Many authors point to the increasing importance of supranationally and 
globally based organisations or institutions (Deacon, Hulse and Stephens, 1997: 2; Ferrera et 
al, 2000); changing the traditional patterns of government to governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2003; Hajar and Wagenaar, 2003); and even leading to the purported transnationalisation of 
policy (Stone, 2004: 559; Keck and Sikkink, 1999.).   
 
Broadly speaking, each of these literatures deals with the possibilities for ideas to circulate 
beyond national boarders, although each is distinctive in the way that ideational mechanisms, 
institutions, agents and structures are theorised.  What these bodies of work do suggest (and 
seek to demonstrate) is that the policy making arena is becoming increasingly fluid; that 
channels of policy learning are increasingly multi-scaler and as such includes an important 
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role for the transnational flows of ideas (Mahon, 2005: 1.).  Much of this work writes with a 
new vocabulary, rooted in an appreciation of the importance of new political practices and the 
theorisation of an emergent system of governance which is experimental and networked rather 
than hierarchical (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2003: 19.).  Terms such as governance, institutional 
capacity, networks, complexity, trust, deliberation and independence dominate the debate, 
while terms such as the state, government, power and authority, sovereignty, participation and 
interest groups have lost their grip on the analytical imagination (Hajar and Wagenaar, 2003: 
82.).  It is suggested that such language aids theorists to unlearn embedded intellectual 
reflexes and break of out tacit patterns of thinking (ibid.).  Such an endeavour is important as 
explaining how some ideas and policies seemingly come to appear in two or more places (at 
once or successively) - especially where there are no obvious existing policy legacies in place 
- has often presented a puzzle for many political analysts.   
 
Indeed, much existing research which has explicitly dealt with welfare state development has 
been conducted within the field of Historical Institutionalism or welfare regime theory 
(Pierson, 2001; Esping-Anderson, 1990; 1999).  Such accounts theorise that national welfare 
institutions crystallise around a coherent set of regime specific logics and that once embedded 
exhibit ‘sticky’ path-dependent trajectories of reform in response to exogenous (material and 
ideational) influences.  In this way, national welfare states (or particular welfare regimes) are 
presumed closed to transnational influences.  Within these theories, the potential for 
ideational circulation to occur outside national borders and to cause path-breaking policies to 
appear within different welfare states is severely limited; empirical evidence of such 
occurrences are often presented as anomalies to the general trajectory of welfare state 
development.  Much of the recent work on ideational circulation, policy transfer and the 
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bridging of insights from international relations theory with comparative politics, aims to 
counter the expectation of embedded national trajectories of reform, as such accounts stress 
structural continuities at the expense of contingencies of change.  Moreover many of these 
accounts tend to exhibit a tendency towards methodological nationalism (Stone, 2004: 546.).   
 
As such, this chapter will briefly examine some of the literature dealing with ideational 
circulation; including work on policy transfer, discursive institutionalism and international 
organisations; all of which seeks to explain the increasing complexity of policy making within 
a broad international context of social interaction.  In so doing, I hope to highlight some of the 
potential pitfalls that some approaches to ideational circulation create through particular 
theorisations of agential/structural relations and tendencies towards the reification of 
analytical levels of analysis especially between the national/international levels.  I shall also 
review some alternative work on transnational policy communities which seeks to elucidate 
how particular agents are able to transcend national boundaries (operating at both national and 
international levels simultaneously) and who facilitate processes of ideational circulation.    
 
Utilising insights from the latter work on transnational agency I hope to explain the particular 
activities of early years advocates and experts who have been pivotal in diffusing particular 
EYEC frames (as outlined above) throughout the international context; operating through and 
facilitated by international organisations.  This chapter will make an in-depth analysis of the 
OECD as an important international organisation with regard to the development of EYEC 
policy218.  Through this discussion I will demonstrate how this organisation has created a 
                                               
218
 I have chosen to review how EYEC frames have been diffused and forwarded by the OECD.  There are many 
other international organisations which have become interested in EYEC policies (ie the World Health 
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favourable (structured) context for ideational circulation that operates beyond the bounds of 
national domains, yet to also iterate that the OECD does not only operate ‘above’ national 
contexts, it operates in various spatial settings, allowing for contingent and indirect influences 
over national policy.  Attention will be paid to how different EYEC frames have come to gain 
ascendancy and subsequently been deployed by this international organisation through an 
analysis of the intersection of particular EYEC frames with the broader discursive structures 
and the broader ideological rationale of the OECD and in particular its Education Directorate.  
Through this discussion I will show how and why this international organisation has sought to 
develop the case for EYEC policies.  In the case of the OECD, traditionally viewed as a ‘neo-
liberal stalking horse’, an interest in extending social provision through EYEC policies is 
quite surprising.  However, alongside this, I will show how this particular organisation has 
facilitated the networking activities of agents beyond the remit of these institutions.  Through 
interviewing key actors involved in early years policies in the UK and Canada I found that 
significant networking occurred through less perceptible channels of communication.  Thus I 
seek to explain how early years experts work simultaneously at multiple (conventionally 
understood) levels of analysis, indeed, I hope to show that many of the same actors who have 
been important at national levels also operate ‘above’ within international organisations and 
‘across’ by engaging in independent networking.  In this way, I will trace how particularly the 
‘child-centred’ EYEC frame has gained ascendancy in multiple contexts simultaneously and 
over time.  I thus seek to elucidate both the structural mechanisms facilitating EYEC frame 
                                                                                                                                                   
Organisation and the World Bank).  However I have chosen the OECD as it has had particular effects within 
Canada and the UK.  I have also conducted research on the EU, especially the European Network on Childcare.  
Due to pressures of space, I have decided not to include this case in the research presented here, largely because 
the main work of the Network coincided with a period during which the UK government was particularly hostile 
to EYEC policy.  Moreover, of course, EU policy can only have a very indirect influence on Canada.  Finally, 
much of the emphasis of the WHO and World Bank has been upon EYEC for developing countries.   
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diffusion and the agency behind such diffusions.  In so doing, I hope to build a framework of 
analysis which focuses on the relational causal complexes that are capable of producing 
potential and actual effects whatever the spatial settings (Patomaki, 2001: 79.).  Indeed, much 
existing work treats international organisations as an autonomous external agency with 
significant ‘ideological coherence’ seeking to convert pressure or sanction the agency of 
national governments.  Often, in the absence of direct empirical ‘evidence’ of influence over 
national agenda setting, much work consequently concludes that international organisations 
have limited causal impact on national policy trajectories.  However, the processes of 
ideational circulation, especially in the field of EYEC policies and ideas is much more 
complex and rather than this process involving straightforward lines of communication, 
power and influence between institutions, states and national actors I hope to capture the 
sense of a mosaic of relationships and interactions where common identity, particular frames 
are deployed and policy consensus are formed (Stone, 2001: 354.).  By tracing largely 
invisible processes of communication and elucidating the complex and multifaceted nature of 
international organisations I seek to develop a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
processes of ideational circulation in the field of EYEC policy. 
 
6.1 Approaches to explaining ideational circulation 
 
Some existing work which seeks to ascertain how policy ideas circulate or transfer between 
different national contexts has been conducted within the policy transfer literature.  Much of 
this work focuses upon analyses of ideational change through identifying common policy 
changes at the national level.  Often in such analyses a policy idea is shown to be 
disembedded and transferred (either wholesale or partially) from one context to another.  As 
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Dolowitz states, policy transfer occurs when ‘the policies and practices of one political system 
are fed into and utilised in the policy making areas of another political system (2003: 101.).  It 
explicitly focuses upon the meso-level of analysis.  As Rose notes this process differs from 
‘the spread of big ideas such as Keynesianism or in reaction to monetarism, because it focuses 
on concrete programme instruments necessary to implement these ideas… lesson drawing is 
about the content of the programmes that are adopted in response’ (2001: 4.).  Indeed policy 
transfers are usually conducted within the fields of health and education policy and more 
substantively policy examples (transferring from the US to the UK) such as the Child Support 
Agency and the New Deal welfare-to-work programmes (Daguerre, 2004: 41; Evans, 2004.).  
Here it is generally governments which are considered to be the agency in the process of 
policy transfer219.  Indeed, the key actors driving processes of ‘mutual learning’, ‘lesson 
drawing’220 or conducting direct emulations of policy between different national contexts are 
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 Although not all analyses of policy transfer specify an agent in the process of transfer.  Many empirical 
analyses merely describe the successive adoption of similar polices between two national contexts without 
specifying the complex processes of ideational transfer that arise through agential action and discursive 
mediation.  This is also a tendency of the diffusion literature (Stone, 2004: 75.).  Moreover it negates analysis of 
how such policy ideas and discourses are mediated by, or resonate within, existing embedded social economic 
structural complexes (ie historically embedded welfare states).  In many ways, these analyses overstate the 
ability of actors to simply lift one policy idea to the next.  Indeed as Dolowitz reasons in reference to the policy 
transfer of the Child Support Agency between the US, Austraila and the UK , many policies which are lifted 
from one context to the next without proper reference to particular institutional and cultural settings will suffer 
significant implementation gaps (2003: 106.).    
220
 Dolowitz and March (1996: 344) caution that although policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing all refer 
to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions in one time or place 
are used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or 
place, there are subtle differences between the terms.  Indeed, lesson drawing implies a voluntary process of 
drawing ideas; whereas policy transfer can involve both voluntary and coercive transfer (ie where a government 
or supranational institution may push or force another government to adopt a particular policy.).  In this section, 
coercive policy transfers do not apply to ideational circulation of EYEC policies between the UK and Canada 
and as such for the purposes of this discussion policy transfer applies to non-coercive transfer.     
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national bureaucrats and politicians (Bennett, 1997: 213).  However, much of this work, 
whilst rich in empirical detail, tends to negate or under-theorises the precise ideational 
mechanisms and political dynamics which precipitate and facilitate these processes.  In many 
ways much of the policy transfer literature does this self-consciously, being wary of deductive 
formal models of reasoning.   Instead as Evans states policy transfer analysis makes a claim 
towards creating simply: 
 
“an analogical or heuristic model in the sense that it [captures] substantive similarities 
between a particular form of policy-making and mechanisms of transfer, diffusion, 
convergence, emulation or learning” (2004: 25.).   
 
However, as Bennett argues, simple analyses of ‘policy emulation’ or lesson drawing can 
rarely be definitively established.  To conclude that convergence is attributable to emulation 
often requires some leaps in judgement (Bennett, 1991: 223.).  Bennett argues that in order to 
confirm a hypothesis of emulation of policy (or direct policy transfer) several conditions must 
be satisfied.  Firstly, a clear exemplar (a state that has adopted an innovative stance); secondly 
evidence of awareness and utilisation of policy evidence from that exemplar; and thirdly a 
similarity in the goals, content or instruments of public policy (ibid.).  Such specific criteria 
are indeed difficult to fulfil and within the transfer literature differences in policy 
implementation are occasionally noted but ultimately glossed over221.  As such, exacting 
                                               
221
 As in the case of Daguerre’s work on the adoption of workfare policies in the UK following the example of 
the US, she suggests that policy transfer has occurred between these two countries labour market policies, even 
though in implementation policy in the UK has been ‘less ideological’ than in the US and there are particular 
differences in policy structure between TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) and the New Deal in 
the UK (see Daguerre, 2004: 46-47.).   
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evidence of wholesale policy transfers between countries is particularly rare to come across 
(suggesting perhaps that more contingent and indirect processes of ideational circulation may 
be behind seeming empirical cases of policy transfers or learning).  In many ways, the term 
policy transfer suggests a rather tight definition of specific policy instruments being ‘lifted’ 
and ‘replanted’ elsewhere, whilst ‘policy learning’ is conversely too vague a concept to 
embrace the subtly different ways that evidence from on country might influence the policy 
making process of another (Bennett, 1997, 225.).  
 
However, in essence, an analysis must do more than simply present empirical detail of similar 
policy instruments to properly account for such emulation or policy transfer.  Even if 
Bennett’s criteria were satisfied and an account of policy transfer could present good 
empirical evidence of emulation as outlined by the conditions above, there is still no 
accounting for the reasons why state actors emulate policies from another context.  Indeed, 
here the reasons for agent behaviour are under-theorised.  Policy transfer literature often 
assumes that agents simply choose to emulate without specifying or exploring the underlying 
context in which such agents make these choices.  As Evans states ‘the emergence of a policy 
transfer network begins with the recognition by a decision-making elite, politicians or 
bureaucrats, of the existence of a decision problem’ (2004: 71.).  Such deeper considerations 
directs the analytical gaze towards existing operative structures (both ideational and material) 
which conditions (but does not entirely determine) actors preferences.  Indeed, whilst political 
actors are reflexive they do not operate in a vacuum; they are located within an established 
context of social interaction222.  Within the policy transfer literature there is a tendency 
                                               
222
 As Baskar notes ‘Social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional act and that their pre-existence 
establishes their autonomy as possible objects of scientific investigation… society does not consist of individuals 
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towards methodological individualism or the proposition that all ideas and actions originate 
with individuals (Fisher, 2003a: 41.).  Again as Evans states ‘an agent is essential to the 
voluntary and coercive dimensions of policy transfer given that policy transfer involves action 
orientated intentional learning.  Hence, transfer must be a conscious process’ (Evans, 2004: 
40.).  However, operationalising frameworks of agential intentionality in explanations of 
outcomes (without accounting for agents as situated in existing discursive and material 
contexts) are fraught with epistemological difficulties.  Indeed it is common for agents 
(especially politicians and bureaucrats) to assert multiple influences in explanations of their 
decisions or that agents may not always be consciously aware of how they acquired influences 
and learning223.  For example, as Deacon notes in his own work on UK emulation of US 
active labour market policies, agents can assert multiple influences as inspiration.  As one 
Treasury official states ‘the model that we looked at closely is Sweden, Denmark a little bit, 
Holland a little, Australia too’ (2000: 13.).  As such whilst policy transfer may enrich 
empirical knowledge of substantive policy changes, by undertheorising agential and 
discursive practices and their location in structured contexts, understanding processes and the 
mechanisms behind ideational circulation are limited.   
                                                                                                                                                   
but expresses the sum of relations within which individuals and groups stand’ (1998: 206-207.).  Indeed actors 
are necessarily situated. 
223
 Indeed, as Bhaskar notes, ‘agency is characterised by the striking phenomenon of intentionality as a feature of 
the neurophysiological complexity which enables them not just, like the other higher-order animals, to initiate 
changes in a purposeful way to monitor and control their performances, but to monitor the monitoring of these 
performances and to be capable of a commentary upon them’ (1998: 215.).  Hence this capacity for second-order 
monitoring also makes possible a retrospective commentary upon actions, which gives a persons account of his 
or her own behaviour a special status which is acknowledged in the best practice of all the psychological 
sciences (ibid.).  However, such knowledge of actions is only ever partial; conditioning discursive influences and 
structural constraints constraining and facilitating actions may operate in indirect ways over intentional 
behaviour (whilst agents will generally speak of making unconditioned choices strategies and purposes) and 
hence an analysis must seek to contextualise accounts of agential reasoning.   
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Recent Discursive-Institutionalist work has also become interested in ideas and ideational 
circulation, although the ways that agents, structures and ideational/material forces are 
conceptualised are very different to that of policy transfer literature.  If policy transfer 
literature, as I have argued above, tends to under-determine agents and negates structural 
conditioning in explanations of outcomes, Institutionalist work (especially Historical 
Institutionalist work) has often had a tendency to over-circumscribe the potential for ideas to 
circulate, to have independent effects on outcomes and agential capacity to chart new 
institutional (and policy) paths.  As mentioned briefly above, much of the Institutionalist work 
on welfare state analysis theorises (and empirically accounts for) institutional stasis and 
institutional immobility in the face of exogenous (ideational and material) forces.  Hence 
these accounts explain policy continuity well but are often lacking when it comes to 
accounting for ideational and policy change.  Discursive Institutionalist approaches have 
sought to incorporate ideas into explanatory accounts of policy change and trajectories of 
institutional change, albeit that many of these analyses set heavy conditions and limits to the 
ability of ideas to circulate, especially between national contexts and welfare regimes.   
 
Hall’s work (1992; 1993) on the spread of monetarist ideas is perhaps one of the best known 
examples of a Discursive-Institutionalist endeavour224.  For Hall, to explain how policy 
makers radically shifted their beliefs about economic management from Keynesianism to 
                                               
224
 Although Hall would probably not name his approach discursive Institutionalist as such, here I am using the 
term generally to include all historical Institutionalist work that has sought to incorporate ideas into explanatory 
explanations of change.  I have chosen to not consider other Institutionalist work (such as rationalist 
Institutionalist work) which has recently incorporated ideas in explanations of change due to constraints of 
space.  
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monetarism requires an understanding of the ability of institutions to hinder or facilitate new 
ideas (Fisher, 2003: 29.).  In this sense, ideas are given transformative powers over 
institutions; Hall evokes the idea of Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shift’ to denote how wholesale 
ideational change (or 3rd order change) switches the path of an institutional policy trajectory.  
Hall hints at how this process is drawn from ideational circulation outside of state institutional 
structures (although he does not elaborate at length on how such growing expertise on 
monetarism potentially transcends national boundaries nor specifically how American 
monetarist ideas found there way into British national debates).  Indeed as Hall states: 
 
“the 1970s saw a vast expansion in the outside marketplace for economic ideas.  The 
media and City brokerage houses were important participants in this marketplace, but 
they were not only ones… new research institutes sprang up and a host of pamphlets 
about economic policy began to circulate” (1993: 289.).   
 
However, the power of ideas (or policy paradigms) to transform institutional trajectories is 
situated within an existing material and ideational context.  Unlike accounts within policy 
transfer literature, the operative forces which drive policy trajectories are institutions 
(containing both ideational and material elements225) that exhibit a relative resistance to 
change226 until conditions alter to the extent that a ‘critical juncture’ occurs, creating an 
institutional puncture in which new ideas can gain ascendancy.  In Hall’s account, an 
                                               
225
 Here Hall describes that the policy making process can be structured by particular sets of ideas - policy 
paradigms – just as it can be structured by a set of institutions.  The two often reinforce each other since the 
routines of policy making are usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be 
done in a sphere of policy (Hall, 1993: 290.).   
226
 Or in Hall’s framework, utilising Kuhn’s idea of ‘normal science’, normal policy making conditions. 
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unemployment crisis and high levels of inflation created numerous perceived policy 
anomalies and failures which undermined the existing paradigm.  Thus underlying this 
analysis, ideational paradigms change, yet these are driven by an insidious tectonic shift in the 
material basis of the economy thus precipitating a structural basis for change (albeit that the 
change is explained via policy paradigm subversion and transformation).   
 
Such an account is rich in the sense of accounting for how underlying structural change 
facilitates discursive instability, creating subsequent institutional policy ‘spaces’ upon which 
ideas gain ascendancy in the national context and, as such, accounting for how ideas are 
mediated by the existing institutional nexus.  However, to argue that new ideas were the 
specific drivers of change in this account is difficult within this framework.  Blyth argues that 
such an account is persuasive at the descriptive level but beyond that the analysis remains 
impressionistic; that even if ideas are important, it is very hard to say how important because 
of the confluence of other factors (1997: 236.).  Moreover Blyth suggests that by proposing 
that ideas are powerful only when they are congruent with the ‘structure of political 
discourse’ and yet expecting such ideas to also be transformative creates internal problems 
within the analysis.  To truly be transformative such ideas appear to be powerful only to the 
extent that that they can challenge and subvert existing discourses and thus transform 
institutions.  Ideas are thus exogenous to institutions (2002: 22.).  For Fisher, Hall has 
overemphasised institutions (albeit in ways that demonstrate clearly how they come into play) 
at the expense of the more general realignment of political forces that took place at the time 
(2003: 30.).  Certainly Hall is attuned to how ideas are mediated by, or resonate within, an 
established cultural matrix and as such his focus on how ideas circulate (and come into being 
within different national contexts) is more limited.  Ultimately Hall does not conceptualise 
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ideas as the independent variable per se as he invokes an underlying material basis 
precipitating change and then explains change through resulting ideational instability - ideas 
here are the intervening variable.  However Blyth’s point about the Institutionalist tendency to 
conceptualise ideas as being both a medium of change and continuity, creates problems when 
accounting for the incorporation of new ideas into a political system.  Indeed, this is a 
particular difficulty in much of the Discursive-Institutionalist approach and has implications 
for analyses which seek to explore mechanisms of ideational circulation.  As Schmidt 
observes: 
 
“Showing that policy discourse exerts causal influence is not simple.  First of all, the 
ideas articulated by a discourse cannot easily be separated from the interests which 
find expression through them, from the institutional interactions which shape their 
expression, or from the cultural norms that frame them.  Culturally specific 
conceptions colour the manner in which new ways of doing and thinking develop, are 
articulated, and are adopted in any given country; and they set limits to the 
transferability of new ideas ” (2002: 250.).    
 
Indeed, whilst Discursive-Institutionalist approaches contend that ideas need to be considered 
as part of the causal mechanism as ‘they may enable public actors to reconceptualise their 
interests rather than just reflect material structures and institutions [and as such] chart new 
institutional paths instead of simply following old ones’ there are institutional and cultural 
constraints which sets limits to ideational circulation (Schmidt, 2003: 129.).  For 
Institutionalists, agents are heavily conditioned by existing institutions and therefore 
historically established cultural matrices which form distinct, nationally embedded structured 
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contexts, mediate and mitigate proposed ideational influence between different nation states.  
As Pfau-Effinger notes in her work analysing cultural complexes and welfare state 
development ‘new challenging ideas may start to compete with older ones within the cultural 
system if they are, for instance, imported from an international context’ (2005: 11.).  
However, like most Institutionalists, Pfau-Effinger considers welfare states to be deeply 
inscribed with specific cultural values227, which institutionally select for particular (general) 
trajectories of development and hence ‘the success of discourse is dependent upon the extent 
to which they can pick up on trends or contradictions in the attitudes of the general population 
in favour of changed values’ (ibid: 2005: 13.).  Thus, once again, ideas are only likely to be 
causal if they sufficiently resonate with existing cultural and institutional structures and 
ultimately such analyses rely upon a material basis for change.  As Pfau-Effinger notes ‘it can 
obviously occur that the degree of cultural and social integration of the welfare state declines 
and then possibilities for social or cultural change in the welfare arrangement increase’ (2005: 
13.).  Similarly with White’s analysis of ideas and the welfare state, ideas are not 
conceptualised as an independent variable: 
 
“Ideas can facilitate actor’s understanding of their interests, but they do not shape 
those understandings.  Rather than ideas merely facilitating actor’s understandings of 
their interests, ideas, institutionalised as norms, help shape actor’s interests and 
identities.  In other words, preferences are the creation of larger social structures” 
(White, 2002, p.726.).   
                                               
227
 Pfau-Effinger specifies in her own account: The cultural foundations of welfare state policies towards waged 
work and the labour market; Cultural ideas about ‘social inclusion’ and ‘social exclusion’ and the nature of 
Citizenship; Cultural bases of redistribution; Cultural values versus poverty; Cultural ideas about the state–
market relationship; Cultural ideas about social services, the welfare mix and the family (2005: 8-9.). 
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As such, the prospect for ideational circulation, especially with regard to the introduction of 
novel or potentially path-breaking, transformative ideas is heavily circumscribed as ideas are 
invoked as both the medium of change and institutional resistance.  As White suggests ‘the 
content of ideas matters in successful policy development as well as the degree of the 
perceived appropriateness of new ideas with existing norms, rather than, or in addition to their 
service to powerful interests’ (White, 2002, p.727.).  Whilst it is true to say that ideas that do 
not draw or interact with available existing discourses will be dismissed as strange or 
irrelevant228 and hence the Discursive-Institutionalists are right to argue that ideas must 
always have some particular ability to resonate within an established institutional matrix, this 
position tends to confuse ideational resonance with processes of institutional isomorphism.  
External ideas are viewed through the lens of existing institutions.  Through an implicit 
theoretical assumption of appropriation and reproduction of an ideational system (rules, 
norms, values) ideas and discourses being studied will either ‘fit’ or ‘clash’ within and 
existing cultural nexus.   
 
Hence it remains a puzzle to account for how innovative ideas and policy discourses may 
come to arise in different national contexts or indeed how to theorise processes of ideational 
circulation within this framework.  As has been shown, under normal policy making 
conditions; heavily conditioned agents will be expected to resist novel or new ideas.  Ideas 
(especially new ideas) only seem to come into play when particular institutional instability or 
                                               
228
 To take an example, before Adam Smith cam along and offered a fully developed discourse on the virtues of 
the free market, it was difficult, as economic historians show, for the small businessman to express or convey 
such interests and concerns.  Now capitalist discourse has long been one of the available discursive themes to 
which one can appeal – approvingly or disapprovingly – in an effort to be understood (Fischer, 2003a: 83.).   
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crisis arises.  This can be seen in Blyth’s analysis of the rise and fall of embedded liberal 
institutions in the US and Sweden and the spread of neo-liberal economic ideas, ‘during 
periods of institutional stasis, ideas reinforce expectations and the generation of stability.  
This situation pertains most of the time.  It is only in those moments when uncertainty 
abounds and institutions fail that ideas have [a] truly transformative effect on interests’ (2002: 
270.).  As such ideas and policy discourses cannot be said to be the actual drivers of change; 
material structures and institutional conditions select for moments of change in which ideas 
will become causal; and in Blyth’s account, the institutions must be at breaking point for ideas 
to become important drivers of change.  For Discursive-Institutionalists ideas and discourses 
thus cannot be the cause but a cause of political change.  In many ways ideas are the added 
influence which makes the difference or an intervening variable (Fisher, 2003: 30.).   
 
As such, in the absence of deep institutional failure, the prospects for ideational circulation 
are therefore heavily limited in these frameworks.  As Schmidt notes ‘while cultures may 
make policy elites blind to the possibilities of new ideas, institutions may limit their 
receptivity’ (2002: 250.).  New ideas which potentially challenge existing ideational 
paradigms will be ignored by policy makers, or indeed if they do not find institutional homes 
they will not be able to sustain themselves over the long term (Beyler, 2004: 5.).  Indeed in 
the absence of problems to solve or a crisis of ideational confidence precipitated by 
institutional failure it is, in actual fact, very unlikely that policy makers will seek to innovate 
or ‘chart new institutional paths’.   
 
In considering these two very different approaches which seek to explain ideational 
circulation, on the one hand, policy transfer literature paints a picture of ideational circulation 
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where ‘anything might go’ whereas Discursive-Institutionalist literature sets strict limits and 
conditions to any possible exogenous ideational influence.  Both approaches have a tendency 
to exhibit methodological nationalism; that change takes place at the national level and 
through national actors (Stone, 2004: 546.).  Ideational circulation occurs in the policy 
transfer literature through and between national actors; within Discursive-Institutionalist 
literature, as either a threat or salvation to national actors depending upon institutional 
structural selectivity.  Neither of these positions explains how actual processes of ideational 
circulation might actually operate; the focus is entirely upon how change occurs at the 
national level.  Whilst Discursive-Institutionalist work may have sophisticated answers to 
how existing discourses and ideas are mediated by particular institutional conditions and 
hence, quite rightly, argue that there are limits to what can be transferred from one context to 
the next, they contend that ideational structures (the intersubjective beliefs and discourses that 
comprise the ideational elements of institutions) will follow routines of reproduction and 
institutions are as such are closed to challenging ideas.  In this way, the ascendancies of new 
and potentially path-breaking ideas, without institutional failure, are outside of this 
methodological scope.  Indeed, whilst Discursive Institutionalists are highly attuned to 
processes of ideational resonance and make correct claims that existing ideational/cultural 
structures are necessarily prior to and in many ways requisite for understanding new ideas or 
new discursive frames, it is not necessarily true that their efficacy must be explained by how 
they may ‘hang’ with existing institutions or threaten the institutional complex overall.  
Indeed ideational resonance is a process of understanding and reflexive comprehension which 
pre-supposes an existing ideological stratum but does not theoretically select for a particular 
outcome for ideas regarding their interaction with a cultural structure.  As Archer states 
‘analysing ideological practices, their efficacy depends upon, because it is superimposed 
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upon, relations in the vertical dimension229 which predate them yet which they presuppose for 
their effectiveness’(1998: 197.).  In this way, this historicity/temporality of vertical 
explanation is intrinsic to the fact that all legitimatory practices ‘presuppose an ideological 
stratum that they did not create’; to be comprehendible ideas must resonate with existing 
ideational structures.  For example, if we had not already acquired a certain ideology from the 
practice of doing the family shopping, Saachi and Saatchi couldn’t have presented Thatcher’s 
welfare cuts as ‘Good Housekeeping’ (ibid.).  As such new discourses and ideas must make 
sense (or be presented in such a way to make sense through framing) but they do not 
necessarily have to fit existing cultural norms and institutional structures.  In this way, Fischer 
argues that although discourses take place in pre-structured contexts that limit or impede the 
range of possible actions, persuasive discourses can even in the face of entrenched social and 
material forces open new paths to action (2003: 91.).  Explaining how such a process might 
occur requires an extension of the methodological scope.  Indeed, whilst such ‘persuasive 
discourses’ and transformative ideas do not simply appear from nowhere, in order to explain 
how they can come to appear in places which are not generally expected requires analysis of 
broader processes which may be at work.   
 
Increasingly and perhaps in order to explain some of the above puzzles concerning ideational 
circulation, policy analysts have looked to the transnational arena and the agents and 
institutions which comprise an international context of social (inter)action, or as Bennett has 
described it ‘a transnational arena of communication, learning and influence’ (2001a: 347.).   
                                               
229
 Vertical dimension is the historicity – the conditions under which experience is possible to agency (observing 
a cherry tree in England depends upon its prior importation from China, just as experiencing educational 
discrimination is posterior to a given definition of achievement being institutionalised or owing rent depends 
upon antecendent relationships between landlords and tenants.  It entails temporality.   
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This research has sought to investigate the influence of global think tanks (Stone, 2001a; Rich 
2004); epistemic communities (Hass, 1992); transnational advocacy networks (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1999); international organisations (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Dostal, 2004; 
Armingeon and Beyeler, 2004; Kildal, 2004; Mahon, 2005; Schäfer, 2006); general processes 
leading to the transnationalisation of policy (Stone, 2004); alongside changing governance 
structures, such as the EU and Open Method of Co-ordination (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2003; 
Zeitlin and Trubek, 2003; Hajer, 2003).  Overall, much of this work seeks to bridge insights 
from international relations to comparative policy (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 90.).  All of these 
works seek to extend their methodological and analytical gaze beyond national contexts of 
policy making; to look beyond conventionally understood levels of analysis and chart 
different patterns of interaction which transcend these boundaries.  This complex web of 
institutions and agents at the international level operates within emerging structures of 
(international) governance; creating new political spaces, contexts and networks in which 
domestic actors can ‘jump’ national scales of political action and develop new channels of 
communication.  As such, this work contributes to solving the ‘missing link’ within analyses 
of ideational circulation.  As I will seek to elaborate below, this work has the potential to 
enrich understandings of the mechanisms and processes behind ideational circulation and to 
highlight the actual and potential effects which the transnational arena has upon (social) 
policy in different (local) contexts.   
 
Contemporary policy studies have increasingly called for a conceptual shift from government 
to governance (Mahon, Andrew, Johnson, 2007: 48.).  As Hajar argues; 
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“we might nowadays be less convinced that the policy maker is automatically the 
agent of change… the shift from government to governance should go hand in hand 
with the appreciation of a whole new range of non-state actors that are actively 
mediating these new processes of policy making” (2003: 101.).   
 
Drawing on existing work on policy networks230, which has sought to capture the involvement 
of non-state actors in certain fields of policy making and move beyond the dichotomy of 
(macro-level) state versus society-centred analyses, various policy analysts have begun to 
look beyond the direct sphere of policy making to investigate both the structural processes 
and agential action contributing to an emergent system of governance; transcending national 
boundaries and structuring new political spaces upon which agents, transnational advocacy 
networks and transnational policy communities organise and seek to alter domestic policy.    
 
Policy analysts have also begun to look at the importance of international organisations in 
creating channels of communication between agents in different national contexts and as 
forums, or potential political spaces, which can facilitate ideational circulation.  As Dostal 
states ‘the policy making environment has become much more crowded at the level of 
international knowledge management and the campaign on expertise takes place in many 
policy venues at the same time’ (2004: 456.).  What is interesting about international 
organisations such as the OECD, World Health Organisation and World Bank, UNESCO (to 
                                               
230
 The policy networks literature, which draws upon Hugh Heclo’s  (1974) Modern Social Policy in Britain and 
Sweden.  Policy networks are described as mechanisms for political resource mobilisation where the capacity for 
decision making, programme formulation and implementation is widely distributed or dispersed among public 
and private actors (Mahon, Andrew, Johnson, 2007: 48.).   
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name just a few)231 is that unlike political governance systems such as the European Union, 
international organisations are largely independent232.  As such, these forums are not clearly 
embedded within a domestic, cultural and institutional nexus, although many of these 
international organisations are located in the West and the organisational culture attracts and 
over-representation of Anglo-American personnel (Dostal, 2004: 446.).  Being relatively 
independent and exogenous to national institutions, international organisations do not have to 
take political considerations when making their analyses or compiling policy reports 
(although often there are indirect political pressures) and are not required to take into account 
particular societal interests.  Therefore, international organisations have the potential to 
exhibit an ideational fluidity that would not be expected domestically (Dostal, 2004: 447.).  
Indeed, international organisations are free to search for and produce data, to develop new 
ideas, or at least to re-frame particular policy ideas into transferable ‘ideational’ packages 
(Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003: 42.).  This type of disembedded knowledge is referred to by 
Peck as ‘fast policy transfer’; the proliferation of portable, technocratic policy tools that are 
designed to achieve reform at a distance (2002: 332.).  Often in practice, international 
organisations seek to pick up upon policy themes emerging within various member states, 
such as lifelong learning or equality of opportunity, or transnational policy problems such as 
demographic change and post-industrialism and engage particular experts within the field who 
can abstract elements of nationally-embedded policy programmes and policy discourses and 
                                               
231
 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development); UNESCO (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation).   
232
 Whilst international organisations have a relative freedom to compose reports of their choosing and often 
appear to be ‘above’ domestic interests, the OECD’s funding, for example, is drawn from prosperous member 
states, of which 25% comes from the USA.  When the USA became displeased with OECD policies in 1995, it 
withheld its contribution for several months – an action that led to budgetary collapse (Marcussen, 2002, in 
Kildal, 2003: 11).    
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re-frame such policies into transferable sets of policy ideas.  In this way Kildal calls such 
organisations a form of ‘ideational agency’ where credibility is gained by helping national 
states concretise and diffuse ideas (2003: 13.).  International organisations therefore, rather 
than exerting a direct supranational power, mainly trade in expertise, ideas and policy advice.  
Often ideas are taken from prosperous member states, which it then links to specific areas of 
activity, further develops and then transfers to less central countries (ibid: 10.).   
 
In this way, as Bartnett and Finnemore state, international organisations are the ‘missionaries 
of our time’ seeking to deploy particular policy frames as ‘weapons of mass persuasion’ 
(1999: 713; Beland, 2005: 13.).  Many officials within such international organisations have 
their stated purpose a desire to shape state practices by establishing, articulating and 
transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behaviour 
(ibid.).  As institutions, they exhibit a form of ideational pressure; prompting governments to 
adopt policies they otherwise would not by conditioning some governmental goal (for 
example debt rescheduling, developing lifelong learning educative systems) or the adoption of 
a policy (such as free elections, lower public spending, equality of opportunity legislation) 
(Harvard Law Review, 2006: 1482.).   
 
In some cases, international organisations seek to depoliticise these issues of economic and 
social policy making into questions of ‘pure’ expertise to be dealt with from the position of 
‘best practice’ (Dostal, 2004: 446.).   Economists are particularly prone to utilising ‘best 
practice’ models of policy, drawn from national contexts which are considered to be the most 
successful in achieving a particular goal (be it minimising inflation, unemployment etc) and 
assume such models will be acceptable and desirable everywhere (Rose, 2001: 4.).  However, 
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in many ways, discursively constructing particular policy frameworks as ‘best practice’ is 
better considered as a strategy to gain legitimacy, credibility and ultimately power.  As those 
schooled in the works of Max Weber would be well aware, the depoliticised nature of 
bureaucracy is often a myth; behind the functional actor of bureaucracy, cultural values 
usually stand (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 708.).  As Weber states ‘bureaucracy’s spirit of 
impersonality and professionalism makes it the most efficient mode of administration in 
modern societies… but is an ominous social force… the most powerful social force in 
modernity’ (Steidman, 1998: 80.).  Moreover, whilst many experts and organisations make 
claims to being objective and hence seeking to install policies which are based upon neutral 
analysis as many post-modern theorists would assert, value-neutral evidence or knowledge is 
a misnomer; knowledge is always situated.  Indeed, as Torgerson notes even the most 
dispassionate forms of analysis cannot operate outside the vagaries of discursive practice;  
 
“there is no escape from discourse through numbers, for these operate exactly like 
metaphors… to count is to form a category by emphasizing some feature instead of 
others… to count as unemployed only people who have looked for work in the past 
month… excludes from the unemployed people who desperately want to work but are 
unable or too discouraged to pound the pavement (2003: 121.).   
 
In practice, behind the veil of ‘best practice’, research carried out by international 
organisations can be identified with particular ideological or epistemological positions.  Many 
authors view international organisations in particular as a neo-liberalising force (Peck, 2002; 
Henry et al., 2001.). 
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In part, the growing voices of international organisations and the expanding debate over 
‘transnational policy problems’, especially in policy areas beyond the traditionally technical 
area of economic policy, can be attributed to an increasing ‘scientized’ or evidentially-based 
policy discourse stream.  This is very much a two way process between states and 
international organisations.  As states increasingly grapple with seemingly intractable and 
complex policy problems (of which welfare state maturation and various post-industrial 
pressures are clear exemplars) so in turn they turn to those (international) knowledge 
institutions which can capitalise upon their research base of specialist experts within the field 
to draw together technical policy solutions and rationalisations.  Such policy reports often 
contain both highly technical data and analysis, whilst also containing executive summaries 
which are phrased in popular language and targeted at non-specialist audiences (Dostal, 2004: 
451.).  Hence policy discourses increasingly become ‘scientized’ whilst also stylised into 
simple ‘common-sense’ messages.  In so doing, the international discursive policy stream 
increasingly speaks with reference to such ‘expert’ knowledge and technical justificatory data 
and hence domestic policy actors must, at the very least, engage with such discourses (even if 
to construct equally complex and data heavy refutations of various external policy debates and 
technical solutions).  In this way, the more technical and complex policies become in 
discourse, the more states seek to explain policy rationalisations with reference to 
international ‘expert forums’233 that can provide worked policy solutions, rationalising 
discourses and data.  In early example of policy expertise on policy, Weiss explains expertise 
encroaching on policy debates.  Weiss found in her analysis into social research and its effects 
                                               
233
 Here it is not always necessarily that the advice comes from international expert forums, domestic policy 
experts can potentially be as influential, indeed as I will discuss below they may very well be the same people 
(especially in particular niches of expertise).  However international organisations, by constructing models for 
the ‘solution’ of transnational policy problems, carry in some ways more gravitas.   
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upon policy making in the US that government officials used research to orient themselves to 
problems; to think about issues and define the problematics of a situation and to gain new 
ideas and perspectives (1977: 534.).  Much of this is not deliberate, direct and targeted, but a 
result of long-term percolation of theories and findings into the climate of informed opinion 
(ibid.).  Growing trends towards expertise in policy discourses has also been mooted by Hass 
(1992).  As he states:  
 
“Among the factors that have contributed to the uncertainties faced by decision 
makers are the increasingly complex and technical nature of ever-widening range of 
issues considered on the international agenda, including monetary, macro-economic, 
technological, environmental, health and population issues.  Forced to deal with a 
broader range of issues than they were traditionally accustomed to, decision makers 
have turned to specialists to ameliorate the uncertainties and help them understand the 
current issues and anticipate future trends” (Hass, 1992, p.13.).    
 
Indeed whilst there is nothing new about policy advice, as Fischer states ‘policy advice giving 
is as old as government itself’, the increasingly complexity (or perceived complexity) of 
modern technological society dramatically intensifies the information requirements of modern 
decision-makers (2003a: 2.).  What was once an emerging concern is now a modern-day 
imperative: government decision-makers need ‘relevant’ information.  International 
organisations both create the need for, and seek to fulfil, such requirements.    
 
Whilst it is clear that international organisations have contributed to an important and 
growing international discursive policy stream, building areas of recognised expertise and as 
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such may be viewed as sources of reliable information by (certain) domestic bureaucrats, 
establishing direct evidence of concordance with international organisation’s specific policy 
recommendations and national state action is more complex.  Indeed most authors researching 
the effects of international organisations on domestic policy, when looking broadly at policy 
recommendations and subsequent national policy outcomes found scant evidence of direct 
influence (Noaksson and Jacobson, 2003; Armingeton and Beyeler, 2004.)234.  Many 
International organisations, as mentioned above, cannot operate as supranational powers; they 
do not have the legal and financial powers with which to exert such pressures upon national 
governments235.  In contrast to the European Union, most international organisations cannot 
issue binding regulations, directives of decisions for the design of national economic and 
social policy 236(Armington, 2004: 227.).  As such, in order to exert influence, international 
organisations have no option but to play the ‘idea game’; to formulate, transfer and 
authorising principled or causal beliefs with a view to constraining or enabling certain types 
of social behaviour within its jurisdiction (Marcussen, 2004, p.16.).  This is a soft mode of 
governance; it builds upon a cooperative effort to criticise existing ideas and to generate new 
ones (ibid.).   However, International organisations ultimately seek to induce national 
governments to consider new policy options and align with a particular set of discursive 
imperatives through multilateral surveillance and peer pressure.  Much of the work of these 
organisations focuses upon the mutual monitoring and evaluation of national policies by other 
                                               
234
 In the case of Armington and Beyeler (eds.) (2004), the research looked at the impact of the summary 
chapters of the OECD’s economic surveys on welfare state policy (see pages 7-8.).  Even though the OECD’s 
economic survey’s had increasingly delved into issues of social policy, is it less likely that the recommendations 
of the EDRC will be taken into consideration on welfare issues than other directorates of the OECD (such as the 
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs).      
235
 Although this applies more to international organisations influence over the West.   
236
 With the obvious exceptions of the IMF and the World Bank. 
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governments (Schafer, 2004: 14.).  Hence Armington and Beyeler (2004) conclude, in a study 
of the OECD and European welfare states that as national institutions are secured and backed 
up by strong political coalitions, it is unlikely that criticism and arguments presented by a 
remote international organisation will cause major change.  Whilst it is true to say that in the 
absence of direct forms of power, any organisation’s influence must necessarily be therefore 
more contingent and indirect, a further complication is that many international organisations 
must compete with one another to secure discursive control over certain policy areas.  Indeed, 
within the field of education, discourses such as lifelong learning and human capital 
rationalisations are not the sole preserve of one specific international organisation; many 
organisations have dealt with these topics and increasingly previously economically-led 
institutions such as the OECD and World Bank have sought to broaden the range of issues 
and policy areas which they deal with.  Ironically, however, it is this competition over 
discursive control and the pressure on organisations to generate expertise in an expanding 
portfolio of transnational policy dilemmas that creates opportunities for domestic policy 
actors to shift scale and form transnational policy communities.  In this way, international 
organisations become not just institutions operating as an ‘agent’ for change but potential 
spaces in which differently situated actors can mobilise to share knowledge, to develop and 
refine ideational frames.  It may in fact be this very background activity which creates 
structured sites and processes for facilitating ideational circulation.   
 
Stone states that the global arena is a highly fragmented one with a ‘frontier like character’ 
and such an environment ‘affords better opportunities for ideational forces for policy 
entrepreneurs to shape political agendas’ (2001a: 346.).  International organisations which 
seek to develop specific expertise in various areas have become an important institutional 
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junction for domestic experts and advocates.  Indeed, whilst international organisations have 
the resources and capacity to nurture specific intellectuals for certain policy areas (indeed 
such research bases are often much more developed and well resourced than domestic 
institutional functions), the increasing diversity of topics with which many international 
organisations have become involved within and the consequent demand for expertise, all 
alongside the fact that international organisations must compete on the basis of ‘expertise’, 
has opened up opportunities for domestic policy experts to engage at the international level as 
well as the domestic level.  Whilst only some of these actors will become directly employed 
through these organisations, for example on specific policy projects, it is within conferences, 
government delegations and other forms of information exchange that can potentially draw in 
a variety of actors; academics, advocates, journalists and policy experts to a common 
discursive enterprise237, establishing a dynamic for research collaboration, cross-national 
engagement and networking.  
 
Transnational policy communities, or advocacy networks are potentially powerful channels of 
communication, learning and ideational circulation.  As Keck and Sikkink state: 
 
“networks are communicative structures.  To influence discourse, procedures and 
policy, transnational advocacy networks may become part of larger policy 
communities that group actors from a variety of institutional and value positions” 
(1999: 90.).   
  
                                               
237
 Even if particular actors hold different ideological conceptions or frame particular policy problems in a 
variety of ways.   
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It is within such communicative structures that actors can share expertise and information and 
develop common patterns of understandings regarding policy through regular interaction 
(Stone, 2001: 6.).  Such learning processes can lead to common identities and consensual 
knowledge (ibid.).  What is novel in these networks is the ability of non-traditional 
international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and 
categories to persuade, pressurise and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations 
and governments, as these activists seek to transform the terms and nature of debate (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1999: 90.).  Whilst there may only be a few actors in one particular domestic 
context, operating with a particular ideological frame and seeking to persuade a national 
government of the necessity of implementing a certain set of policies or to challenge existing 
policy frameworks, international organisations and transnational networks potentially open up 
sites where these issues can be brought to the main stage.  Potentially ideas and policy 
discourses can be brought into the international arena which lends them more weight (or at 
least potentially more air-time with domestic bureaucrats).  However, of arguably the most 
importance when considering ideational circulation is that it is within such forums that 
processes of discursive mediation can occur.  As those following a Discursive-Institutionalist 
position assert, ideas and policy discourses do not easily jump from one cultural context to 
another; they will be strange or irrelevant.  Equally, policy frameworks are difficult to simply 
‘lift’ from one context to another.  However, potentially, these transnational communities can 
become important places where certain policy ideas can be re-framed (often strategically) so 
that they suit domestic contexts and domestic debates more favourably.  This important 
discursive filtering process can potentially become the locus around which ideational 
circulation actually occurs.   
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To substantiate these claims that international organisations can be important focal points for 
ideational circulation and can create ‘potential spaces’ or forums in which transnational policy 
communities develop networks, I now seek to elaborate upon how particular EYEC frames 
have been taken up into the international arena and forwarded by a particular international 
forum: the OECD.  I seek to explain processes by which EYEC policies have ascended onto 
the discursive agenda of the OECD during the 1990s – after a period during which the 
organisation had become closely associated with an especially stark form of neoliberal 
economic reform.  I address how particular EYEC ideas have been reframed by experts 
working within OECD forum.  I also seek to show whether and (if so) how the OECD has 
been important as a political space which has facilitated channels of communication between 
domestic actors and ideational circulation between the UK and Canada.   
 
6.2 The OECD’s thematic review on Early Childhood Education and Care 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has long been 
associated with economic policy making and has generally been tarred with a neo-liberal 
brush238.  Defenders of the European Social Model have often referred to the OECD as ‘a 
neoliberal stalking horse located in Paris’ (Deacon, 2007: 58.).  With regard to economic 
policy and the OECD’s highest profile activity – the country appraisal mechanism (EDRC) - 
the Economics Directorate, responsible for these country reviews, is said to have spread a 
                                               
238
 Since 1961 the OECD has sought to ensure that its member states follow the code of conduct for sound 
economic policies laid down in the OECD convention.  This is done through regularly monitoring and evaluating 
the economic situation in the member states and their respective policies.  Every 12-18 months the OECD 
produces an Economic survey for each country (Schaefer, 2004: 5.).  As Mahon reminds us however, the OECD 
has historically been associated with Keynesian ideas, although during the 1970s became an early convert a neo-
liberal supply side paradigm (2005: 8.).   
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structurally determinist globalisation discourse, especially when required to do so by the USA 
(Kildal, 2003: 11.).  As such, within the Economics Directorate, the welfare state is treated in 
standard liberal economic terms; that it is a burden for the economy and this burden is due to 
non-market institutions and goals (Armington, 2004: 229.).  In this way, the OECD 
recommends that states intervene less in society and the economy, to free markets from public 
regulations as long as these are not indispensable for the functioning of economic exchange 
(ibid.).   
 
Whilst economic policy ideas are the mainstay of OECD endeavours and certainly the most 
prominent, the OECD has been involved in developing social policy ideas since the 
Directorate of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DEELSA)239 was 
established in 1974 (Deacon, 2007: 57.).  However, for the most part, early DEELSA activity 
in this area served to reinforce the perception that the OECD operates within a neo-liberal 
paradigm.  In particular, the 1980 conference that the OECD convened on welfare state crisis 
concluded that ‘social policy in many countries creates obstacles to growth’ (ibid.).  Deacon 
argues that the continued association of the OECD with the ‘welfare as a burden’ approach 
stems from this publication and indeed for authors such as Kildal, the OECD is generally 
considered a neo-liberal threat to the welfare state (ibid; Kildal, 2003).  Yet, for Noaksson and 
Jacobson, the idea that the OECD (at least since the 1980s) has presented a united neo-liberal 
front is somewhat misleading; in many ways Economics Directorate and DEELSA have 
become increasingly in conflict with one another over ideas about the welfare state (2003: 
15.).  In particular, DEELSA has latterly become interested in the ways in which social policy 
                                               
239
 Latterly referred to as Directorate for Employment and Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA).  Education 
subsequently split to become a separate division of the OECD (Mahon, 2005: 9.).   
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can assist economic growth.  In terms which appear to be influenced by ideas of endogenous 
growth theory and of human capital, the 1994 draft Ministerial conference document, asserts 
that ‘non-inflationary growth of output and jobs and political and social stability, are 
enhanced by the role of social expenditures as investments in society’ (Deacon, 2007: 58.).  
Similarly, within the Education Directorate, the Education Ministers during 1996 began to 
argue for investments within education as a counter policy to broader globalising tendencies: 
 
“there has emerged a consensus on the importance of lifelong learning in meeting a 
range of educational, social and economic policy objectives… lifelong learning is a 
means of shaping the future OECD countries… countering the risks to social 
cohesion, promoting democratic traditions and responding to the challenges posed by 
increasingly global and knowledge-based economic and social systems (OECD, 1996: 
27.).   
 
As such, rather than social policy being a burden to growth, in the context of what the OECD 
views as an increasingly globalised, post-Fordist knowledge intensive economy240, certain 
forms of strategic investment could in fact create growth.  Indeed for the Education Ministers, 
‘OECD economies have moved towards a dependence on the creation and manipulation of 
knowledge, information and ideas… for the economy there is a positive relationship between 
educational attainment and economic growth’ (OECD, 1996: 90; 15.).   This way of framing 
the benefits of investment in education provision is reflective of human capital ideas.  Human 
capital focuses upon the economic behaviour of individuals, especially on the way their 
                                               
240
 Hence I would not dispute Kildal’s argument that the OECD considers processes of globalisation to be a real 
and objective phenomenon, although by viewing such processes through human capital ideas, the welfare state 
and other social investments are treated very differently.   
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accumulation of knowledge and skills enables them to increase their productivity and their 
earnings and, in so doing, increase the productivity and wealth of the societies they live in 
(Shuller, 2001: 19.).  The underlying implication of a human capital perspective is that 
investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and therefore 
collectively (ibid.).  Whilst some commentators, such as Henry et al, consider human capital 
ideas to dovetail quite neatly with a broader neo-liberal paradigm, others such as Mahon 
assert that these ideas are more indicative of a newer social investment paradigm (cited in 
Deacon, 2007: 59; Mahon, 2005: 8.).  Although initial OECD interest in ‘lifelong learning’ 
and other investments in education are certainly rooted from within an economic perspective, 
it does seem somewhat of a discursive-stretch to assert that human capital ideas and the 
development of endogenous growth sit easily within a neo-liberal paradigm, especially where 
such ideas explicitly rationalise increasing (state) investments.  The devil as always is in the 
discursive details.  For Henry et al., (2001) by framing educational investment through ideas 
of human capital ‘educational purpose has in large measure, been reduced to a student’s 
calculus of job opportunities and to the state’s calculus of maximum return on minimum 
input’ (cited in Deacon, 2007: 59.).  However, the Education Directorate’s discourse, at least 
contained within Lifelong Learning for All, stresses somewhat broader and more inclusive 
aims.  As the Education Ministers make clear, the implications of a changing skills base 
within the economy may result in a 
 
“risk of new polarisation emerging between those who participate fully in the 
acquisition and use of knowledge and skills, and those who are left on the margins… 
future economic prosperity, social and political cohesion and the achievement of a 
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genuinely democratic societies with full participation all depend on a well educated 
population” (OECD, 1996: 13; 24.).   
 
Moreover, the Education Ministers stress access and quality (which again departs from a 
narrow economist’s focus on maximising output from input): 
 
“Ministers agreed that educational disadvantage which is not addressed early in life is 
likely to persist.  They therefore assigned high priority to the goals of improving 
access and quality in early childhood education and creating ‘tomorrow’s schools’ that 
would effectively combat failure” (ibid).   
 
The Education Ministers seem to have departed from the OECD’s broader neo-liberal 
paradigm.  In many ways, the Education Minister’s discourse of ‘lifelong learning’ is much 
more in tune with those advocates seeking to forward a Educative frame for EYEC (at least at 
one end of the lifelong learning spectrum)241 and these ideas dovetail quite neatly with 
broader ideas of human capital and social investment.  The Education Ministers rather 
unsurprisingly viewed EYEC policy through a strong discourse of education and as such 
‘readiness for school’ and ‘learning outcomes’ form the basis of EYEC policy 
rationalisations.  As the Education Ministers make clear EYEC policy should have an 
educative goal: 
 
                                               
241
 Whilst remembering that Educative advocates develop such ideas and policy frames without regard to human 
capital ideas. 
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“lifelong learning is not synonymous with adult education; it begins from the earliest 
years… enriching the early learning environment early on, developing a sound 
foundation for subsequent growth of knowledge, skills and values and a positive 
attitude towards learning are the key features of any coherent strategy for continuing 
growth and development throughout the life-cycle, the ultimate goal of lifelong 
learning (ibid: 99.).   
 
As such, it was from this educative discourse of lifelong learning and through a lens of 
developing better education levels across OECD countries that engaged activity in the field of 
EYEC policy.  The 1996 Education Ministerial meeting recommended that ‘synthesising the 
available knowledge base for early childhood education and undertaking reviews of recent 
policy initiatives and of ‘good practice’ appear to be urgent tasks’ (ibid: 115.).  To complete 
this task the OECD organised a Thematic Review of Early Childhood Education and Care 
Policy, the goal of which was to provide cross-national information and analysis to improve 
policy making in early childhood education and care (ECEC) in all OECD countries (OECD, 
2001: 3.).  The slight change in discourse from ‘early childhood education’ to include ‘care 
policy’ is significant.  Indeed, John Bennett, the consultant engaged to carry out the review, a 
former Director of the Early Childhood Unit at UNESCO, was keen to ensure that the 
thematic review did not employ a narrow conception of EYEC policy as simply ‘educative’ as 
operates in an educative frame and the position held by the Education Directorate.   Bennett 
was particularly attuned to the discursive construction of EYEC policy and the ways in which 
linguistic divisions between care and education, especially in English vocabulary, had led to a 
historic separation between education policy and childcare policy and consequently 
materialised as separate institutions and services within Anglo-Saxon countries.  As such 
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Bennett sought to discursively construct EYEC policy in an integrated fashion.  As Bennett 
makes clear: 
 
“We called the project Early Childhood Education and Care to underline that whatever 
we do with children at whatever age then education has to be a part of it.  And we also 
added in care because care is extremely important in education systems also – and that 
is often overlooked” (Bennett, 2006) 
 
Bennett and his colleagues, Collette Tayler and Michelle Newman, who were brought in to 
work on the thematic review, were operating with a broader frame for EYEC than that of 
either the Education Directorate or that of the OECD; one which sought to look at services 
from a perspective of equal opportunity for all children as its basic starting point (Bennett, 
2006.).  Being child development experts, the thematic review team sought to broaden the 
both the original agenda of the thematic review and the wider OECD discourse for EYEC.  As 
Bennett stated ‘we moved the agenda onto two new avenues; on equity and on child 
development in the global sense’ (2006.).  By seeking to frame early years and childcare 
policies through children’s rights, this broad conception of ‘ECEC’ was highly resonant with 
a ‘child-centred frame’.  Moreover, for Bennett, conscious that many of the Nordic countries 
had already instituted highly integrated, well funded services which had a holistic child-
development agenda, the OECD thematic review would need to consider an equally broad 
approach (Bennett, 2006).  As the consolidated report by the thematic review team, Starting 
Strong, makes clear ‘The Thematic review has taken a broad and holistic approach to studying 
children’s early development and learning… recognising the growing consensus in the field, 
the review has treated care and education as inseparable and necessary parts of quality 
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provision’ (OECD, 2001: 3.).  Moreover the thematic review limited itself to covering the 
period before formal school entry (whereas early childhood is commonly defined as birth to 
age 8) so as to concentrate more specifically upon ‘early years education and care’ rather than 
a broader childcare agenda (as a service specifically for working women), nor specifically a 
primary education agenda (or as such formal schooling) (ibid: 14.).  This careful agenda 
setting of the Thematic Review was both strategic and implicit.  Indeed, whilst the review 
team may have had a particular ‘child-centred’ vision of EYEC services and sought to create 
an agenda on this basis; the process of the thematic review made such an agenda much more 
subtle.  As the review team states, the Thematic Review sought to analyse a diverse range of 
ECEC provision as possible; ‘all educational and care arrangements for children under 
compulsory school age, regardless of setting, funding opening hours or programme content 
[and] in addition… links with family support, health, employment and social integration 
policy domains’, whilst also seeking to ‘respect the diversity of policy approaches to ECEC 
[and did] not attempt to compare countries in terms of better or worse, or right and wrong, or 
to rank countries in a league table’ (ibid: 3; 17.).  In this way the Thematic Review sought to 
engage in contextualised benchmarking rather than seeking to rank countries against measures 
of ‘best practice’ and utilise ‘fast policy’ transfer methods to bring individual states around to 
one particular ‘external’ package of prescriptive ECEC ideas and policy advice.  The review 
team did not fully follow the broader OECD’s ‘best practice’ approach, but placed a higher 
value on the plurality of cultural values in different member states and hence seeking to 
‘analyse the nature of and reasons for similarities and differences in policy approaches across 
participating countries and to identify the possible implications of the analysis for 
policymakers’ (ibid: 17; Mahon, 2006: 191.).  For the most part however, this approach was 
necessary for political reasons; OECD countries volunteered to participate in the review of 
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their early childhood education and care services and as such the Thematic Review needed to 
be constructed in such a fashion as to draw countries into the process.   
  
Within the first round of the thematic review, twelve countries agreed to participate, one of 
which was the UK242, with the review carried out during 1999.  Canada participated in the 
second round of reviews carried out in 2003.  Government representatives from various 
ministries associated with ECEC policy (which for the most part was dealt with by Education 
Ministries and within the UK, DfEE) in negotiation with the thematic review team, agreed 
upon particular national representatives who would compile a ‘background report’ for their 
country.  Here, national governments (who funded these reports) would have a clear say on 
who would compile these reports and vet the content of the report.  Guided by a common 
framework and questionnaire this background report would provide information on the 
history and background to ECEC policy, current ECEC services and provision, 
conceptualisations of quality, levels of access, regulations, staffing, ECEC programme 
content and types of pedagogy, funding and evaluation and research (OECD, 2001: 192-195.).  
In practice, the background reports were quite varied in approach and upon the level of 
detailed analysis243.  Working from the basis of these reports, a review team (comprised of an 
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 The others were Australia, Belgium (Flemish and French Communities), the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United States. 
243
 Indeed comparing the UK and Canada, the latter has much more depth and scope.  In part this was due to the 
different political systems; Canada’s particular form of Federalism meant that compiling Canada-wide data upon 
ECEC policy was a much lager and complex task.  Moreover, that in a Federal system, more complex 
negotiation procedures were in place for commissioning the authors of the Canadian background report, hence 
many proposals to carry out the work were submitted, which eventually went to Gillian Doherty, Martha 
Friendly and Jane Beech, under Doherty’s childcare consultancy company (Friendly, 2006.).  The Canadian 
Background report also had a large steering committee which would represent the various provincial interests 
(even though in the end only four provinces, Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and 
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OECD Secretariat Member and allotted each three peer experts, Rapporteurs, from other 
participating OECD countries) visited the country in question for 10-12 days, interviewing 
major actors involved in ECEC policy and practice, stakeholder groups and visiting examples 
of ECEC services (OECD, 2000: 5.).  From this visit and extensive policy data provided, a 
Country Note would be written by the Rapporteurs which would then feed back information 
to the thematic review team on which a consolidated report; Starting Strong: Early Childhood 
Education and Care was produced drawing together insights from particular countries, 
examples of ‘good practice’ and policy implications of particular forms of ECEC provision.  
Although, both the choice Rapporteurs and Country Note were subject to some consultation, 
the thematic review team and John Bennett in particular could make strategic choices about 
who to bring into the review process.  Within each rapporteur team, Bennett ensured that there 
was a mix of actors from countries which had very different EYEC systems in place; 
especially between countries with integrated universal provision (ie Nordic states and Italy) 
and those which had traditionally had a low base of (mainly) private services (being mainly 
Anglo-Saxon countries).  Some of these actors had previously been involved in the European 
Childcare Network244.  In some part, the thematic review team served to strengthen the 
existing ‘transnational policy network’ of experts committed to a particular child-centred or 
equal opportunities frame for EYEC, although officially such experts were drawn more 
neutrally.  As such, the process of the thematic review was intentionally devised to facilitate 
                                                                                                                                                   
Manitoba volunteered to participate alongside a small visit to Ottawa, in Ontario).  In contrast the UK team, 
Christine Pascal and Tony Bertram were freer to write the report as they saw fit and liaised purely with DfEE 
(Pascal, 2006.).  From interviews with both Pascal and Friendly, it very much appeared that the Canadian report 
had involved significantly more negotiation and redrafting than that of the UK.   
244
 For example Peter Moss was brought in to be the rapporteur for Norway in the first review and Helen Penn 
reviewed the Belgium-Flemish Community.  Moreover in the second round of reviews Helen Penn became a 
rapporteur for Canada.   
 298 
mutual exchange of ideas, information and expertise through peer review.  As Helen Penn, 
rapporteur for both Belgium and Canada (during the second round of reviews) noted ‘the 
OECD review [was] a very collective process and writing the reports is intensely collective’ 
(Penn, 2007).  This review process (as outlined above) was particularly conducive to 
ideational circulation.  It also broadened the circulation of ideas transatlantically.  Indeed, the 
access and depth with which each rapporteur team engaged with each country’s system 
allowed for a detailed assessment of each policy profile and an equally detailed approach to 
assessing policy strengths, weaknesses and policy recommendations.  By engaging with 
existing with existing state policy initiatives in a contextualised way, policy recommendations 
could be couched in such a way to appear to be building upon existing policy initiatives and 
appear more resonant with local discourses.  Moreover, whilst the official OECD review 
appeared to take a neutral stance with regard to peer review, in many ways the teams were 
constructed in such a way to facilitate (or at least tilt towards) the circulation of particularly 
Nordic-inspired, or child-centred frames for EYEC.  As such, the OECD thematic review 
created a subtle process for circulating or promoting a child-centred frame. 
 
In the UK case, Christine Pascal and Tony Bertram, from the Centre for Research in Early 
Childhood at University of Worcester, were commissioned by the Department for Education 
and Employment (DfEE) to produce a background report for the OECD thematic review.  
Pascal had been involved in the formulation of New Labour’s early years strategy and both 
Pascal and Bertram conducted the National Evaluation of the government’s Early Excellence 
Centres and Sure Start (NES); so clearly this had been a political choice.  The UK had already 
embarked upon an expansion of EYEC policy (albeit that in 1999 most EYEC programmes 
were still being rolled-out) and hence as Pascal noted ‘they wanted to do it because they 
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wanted to see themselves in relation to others.  They thought that the OECD was an objective 
thing I think that would give them knowledge… they also wanted to showcase that they were 
doing something’ (Pascal, 2006.).  The rapporteur team were drawn from Norway, Belgium 
and the US245.  Whilst the rapporteur team acknowledged in the UK Country Note that ‘given 
this quite recent history impressive strides have been made toward creating a co-ordinated 
service’, it was clear that the rapporteur team were seeking to realign recent UK policy 
initiatives towards a system which would be more resonant with a ‘child-centred frame’ for 
EYEC (OECD, 2000: 31.).  As Pascal noted of the experience: 
 
“In many ways they were quite critical of the English services and provision.  They 
argued that the early years education system was too formal too soon… they were 
quite challenging in their report, arguing for the government to be braver and asked 
‘why don’t you just go for universal children’s centres instead of targeting things?’” 
(Pascal, 2006.).   
 
Such concerns are reflected in the Country Note.  In common with a ‘child-centred frame’ the 
Country Note cites the lack of universal provision in the UK compared to Sweden and 
Finland which ‘includes all children under three… in order to ensure that all children have a 
right to quality, affordable, early childhood provision’ (OECD, 2000: 36.).  Whilst the 
rapporteurs note the importance of integrated services being developed such as the Early 
Excellence Centre pilot scheme, they question the lack of a ‘comprehensive early years 
strategy from birth’ and the ‘ambivalence towards ECEC for children under three… 
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 These were Ms Kristin Bruusgaard Arneberg of Norway; Professor Ferre Laevers of Belgium; and Professor 
Sally Lubeck of the US.   
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[reinforcing] the public opinion that programming for children under three is not “education”’ 
(ibid: 34.).  Hence the Country Note asserts that a discursive split remains in the UK between 
‘early education primarily for school’ and ‘childcare as a support to working parents’ (ibid: 
41.).  By seeking to incorporate ‘education’ into England’s EYEC policy, the rapporteurs 
make clear that such education should be based upon a holistic pedagogy and consider 
children’s well being in the here and now as within England:  
 
“a school-based agenda has begun to shape early education such that early childhood 
is treated primarily as a stage to prepare children for subsequent school achievement, 
and less as a specific stage with its own unique approaches and windows of 
opportunity.  Programmes that are tied to attainment targets cannot release sufficiently 
the inner creativity of young children” (OECD, 2000: 31-32.).  
 
Instead the report cites (in common with a child-centred frame and that of Norway) the 
importance of creating ECEC policies which would view early childhood ‘as a distinct stage 
with intrinsic value, as well as an important period for primary school’ (OECD, 2000: 45.).  
The Country Note also suggests that ‘the creation of a Minister for Children and Education… 
might ensure that children’s issues would be dealt with in a systematic and comprehensive 
fashion’ (ibid: 41.).  Lastly, and perhaps most reflective of a child-centred frame, the Country 
Note questions the ‘dominance of a rather narrow and technical research paradigm’ and 
instead urges the UK government to develop ‘knowledge of other perspectives and 
approaches, as outlined in the present OECD cross-national research’ (ibid: 46.).   
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The Thematic Review was conducted at an early stage of New Labour’s tenure and as such 
the team were invariably looking at a rapidly moving target, moreover, the UK was already 
engaged in developing EYEC policy and as such the OECD would not be in a position to 
influence the setting of a UK EYEC agenda.  As Pascal commented, the OECD instead 
‘added weight and momentum to the policy’ (Pascal 2006.).  However, the rapporteur team’s 
concern with the fragmentation of ECEC policy and the lack of policy coherence were themes 
which were subsequently taken up by the UK government and especially by the Education 
and Employment Select Committee.  Similarly, the development of more extensive provision 
and moves to make some EYEC services ‘universal’ became an important policy pillar of 
New Labour’s second term of office.  However, the OECD’s underlying framing of ECEC 
through a ‘child-centred’ perspective and voicing criticisms from this perspective against a 
UK early years paradigm which favoured both ‘evidence-based’ and ‘educative’ approaches 
to EYEC had much less impact on the UK’s trajectory of policy development.  This positivist 
paradigm and attendant discourses had already become heavily embedded within the UK 
policy making context and acted as meta-frame through which all other policy discourses and 
EYEC frames were filtered.  In many ways this served to constrain the ways in which a child-
centred frame would resonate with UK government actors and despite the best efforts of both 
domestic actors and the thematic review team, the persistence of such mainstream EYEC 
frames in guiding policy precluded a ‘rights-based’ child-centred approach being adopted 
fully in the UK’s EYEC policy discourse and policy. 
 
The Canadian case is interesting for the reasons by which the Canadian government came to 
become involved in the OECD’s thematic review and the fortuitous timing in which it was 
being conducted.  Indeed, whilst the UK was subject to a continuous period of government 
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during the Thematic Review and subsequently, within Canada there were changes of 
government at both Provincial and Federal Level246.  Such periods of change would provide 
moments of open space to discursive influence through which Thematic Review would be 
able to influence policy discourse and the framing of EYEC.  Whilst Canada and Ontario had 
already embarked on EYEC policy during the time of the thematic review, the OECD was 
able to exploit these particular moments to subtly change the framing of policy towards more 
equitable and child centred ends.   
 
As mentioned briefly above, Canada did not participate in the first round of the thematic 
review.  The process of securing a Country’s approval for participation had entailed the 
review team contacting relevant government ministries for early years education.  In the first 
instance, the review team had contacted CMEC, the Council of Ministers of Education 
Canada.  CMEC, however, did not have a remit for early childhood education (as owing to the 
structure of Federal and Provincial relations education is a Provincial responsibility, save for 
post-secondary funding and assistance) and as such the review team got a negative 
response247.  Moreover as two Federal bureaucrats had made clear, even within the relevant 
department, Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), during 1997/1998 (which was 
when the review team would have been seeking to ascertain approval to do the review) 
interest in early childhood education and attendant expert discourses were only just beginning 
to filter into the discursive lexicon of the Federal bureaucrats working in strategic policy 
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 The Federal Level being the change of Liberal Leadership from Jean Chrétien to Paul Martin in Nov 2003 
and subsequent Federal election in June 2004 which the Liberals secured.  At the Provincial level, there was an 
election in Oct 2003 replacing the Progressive Conservative Eves government with that of a Liberal government 
led by Dalton McGuinty.   
247
 This information was kindly provided by Martha Friendly who relayed a conversation that she had with John 
Bennett’s boss, Abrar Hassan, Head of Education and Policy division at the OECD.  
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development and hence there would not have been much political appetite in the broader 
HRDC Ministry and Federal government more generally to be involved in the thematic 
review (Goldman and Westlake, 2006.)248.  In many ways, before any broad Federal interest 
in this area, by associating policies of early childhood with education, this would have been 
primarily considered a Provincial issue; in essence an irrelevance for the department and 
hence such ideas would also appear irrelevant to the concerns of the Federal government.  
Hence the process stalled at this point and the first thematic review round went ahead with the 
countries which had already agreed to participate.  It is at this point which the existence of a 
transnational community of policy experts would play a key role in securing Canada’s 
involvement in the project.  Indeed it was owing to existing links between Canadian childcare 
advocates and UK academics already involved with the thematic review process that the 
review team could seek to draw in Canadian advocates and policy experts.  As Martha 
Friendly of the Childcare Resource and Research Unit (CRRU) stated, she had become 
initially interested in the OECD’s work through UK advocates who alerted her to the work of 
the thematic review and this recommendation was pivotal to her interest in it as, like many 
others, she had generally considered the OECD to be a right-wing organisation (Friendly, 
2006).  Moreover, through these existing links Martha had been suggested as a potential 
rapporteur and invited as part of a small delegation of Canadian bureaucrats, advocates and 
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 Although it is out of the scope of this chapter, the position of HRDC (or at least the ‘learning branch’ of 
HRDC) had changed significantly by December 2000, reflected by the decision to joint hosted an international 
conference with the OECD’s Education Directorate entitled “Lifelong Learning as an Affordable Investment” in 
Ottawa (Verry, 2001: 9-10).   Although ECEC policy formed only a small part of the Lifelong Learning agenda, 
where it did cover ECEC policy this was framed through discourses of lifelong learning and human capital, 
rather than the child-centred focus of the thematic review.  However, there was one notable dissenting voice in a 
paper given by Barbara Martin Korpi, Deputy Director, Ministry of Education and Science, Stockholm, Sweden, 
which was much more reflective of a child-centred frame (Korpi, 2000: 4).  Hence, in general this conference 
was more resonant with the official position of the Directorate of Education, OECD.   
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policy experts to the launch of the OECD’s thematic review findings and consolidated report, 
Starting Strong: Early Childhood Education and Care in a conference held in Stockholm in 
June 2001.  
 
The Canadian delegation who attended Stockholm was highly impressed with the thematic 
review process and the ‘child-centred frame’ for EYEC which had been elaborated (albeit 
subtly) in Starting Strong (Friendly, 2006).  In particular, Starting Strong concludes that when 
comparing different ECEC policy systems, those which are particularly successful have 
‘pedagogical frameworks focusing on children’s holistic development’ and ‘ensure equitable 
access, such that all children have equal opportunities to attend quality ECEC, regardless of 
family income, parental employment status, special educational needs or ethnic/language 
background (OECD, 2001: 126.).  This framing of ECEC policy rationalisations through 
children’s rights and attendant idea of a holistic developmental pedagogy was a subtle but 
qualitatively different discursive construction of EYEC; one which did not appear in 
mainstream Canadian policy discussions at the time (instead being dominated by 
neuroscientific ideas which construct development as a process of securing better cognitive 
gains and health indicators).  Through their own exposure to this re-framing of EYEC, the 
Canadian delegation and in particular, Martha Friendly, Julie Mathien, a policy development 
officer for the City of Toronto and Kathleen Flanagan Rochon, Director of the Children’s 
Secretariat, Prince Edward Island, were extremely keen to expose the Canadian policy stream 
to these ideas (Friendly, 2006).  Hence, when the review team suggested that a second round 
of thematic reviews was being floated by the OECD, the Canadian delegation sought to lobby 
HRDC and Provincial Ministers that a thematic review would be a positive thing to 
participate in.  In this respect, these advocates were successful, although the underlying 
 305 
strategic context in which they were operating had changed since the time of the first thematic 
review which partially contributed to their success.   
 
By the end of 2001 when negotiations over Canada’s proposed participation began, one 
Federal EYEC initiative, the Early Childhood Development Agreement (2000) had been 
agreed with the Provinces (HRSDC, 2004).  As such, Federal interest and activity in early 
years policy had already been established and the strategic policy arm of HRDC were 
conducting ongoing research into EYEC policy (Westlake, 2006).  However, although the 
discursive link between ‘early years’ and ‘education’ had been established, it was not 
inevitable that either HRDC, or the individual Provinces would agree to participate.  Indeed 
the process of securing approval involved protracted discussion and negotiation at all levels of 
government; in what is termed ‘FAP discussion’ (Federal and Provincial discussions249) in 
which Ontario and Quebec notably stood highly opposed to the review (Goldman and 
Westlake, 2006).  Hence extensive lobbying had played an important role in securing 
Canada’s participation, both to get enough Provinces to submit to a review and to secure 
approval from HRDC and ultimately the Minister, Jane Stewart.  For the Minister personally, 
there had been a strong bias in the department and from stakeholders who had pressed to be 
part of the thematic review, but also the perception that the OECD study would be ‘logical 
and critical’ and moreover that ‘measuring up is a very useful whip from a policy point of 
view’ (Stewart, 2006).  Hence, in a similar fashion to the UK government, the Canadian 
government decided that the thematic review would be an objective arbiter of Canadian 
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 Which are organised through a working group consisting of HRDC officials and deputy ministers at 
Provincial level which consult with stakeholders and report back and forth, negotiating between Provinces and 
eventually presenting to the HRDC Minister (I am grateful to Linda Westlake from HRSDC for providing this 
insight).   
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EYEC policy and more specifically to the Canadian context, an external voice which could 
potentially overcome parochial disputes over EYEC between the Provinces.  By May 2002, at 
the end of the negotiation process, four Provinces agreed to participate: Prince Edward Island; 
British Columbia; Saskatchewan and Manitoba with supplementary visits in Ottawa, Ontario 
(OECD, 2004: 16.).  With Canada’s participation secured, a second round of negotiations 
began to commission the Canadian Background Report.  This was subsequently secured by a 
proposal prepared by Gillian Doherty, Martha Friendly and Jane Beach alongside a steering 
committee comprised of Provincial Childcare Leads and members of HRDC.  The Rapporteur 
team was headed by Helen Penn (UK), alongside Päivi Lindberg (Finland), and Bea Buysse 
(Belguim) and John Bennett.  Penn had been nominated by the authors of the Background 
report (as a consequence of particular existing transatlantic links) and Bennett had put the 
other members of the team together.   Penn thought that this was particularly clever as the 
other reviewers had views ‘which were in many ways much more extreme than mine… they 
both came from countries where it was absolutely axiomatic that the state would provide 
[services] and the real concern was how the state provided well’ (Penn, 2007).  Hence, as with 
the UK, the Rapporteur team was tilted towards reviewing Canada’s EYEC policy through a 
child-centred lens.   
 
The review was carried out between September 22 and October 3rd 2003.  By this time a 
second Federal and Provincial agreement, the Multilateral Framework on Early Learning And 
Child Care (2003), had been agreed, giving some Federal direction to EYEC policy at this 
level.  Yet in the main, EYEC policy and provision varied quite substantially between 
different Provinces and the rapporteurs found a particular paucity of provision in places.  
Indeed for Penn and the other rapporteurs it was shocking to find a low level of EYEC 
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provision in Canada; they had assumed that provision would be better in terms of quality and 
quantity, given such a strong and united childcare advocacy movement (Penn, 2007).  
However, as representatives of the OECD, the rapporteurs were somewhat careful of their 
handling of the review (ibid).  As the Country Note observes: 
 
“The Federal government has become involved again with early development with 
some promising results.  At Federal level, child development policies have been given 
some prioritisation and federal financing has been used to leverage 
provincial/territorial collaboration” (OECD, 2004: 69.).   
 
Although, for the great part, the report makes clear that Canada and especially the Provinces 
need to move much further on EYEC policy, describing it current as: 
 
“a patchwork of uneconomic, fragmented services within which a small ‘child care’ 
sector is seen as labour market support separated from child development and 
education.  This fragile creation relies to a great extent on the voluntary work of 
women and survives with inadequate public financial support” (OECD, 2004: 69.).   
 
The report makes clear that Canada lacks a consistent EYEC rationale and a limited 
conception of quality: 
 
“the quality debate in Canada has been a restricted one… in the education sector, the 
quality debate has tended to focus on narrow readiness-for-school goals.  In the care 
sector, quality has been greatly undermined by the struggle to survive” (ibid: 79.).   
 308 
 
Instead, the Country Note seeks to overcome the auspice debate in Canada and ‘encourage the 
Canadian government to consider funding a publicly managed service for Canadian children 
from 1-6 years’ as ‘most ECEC experts argue persuasively that the quality of care being 
purchased in free markets is generally inadequate and in many cases dangerous to children’s 
development’ (ibid: 69; 73.).  Moreover the rapporteurs advocate universality as an 
overarching principle for Canada’s EYEC system: 
 
“the quality of a system must also include equitable outcomes.  Access cannot be a 
preserve for the fortunate children in recognised settings but for all families and young 
children seeking child care” (ibid: 66.).   
 
Secondly from an overall policy perspective the Country Note seeks to reframe existing ideas 
(influenced by neuroscience and mainstream education theory) of ‘child development’ as 
‘cognitive gains’ to a broader notion of child wellbeing supporting a social pedagogical 
approach.  As the rapporteurs suggest, Canada should develop ‘a national quality framework 
document…[which] would focus on broad national aims and on children’s holistic 
development and well-being rather than on detailed curricular objectives’ (ibid: 79.).  In this 
way, by ‘stressing the developmental and learning aspects of an early childhood service we 
are not proposing that a mainstream ECEC service should be conceived as a school for young 
children’ (ibid: 69.).  To this end the report states the need for a well remunerated and highly 
qualified staff; ‘specific early childhood professional[s] trained to work with both young 
children and their families’ (ibid: 71.).  Moreover, to address the fragmentation between low 
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quality low cost childcare and scarce early education/provision, the rapporteurs suggest 
integrating these services as:  
 
“early childhood centres [are] more effective when they function as community hub of 
interconnected services for families, and act as a frontline mechanism for child well-
being screening and prevention” (ibid: 70.).   
 
The Country Note cites an outstanding example and model of an integrated, inclusive 
community-based project, which has much in common with the child-centred perspective 
tuned to local knowledge (very much in contrast to the neuroscientific discourses of universal 
and measurable developmental goals). The rapporteurs found the Langara Child Development 
Centre to be: 
 
“responsive to diversity, inclusive, offering imaginative activities, and grounded in the 
local community… Underlying the use of indoor and outside space was a clear 
pedagogy. At the centre of this pedagogy was a view of young children as 
autonomous, playful, resourceful and creative” (ibid: 47.).   
 
Hence the Country Note ‘encourages the decentralisation of management to the local level’ 
(ibid: 70.).  To secure this complex policy rationale through Canada’s mutli-level governance 
it is suggested that both the Federal and Provincial governments should develop ‘a lead 
ministry of child development agency given charge of legislation, regulation, financing, 
policy, training curriculum, monitoring and evaluation’ (ibid: 71.).   
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In summary therefore, the review team sought to take existing Canadian EYEC policy and re-
frame particular elements to be more reflective of a child-centred rationale for EYEC; to 
determine a quality framework which is child-centred and stress holistic goals, to create a 
universal, integrated service whilst maintaining local diversity and to greatly increase the state 
funding levels to ensure the former goals.   
 
The OECD’s thematic review was given a much higher profile in Canada than within the UK.  
In particular was the profound effect with which the OECD’s child-centred discourse had over 
the advocacy community.  Indeed, there had existed somewhat of a split between a rather 
select group of academics and policy advocates seeking to motivate policy change through 
neuroscientific ideas and the much broader and larger childcare advocacy lobby which had 
primarily framed policy rationales for change through feminist ideas to support equal 
opportunities.  The OECD’s message of stressing an integrated, non-profit community based 
system which would provide both care and early education resonated with those advocates 
who sought and struggled to secure a high quality national childcare system.  Hence many 
policy documents from the advocacy groups begin to draw upon (and indeed directly cite) the 
OECD’s child-centred discourse and construction of ‘ECEC’ policy as opposed to simply 
childcare or daycare (CCAAC 2004; Campaign 2000, 2002; Friendly and Lero, 2002).  The 
Childcare Resource and Research Unit (CRRU) in particular heavily promoted the child-
centred ideas of the OECD and sought to recycle and republish the OECD’s work (Friendly, 
2006.).  In many ways and particularly striking in Canada was the way in which the OECD’s 
thematic review served to redefine and reframe the discourse of the advocacy community 
from primarily an equal opportunities frame to that of a child-centred frame.  
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The Canadian press, moreover, had been quick to draw upon the findings from the OECD 
Country Note, published October 2004.  Indeed, the release of the Country Note made front 
page news of Canada’s national newspaper, the Globe and Mail, which boldly asserted that 
‘Canada’s childcare system is failing’ and these findings were taken up in Senate debate 
(Philip, 2004; Canada, Hansard, 28 October 2004)250.  However, even before the extensive 
media interest surrounding the publication of the Country Note, the thematic review was 
having a significant effect upon the EYEC policy trajectory at the Federal level.  The thematic 
review served to create a shift in the discursive emphasis of Federal EYEC policy from a 
primarily neuroscienctific frame with attendant discourses of child cognitive and health 
development (as embodied in the two existing multilateral agreements) towards a policy 
frame containing many discursive elements of a child-centred frame; creating a broad policy 
agenda which mirrored many of the OECD’s concerns with Canada’s existing EYEC system.  
Moreover, the influence of the OECD at a particularly fortuitous moment of time in Canadian 
political history allowed a reframed EYEC policy to rise to the top of the Federal agenda and 
to become a flagship policy of the Liberal government.   
 
The ability of child-centred ideas to gain ascendancy in Federal policy discourse relied to a 
great extent from a moment of open space to discursive influence precipitated by a change of 
leadership in the governing Liberal party and the need to create distinctive policies which 
could define Paul Martin’s tenure from the predecessor’s, Jean Chretien.  In essence, this 
created a brief period of openness to new and innovative policy ideas.  As Peter Nicholson, 
                                               
250
 Indeed the release of Starting Strong II in September 2006 which ranked Canada last out the fourteen 
countries it had reviewed, precipitated the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology to directly address the concerns of the OECD’s report and produce a report, Early Childhood 
Education and Care: Next Steps (Canada Senate, 2009: 6.).   
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Principal Policy Advisor to Paul Martin made clear, with the (internal) election of Martin as 
Leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister, there was a feeling that whilst Martin 
(previously the Liberal Finance Minister) had an extensive record with economic policy 
making, his social credentials were lacking (Nicholson, 2006).  Hence Martin’s policy team 
were actively scoping for social policy ideas to define Martin’s policy agenda (ibid.).  In this 
favourable institutional context, highly skilled and organised childcare advocates sought to 
exploit these political conditions and alter the political discourse of the policy elite.  In 
particular, Martha Friendly had sought to utilise political links to get an early draft of the 
OECD Country Note to the new Prime Minister’s policy team; which particularly influenced 
Peter Nicholson (Friendly, 2006; Nicholson, 2006).  Indeed it appeared that the OECD’s 
Country Note provided an ideal contextualised policy blueprint for the innovative social 
policy ideas that the policy team had been looking for.  As Peter Nicholson stated, it was an 
indispensable resource because of all of the knowledge, facts and figures which were not 
collected centrally, alongside international experience (Nicholson, 2006).  However, 
underneath this seemingly neutral report, EYEC policy, as I have outlined above, is framed 
with a child-centred discourse.  When the time came to create the Liberal platform for June 
2004, Nicholson engaged experts from the Calendon Institute, alongside other stakeholders in 
childcare to determine policy elements of the Liberal platform.  Much of the inspiration for 
the Liberal Platform came from the Country Note, as Nicholson noted ‘it had a huge impact 
on the genesis of the ideas and the development of the argument’ (Nicholson, 2006.).  These 
policy considerations and child-centred ideas would come to partially overlay the existing 
federal policy discourse framed through neuroscientific ideas; a subtle but important shifting 
of discursive priorities and which would have a significant impact on the subsequent policy 
trajectory (despite some obvious internal discursive conflicts).  Whilst it is important to note 
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that substantive policy decisions on EYEC are a Provincial and Municipal area of jurisdiction, 
the Liberal platform reflects this shift.  In particular the platform picks up the OECD’s 
discourse of holistic development; stressing the importance of social and emotional 
development and as a policy which creates social equity.  As the Liberal platform states  
 
“investments in child care and early learning [can] help to level the playing field for 
those disadvantaged by birth or background and because they set our youngest on the 
path to lifelong achievement…good childcare and early learning contribute immensely 
to the healthy growth of children, as well as to their physical, emotional, social, 
linguistic and intellectual development” (Martin, 2004: 28.). 
 
Moreover, echoing the concerns in the Country Note, the Liberal platform asserts that in 
comparison to progressive European EYEC systems, for instance ‘Denmark has a 
comprehensive, largely publicly-funded program for all children younger than age seven’ 
whereas ‘the systems in Canada and the US are nowhere near as advanced’ (ibid: 29.).   
 
The key change that platform makes and greatly reflective of the OECD’s report is a 
commitment to create a national system of high quality, government regulated spaces around 
four key policy pillars; Quality, Universality, Accessibility and Developmental (the QUAD 
principles) (ibid.).  In particular, the ‘Developmental’ pillar embodied the idea of integrating 
both care and education; ‘the programme must include a component of development/learning 
that is integrated with the care component’ alongside ‘high quality practices related to 
programs for children’ (Canada, 2005: 119.).  In this way, rather than children being the 
subject of early intervention, the Liberal discourse moved towards defining services for 
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children.  In many ways, the intention was to create a national system moving towards 
universal provision; a programme analogous to Medicare (Nicholson, 2006).  As the later 
Liberal platform states ‘we will move the vision of a national early learning and child care 
system from being an ideal into being a permanent and tangible component of our national 
social fabric’ (Martin, 2006: 28.).  As was developed more fully in the Ontario case, this 
change in EYEC policy discourse at the Federal level and secured by more significant funding 
would also diffuse downwards to Provincial and Municipal levels in the context of bilateral 
negotiations between Ontario and Social Development Canada (which made funding 
conditional upon plans which supported QUAD principles); opening up these political spaces 
and institutions to debate and define child-centred ideas, such as holistic child-centred 
pedagogy and integrated community hubs251.  Moreover this process opened up the Provincial 
and Municipal policy process to those experts and advocates engaged in research around 
pedagogy and other child-centred ideas (and in this way, experts from the OECD thematic 
review process and other advocates forwarding a child-centred frame.).  As such, at different 
times and within different levels of government, child-centred discourses began to condition 
policy agendas and guide the development of EYEC services.   
 
This chapter has sought to explain how international organisations have become important 
focal points for domestic EYEC experts and advocates; forums which encourage discursive 
exchange and facilitate processes of ideational circulation.  The OECD’s thematic review 
structured opportunities for a transnational community of experts to operate at multiple spatial 
settings and transcend scalar levels; creating potential spaces where these disparately located 
                                               
251
 Owing to Federal/Provincial/Municipal structures of government – the municipal and provincial level has 
jurisdiction over policy relating to service delivery.   
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actors could network, share expertise and exchange ideas.  Moreover, the OECD sought to 
develop EYEC policy discourse, float different EYEC ideas and exchange good practices of 
EYEC policy with the intention of shaping the terms of the debate at the international level, 
whilst also seeking to diffuse particular frames and policy advice back to the domestic 
context, with varying success.  In this sense, these organisations are best thought of as 
contexts or forums of social interaction, blurring the idea of an autonomous external ‘agency’ 
operating purely above the national context.  As I have endeavoured to demonstrate these 
organisations operate both above and through national contexts.    
 
Ideational circulation in this case is a largely indirect and complex process, precipitated by the 
communicative structures and discursive streams opened up through international 
organisations and subject to the mediating factor of particular contingent local conditions.  
Indeed, the process relies upon a complex of agents, structures, ideas and institutions 
operating in concert to produce similar but yet distinctive outcomes in each local context.  
However, whilst the processes and mechanisms behind ideational circulation exhibit a great 
deal of contingency, by tracing the channels of communication and the agents interacting at 
multiple ‘levels of analysis’, I have sought to demonstrate how particular EYEC frames have 
been brought into the international policy stream and circulated to specific local contexts.  In 
the Canadian case, where processes of ideational circulation can be demonstrated the most 
clearly; the appearance of child-centred ideas (especially Nordic inspired pedagogy) within 
the policy discourse of a supposed liberal welfare state is both unexpected and difficult to 
account for, especially within existing approaches dealing with ideational circulation.  Indeed, 
these ideas neither ‘hang with’ the existing policy discourses (some discursive elements 
explicitly challenged the prevailing neuroscientific frame) nor required institutional failure to 
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become causal.  In many ways, the appearance of these ideas at the Federal level relied upon 
their perceived difference to existing policy frames; the moment of openness to discursive 
influence within the policy stream was a product of government actors seeking to innovate 
rather than follow (and hence reproduce) established discursive matrices.  This finding 
explicitly counters what many Discursive-Institutionalist theories would expect, that cross 
pollination of social policy ideas (especially between different ‘worlds of welfare’) can occur 
in normal policy making conditions.  These ideas, moreover, have had a significant effect 
upon the Canadian policy trajectory.  As I have argued earlier, seemingly small tweaks in 
policy discourse and ways of framing EYEC can ultimately lead to qualitatively different 
services once embedded and concretised in services.  It is necessary to qualify however, that 
in some part, the OECD’s ‘contextualised’ approach was conducive to facilitating the spread 
of child-centred ideas to alternate contexts and to influence domestic policy discourse.  
Indeed, rather than acting as a remote, external agent of change, seeking to offer 
decontextualised policy prescriptions and one-size fits all best practices (which are less likely 
to resonate with domestic institutions), the thematic review process drew upon the local 
knowledge of domestic experts and conducted significant analysis of existing policy, in some 
places utilising domestic terms and language to explain particular pieces of policy advice.  As 
such, the child-centred EYEC frame with which the OECD sought to draw countries towards 
was somewhat softened by a process of discursive filtering specific to each context.  In this 
way, whilst these child-centred ideas originate from a different cultural context, they are 
constructed in such a way as to resonate within specific local contexts.  Hence, in this case, 
the OECD played an important role of discursive mediation.  Moreover, by structuring 
opportunities for domestic agents to operate above and beyond their local context the OECD 
created potential spaces where disparately located actors could network and ultimately seek to 
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gain leverage over domestic policy making institutions.  In many ways, this behind the scenes 
networking and discursive exchange played just as much an important role in the spread of 
child-centred EYEC ideas, indeed as I have sought to show, Canadian advocates were 
important motivating factors behind Canada’s decision to participate in the thematic review.  
Moreover, once the policy process had been opened up through the Federal involvement with 
the OECD’s review, local advocates and academics could seek to build upon this pressure to 
reform at the Provincial and Municipal level towards more child-centred ends.  As such, as 
was stated from the outset, rather than ideational circulation involving straightforward lines of 
communication, power and influence, the process is reliant upon a mosaic of relationships 
(both agential and structural) pulling together in the strive for a particular outcome.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This PhD thesis has developed a detailed account of recent policy developments and 
substantial new state investments in EYEC in England and Ontario/Canada; two liberal 
welfare states.  In both cases, EYEC services attracted significant policy attention and new 
investment during the late 1990s and during the 2000s, despite weak (or fragmented) 
institutional legacies.  Despite some differences in both cases, the state has historically played 
a very limited role in the care, development and general wellbeing of young children.  
Broadly congruent with the archetypical ‘liberal’ residual welfare model, children have 
largely been the private responsibility of their parents.  Historically, state conceptualisations 
of EYEC policy have been weakly defined; services have been (sometimes deliberately) 
underdeveloped, primarily directed at the margins to those ‘at risk’ and operated with a low 
funding base.  Hence both England and Canada’s recent attention towards children’s 
development, care and latterly wellbeing makes an important and historically unexpected 
break with the past.   
 
Again surprisingly, these new investments were developed in the immediate aftermath of neo-
liberal austerity politics which imposed significant retrenchment in other areas of the welfare 
state.  In addition new public management reforms enacted in both cases institutionalised 
managerial imperatives of efficiency and programme management at the expense of internal 
policy analytical capacity.  These changes arguably had a significant negative effects on the 
capacity of women’s movements, external (academic) actors and other progressive forces to 
make equality claims and entry points to make the case for EYEC policy (Jenson, 2009: 186.).  
Indeed mainstream Institutionalist welfare state research considers liberal welfare states, 
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following path-dependent processes, to be driven by a logic of retrenchment and cost-
containment.  As such, this new attention towards EYEC and efforts to expand the welfare 
state into new domains appear as a particular anomaly in these two liberal welfare states.  The 
central question of this thesis has sought to explain in both how and why these two case 
countries have apparently broken away from their broader retrenchment trajectories and 
sought instead to innovate in new areas of social policy.   
 
There are many ways in which thesis could have proceeded in order to answer these important 
questions.  I could have adopted a similar approach to that of Jenson and Saint-Martin (200) 
and Dobrowlsky and Saint-Martin (2002) who have sought to identify evolving employment 
and family structures that have precipitated the occurrence of new social risks which have 
highlighted, through risk-benefit mismatches, the inadequacy of the existing family-
responsibility paradigm to adjust to these evolving social conditions and led to a general 
convergence in welfare state redesign around a new child-centred ‘social investment 
paradigm’.  In this approach, these authors have identified the emergence of a new social 
learning network which has promoted a discourse on children and investment in human 
capital in order to combat and attempt to resolve these contradictions in the existing welfare 
state framework.  However, this thesis has not taken this approach.  Indeed broad ideological 
paradigms may serve as useful heuristics to capture the aims and strategies of political agency 
and to map the subsequent institutional configurations, but in the search for coherence there is 
a danger that all policy developments may be read through the social investment lens, even if 
some are not consistent.  In so doing, these analyses may mask actual processes of change, the 
lengthy and broader ideational roots behind particular EYEC frames that have helped shape 
and direct policy debates and the continuing discursive instability of current policy 
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developments.  In addition, that the qualitative texture, complexity of multiple distinctive 
policy trajectories will also be subsumed under a broader meta-logic of convergence trends.  
Indeed this thesis contends in common with Lister (2003) that not all policy shifts in EYEC 
are necessarily reducible to the social investment template, even if some are consistent with it 
(438).  The idea of a paradigm stresses a greater level of ideational consensus and strategic 
coherence than has defined either the Ontario/Canadian or English policy trajectories.  
Moreover, other differences in the timing of social structural change – even in such areas as 
changing patterns of female employment (especially of mothers) which it may be expected to 
generate material pressure to reform seem to give us little traction in terms of the comparison 
between England and Ontario/Canada.   
 
This thesis has adopted what is, perhaps, a more modest approach to capture the rich texture 
and unstable nature (both discursively and materialised in policy) of EYEC policy in England 
and Ontario/Canada and points of convergence and divergence between these two places.  I 
have considered discursive instability through the lens of identifying six main EYEC frames.  
Historically the governments of Canada and England have framed EYEC narrowly. 
Nevertheless, extensive bodies of evidence and expertise have arisen external to the state, 
located around particular discursive ‘hubs’.  These specify normative and prescriptive modes 
of state intervention in terms of reconciling care/early education and development and define 
the purposes of early childhood services.  Each aims to motivate change and each is 
distinctive in focus.  Whilst some entail an expansive role for the state and are potentially 
reconcilable such as the child-centred and equal opportunities frames, others exclusively 
focus on particular elements of EYEC whilst the maternal care frame acts to counter an 
expansive state role in EYEC.    
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My analysis of EYEC policy has centred on the dynamic interplay of these ideational frames 
through evolving institutional policy making structures which have at points sustained 
particular relationships to external experts and forms of evidence and at other points created 
potential openings in the political bureaucracy for other EYEC actors to re-frame EYEC and 
attempt to motivate change.  There are some examples of significant differences between 
ideational frames which were prevalent in the two historical country case chapters.  Perhaps 
the most striking difference was that whilst the maternal care frame exerted a powerful 
historic influence in England, it played a much weaker role in Ontario (although it does seem 
to have been more influential in other provinces of Canada).  This may have also contributed 
to an earlier and more wide-ranging influence of the equal opportunities frame in Ontario than 
in England.  However any policy consequences of the weaker role of maternal ideas in 
Ontario seem to have emerged in a larger role for the traditional nursery/kindergarten sector, 
rather than the development of extensive childcare provision.  There are also points of policy 
convergence across the cases during the neo-liberal era, where Ontario’s more established 
legacy of (albeit incremental) growth within EYEC services became exposed to broader 
retrenchment agendas, shifting the policy trajectory towards a residual model more in 
common with England’s pattern of EYEC as Cinderella services.   
 
For each case, the second country chapter has identified common institutional reforms which 
have altered the context and form of social policy innovation.  These changes have presented 
new opportunities for particular EYEC actors to gain access to the broader bureaucratic 
structure.  Whilst a wave of New Public Management inspired reforms appeared to establish a 
policy process largely closed to the influence of non-governmental actors and emphasise 
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managerial calculus of economy and efficiency, it also prompted a subsequent wave of 
reconstructive efforts to redevelop internal (social) policy capacity, which set parameters 
where new forms of external evidence and expertise would be privileged.  In both cases, 
efforts were made by particular EYEC expert actors to exploit these open spaces in the 
political process and utilise new developments in neuroscience and outcomes from 
longitudinal studies to articulate the importance of the early years for subsequent outcomes 
and to force a reappraisal of the state’s limited role in EYEC.  In both cases, we have seen that 
particular EYEC frames have exerted a powerful pull on the imaginations of policy makers 
and precipitated significant phases of innovation and ‘evidence-based’ policy experiments in 
EYEC.   
 
This phase of policy development has been characterised by a relative openness to discursive 
influence (which was much greater than orthodox accounts of liberal welfare states might 
suggest) but also a tendency towards discursive instability and strategic incoherence.  
Particular (competing) EYEC frames have fought for ascendancy in the political process.  
Indeed, whilst in both cases, governments appear to be unified by a broad acceptance that 
intervention and investment in the early years of children’s lives is important, the qualitative 
direction of policy has been directed at different times and in certain places by particular 
EYEC frames and a variety of evidential bases.  To some extent, this has depended upon 
whether domestic networks of expert actors have sought to link together agendas, as happened 
in England where initial policy experiments led to a ‘scattergun’ approach to policy making 
driven by distinct EYEC frames.  In Canada, where CIAR experts worked in isolation, initial 
policies appeared to be driven primarily by the neuroscientific frame to the exclusion of other 
elements of EYEC and in particular, the care element.   
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As the case chapters indicate, and discussed in detail in chapter six, an international network 
of  EYEC actors operating through international organisations such as the OECD have also 
played an important role in circulating an holistic child-centred EYEC frame.  In both cases 
the OECD has had important implications for the re-framing of policy and extending the 
EYEC debate.  The relative extent of policy influence has differed.  In Canada, the OECD 
played a reframing role where direct influences over the federal Liberal Party created strong 
imperatives for reform (and injecting a child-centred policy lens at the provincial level).  In 
England, it was an intervening role, as influence was more partial and indirect.  Hence in the 
province of Ontario, the articulation of a child-centred frame has significantly broadened 
conceptualisations of EYEC institutions or ‘Best Start Hubs’ as universal, integrated spaces 
which attend to children’s holistic development, care and wellbeing in the here and now and 
not simply future orientated ‘human capital’ investments.  Despite the switch of direction at 
the federal level, the seeds of a fully integrated child-centred system are in place, particularly 
at the municipal level which may provide a strong basis for future development of hubs, albeit 
at a slower pace.  In England, whilst Children’s Centres offered a potential model of similarly 
integrated holistic services, the tempering effect of the social engineering frame which 
rationalises policy attention towards those primarily at risk has conditioned against universal 
implementation252.  Indeed following are more embedded ‘instrumental’ outcomes driven 
agenda, it is only the educative elements of EYEC (nursery education places) which have 
been fully universalised.   
                                               
252
 And in so doing made Children’s Centres potentially more vulnerable to changing political fortunes.  As 
David Cameron has suggested recently, Children’s Centres under a Conservative government would be stripped 
back to their ‘original’ purpose of highly targeted services for the most deprived and ‘dysfunctional’ families 
(Williams, 2010).    
 324 
 
The significant investments and policy innovations over the last decade in both cases should 
not be discounted.  Overall, however, it has proved very difficult to fully embed a systematic 
set of EYEC institutions and services.  The instance and persistence of multiple EYEC frames 
directing policy in (potentially) very different qualitative directions, continues to block the 
full embedding and concrete implementation of an integrated, universal system, where the 
state plays a clear social policy role in the lives of young children.  The countries may still be 
in an ‘innovation’ rather than ‘consolidation’ phase – hence it may be somewhat pre-emptive 
to conclude that EYEC policy in Canada and England is a story of missed opportunities.  But 
both have a long way to go if their respective ‘flagship’ EYEC policies will truly put children 
at the centre of social policy development in the future.   
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